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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides the first in depth study of formal and informal labour markets in Georgia, 
based on the analysis of labour force and household survey data for 1998, 1999. A conceptual 
framework is developed, which distinguishes informal activities from other types of untaxed, 
unregulated and/or unmeasured activities (illegal, underground and household activities).
Despite a massive collapse in output, following the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, 
open unemployment increased relatively little in Georgia. This thesis suggests that this was, in 
part, due to a transfer of labour into informal employment. The results show that by 1999, 52% of 
total (34% of non-agricultural) employment was informal. It argues that the resulting fiscal crisis 
squeezed social security provision and individuals could not afford to be unemployed. It also 
shows that there was little growth in private firms capable of absorbing labour shed from the state 
sector. With limited formal job creation and no adequate social benefits, labour shifted mainly 
into informal employment.
The analysis shows that informal activities provide a social safety net. Informal employment is 
found to increase the risk of poverty with respect to formal employment and to lower it with 
respect to unemployment and inactivity ceteris paribus. Assuming that individuals are utility 
maximizing and that they make rational choices, this thesis concludes that, on average, 
individuals work informally because there is no formal alternative and because they are better off 
than being unemployed or inactive.
However, the informal sector is also found to be contributing to deskilling the labour force, 
further marginalizing certain vulnerable groups, and its concentration amongst ethnic minorities 
and underprivileged regions could contribute to undermining Georgia’s stability. The challenge 
for policy will be how to benefit from the informal sector’s capacity to provide a social safety net, 
while minimizing its potentially detrimental consequences.
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1THE BACKDROP
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1.1 THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
When the socialist system collapsed, it was widely predicted that unemployment would be a key 
adjustment mechanism in the transition to a market economy (see for example Aghion and 
Blanchard 1993; Commander, S and Coricelli 1995).1 The restructuring process was to result in 
the shedding of labour from state enterprises and the creation of a pool of unemployed, which 
would be needed to fill new jobs in private firms. However, despite a massive collapse in output 
in all transition countries, unemployment in the countries of the Former Soviet Union increased 
relatively little.2 Many have argued that the lack of correlation between unemployment and 
restructuring can be explained by substantial labour hoarding in state enterprises (see for example 
Commander, S, et al. 1996; Commander, Simon and Tolstopiatenko 1997; Evans-Klock and 
Samorodov 1998; Layard and Richter 1995).3 This thesis suggests that there is also another 
explanation; the growth of informal labour market activity.
In Georgia, 13 years after the beginning of the transition to a market economy, over 50% of the 
employed population works informally. The majority is self-employed in small-scale activities 
such as petty trade, home-based bread manufacturing, unofficial taxi services or subsistence 
farming. Others are contributing family workers in household enterprises and on household farms 
and unregistered, low-skilled wage employees in the tea industry, on construction sites, in hotels, 
restaurants and domestic services. What the transition models failed to predict was the 
unprecedented collapse in output that followed the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union and 
the scale of the fiscal crisis that resulted in the virtual collapse of social security provision. 
Moreover, the break-up of inter-republican and CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) 
trade links, coupled with mass privatisation and high inflation (resulting from the instantaneous 
and indiscriminate liberalisation of prices) impeded growth from resuming quickly. In the absence 
of formal jobs and social benefits, individuals engage in informal income-generating activities to 
survive. In this sense, the informal sector is providing a social safety net. However, does the 
informal sector also undermine government revenue and further exacerbate the government’s 
inability to provide social security and intervene in the economy?
1 In this thesis, the ‘socialist’ system is used to describe the system that existed in the USSR and Central and Eastern 
Europe prior to the transition to a market economy, as per Komai (1992, p.10). Komai argues that this is the term the 
system used to describe itself, since under Marxism-Leninism ‘communist’ referred to the unattained utopian society of 
the future, in which all would share in social production according to their needs, while in the meantime, there would be 
‘socialism’.
2 The term ‘transition countries’ is used to refer to the countries o f Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU).
3 Instead o f shedding labour to adjust for a decrease in demand, enterprises reduce real wages, accumulate wage arrears, 
place workers on unpaid leave or reduce working hours.
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Before tackling these questions, we first of all ask what exactly is the informal sector? Although 
an extensive body of literature exists on the definition of the informal sector in the international 
development context, it has largely been disregarded by researchers working on transition 
economies. Authors in this region have used the term the ‘informal’ (‘underground’, ‘unofficial’, 
‘shadow’, etc.) economy to describe a wide spectrum of activities such as tax evasion, corruption, 
money laundering, organised crime, bribery, subsistence farming, barter, petty trade, and the 
stealing of state property. For policy purposes, it is important to distinguish small-scale income 
and employment-generating activities, from tax evasion, corruption and crime.
This thesis develops a conceptual framework that distinguishes between four types of ‘hidden’ 
economic activities4: (1) 'informal' activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’ and are 
within the System of National Accounts (SNA) production boundary5; (2) ‘underground’ 
activities, which are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid either the payment of 
taxes or compliance with certain regulations; (3) illegal activities, which generate goods and 
services forbidden by the law or which are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised producers; 
and (4) household activities, which produce goods and services for own-consumption and are 
outside the SNA production boundary.
Unlike the traditional International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of informal 
employment, which comprises all individuals employed in informal ‘enterprises’6, this approach 
includes all informal labour market ‘activity’7, regardless of whether it takes place in informal or 
formal enterprises. It consists of the following types of employment: (1) self-employed in 
household enterprises8; (2) self-employed on urban or unregistered plots of land; (3) unpaid 
contributing family workers; (4) wage employees working on the basis of oral agreements; (5) 
secondary job holders with formal primary jobs and informal secondary jobs in categories 1-4 
above.
Turning to the question of whether the informal sector provides a social safety net, we can build 
on utility theory and on the theory of rational choice and examine the relationship between labour
4 We define hidden economic activities as productive activities that are (a) unmeasured in GDP, and/or (b) untaxed 
and/or (c) unregulated.
5 The SNA (1993) production boundary defines those productive economic activities that should be included in GDP 
estimates.
6 According to the ILO (1993b) ‘Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector’, the informal 
sector is comprised o f household enterprises engaging in the production o f goods or services with the primary objective 
o f generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned. Amongst others, they can be characterised as 
operating at a low level o f organisation, with little or no division between labour and capital and on a small scale.
7 Activity is used in the sense o f productive economic activities as defined in ILO (1989) and in SNA (1993).
8 Household enterprises are defined in (ILO 1993b, para.5) Location is used as a proxy for household enterprise; 
enterprises located at home, outside home, in a street booth, market place, construction site, at a customer’s home or a 
non-fixed location.
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market status and poverty to show that it does. In Georgia, informal employment is associated 
with higher poverty risks than formal employment, ceteris paribus. Thus for any category of 
employment, individuals who are informally employed are more likely to be poor than are those 
who are formally employed, everything else being equal. At the same time, informal employment 
significantly decreases the risk of poverty with respect to unemployment and inactivity, ceteris 
paribus. Assuming that individuals are utility maximizing and that they make rational choices, 
then we can deduce that, on average, individuals work informally because there is no formal 
alternative and because it is better than being unemployed or inactive and therefore conclude that 
the informal sector is providing a social safety net.
Indeed opportunities for formal employment are extremely limited in Georgia. The formal labour 
market is essentially limited to wage employment in state administration, health and education 
and to self-employment in agriculture. The private sector is still in an incubatory stage and offers 
very limited opportunities for formal employment. By the end of 1999, only 29% of all wage 
employees worked in the private sector and the large majority worked informally, without a 
written agreement. Moreover, the small private firms that were to absorb part of the labour shed 
from restructured state enterprises and be the driving force behind economic growth failed to 
materialise; only 1% of Georgia’s employed in 1999 were entrepreneurs hiring at least one wage- 
employee. At the same time, unemployment is not an option as benefits, if paid at all, are worth 
approximately 11% of the minimum subsistence level. Therefore, in the absence of formal 
employment opportunities and formal social protection, the informal sector is providing a social 
safety net.
Does the informal sector undermine government revenue? Given the definition of informal sector 
adopted in this thesis, little support is found for this claim. The types of activities involved 
suggest that attempting to tax the informal sector may generate very little revenue and may indeed 
suppress these activities altogether. This does not of course deny that underground and illegal 
activities are widespread in Georgia and that there is enormous scope for increasing tax revenue 
by addressing these issues. However, attempting to tax subsistence farmers, petty traders and 
informal wage labour may raise very little revenue and could seriously undermine livelihoods in 
the absence of an alternative form of social security. Moreover, the findings show that most 
informal enterprises are better characterised as survival activities than as ‘potential capitalist 
enterprises’, although further research is required to examine which (if any) informal activities 
could potentially grow into formal enterprises.
Finally, the risk is that in the long run a dual labour market is created with a high-skilled, 
protected formal sector and a low-skilled, vulnerable informal sector. There is evidence that this is
15
already happening as informal employment is found to be strongly associated with certain 
vulnerable groups. Females, youth, ethnic minorities and people living in certain depressed 
regions are all more likely to be informally employed, ceteris paribus. This concentration 
suggests that the informal sector is not a transitional phenomenon, which temporarily absorbs the 
unemployed and provides a source of income while new formal jobs are being created. On the 
contrary, it indicates that the informal sector may become more entrenched as certain vulnerable 
groups are excluded from the formal labour market altogether and will only have one alternative 
to unemployment; informal employment. If Georgia and other transition countries are to avoid the 
establishment of a ‘developing country’-style dual labour market, it is critical that while the 
informal sector should be supported in the short-run, emphasis should be placed on 
‘formalisation’ through the creation of formal employment opportunities and a formal social 
security system that can address the needs of the most vulnerable groups in society.
Main Questions, Hypotheses and Road Map for the Thesis
Having outlined the core argument of the thesis, the main questions and hypotheses can now be 
summarised as follows:
1. Did the collapse in output, which accompanied the transition to a market economy in 
Georgia, result in a proportional increase in open unemployment? (Chapter 4)
2. If not, why not? (Chapter 5)
Hypothesis 1: Unemployment did not match the collapse in output, in part, because labour 
shifted directly into informal employment.
3. If informal employment increased, what caused this increase? (Chapter 6)
Hypothesis 2: The unexpected scale of the collapse in output led to a fiscal crisis that crippled 
social security provision and meant that individuals could not afford to be unemployed. 
Individuals work informally because there are no formal employment opportunities and 
because social benefits are inadequate.
4. What are the implications for the country’s social and economic development? (Chapters 
4, 5 and 6)
5. What are the implications for policy and what should be done about it? (Chapter 7)
However, before tacking these questions, the following questions must be addressed:
6. What is the informal sector? How has it been defined in the existing literature? (Chapter 
2)
7. Why is a new conceptual framework needed and how can we measure informal labour 
market activity? (Chapter 3).
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The thesis is organised as follows:
The rest of this chapter sets the stage for the thesis. Section 1.2 provides a background to the 
labour market in transition countries. It examines employment and social security during the 
Soviet period and describes the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the reforms in the first years of 
transition and the outcomes in terms of social security and living standards. Section 1.3 provides a 
brief background to Georgia, its history and geo-political significance.
The next two chapters provide the theoretical core of the thesis. Chapter 2, reviews the existing 
informal sector literature in developing, western industrialised, centrally planned and transition 
countries and shows that a new definition of the informal sector in transition countries is needed. 
This definition is developed in Chapter 3, which presents a new conceptual and operational 
framework for the study of the informal labour market activity. The framework clarifies the 
distinction between informal labour market activities, which are undertaken to meet basic needs, 
and other types of unmeasured, untaxed and/or unregulated activities, namely underground, 
illegal, and household activities.
The next three chapters provide empirical evidence for the hypotheses, based on the analysis of 
household and labour force survey data. Chapter 4 analyses the characteristics of the Georgian 
labour market and examines whether the collapse in output was matched by an increase in open 
unemployment. It assesses to what extent privatisation and restructuring resulted in the growth of 
private firms capable of absorbing the labour that was shed from the state sector. This chapter also 
analyses the determinants of poor labour market outcomes , or in other words, unemployment, 
underemployment and long-term unemployment.
Chapter 5 addresses the first hypothesis; namely that open unemployment did not increase, in 
part, because labour shifted from the state sector to the informal sector. To this end, it estimates 
the size of the informal labour market in Georgia as well as the characteristics and determinants of 
informal vs. formal employment. The second hypothesis, namely that individuals work informally 
because there is no formal alternative and because social benefits are inadequate, is addressed in 
Chapter 6. Answering this question provides insight into whether informal labour market activity 
provides a social safety net. Finally, chapter 7 summarises the main findings and highlights the 
implications for policy formulation. It discusses whether the informal sector should be 
encouraged or repressed and highlights the contributions of the thesis to the on-going debate 
about the nature and causes of the informal sector. It ends with a delineation of the contents of a 
possible future research agenda.
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All methodological questions are dealt with in Appendix 2. This includes a description and 
discussion of the quality of the data, sample design and characteristics, definitions of variables 
used in the thesis, methodology for measuring and analysing poverty (including the definition of 
poverty and well-being, the choice of an indicator, equivalence scales and economies of scale 
indexes and the definition of a poverty line). It also discusses the multivariate analysis techniques 
exploited in the thesis. The rest of the appendices include annexes relating to chapters 3 to 6 
(appendices 3 to 6 respectively) as well as a list of abbreviations and acronyms used in the thesis 
and currency equivalents (appendix 1).
1.2 THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS AFTERMATH
This section provides a background to Georgia’s labour market and social security. Section 1.2.1 
discusses the characteristics and main issues as regards employment and social security in the 
Soviet Union as a whole, and takes a brief look at Georgia’s extensive second economy. Section
1.2.2 examines the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the reforms in the first years of transition 
and the outcomes in terms of social security and living standards in Georgia.
1.2.1 Employment and Social Welfare in the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union had centrally planned labour market and an extensive, well-established system 
of social welfare. The demand for labour was determined through the planned demand for output, 
and since the main concern of the socialist system was to maximize the growth of production, the 
result was that, relative to market economies, the distribution of labour was heavily biased in 
favour of industry, and to some extent agriculture, at the expense of (non-productive) services, 
(see Estrin 1994, 58-59; McAuley 1997, p.223)
Nevertheless, despite the fact that it was centrally planned, the Soviet labour market was 
characterised by a considerable degree of labour mobility. In practice, although there were some 
restrictions through housing and administrative constraints, workers were reasonably free to 
change jobs and employers were reasonably free to compete for their labour.9 Jackman (1994, p. 
123) suggests that from the 1970s onwards, the Soviet labour market functioned more like that of 
a market economy than a centrally planned one. Workers were by and large allowed to choose 
their jobs, skills or professions as well as the region where they worked, and they were free to 
resign.
9 The image o f an inflexible labour market comes from the Stalinist period (1930s), when workers were forbidden to 
quit their jobs. As discussed below, this was part of an industrialisation strategy based on the massive mobilisation of 
labour from rural areas.
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Wage policy was fixed by the central government. A system of wage differentials existed such 
that jobs were graded according to output levels, hour’s worked, bonuses and regional coefficients 
set to encourage migration to unattractive areas or to offset labour flows to richer areas (Estrin 
1994, p.60-61; Jackman and Rutkowski 1994, p. 127). Thus, in contrast to western economies, 
wages did not necessarily reflect human capital and productivity. Because of the Soviet emphasis 
on industrial production, wages in construction and manufacturing were particularly high, 
whereas they were below average in agriculture and even lower in the services sector. As a 
consequence, enterprises competed for labour with benefits such as welfare facilities, subsidized 
kindergartens, housing, the right to buy a car or consumer durables, rather than with wages 
(Yemtsov 2001, p.8).
In general, the Soviet system was characterised by substantial labour surplus at the micro level, 
and perennial shortages at the macro level (see Clarke 1999a, p.4; McAuley 1997, p.225). 
Scarcity of labour at the macro level was one of the main concerns of policy makers throughout 
the Soviet period. From the early 1930s to the 1950s, one of the Government’s key priorities was 
to transfer large numbers of the rural population to manufacturing centres and extractive industry, 
as part of the national plan for industrial development. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s it became 
necessary to draw on the non-working urban population (primarily women with children and 
pensioners) to meet production targets (Jackman and Rutkowski 1994). The high rates of growth 
achieved from the 1930s to the 1950s were based on an extensive-type of growth, whereby 
essentially free rural labour inputs were used in the industrialisation process. However, by the 
1960s, returns to rapid capital and labour accumulation in industry started to diminish and the 
system was unable to shift into an intensive-type of growth, by increasing output per unit of input 
through technical progress. The result was that by the late 1980s, growth rates in the USSR had 
fallen to around 0% (see Estrin 1994, p.69).
At the same time as there was a shortage of labour at the macro level; a surplus of labour at the 
firm level was very common. This was a result of the fact that investment strategies, which were 
often inadequate, led to frequent fluctuations in demand and that enterprises, which had no 
incentive to use labour efficiently, would simply hoard substantial reserves of labour to meet 
these fluctuations (Clarke 1999a, p.4). One of the consequences was low labour productivity (see 
Estrin 1994; Jackman and Rutkowski 1994; McAuley 1997). Some studies suggest that by the 
mid-1980s, labour productivity was one third of that of the middle-income countries of the OECD 
(see Jackman and Rutkowski 1994, p. 127). Nevertheless, productivity was not a major concern, as 
the ultimate goal of enterprises was not that of profit maximization. Soviet enterprises were first
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expected to meet production targets, and second to provide a wide range of social benefits. In fact, 
Soviet enterprises played an important role in the provision of social security.
The Soviet Social Welfare System
One of the central tenets of the socialist system was the right to state-provided social welfare from 
‘cradle to grave’ (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992c, p.215). Social security was guaranteed 
through the provision of a wide range of benefits through enterprises and supported by a 
comprehensive social welfare system, consisting of cash benefits and the provision of free public 
services. Enterprises provided a wide range of social benefits such as housing, garden plots, child­
care, subsidized meals, vouchers for the purchase of durable goods, access to holiday resorts, 
transportation, and medical services to all employees and their family members, whether working 
or not (see Estrin 1994, p.60-61).
At the same time, Government policies ensured full employment and low controlled prices for 
basic goods and services as well as an extensive system of social welfare (see Falkingham, Jane, 
et al. 1997, p. 15). McAuley (1979a) provides a detailed account of Soviet social welfare state, or 
in Soviet terminology; ‘social consumption expenditures’. These consisted of cash transfers as 
well as free and subsidized services. The system of cash transfers comprised an extensive system 
of pensions, including: old-age pensions, invalidity pensions, survivor pensions, long-service 
pensions and personal pensions (for those who performed some special service to the state or the 
cause of revolution). It also included other types of social insurance transfers including sick 
benefits, maternity allowances and maternity grants (for low-income parents), burial grants, child 
allowances, family income supplement (an additional child allowance for low-income 
households), stipends for students in full-time higher education and secondary specialist training, 
and holiday pay (which technically was not part of the social insurance system but considered part 
o f the social welfare system).
In addition, the social welfare system provided free health care, free education and subsidized 
housing (for details on the Soviet welfare state see McAuley 1979a, p.260-292). As argued by 
Falkingham (1997, p. 15), the guarantee of full-employment, coupled with the provision of social 
security through the workplace, the system of cash benefits and extensive Government subsidies, 
were supposed to counteract the requirement for a targeted poverty alleviation programme and 
income-tested social assistance.
One result was that ‘everyone enjoyed a feeling of stability and certainty’ (Jackman and 
Rutkowski 1994, p. 123). Indeed, Estrin (1994, p.57) suggests that the socialist system came to
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regard absolute job security and the right to a job as virtually defining characteristics of socialism. 
Labour market policy was based on the ideal of a job for life and the work place was almost a 
‘second home’. ‘For a Soviet worker, the main goal was finding a suitable job for the duration of 
his or her working life’ (Clarke 1999a, p.2). There was essentially no unemployment, in the sense 
of workers willing to work at the going wage rate but unable to find jobs, and where it existed 
unemployment was of short duration (McAuley 1991, p.95).10
Another result was that, relative to western industrialised countries, there was relatively low 
inequality and, officially, no poverty (although, given the sensitivity of these issues, figures were 
not entirely reliable). Flemming and Micklewright suggest that in the 1980s, the socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Soviet Union were more equal than the 
average OECD country at the time, and probably similar to the Scandinavian or Benelux countries 
(Flemming and Micklewright 2000, p.909). The low level of inequality in the socialist system can 
be explained by the fact that households received little income from wealth (as all productive 
capital was owned by the state) and that there was little differentiation in earnings since wages 
were determined by a relatively egalitarian wage structure (McAuley 1991, p.97-98). 
Nevertheless, McAuley suggests that there are reasons to believe that inequality was higher than 
official statistics would suggest thanks to the significant second economy and the extensive 
privileges (cars, access to western consumer durables, sanatoria, etc.) available to the ruling 
‘nomeklatura’ ( see also Flemming and Micklewright 2000; McAuley 1991, p.98).
As regards poverty, there is evidence that a certain amount of poverty did exist. The USSR 
Yearbook ’90, for example, reported that ‘nearly 40 million people live below the poverty line’ 
(quoted by Atkinson and Micklewright 1992b, p. 178). This represented about 14% of the 
population of the USSR (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992c, p.237). Indeed as argued by 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992b), poverty rates were probably similar to those of the EU at the 
time, although comparing is very difficult, as the choice of poverty line varies from country to 
country and reflects the historical, cultural and economic context as well as the dominant social 
values at a given time, and therefore differences in poverty rates can be as much a reflection of 
methodological choices as they are of real differences in well-being (Atkinson and Micklewright 
1992b, p.180-181).
A third consequence o f the socialist system was a high rate of labour force participation, much 
higher than in western industrialised countries. As previously discussed, this was partly motivated
10 Jackman argues that some unemployment did exist and that, since the Government denied its existence, the 
unemployed received no assistance (see Atkinson and Micklewright 1992c, p.219; Jackman and Rutkowski 1994, 
p.133-134).
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by the pervasive shortage of labour and the necessity to draw on the non-working urban 
population to meet production targets. One result was that older workers received pensions and 
were, at the same time, able to continue working. Another was that women had particularly high 
participation rates relative to their Western European counterparts. This was made possible by a 
well-developed system of child-care and generous maternity leave. As illustrated in the table 
below, by 1985, the USSR had a labour force participation rate for 40-45 year-old women of 97% 
compared to a rate of 37% in Southern Europe and 71% in Northern Europe. Higher participation 
rates were associated with greater gender equality as female participation rates in education were 
very high and their career prospects were better than in many market economies today. Jackman 
(1994, p. 125) suggests that by enhancing their financial independence, labour force participation 
helped to raise the social and political status of women. However, at the same time, women 
continued to bear most of the household and child-rearing responsibilities and therefore had 
essentially a double burden.
Table 1.1 Rates o f  Participation in the Labour Force for 40-45 year-oldfemales (1950-1985)
Region and Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985
U.S.S.R. 67% 78% 93% 97% 97%
Central and Eastern Europe* 61% 70% 79% 86% 87%
Northern Europe 31% 40% 54% 70% 71%
Western Europe 35% 40% 46% 55% 56%
Southern Europe 22% 25% 30% 36% 37%
Source: (Kortiai 1992, p.207)
Notes:
(a) * Average o f participation rates of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania.
(b) Northern Europe includes: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Western Europe includes: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Federal Republic o f Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and United Kingdom. Southern 
Europe includes: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain
The second economy
A significant consequence of the heavily taxed formal labour market was the development of an 
extensive secondary labour market, which was liberal and largely inconsistent with Soviet 
ideology. Individuals engaged in the so-called ‘second economy’ to supplement their official 
wages, which were stable but low. Some of these activities were legal, while others were illegal 
(see chapter 2 for a detailed description of the Soviet second economy). Legal second economy 
activities included small-plot agricultural production and the private practice of certain 
professionals such as physicians, dentists, teachers, and tutors (Grossman 1982, 256). Illegal 
second economy activities included stealing from the state, speculation, illicit production and 
underground enterprises.
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Both legal and illegal second economy activities were widespread in Georgia. Indeed, Georgia 
had what was perhaps the most extensive, visible and tolerated ‘second’ economy in the Soviet 
Union.11
‘Georgia’s has a reputation second to none in this respect...In form this activity 
may not differ greatly from what takes place in other regions, but in Georgia it 
seems to have been carried out in an unparalleled scale with unrivalled scope and 
daring’ (Grossman 1977,35).
Similarly, Mars and Altman suggest:
‘Soviet Georgia demonstrates an extraordinary economic ebullience ... linked to a 
parallel effervescence in Georgia's second economy, which Soviet watchers have 
... continually affirmed as being particularly dominant compared to those of other 
Soviet Republics’ (Mars, G and Altman 1987, 197).
Thus, before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union was characterised by a level of employment 
and social security that was high relative to most market economies. Poverty and inequality were 
low by western standards, as were wages and the general standard of living. While the formal 
workplace provided an important source of security and access to a variety of benefits, the second 
economy, which was officially denied but actively tolerated, enabled households to make a living. 
In this context, it is not difficult to see that the socialist system was poorly equipped to deal with 
the impact of the transition to a market economy.
Barr (2001, p.242) highlights three important implications of the Soviet system for the 
government’s ability to deal with the social impact of transition. First, as there was officially no 
unemployment, there existed no system of unemployment benefits. Second, as there was officially 
no poverty, there existed little poverty relief. Third, as there was little (income) inequality, there 
exited no sophisticated targeting system. As a result of these factors and of the fact that most 
benefits were delivered by enterprises, the government’s administrative capacity was very weak. 
Fretwell and Jackman (1994) provide details of the specific obstacles within the labour market: 
there were very limited if any active labour market policies; labour services were poorly funded 
and staffed; existing labour offices provided minimal local matching of workers with vacancies; 
there were no policies or technical expertise to deal with large-scale layoffs, because they did not 
occur; and finally, attitudes toward unemployment and job seeking were unhelpful as workers
11 Agriculture accounted for the greater part of Georgia’s second economy. Because o f its southerly location, Georgia 
had a monopoly on citrus fruit production in the USSR and had considerable advantage in growing out o f season fruit 
and flowers. Instead of being distributed by the State throughout the USSR, products were sold directly by producers in 
'open markets' (particularly in the northern regions o f the Soviet Union) for a much higher price. Some estimates have 
put Georgia’s share o f private agricultural revenue, in the early 1970s, at 40% o f its total agricultural revenue 
(Gougouchvili and Zurabishvili 1983,113).
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were not accustomed to unemployment or to finding employment and expected the State to 
provide them with a job (Fretwell and Jackman 1994, p. 165).
1.2.2 Transition: Policies and Outcomes
Why did the Soviet Union collapse? This question has been extensively discussed elsewhere (see 
for example Lavigne 1995) and goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say here that by 
1989 a combination of political and economic factors had led to the unexpected and very rapid 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. As previously discussed, the possibilities for extensive-type 
growth, based on rapid capital and labour accumulation, had been exhausted and the system 
proved unable to switch to a more intensive-type growth, based on technical progress. As a result, 
growth was declining, productivity of labour and capital were low, and technical progress was 
implemented slowly. In addition, the military build-up was absorbing a large part of GNP, the 
agricultural sector was backward and could not provide food self-sufficiency, and the standards of 
living and consumption were mediocre (Lavigne 1995, p.92). At the same time, perestroika 
(restructuring), launched in 1985-87 and glasnost (openness), introduced in 1990, led to the 
introduction of political pluralism and to the end of the party’s monopoly of power. Lavigne 
argues that the socialist system rested upon the monopoly of the party and that it was the breach in 
this monopoly that triggered the collapse (Lavigne 1995, p.94).
Major developments during the early years o f transition
Between 1989 and 1991, the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union declared their independence 
one after the other. Georgia did so in April 1991.12 This was followed by the dissolution of all ties 
that had kept the socialist system together. In particular, the Comecon and Warsaw pact were 
dissolved almost simultaneously in mid-1991.13 The dismantlement of Comecon, and all that 
operated within the organisation, was not inconsequential. In particular, the drastic dismantlement 
of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) institutions and the vacuum that it 
created was to prove to be perhaps the single most important explanatory factor for the general 
collapse in output in the region. Moreover, not only were trade links between the members of the 
Comecon dismantled, but also trade between the republics of the former Soviet Union, which 
operated within the CMEA, was abruptly halted.
12 Soon after the declarations o f independence, the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) was formed on 21 
December 1991 between all former Republics except the Baltic States and Georgia. The Baltic States never joined, 
while Georgia finally joined in October 1993. The USSR was officially dissolved nine days later, on 30 December 
1991.
13 The Comecon was an economic organization, which existed froml949 to 1991, linking the USSR with the countries 
of CEE, Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam (Yugoslavia as an associated member and Albania belonged to it only between 
1949 and 1961). The Warsaw pact was a military and political organisation created in 1955, whose aim was to ensure 
collective security for its members.
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Under the Centrally planned system, most enterprises producing intermediate and capital goods 
had a single buyer for their output and a single source of supply. Moreover, given the emphasis on 
very large enterprises, many towns were essentially company towns, being heavily dependent on 
a single enterprise for employment and many republics, such as Georgia, relied heavily on a 
handful of gigantic enterprises. With the dismantlement o f inter-republican trade, enterprises 
suddenly lost their markets for both inputs and outputs and were unable to instantaneously find 
new trading partners, in part because marketing channels did not exist, in part because they were 
producing intermediary goods that were of no use to western markets and in part because the 
quality of the goods did not meet world standards. The consequences in terms of output and 
employment were dramatic. However, before turning to the outcomes, we must briefly discuss the 
other major policy decisions that were taken in those first years of independence and that were to 
determine the path that the newly independent states would follow in their transition to a market 
economy.
In the beginning of the 1990s there were two main schools of thought on how countries should 
undertake the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. The first has been referred 
to in the literature as ‘shock-therapy’, ‘the big bang’, ‘simultaneous reforms’ or the ‘Washington 
consensus’. The second has been called the ‘evolutionary-institutionalist perspective’, the 
‘gradualist approach’, or ‘sequential reform’. The principal source of disagreement between the 
two approaches was on the speed and sequencing of reforms. We will refer to the first approach as 
‘shock-therapy’, as labelled by Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University, who introduced it to the 
wider public through his article in the Economist magazine on 13 January 1990 entitled ‘what is 
to be done?’. Shock-therapy is based on the idea that countries should move from central planning 
to a market economy as quickly as possible by introducing market reforms simultaneously. It is 
based on three main pillars: privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation. The second school of 
thought, which we will refer to as the ‘evolutionary-institutionalist perspective’, as per Roland 
(2000b), is based on a more gradual approach to reform, emphasising the need to use existing 
institutions to prevent economic disruption and social unrest while developing new institutions.
While ‘shock therapy has been dominant in shaping policy recommendations from the IFIs 
(International Financial Institutions), and has consequently largely been adopted by most newly 
independent states, the academic community has increasingly supported the evolutionary- 
institutional perspective (Roland 2000b, p.343). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss the merits and drawbacks of the two approaches, there is one significant point that I would 
wish to highlight here. As argued by Roland (2000b, p. 13, p.336-337), the shock-therapy 
approach ignored ‘aggregate uncertainty’ and failed to take existing political constraints into 
account and factor them into policy recommendations. However, political constraints cannot be
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ignored, just as budget constraints or incentive constraints cannot be ignored. The political 
constraints that existed at the time transition began (i.e. pervasive corruption and the high 
concentration of economic and political power in a few hands) were of crucial importance and 
were endogenous to the transition process, and not exogenous to it. The failure to take into 
account these political constraints led to unexpected outcomes including the significant fall in 
output, asset stripping following mass privatisation in Russia, an explosion of the hidden 
economy, and resistance of large Russian enterprises to tax collection. Roland argues that it is 
unacceptable to lament incompleteness of reforms without taking into account existing political 
constraints; ‘economists have too often blamed the (ugly) politics for messing up (elegant) 
economics’ (Roland 2000a, p. 13).
Nevertheless, Georgia, Russia and most other former Soviet republics, adopted some form of 
‘shock-therapy’, liberalising, stabilizing and privatising at the same time.14 In Russia, all three 
were essentially launched in 1992, whereas in Georgia liberalisation took place in 1992, while 
privatisation was stalled until 1995 due to the civil war and territorial conflicts (see section 1.3.4). 
In Georgia privatisation was carried out through a large-scale give-away scheme (so-called ‘mass 
privatisation’)15. In 1995-1996, 1,295 (or 80% of all) small and medium enterprises were 
transferred to majority private ownership through voucher privatisation (the distribution of 
investment coupons at a symbolic price). At the same time, the privatisation of large-scale 
enterprises, which started in the same year, was to be carried out through strategic sales but 
continued to progress very slowly due to lack of financial viability and difficulties in attracting 
investors (EBRD 2000, p. 166).
As everywhere in the former Soviet Union, the results can now be said to have been catastrophic. 
The disruption of CMEA (and particularly inter-republican) trade links, coupled with mass 
privatisation, led to an unprecedented collapse in output, while sudden and across the board price 
liberalisation resulted in an explosion of prices that further exacerbated the collapse of output16.
14 Note that not all transition countries followed the shock-therapy approach. Most notably China and Vietnam as well 
as some countries in Central and Eastern Europe such as Slovenia and Hungary, followed a gradualist strategy. As a 
general rule these countries introduced policies to encourage entiy o f the small private sector early on, and have 
followed with gradual privatisation and restructuring later on. Liberalisation has also been carried out gradually, as in 
China where dual pricing was successfully introduced in 1984; prices were liberalised at the margin in all sectors 
thereby maintaining planned prices for planned output and avoiding unmanageable inflationary pressures (see table 1.3, 
p. 15 in Roland 2000a). Another country that did not follow the shock therapy approach was Uzbekistan, where gradual 
reform succeeded in avoiding a dramatic decline in output.
15 There were four main types of privatisation mechanisms in the FSU and CEE: sale to foreign investors, sale to 
domestic capitalists, give-away schemes, and spontaneous privatisation (Lavigne 1995, p. 160).
16 Griffin (1995, p.5) argues that the unparalleled inflation was mainly a result o f the instantaneous and indiscriminate 
liberalisation o f prices and was further fuelled by the legacy of price controls and rationing, which led to a sort of 
‘forced savings’ and accumulation o f liquid funds in bank accounts. These cash balances or ‘monetary overhang’ 
represented pent-up demand that was released by rapid price liberalisation. Moreover, he suggests that because 
industrial and trading enterprises were not subject to market disciplines and were virtual monopolies, they reacted to
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Relative prices fluctuated erratically and long-term investment decisions became impossible. As a 
result investment collapsed, further depressing output and incomes. The decline in gross 
investment in Georgia was so great that it was impossible to maintain the initial stock o f capital 
intact. By 1995, gross domestic investment as a percent o f GDP was just 3% 17 (World Bank 1997, 
p. 174-176). Georgia’s output had fallen by approximately 70%, while industrial capacity 
utilisation dropped to about 20% o f pre-1989 levels. Agricultural production collapsed as state 
and collective farms were broken up into low-productivity small ‘subsistence’ plots and tourism 
revenues collapsed. At the same time, significant external debt and payment arrears accumulated, 
while the budget deficit expanded. By the end o f 1993, annual inflation had reached 8,400% 
(W orld Bank 2004, p .l).
Georgia experienced one o f the sharpest declines in output in the region. 18 The decline was, 
generally speaking, smallest in the countries o f Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and greatest in 
the Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS). Figure 1.1 shows that between 1989 and 1998, 
output declined by more than 60% in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and by nearly that amount in 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.
Figure 1.1: Real GDP CEE and CIS countries 1998, (percentage change, 1989=100)
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Source: UNICEF Transmonee database (UNICEF 2004).
The impact on living standards
Throughout the region and particularly in the CIS, the results in terms o f social security and living 
standards were disastrous. The collapse in output led both to a contraction o f employment and real
price liberalisation by increasing prices and exploiting their dominant position in the market, further exacerbating 
inflationary tendencies. Finally inflation was also fuelled by public deficits that were monetized by central banks.
17 as a point o f reference, the average level o f  investment in the CIS in 1990 was approximately 32% o f GDP (World 
Bank 1997, table 4.12 p.174-176).
18 There are, o f course, problems in measuring output, as statistical information is frequently inaccurate (not least 
because o f the informal economy) and pre and post transition figures are difficult to compare. However, there is no 
doubt that output fell massively all over the FSU.
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wages as well as to a decline in tax revenues. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, enterprises 
adjusted to the fall in output by cutting real wages, delaying the payment of wages, cutting 
benefits, placing workers on unpaid leave and releasing labour. Workers were thus deprived of 
their main source of income and social benefits. At the same time, the dramatic decline in output 
and inflation led to a fiscal crisis and the government was unable to compensate for the fall in real 
incomes with the provision of social security. 19 As a result many workers turned to informal 
labour market activities to survive. In Georgia, the scale of the fiscal crisis was so severe that by 
1999, tax revenue still amounted to only 14% of GDP, amongst the lowest levels of tax revenue in 
the world (EBRD 1999, p.168).20 With external debt servicing absorbing more than 60% of 
government revenue, total spending on unemployment benefits, pensions, family allowance, 
assistance to IDPs (Internally Displaced Peoples)21, health, education and food security amounted 
to a meagre 8% of GDP in 1999 (World Bank 2004, p.l l).22
However Georgia was not unique in this respect. The decline in output which characterized the 
first decade of the transition period was accompanied by a decline in real government expenditure 
in most countries of CEE and the CIS. Figure 1.2 shows that between 1989 and 1998, overall 
government expenditure declined by roughly 40% in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Albania 
and by more than 60% in Tajikistan.
Although the case of Georgia may be one of the more extreme ones in terms of the sheer scale of 
the collapse of GDP and government expenditure and hence the development of informal labour 
markets, there is evidence that informal labour market activity is widespread, particularly in the 
poorer countries of the CIS. For example Bemabe, Krstic’ and Reilly (2003, p.24) find that in the 
CIS-7 (the seven poorest countries of the CIS)23, in the late 1990s, informal employment ranged 
from approximately 30% of total employment in Moldova to 59% in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Similarly, Schneider (2002, figure 2.3) estimates that at the end of the 1990s, the share of the 
working age population engaging in informal employment in these countries ranged from 33% in 
Uzbekistan to 53% in Georgia. Thus, this detailed analysis of the determinants and characteristics 
of informal labour markets in Georgia may very well provide some insight into the nature of 
informal labour markets in other poor CIS countries.
19 In addition to the collapse in output, the fiscal crisis was also caused by large-scale tax evasion and weak institutional 
capacity to collect taxes.
20 Note that other countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia also had extremely low levels o f tax collection, especially 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which reached lows of 16% and 13% o f GDP respectively in 1996 and 1997 (see 
Falkingham 1999b, p.6).
21 There are approximately 286,000 IDPs spread over the territory of Georgia, as a result o f the war in Abkhazia; see 
section 1.3.4 below (IMF 2001, p.51).
22 Klugman, Micklewright and Redmond (2002, p. 17-19) show that debt-servicing levels in Georgia are almost three 
times the level o f HIPIC countries (the group of mostly African and Central American countries that are considered 
‘Highly Indebted Poor Countries’ by the IFIs).
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Figure 1.2 General Government Expenditure CIS and CEE (percentage change, 1989=100)
Source: UNICEF Transmonee database (UNICEF 2004).
In Georgia, as a result o f the fiscal crisis, the social security system was reduced to unemployment 
benefits, pensions, state social allowance and assistance to IDPs. However, despite its limited 
scope, the system remains weak. Incentives to register as unemployed with a state employment 
office are low because o f the extremely low level o f unemployment benefits (US$7 per month), 
frequent payment delays, time-consuming registration procedures and a widely held perception 
that registration is o f no help in finding a job. In 1998, there were 98,000 registered unemployed, 
whereas the number o f individuals without work was estimated at about 300,000 (IMF 2001, 
p.51). Similarly the level o f pensions is extremely low; a flat rate o f GEL 14 (US$7) per month, 
while the official minimum consumption basket (for a family o f four) is o f GEL 104 (US$52) 
(IMF 2001, p.l 1). Moreover pensions also suffer from serious arrears; by 1999, the Government 
had accumulated total pension arrears o f GEL 76 million (TACIS 1999b, p.72).24 The state social 
allowance, which was introduced in 1998 and replaced the ‘family allowance’ is in fact only for a 
very small vulnerable group; non-working pensioners who live alone and have no legal 
breadwinner (TACIS 1999a, p.71). Finally, the IDP assistance programme comprises various cash 
and in-kind benefits that are not income tested, which makes the programme poorly targeted and 
means that IDPs often face a lower risk o f  poverty than non-IDPs (IMF 2001, p.52).25
In terms o f  social spending in health and education, the results were also disastrous. Between 
1990 and 1995, state expenditures in health and education decreased by 90-95% with respect to 
their pre-1989 levels (see Government o f  Georgia 2000, p.6; Micklewright 2000, p. 19). In 1999, 
expenditures in health care represented 0.9% o f GDP, or US$7 per capita (according to the WHO,
23 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
24 The pension arrears are despite the introduction o f a token flat rate pension, the increasing o f the retirement age from 
55 to 60 for females and from 60 to 65 for males and the elimination o f early retirement (IMF 2000, p.88).
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a minimum of US$60 per capita is needed for a health care system to function properly) 
(Government of Georgia 2000, p.6). Similarly education expenditures in 1999 amounted to 2.2% 
of GDP (Government of Georgia 2000, p.6). As a point of reference, the average level of 
spending in all low-income countries world-wide in 1997-98 was 1.2% of GDP for health care 
and 3.2% of GDP for education, while it was 2.6% and 4.6% respectively in middle-income 
countries (see Klugman, et al. 2002, p. 14).
The human costs of transition have been well documented (see Comia 1996; Falkingham 1999b; 
Falkingham, J, et al. 1997; Milanovic 1998; UNDP 2000; UNICEF 1999).26 Whereas before the 
beginning of transition Georgia was considered to have one of the highest standards of living in 
the USSR, by 1999, 53% of the population was living below the official poverty line (World- 
Bank 2001).27 Inequality levels are now comparable to the most unequal of Latin American 
economies with a gini coefficient for income inequality at 0.53 and 0.4 for consumption 
inequality (World-Bank 2001).28 The poor are getting poorer (as poverty severity is increasing), 
vulnerability is increasing (it is estimated that about 60% of the population is at risk of falling into 
poverty) and chronic (long-term) poverty is increasing (World-Bank 2001). By 1998, Georgia 
ranked 108 out of a total of 174 countries according to the UNDP Human Development Index, 
which takes into account longevity, education and the standard of living, as measured by real 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity prices in U.S. dollars (see appendix A2.3.1). With 
pension benefits below the minimum subsistence level, pensioners are migrating to rural areas to 
survive on small garden plots.
Moreover, under-investment in health and education have resulted in the rapid deterioration of 
hospitals and schools and contributed to the decline in public health and education. Patients and 
parents are required to make unofficial expenditure to cover costs of medicines, textbooks and 
maintenance of hospitals and schools. The Government estimates that 70% of health expenditures 
are covered directly by patients. These expenditures are often beyond the affordability of poor 
families, thereby further widening the gap between rich and poor (Government of Georgia 2000,
25 The social security system is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.
26 Comia argues convincingly that the increase in mortality rates (arguably the ultimate ‘human cost’ o f the transition 
process), which have characterised almost all countries in the region, has been mainly caused by the psycho-social 
stress resulting from ‘unguided , unassisted and unmanaged process o f restructuring, the pace and pattern o f which is 
left to highly imperfect markets and weak institutions’ and from the resulting ‘large shifts in income distribution and 
social stratification, and the erosion of health services, personal security and law and order’ (Comia 1996, p.30).
27 Atkinson and Micklewright find that Georgia was amongst the least poor of the Soviet Republics, with poverty rates 
that were higher than the Baltic and European Republics but at least a third lower than those o f  the Central Asian 
Republics (see Atkinson and Micklewright 1992c, p.241-242).
28 This represents a substantial increase in income inequality. Atkinson and Micklewright report a Gini coefficient for 
per capita income for Georgia of 0.292 in 1989, although data is not necessarily comparable (table U13 Atkinson and 
Micklewright 1992a).
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p.6)29. Health and education indicators speak for themselves: Infant mortality has increased by 
16%, to 23 deaths per thousand births, the number of new cases of tuberculosis has tripled and 
malaria is re-emerging (IMF 2002, p.7). There has also been a sharp increase in drug use, STDs30 
and in AIDS, all of which were virtually inexistent before the beginning of the transition period 
(Government of Georgia 2000, p.6). The quality of education is also rapidly declining. The 
enrolment rates in primary and secondary education fell from 95% in 1990 to 80% for primary 
and 76% for secondary in 1994 (IMF 2001, p.54).
With these statistics in mind can we really claim that the reform has been a success? In the 
beginning of the 1990s, it was widely acknowledged that the reform had two central purposes: to 
raise the standards of living and to increase individual freedom and protect individual rights (Barr 
1994). At the time, it was predicted that the reform effort would have failed if it would be unable 
to improve earnings opportunities, provide better education and more effective health services and 
increase individual choice (Barr and Harbison 1994, p.4). I would argue that by these standards, 
we could safely say that, in Georgia, the reform has (so far) failed.
1.3 GEORGIA: A BACKGROUND
Having described the general economic context, this section now completes the setting of the 
stage with an introduction to Georgia. First, it describes Georgia’s geography, ethnic composition, 
language and religion. Second, it provides an overview of Georgia’s regions. Third, it gives a 
brief account of Georgia’s history and finally, it examines recent political and economic 
developments and discusses Georgia’s strategic geo-political situation.
29 UNDP estimates that less than 15% of the poor can afford to visit a doctor and purchase the medicines required for 
treatment (UNDP 2002, p. 12).
30 sexually transmitted diseases.
Fi
gu
re
 
1.3
 
H
ist
or
ic
al
-C
ul
tu
ra
l 
Re
gio
ns
 a
nd 
Ad
mi
ni
str
at
ive
 D
ist
ric
ts 
of 
the
 
Re
pu
bl
ic 
of 
Ge
or
gi
a.
Map 2. Historical-Cultural Regions and Administrative Districts of the Republic of Georgia
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1.3.1 Geography, ethnicity and religion
The Republic of Georgia, or Sakartvelo31 (the land of the ‘Kartvelians as the Georgians call 
themselves), lies between the Black and the Caspian seas, and on the southern flanks of the main 
Caucasus range. It borders Russia to the north and east, Turkey to the southwest, Armenia to the 
south and Azerbaijan to the southeast (see figure 1.3). Georgia occupies an area of about 70 000 
sq km (about twice the size of Belgium) and has a population of roughly 5.5 million. Eighty 
percent of the land is covered by mountains: the Greater Caucasus Mountains to the north and the 
Lesser Caucasus Mountains to the south. Between these massive mountain ranges and land­
locked seas lies a narrow belt of fertile lowlands. The strategic importance of these lowlands as 
one of the main routes linking Europe and Asia is not difficult to see. Throughout history Greeks, 
Romans, Parthians, Byzantines, Khazars, Arabs, Mongols, Persians, Ottoman Turks and Russians 
have repeatedly sought control of the Georgian territory. In spite (or perhaps because of) its 
history, Georgia has maintained a unique culture, language and religion.
Georgians make up approximately 70% of the population, while the rest is comprised of 
Armenians, Russians, Azeris, Ossetians, Greeks, Abkhaz, Ukrainians, Kurds, Jews and others (see 
table 1.2). The Georgian language belongs to the Kartvelian group of Iberian-Caucasian 
languages and is one of the oldest of the living languages. The Georgian alphabet is unique (one 
of 14 alphabets of the world) and was created in III century B.C. 32 The large majority 
(approximately 78%) of the population is orthodox Christian, although there are also Catholics, 
Shi’a Muslims (mainly Azeris), Sunni Muslims (Kists and Avarians), Jews and Yezids (Kurds) 
(Gachechiladze 1995, p.96-98). Georgia was the second state in the world to convert to 
Christianity (after Armenia) in the IV century A.D.33
31 The name Sakartvelo is derived from a pagan god called Kartlos, said to be the father o f all Georgians. The foreign 
name ‘Georgia’, used throughout Western Europe, is mistakenly believed to come from the country’s patron saint, St 
George. Actually it is derived from the names Kuij or Guij, by which they are known to the Arabs and modem Persians 
(Rosen 1991)
32 The Assyrian manuscript ‘A book o f peoples and countries’, written in the 5th century, contains a note that of 73 
peoples then known, only 14 had a written language. Among these Georgians are mentioned (Rosen 1991).
Tradition has it that it was St. Nino o f Cappadocia that brought Christianity to Georgia in AD 330.
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Table 1.2: Ethnic Composition o f Georgia, 1989
Population in 1000s Share of total (%)
Georgians 3787.4 70.1
Armenians 437.2 8.1
Russians 341.2 6.3
Azeris 307.6 5.7
Ossetians 164.1 3
Greeks 100.3 1.9
Abkhaz 95.9 1.8
Ukrainians 52.4 1
Kurds 33.3 0.6
Jews 24.8 0.5
Others 56.6 1
Total 5400.8 100
Source: Population 1991
Geographically, Georgia can be divided into three main zones: kavkasoni (northern highlands), 
the intermontane lowland and the southern upland (see Gachechiladze 1995, p.8-10).
To the north, Kavkasoni (the great Caucasus range with heights exceeding 5600m) is the least 
populated geographical zone. Agricultural opportunities are limited and the main economic 
activity is animal husbandry. In contrast, the Intermountain lowland (between the north and south 
Caucasus ranges) covers only 40% of country’s territory but holds 88% of its population. It is 
divided by the Likhi mountain range, which serves as the major watershed between eastern 
Georgia {Iveria) and western Georgia (Kolkheti). Kolkheti has a subtropical and humid climate 
and until the 20th century it was boggy and malaria-infected, and consequently much poorer than 
east, which had richer agricultural land and a healthier climate. In late 1920’s, the region was 
revived with the introduction of subtropical crops (tea and citrus fruit) to supply the entire soviet 
market, bringing a high level of prosperity to the region (95% of tea and 100% of citrus fruit 
produced in the USSR came from this area) (Gachechiladze 1995, p. 10). Iveria, (the eastern 
lowlands) is historically richer and more populated with a much drier climate and fertile soils. 
During the Soviet period agriculture became specialised in viticulture and fruit growing. Eastern 
Georgia is also ethnically more diverse, as it has historically been more vulnerable to external 
aggressions and suffered substantial population losses. The land that had been left vacant was 
subsequently populated by ethnic minorities (mainly Greeks and Azeris). All of Georgia’s 
manufacturing industry is located in the intermountain lowland zone.
Finally, the Southern Uplands, which border with Armenia, are less elevated than kavkasoni but 
still peak at 3000m. This region is historically poor and characterised by very rigorous climate 
and limited agricultural opportunities other than the farming of potato and fruit. Since the south of
34
Georgia is less isolated than the north, it is also more ethnically diverse and the majority of the 
population is Armenian and Azeri.
1.3.2 Administrative-territorial division
Administratively, Georgia has inherited the complicated territorial division of the Georgian SSR 
(Soviet Socialist Republic). The country includes three autonomous regions: two Autonomous 
Republics (Abkhazia and Achara, both on the Black Sea coast) and one Autonomous Region 
(South Ossetia, in the north-eastern part of the country). There are 65 regions and 61 cities. 
However, in practice, Georgia is divided according to it historical provinces, coinciding with the 
kingdoms and principalities of the late Middle Ages. These provinces are outlined in figure 1.3.
In the centre-east, is located the historical province of Kvemo Kartli and Georgia’s capital, Tblisi. 
This is the richest and most populated part of the country; 38% of the country’s population and 
about half of its total industrial production are located here.34 The extreme eastern part of Kvemo 
Kartli is also the most important agricultural area of Georgia, specialising in fruit-and vine 
growing, while the Borjomi valley (to the south west), is an important health-resort area with its 
well-known sulphurous water springs. From south to north stretches the Georgian Military 
Highway, which is the main route connecting Georgia to the Northern Caucasus.
In the eastern part of Georgia, are located the provinces of Kakheti and Mtianeti. These account 
for only 9% of Georgia’s population and are largely specialised in viticulture and livestock 
breeding. To the centre-west are the provinces of Imereti, Racha and Svaneti, which together 
account for approximately 18% of Georgia’s population. This part of Georgia is next in economic 
importance after the centre-east. It is rich in minerals, including manganese ores, copper, zinc, 
lead, arsenic, barite, diomite, talcum, bentonite clays, limestone, marble and other building 
materials (Gachechiladze 1995, p. 12). Agriculture in this area is chiefly specialised in viticulture 
and tea growing. This is also the location of Georgia’s second largest city, Kutaisi. In the western 
part of Georgia, along the black-sea coast, are located the historical provinces of Guria and 
Samegrelo, which together account for about 13% of the country’s population. This area is the 
major centre for Georgia’s subtropical agriculture (tea and citrus-fruit plantations). The economic 
and cultural centre of the region is Poti, one of the largest seaports on the Black-sea coast. In the 
south is the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, the most sparsely populated part of the country, 
accounting for only 4 per cent of Georgia’s population and one of the poorest regions in the 
country. The majority of the population here is Armenian and the main economic occupation is 
livestock breeding and fruit growing.
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The autonomous republic of Abkhazia is located in the north-western part of the country, along 
the Black Sea coast. This is a mountainous region and the majority of the population is 
concentrated along the coast. The capital and main economic centre is Sokhumi. Abkhazia 
occupies a strategic position, straddling Georgia’s only rail and most important road link to 
Russia as well as containing half of Georgia’s coastline, including the best tourist resorts. It is rich 
in agricultural land and mineral resources and hosts one of Georgia’s main power stations. 
Abkhazia has historically been an ethnically very diverse region, with Abkhaz (or Apsua as the 
ethnic Abkhazians refer to themselves) accounting for only 18% of the region’s population in 
1989. Some 45% of the population at that time was Georgian, while Armenians and Russians 
accounted for nearly 30%. Abkhazia has been the scene of violent conflict during the last decade. 
In August 1990, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet declared Abkhazia’s sovereignty and in August 
1992 a war with Tblisi broke out, which lasted until September 1993 when the Georgians were 
expelled from Abkhazia. The war cost more than 20,000 lives and displaced approximately 
300,000 people. Talks between the Georgian and Abkhaz authorities under Russian and UN 
auspices resulted in a cease-fire agreement in May 1994 and the deployment of a .CIS peace­
keeping force monitored by UN troops. These fragile arrangements have been in place ever since 
(see Herzig 1999, p.76-81).
To the extreme southwest, along the border with Turkey and on the Black Sea coast, lies the 
Autonomic Republic of Achara. This region is known for its subtropical climate, citrus-fruit and 
tea plantations (about 60% of Georgia’s total citrus fruit and 12% of the tea-plantations are in this 
region) as well as its considerable tobacco plantations. Given its strategic position, along the 
Turkish border, Achara has prospered significantly since the break up of the Soviet Union and the 
opening of trade routes with Turkey. The coastal area also boasts some well-known holiday 
resorts, and an important seaport at Batumi, the region’s capital. The majority of the population is 
Georgian, but contrary to the rest of the country, the dominant religion is Islam. After the break­
up of the Soviet Union, Achara was ruled in more or less complete autonomy from Tblisi by 
Aslan Abashidze, and represented a potential source of instability for Georgia. Although at the 
time of writing Aslan Abashidze had resigned, the region continued to be a potential source of 
instability for the country.
Finally, to the northeast of Georgia, between the Main Caucasus range and the Inner-Kartli plain, 
lies the autonomous region South Ossetia (Shida Kartli). About two-thirds of the area is occupied 
by medium and high-mountains, while in the foothill zone, climactic conditions are favourable for
34 This includes metallurgical, mechanical engineering, chemical, building materials, food processing, and leather and
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the cultivation of fruit, cereals and other crops. Ossetians, who originally descended from Iranian­
speaking tribes of Central Asia but largely converted to Christianity in the early middle ages, 
enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy during the Soviet period, particularly in so far as their 
language and culture was concerned. In 1989, concerned by rising nationalism in Georgia (see 
‘recent developments’ below), the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet voted to unite South Ossetia 
with North Ossetia (now part of Russia). However, the decision was revoked by the Georgian 
Parliament and a violent conflict broke out towards the end of 1991, resulting in the flight of more 
than 100,000 refugees, mostly across the border into North Ossetia. In 1992, a ceasefire was 
negotiated at the initiative of the Russians and a peacekeeping force of Ossetians, Russians and 
Georgians was set up and was still in place at the time of writing.
1.3.3 A brief history: from mythology to independence
The Georgians themselves tell the following story about how they came to possess the land they 
deem the most beautiful in the world: When God was distributing portions of the world to all the 
peoples of the Earth, the Georgians were having a party. As a result they arrived late and were 
told by God that all the land had already been distributed. When they replied that they were late 
only because they had been lifting their glasses in praise of Him, God was pleased and gave the 
Georgians that part of Earth he had been reserving for himself. The beauty of Georgia’s landscape 
is also evoked in Greek mythology. In particular, the legend of Jason and the Argonauts tells of a 
fabulously wealthy land (the ancient Kingdom of Colchis, present-day Kolkheti) where Jason 
stole the Golden Fleece from King Aeetes with the help of his daughter Medea.
Indeed the Kingdom of Colchis was established along the Black Sea coast in the 6th century B.C. 
In the 3rd century B.C. the Kingdom of Kartli, or Iberia, was established in Eastern Georgia 
(present-day Iveria), with its capital in Mtskheta (near Tblisi). However settlement in the territory 
covered by present-day Georgia dates much further back to the 5th millennium B.C., when 
Neolithic tribes occupied the area.
Georgia’s golden age was between the 11th and 13th centuries under the reign of King David the 
Builder (1089-1125) and then under his great-granddaughter, Queen Tamar (1184-1212). As 
Islam spread rapidly throughout Asia Minor, Georgia, like Armenia, began to forge an identity 
that marked it off from the surrounding Persian and Arab worlds. With the collapse of the last 
Armenian state in the 11th century, Georgia was left as a solitary outpost of Christianity. Yet it 
was just at this moment that the Georgian state reached the peak of its powers. Against a 
background of political unity, economic prosperity and military success, Georgian culture
footwear industries.
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flourished. Most notable was the development of a literary tradition revered to this day, marked 
by Shota Rustaveli’s great epic poem, ‘The Knight in the Tiger’s Skin’, which exemplified all the 
virtues of chivalry and honour and has been compared to Dante Alighieri’s ‘Divina Commedia’.
By the 13th century, Mongol invasions shattered the power of the central state. From then on, 
fractured by rivalries of its feudal princes and constantly invaded by the Mongols, Persians and 
Turks, Georgia suffered a lengthy period of decline that lasted well into the 18th century. Towards 
the end of the 18th century, Georgia concluded several agreements with Tsarist Russia to gain its 
protection against Ottoman Turkey. This was to prove to be the first step on the road to 
incorporation into the Russian empire. In 1801-1810 Georgia was occupied and annexed by the 
Tsarist Russian Empire.
By the late 19th century, opposition to the Russians had led to the formation of a national 
liberation movement among the Georgian intelligentsia, which quickly spread to the peasantry 
and the working class. When the Russian revolution broke out in October 1917, Georgia 
proclaimed its independence (on 26 May 1918). During its brief period of independence (1918- 
1921) Georgia was ruled by the Menshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party. However the 
new government faced enormous economic difficulties, not least because of the sudden loss of the 
crucial Russian market. In February 1921 the Soviet army occupied Georgia and incorporated it 
into a Transcaucasian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic (TSFSR), comprising Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 1936 the TSFSR was dissolved and Georgia became one of the 15 
republics of the Soviet Union.
Before its incorporation into the Soviet Union, Georgia had been a predominantly rural society 
with some 70% of its national income derived from agriculture and 85% of the population living 
in the countryside (Jones and Parsons 1996). However during the 1930s, under Stalin,35 forced 
collectivisation and industrialisation entirely altered the socio-economic make-up of the country. 
During the political purges of 1936-38 countless Georgian writers, poets, artists, scientists and 
other were executed or perished in exile. Some have highlighted that far from benefiting from 
Stalin’s patronage, Georgia suffered more than any other republic during the purges of the 1930s 
(see Jones and Parsons 1996). By 1989, 56% of the population was concentrated in urban areas 
and over 50% of the workforce was employed in industry and only 16% on collective farms 
(Jones and Parsons 1996).
35 Josef Stalin was a Georgian, bom Josef Vissarionovich Djugashvili.
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1.3.4 Recent developments and the geopolitical framework
Toward the end of the 1980s Georgia witnessed a resurgence of the nationalist movement. At the 
same time, nationalist movements in Georgia’s minority-populated regions, most notably 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, led to increasingly violent clashes with the Soviet authorities. On 
April 9, 1989, an event which was to be a major turning point in Georgia’s recent history took 
place: Soviet troops were used to break up a massive pro-independence demonstration in Tblisi. 
Twenty people were killed and more than 4,000 were injured. This event accelerated the collapse 
of the socialist system and in October 1990, multi-party parliamentary elections were held, 
resulting in a majority of seats for the radical nationalist movement led by Gamsakhurdia. In 
March 1991, a referendum was held and Georgians voted unanimously for independence, which 
was officially declared on 9 April 1991.
Gamsakhurdia, elected president in May 1991, has been widely criticised for his authoritarian 
rule, his policies on Georgianisation and his very damaging attitude towards ‘dangerous’ ethnic 
minorities (see Jones and Parsons 1996). By the end of 1991, nationalists and reformists had 
joined forces in an anti-Gamsakhurdia coalition and in December 1991 armed opposition groups 
launched a violent coup d’etat. Gamsakhurdia fled to Chechnya, and in January 1992 a military 
council took over and invited Edward Shevardnadze to return from Moscow, where he had been 
serving as foreign minister under Gorbachev, and resume his leadership of Georgia.36
When Shevardnadze came to power, the Georgian state was in shambles. There were two wars, 
one with South Ossetian secessionists, and the other with Gamsakhurdia supporters in western 
Georgia. The south-western autonomous republic of Achara and the Abkhazian autonomous 
republic were out of Tbilisi’s control and the Armenian and Azeri populated regions on the 
republic’s southern borders (Samtskhe-Javakheti) effectively ran themselves. In September 1993 
Gamsakhurdia returned from exile to organise an uprising and Russian armies were sent into 
Georgia to assist the government. The uprising was crushed. However, as part of the price for 
military and political support, Shevardnadze’s government was forced to join the CIS in October 
1993 (having initially refused to join in 1991).
Until his resignation on November 23, 2003, Shevardnadze became increasingly associated with 
the pervasive corruption that has hampered Georgia’s economic growth. Many have criticised him 
for sacrificing Georgia’s sovereignty to Russia in exchange for peace (Russia continues to 
exercise a great influence in the country- see below). On 2 November 2003 Georgia held 
parliamentary elections and a coalition of young reformists headed by Michail Saakashvili, Nino
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Buijanadze and Zurab Zhvania opposed Shevardnadze’s government. Shevardnadze won, 
however the elections were widely regarded as rigged and massive demonstrations followed in 
Tblisi, finally forcing Shevardnadze to resign.
On January 4, 2004 Michail Saakashvili was elected President by 96% of the votes. He inherited 
many difficulties including more than 230,000 IDPs, fragile peace agreements with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Achara’s refusal to recognise Tbilisi’s authority, and potential separatist tendencies 
in the Armenian dominated south (Javakheti). Moreover, relations with Russia remained 
problematic. Russia continued to have an important influence in the country; Russian 
peacekeepers were still present in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ‘in exchange’, the 
Russian military occupied three military bases, had joint use of all of Georgia’s ports and airfields 
and supervised Georgia’s borders. The war in Chechnya caused additional friction, as Russia 
accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen guerrillas.
At the same time, Georgia’s increasingly close relationship with the US (particularly since it sent 
hundreds of special operations forces to assist the local military in fighting guerrillas as part of its 
‘war on terror’) did nothing to improve relations with Russia, and nor did the securing of a US$3 
billion project to build a pipeline carrying oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia (and not via 
Russia). In addition, one must not forget that following the break up of the Soviet Union, Moscow 
lost much of its indispensable access to the Black Sea coast (and through it to the Mediterranean 
and the rest of the world) to Ukraine and Georgia. As a result, Russia was left with only one 
important port on the Black Sea at Novorossiisk. Given these considerations, Russia’s interests in 
Georgia cannot be underestimated.
Georgia’s strategic geopolitical location will continue to be key in shaping its future. Sandwiched 
between Russia and a NATO member (Turkey), Georgia also serves as a buffer between two 
countries that have almost always had a common border and have continuously fought each other 
throughout history. Moreover, recent US and Western interests in the oil fields of Central Asia, as 
part of the US strategy to decrease dependence on middle eastern oil, have increased interests in 
this small country as the most convenient, technically least difficult, and ‘friendly’ means of 
transporting oil from central Asia and Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean sea. Georgia also serves as 
Armenia’s only open border and therefore its only access to Russia and to the rest of the world, as
36 Shevardnadze was involved in Georgia’s leadership for the greater part o f the last 40 years. From 1972 to 1985 he 
was First Secretary and previous to that he was Interior Minister from 1964 to 1972.
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Armenia’s borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed.37 This important strategic 
position makes the stability and independence of Georgia difficult to maintain.
Finally, the Georgian economy remains very weak with extremely low fiscal revenues, 
widespread corruption and unsustainable external debt. GDP growth has been slow since the 1998 
Russian crisis, further exacerbated by energy supply problems. As discussed above, poverty and 
inequality have increased substantially and the low level of government revenue has prevented the 
satisfactory provision of social security. Within this complex, insecure and unstable political and 
economic environment, we ask: How do the Georgian people make a living? As we will see in the 
following chapters, one important answer to this question is through informal economic activities.
37 Armenia has tense relations with Turkey, largely as a result o f the Armenian genocide in 1915, and continues to be at 
(undeclared) war with Azerbaijan over Nagomo Karabakh, the Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan.
2WHAT IS THE INFORMAL SECTOR? 
A REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
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In the past few years the informal sector has increasingly become the focus of research, public 
policy and the media in the countries of CEE and the FSU. Newspapers cover front pages with 
eye-catching headlines on its scale; Governments, under pressure from international organisations 
to improve the state of their public finances, vow to eradicate it; while research increasingly 
highlights its multifaceted nature, as an important source o f livelihoods, the cause of debilitating 
public deficits, and a dynamic sector which develops in reaction to crippling bureaucracies, 
corruption and excess regulation.
What exactly is the informal sector? Although the term has been very widely used, its meaning is 
far from clear. This chapter reviews the informal sector literature in developing, western 
industrialised, centrally planned and transition countries. Although comprehensive reviews of the 
main issues and debates exist in both developing and industrialised countries, I know of no 
attempts to provide a comprehensive, comparative review of how the informal sector has been 
defined in all five contexts.
The literature review reveals that there is no consensus over what constitutes the informal sector 
worldwide. Over the past 30 years, the term has been used in developing, western industrialised, 
centrally planned and transition countries to analyse a wide spectrum of activities that escape 
taxation, measurement, and regulation. The term ‘informal sector’ or ‘informal economy’ has 
been used to describe such diverse activities as street vending, hawking, undeclared domestic 
work, barter, stealing state property, corruption, tax evasion, the Mafia and organised crime. 
Below we review, in turn, the main definitions and sources of debate in developing countries, 
western industrialised countries, the Soviet Union and transition countries.
2.1 THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD ENTERPRISE
In developing countries, the term ‘informal sector’ has broadly been associated with unregistered 
and unregulated small-scale activities (enterprises) that generate income and employment for the 
urban poor. There have been two main parts to the informal sector debate: The first, which 
dominated much of the 1970s and 1980s, focused on the informal-formal sector relationship. 
Those who supported the ‘duality’ approach’ argued that there were two distinct urban economies 
(the poor/informally unemployed vs. the rich/formally employed), while their critics saw these as 
two aspects of the same, single, capitalist economy. The second part of the debate, which took off 
in the late 1980s in Latin America with the publication of de Soto’s (1989) work on Peru, is
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concerned with the causes of the informal sector: is the primary cause of the informal sector 
poverty or excess regulation?
2.1.1 The Informal sector relationship: dualism or continuum?
The term ‘informal sector’ emerged in the 1970s, at a time of crisis in development theory,
following the growing recognition that the ‘accelerated growth model’ had not succeeded in
38creating employment and eliminating poverty in developing countries. Unprecedented 
population growth, as of the 1950s, coupled with increase rural-urban migration, and an inability 
of the industrialisation process to absorb the large numbers of unskilled, illiterate workers resulted 
in widespread poverty and unemployment (Moser 1994, p. 13-14). However, it soon became 
apparent that the urban poor were not actually ‘unemployed’, but were in fact engaged in a 
multitude of small-scale, unregistered, unmeasured and largely unregulated ‘informal’
. . .  39activities.
The Dualist model
The first to employ the term ‘informal sector’ was anthropologist, Keith Hart, who described the 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ income-earning opportunities that he observed in Ghana, equating the 
first with wage-earning jobs and the second with self-employment, thereby setting the stage for 
the dualist interpretation (Hart 1973, p.67).
However, it was the International Labour Office (ILO) that was to disseminate the concept, 
through its very influential ‘Report on income and employment in Kenya’ (1972), which 
suggested there that there existed a marginal, poor, ‘informal’ sector of the urban economy, which 
produced goods and created employment and income for the poorest of the poor. The informal 
sector was seen as a separate, autonomous sector, which was defined in contrast to the formal one 
through seven distinguishing characteristics. Thus, for instance, where formal sector units were 
characterised by large-scale production, incorporation, and the use of capital-intensive 
technologies, informal sector units involved small-scale production, were unincorporated and 
family owned and used labour intensive technologies (ILO 1972, p.6). In contrast to Hart’s 
emphasis on the individual, the ILO’s focus was exclusively on units (or enterprises), thereby 
establishing the basis for most future interpretation of the informal sector in developing countries 
as a set of units.
38 The ‘accelerated growth model, which dominated development thinking throughout the 1950s and 1960s, was based 
on the assumption that industrial expansion would increase wage-sector employment and that the ‘trickle-down’ effect 
would ultimately lead to redistribution of resources and income.
39 This raised important questions regarding the definition o f ‘employment’ and ‘unemployment’ in a development 
context. Is the concept of ‘unemployment’ relevant in a context where unemployment insurance is essentially inexistent
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In order to measure the size of the informal sector in developing countries, the definition was 
operationalised by using a set of multiple criteria. The operational definition included: (a) all 
enterprises or production units with less than a maximum number of workers (usually ten) or (b) 
enterprises with more than the suggested maximum number of workers that specified at least one 
of the following additional criteria: they operated illegally; they worked on an irregular basis; they 
were located in a temporary structure or in the open; they did not use electric power; they did not 
depend on formal credit institutions; they did not rely on formal distribution network, or; most of 
their workers had less than six years of schooling (Sethuraman 1981, p.22). This definition still 
holds today and forms the basis of the ILO revised definition adopted in the ‘1993 Resolution 
Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector’ (ILO 1993b, par. 7-9).40
An alternative dualist interpretation was offered by PREALC, the ILO’s World Employment 
Programme in Latin America.41 Like the ILO-Geneva, PREALC viewed the informal sector as a 
marginal, unprotected sector of the economy in which people survive. However, in contrast to the 
ILO-Geneva’s focus on the enterprise, PREALC concentrated on income and employment. Two 
alternative typologies were used: the first, based on status in employment, included domestic 
servants, casual labourers, the self-employed, and all persons working in enterprises employing a 
maximum number (4-10) of persons. The second included all persons whose income is below a 
minimum level (usually the minimum wage) (Souza and Tokman 1976, p. 356-357).42
Finally, other dualist approaches have defined the informal sector in terms of its position vis a vis 
‘state protection’. Weeks (1975), for instance, argues that informal sector units operate outside the 
formal system of benefits and of formal credit institutions, while formal sector units are officially 
recognised, nurtured, and regulated by the State, through such mechanisms as tariff and quota 
protection, import tax rebates, selective monetary controls and licensing measures. Similarly, 
Mazumdar (1976) distinguishes between informal, ‘unprotected’, urban labour and formal, 
‘protected’ urban labour and, more than a decade later, Roberts (1990, p.35) argues that the 
informal sector is ‘the means by which people make out in the absence both of state provision of 
basic welfare services and of private mutual interest associations which defend their members and 
advance their interests’.
and people engage in informal activities to survive? And can the concept o f ‘employment’ be limited to official, 
‘formal’ employment? These questions are the source of much research and debate in developing countries.
40 This new definition is discussed in detail in chapter 3, section 3.2.
41 PREALC stands for Programa Regional del Empleo Para America Latina y el Caribe.
42 Note that there is considerable debate as to whether informal sector employment can be equated with poverty. Many 
have argued that not all informal workers are poor (successful informal entrepreneurs for instance) and that not all poor 
work in the informal sector (low-paid industrial workers for instance) (see Cartaya 1994; Portes, Alejandro and 
Schauffler 1993; Thomas 1995).
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Informal-Formal Continuum
Critics of the dualist model have argued that formal and informal activities are not separate and 
independent, but rather parts of one overall capitalist system in which informal activities are 
subordinate to, and dependent on, the formal sector.
The Marxist critique, for instance, rejects the whole concept of ‘informal sector’, preferring the 
term ‘petty commodity production’ to refer to these activities, which, it argues, exist at the 
margins of the capitalist mode of production but are integrated into and subordinate to it 
(Birkbeck 1979; Bromley and Gerry 1979; Moser 1994; Portes, Alejandro 1978). Two main 
exploitative relationships are emphasised. On the one hand, the informal sector is simply an 
extension of the production network of large firms, providing a pool of cheap and flexible wage 
labour through self-exploitation.43 On the other, it subsidizes the formal economy by providing 
cheap goods and services to the labour force, therefore enabling large firms to pay extremely low 
wages (Allen 1998, p.9).
Within this framework, Portes, Castells and Benton (1989, p.300) suggest that at least three types 
of activities can be distinguished: direct subsistence activities, informal activities subordinate to 
production and marketing in the formal sector, and autonomous informal enterprises with modem 
technology and some capacity for capital accumulation. Similarly, Bromley and Gerry question 
the adequacy of the formal-wage-employment vs. informal-self-employment dichotomy. They 
suggest that there is a continuum from stable wage work to true self-employment, passing through 
4 categories of ‘casual work’: short-term work, disguised wage-work, dependent work and finally 
true self-employment (Bromley and Gerry 1979).
Similarly, in her work on Zaire, MacGaffey calls for the introduction of a new conceptual 
framework; that of the ‘Real Economy’, which includes the totality of economic activity, and not 
just its component parts. She suggests that the real economy should consist of:
‘the recorded economy, that is, all economic activities that are recordable and 
reported and that are gathered by statistics; the non-monetised economy that is, 
all activities concerned with the non-monetised production for self-consumption; 
and all the remainder, which is monetised (though operating with a variety of 
currencies and also through barter), unrecorded, and inadmissible (because it is 
more or less legal)’ (MacGaffey 1991, p. 10).
43 A well-known example is offered by Birkbeck’s 1978 study of informal garbage collectors in Cali, Columbia. It 
shows the extent to which collectors, the most ‘marginal’ o f workers, are connected with modem capitalist production. 
Informal garbage collectors supply sorted and packed plastic, paper, bone and glass to informal deposit owners, who in 
turn pass on the product to wholesalers that supply the large orders o f industrial firms. The firms dictate the final price 
and each intermediary along the chain takes a share, with the collectors receiving the lowest share, and no work 
protection whatsoever (Birkbeck 1979).
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She argues that the division of the economy into formal and informal sectors is arbitrary and 
unrealistic, and that ‘what has previously been thought of as a marginal sector of the economy is 
in fact the principal means by which it operates’ (MacGaffey 1991, p.7).44
Finally, in an attempt to reconcile the two interpretations, Sethuraman (1981) argues that the 
concept of dualism does not necessarily deny the presence of interdependence. Thomas suggests 
that ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ should be exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories (in order to 
classify agents), but they are not required to be independent. In fact, as Moser points out, the 
debate is not so much on whether or not the informal sector is independent, but on the nature of 
the formal-informal relationship. Where the dualist approach assumes a benign relationship and 
therefore advocates the development of closer links through subcontracting and credit, the petty- 
commodity production school assumes the relationship is exploitative and consequently advocates 
an increased autonomy of petty commodity production and cutting the links with large-scale 
capitalist enterprises (Moser 1994, p. 12).
2.1.2 The causes of the informal sector: excess regulation or poverty?
Much of the debate on the informal sector in the past decade has focused on its causes. Is the 
primary cause of the informal sector rural-urban migration and urban poverty or is it excess 
regulation, taxation and a heavy state bureaucracy? The position taken on this question largely 
determines the definition used, and ultimately the policy recommended.
Poverty
The ILO-Geneva and PREALC approaches emphasise the survival nature of informal activities, 
arguing that poverty is the main cause of the informal sector. In their view, activities are 
undertaken as an alternative to open unemployment since, in the absence of social security 
benefits, individuals cannot afford to be unemployed (Souza and Tokman 1976, p.355-356). 
Informal activities are seen as marginal, and workers are vulnerable, as they are unprotected by 
labour laws. Thus, they argue, the primary path to development and to poverty alleviation is 
macroeconomic policy that emphasises expanding modem sector employment and incomes 
(Rakowski 1994, p.36).
44 A similar argument has been presented by Harding and Jenkins (1989) for western industrialised countries. They 
suggest that there is no such thing as a separate ‘black’ or ‘hidden’ economy, but that formal and informal activities co­
exist and are part o f the modem capitalist economy. There are simply varying degrees o f formality and informality 
depending on the context and most social interaction partakes of a degree o f each (Harding and Jenkins 1989, p. 175).
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Some have emphasised the ‘discrete logic of production’ in informal sector units, which differs 
from that prevailing in the formal economy, in that ‘the accent is on employment generation and 
not on seeking suitable investment opportunities for the sake of realising a return on investment’ 
(Guerguil 1988, p.60; Sethuraman 1981, p.16). I will later argue that this ‘discrete logic of 
production’ (to use Guerguil’s terminology) which characterises informal activities and 
distinguishes them from formal ones, can also be used to distinguish ‘informal’ activities 
undertaken to meet basic needs from larger scale ‘underground’ activities deliberately concealed 
to avoid the payment of taxes.
Excess Regulation
In the late 1980s, De Soto introduced a new dimension to the study of the informal sector. In his 
best selling book, ‘The Other Path’, on ‘the informals’ of Peru, de Soto highlights the role of 
excess regulation and the state bureaucracy in creating the informal economy (de Soto 1989). The 
informal sector consists of ‘potential entrepreneurs’ who are forced to operate illegally because of 
flaws in the tax system and in other laws and regulations. Although he highlights the role of rural- 
urban migration, it is essentially the ‘mercantilist’ state, which ‘only exists to protect the interests 
of itself and big business’, which is responsible for in the existence of the urban informal sector. 
Informality is therefore the ‘popular response, which successfully breaks down this legal barrier’ 
(de Soto 1989, p .ll).
As noted by Rakowski (1994, p.31), de Soto’s work marked a shift away from seeing the 
expansion of the informal sector as a problem for development, to an emphasis on the informal 
sector as an asset or solution to economic crisis and poverty. Thus, in Bromley’s words, de Soto 
argues that through the combination of deregulation, de-bureaucratisation and privatisation, ‘the 
size of the state apparatus can be reduced and the quality of life of every citizen improved, and the 
nation’s vast entrepreneurial potential unleashed’ (Bromley 1994, p. 138).
This view of an informal sector defined as the set of ‘illegal’ activities, resulting from excess 
taxation and regulation, has been the basis for numerous studies of the informal sector in Latin 
America in the past decade. Loayza, for instance, uses an empirical model of the informal sector, 
defined as all ‘untaxed’ and ‘unregistered’ activities, to show that its size depends positively on 
the level of taxation and labour market restrictions, and negatively on the quality of Government 
(Loayza 1997).
A third approach, the so-called ‘structuralist approach’, combines elements of both the de Soto 
‘legalist’ interpretation and the PREALC poverty-based one (see Castells and Portes 1989; Portes, 
Alejandro 1978; Portes, A, et al. 1989; Portes, Alejandro and Schauffler 1993). The informal
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sector is viewed as a product of state regulation, which essentially supports the modem formal 
sector. Firms ‘go underground’ (i.e. large firms subcontract to small firms or engage in illegal 
hiring practices) to lower the costs associated with protective labour legislation. However, the 
structuralist approach argues that the elimination of state controls would remove the informal 
firms’ competitive advantage, which stems from their ability to escape tax and labour regulations, 
and would therefore not result in the expansion of entrepreneurial activity and reduction in 
poverty that is suggested by de Soto. Nevertheless, they recognize that more deregulation and 
greater flexibility is needed to enable firms to adjust to changes in the economic conditions, but 
ague that it should be supplemented with policies aimed at reducing survival activities through 
capital investment in the modem industrial sector (Portes, Alejandro and Schauffler 1993, p.55).
In summary, the legalist and poverty-based approaches essentially define two different groups of 
activities and consequently give rise to different policy recommendations. In the ILO/PREALC 
approach illegality is a related characteristic of informality, but the basic defining one is its 
‘discrete logic of production’.45 In the de Soto approach illegality is the basic defining 
characteristic and the ‘production rationale’ of informal enterprises is no different from that of 
formal ones. Guerguil argues that these two definitions only slightly overlap. Some activities 
performed to generate basic household income, such as domestic work, may not be illegal, 
whereas other activities which are illegal are not carried out with a production logic different from 
that of the formal (capitalist) sector (Guerguil 1988, p.61).
2.2 THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN WESTERN INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES: 
UNMEASURED AND UNTAXED PRODUCTION
Whereas in developing countries the debate on the informal sector has been mainly conceptual, in 
western industrialised countries, it has been methodological, focusing principally on measurement 
techniques. Moreover, whereas in developing countries there is disagreement over what 
constitutes the informal sector, but agreement over what to call it, in western industrialised 
countries there is general agreement over what it is but absolutely no agreement over what to call 
it. Thus the terms ‘informal’ ‘black’, ‘underground’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘hidden’, ‘shadow’ ‘irregular’, 
‘subterranean’, ‘parallel’, economy have all been used to essentially describe income or 
production, which escapes taxation and/or GDP estimates.
45 The ILO/PREALC’s Viktor Tokman points out that the majority of enterprises are neither fully illegal nor fully legal, 
but that there exists a spectrum o f positions with ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ merely being two extremes (Tokman 1992, p.5-6).
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Definitions in western industrialised countries have mainly been income-based. Two such 
definitions can be identified: (1) The national production or income that is missed by the 
statistical offices when they calculate the value of national product, and, (2) the revenue not 
reported to, and discovered by the tax authorities, which is produced in underground activities 
(Tanzi 1999, 344). On the one hand, Tanzi, Macaffee and Feige all (more or less) define the 
‘underground’, ‘unobserved’ or hidden’ economy as the GDP that is not measured by official 
statistics because of un-reporting and/or underreporting (although Feige also includes activities 
which escape registration due to convention - e.g. household activities) (see Feige 1983; Feige, 
E.L. 1979; 1980; Macaffee 1982; Tanzi 1982; Tanzi 1983). On the other hand, Gutmann defines it 
as ‘the economic activity or transactions that escape taxation’ (Gutmann, P.M. 1979, p. 14).
As noted by Tanzi (1999), these two approaches do not necessarily measure the same thing as tax 
evasion and GDP are measured in different ways, and it is therefore possible to have a lot of tax 
evasion without understating GDP. Cowell (1990) provides a useful framework to understand 
how these concepts are related to one another. He distinguishes between total economic 
production and officially defined production, or production which falls within the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) of a country. The second is a subset of the first and excludes activities 
such as housework and do-it-yourself work. He then shows how the black economy intersects 
both these production boundaries but also includes activities such as benefit fraud and evasion of 
taxes on capital gains, which are not productive activities, and therefore fall outside the 
production boundaries. Thus, unmeasured GDP includes that part of the black economy, which 
overlaps with total economic production but not with officially defined production, which by 
definition is allowed for in the SNA and therefore estimated, whereas untaxed revenue includes 
all of the black economy (i.e. both that which overlaps with total economic production and that 
which is outside of it) (Cowell 1990, p. 15).
Others, such as Dallago (1990) and Thomas (1992; 1995), have used a definition of the ‘irregular’ 
economy based on legal status rather than income. Dallago, for instance, defines the ‘irregular’ 
economy as activities which are ‘deliberate attempts to evade or avoid the rules (laws, regulations, 
contracts and agreements) that apply to a particular context, the purpose being to achieve a goal 
that is permitted, tolerated, or at any rate not explicitly condemned in the economic system 
concerned’ (Dallago 1990, p. XVIII).
However, the core of the debate in western industrialised countries has been on empirical 
methodologies. Apart from a few direct methods (such as the tax auditing approach), most 
methods used to measure the underground economy, have been indirect (i.e. using available
50
statistics). There have been three main approaches: monetary, expenditure-income discrepancy, 
and employment census methods.
Monetary approaches, which have been the most common, are based on Cagan’s (1958) currency- 
ratio method, which assumed that transactions in the underground economy are conducted in cash 
and that changes in the ratio of currency to money supply could partly be explained by changes in 
the size of the underground economy. Gutmann (1977; 1983), elaborates this model and develops 
the currency demand deposit method, based on the assumption that there exists a base period in 
which little subterranean, activity existed, and attributes changes in the ratio of currency to 
demand deposits to changes in the level of subterranean activity (Gutmann, P.M. 1977, p.27). 
Feige (1979) and Tanzi (1983) also use similar methods (see Bemab& 2002a, p.14-15 for details).
The expenditure-income discrepancy method compares production and consumption data, either 
at the national or household level, to derive the size of the underground economy. Macafee argues 
that by comparing income measures of GDP, which are primarily based on tax declarations, and 
expenditure measures of GDP, which are primarily derived from industrial and household 
surveys, one can obtain a reasonable indication of the size of the ‘hidden’ economy (Macaffee 
1982, p. 148). Smith (1986), for example, uses both macro economic data (national accounts) and 
micro economic data (family expenditure data) to find evidence of discrepancies between income 
and expenditures for the UK. Finally, the employment census methods, involve comparing the 
official rate of employment and the employment rate as calculated by other means. Examples 
include comparing employment figures from population surveys to those obtained from surveys 
of establishments, or comparing employment figures from demographic data to figures of 
employment derived from the data used in the national accounts.46
What is worrying is that these methods give considerably different estimates of the underground 
economy. Frey and Pommerehne find that in the United States, the underground economy 
estimates for 1976 range from 4% of GNP if one uses the expenditure-income discrepancy 
approach to 22% if the transactions-ratio method is used (Frey and Pommerehne 1982, p. 18). 
Similarly, Smith (1986, p.84-85) finds that for the UK, the range of estimates of the size of the 
black economy extends from 2%-4% of GDP if expenditure-income discrepancy methods are 
used to about 15% if monetary approaches are used.
46 Charmes (1993) uses this approach to derive the size o f the informal sector in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. He 
compares national statistics on the active population (using the population census or a household survey) to statistics on 
firms in these countries
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2.3 THE SOCIALIST SECOND ECONOMY: THE PRIVATE PARALLEL ECONOMY
The informal economy in transition countries is not new. There has long been a parallel, private, 
unregistered and untaxed part of the economy, which during the Soviet period was referred to as 
the ‘second economy’.
It was Grossman (1977) who was largely responsible for the spreading of the term ‘second 
economy’, which he defined as comprising ‘all production and exchange activity that fulfills at 
least one of the two following tests: (a) being directly for private gain; (b) being in some 
significant respect in knowing contravention of existing law’ (Grossman 1977, p.25). Others have 
adopted definitions based on ideology. Los (1990) defines the second economy as ‘all areas of 
economic activity which are officially viewed as being inconsistent with the ideologically 
sanctioned dominant mode of economic organisation’ (Los 1990, p.2; see also Shelly 1990, p. 12).
We can divide the ‘second economy’ activities into those that were legal, but ideologically 
unacceptable and therefore officially discriminated against, and those that were illegal. The most 
common legal second economy activity was the cultivation of private ‘garden’ plots. Private 
agricultural production was permitted not only for farming households that worked on collective 
or state farms, but also for many workers of industrial and other sectors, including those in urban 
areas who were allocated plots outside the city limits on which they could build their dachas 
(summer houses) (see Braithwaite 1994, p.6; Grossman 1982, p. 256). Private plot production 
seems to have been quite extensive. McAuley (1979c, p.76) reports that for instance in Pavloskii 
Posad (a small town in the Moscow oblast) between one half and three quarters of all households 
(depending on income) had access to a private plot of land. Indeed private plot production was an 
important source of additional income, especially as it was often sold (illegally) on the black 
market (see Grossman 1982; Grossman and Treml 1987). Grossman and Treml estimate, for 
instance, that if private plot production were considered, then the Soviet Union’s actual 
agricultural production in 1977 would have been approximately five times the official figure 
(Grossman and Treml 1987, p.292).
Another type of legal private activity was the construction of private housing, which consisted of 
apartments in housing cooperatives (mainly used by better off families), traditional peasant huts in 
rural areas and summer residences (dachas) (McAuley 1979b, p. II) .47 In fact some estimates 
claim that as much as half of all Soviet families resided in private accommodation (as quoted by
47 Note that private housing became illegal when it involved the acquisition of materials on the black market and the 
illegal hiring of construction workers
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McAuley 1979b, p. 11). Finally, other private legal activities included the private practice of 
certain professionals such as physicians, dentists, teachers, and tutors (Grossman 1982, p.256).
The illegal second economy consisted of four types of activities: (1) stealing from the state, (2) 
speculation, (3) illicit production and (4) underground enterprises (Grossman 1982, 249). Stealing 
from the state, which involved stealing anything from enterprise light bulbs and toilet rolls to 
output produced, was widespread. Grossman relates:
‘All sources agree that it is practised by virtually everyone. All also agree that the 
public takes it for granted, attaches almost no opprobrium to it -  and on the 
contrary, disapproves of those who do not engage in it -  and sharply distinguishes 
between stealing from the state and stealing from private individuals’ (Grossman 
1982,249).
Similarly, Simis claims that ‘the mass of the population does not look upon theft from the state as 
real theft, as stealing someone else’s property’ (Simis 1982, p.253).
Apart from the stealing of state property, stealing from the state also included so-called left-hand 
work (the earning of informal income at the formal workplace, or that which the left hand does 
while the right hand performs the official work). Simis explains that left-hand work ‘is usually 
done during working hours, using state tools, equipment and means of transport’ (Simis 1982, 
p.261). It was widespread and considered a normal aspect of working life. Simis and Kurkchiyan 
use the example of bus drivers to illustrate left-hand work in Georgia and Armenia respectively 
(Kurkchiyan 2000, p.86; Simis 1982, p.265). Bus drivers had an official wage, which served to 
guarantee basic security, however it was accepted (and expected) that their main source of income 
came from charging passengers for fares and not issuing tickets or receipts. At the same time, they 
had to pay bribes to get good routes and to avoid inspection of tickets. Kurkchiyan argues that any 
driver who did not partake in left-hand work would not have been able to survive and that ‘it was 
not possible to live outside the alternative economy other than at great cost, not only in terms of 
income, but also in terms of social mobility and integration in society’ (Kurkchiyan 2000, p.86). 
She argues that the official and the second economy were two inseparable and essential parts of 
the Soviet economy; while the first provided a basic standard of living, the second complemented 
it and ensured a reasonable lifestyle for the population.
Finally, another example of ‘stealing from the state’ was embezzlement, which was a direct 
product of the shortage of goods. Thus, employees of State-owned stores or restaurants would 
take rare goods and re-sell them for a profit, or they would set them aside for their favoured 
customers, from whom they could expect good tips (Grossman 1982, p.250; Shelly 1990, p. 13).
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The second illegal second economy activity, which also resulted from the shortage of goods, was 
speculation. Grossmann relates: ‘given the invariable maldistribution by the state of goods over 
time and space and chronic shortages of many items in the USSR, the opportunities for black 
market trading for profit are nearly unlimited’ (Grossman 1982, p.251). However, despite its 
pervasiveness, speculation was considered a very serious offence and punishable by the death 
penalty (Simis 1982, p.267). Nevertheless, it was normal for people to have their ‘own 
speculator’, who would come around the workplace or home to sell consumer items such as 
clothing or food.
A third illegal ‘second-economy’ activity was illicit production (or moonlighting). This was 
production that took place for private gain outside official working hours (as opposed to left-hand 
work which took place during working hours). ‘Moonlighters’, particularly those working in 
construction, were referred to as shabashniki. They were typically men who worked in 
construction trades or as agricultural workers on state and collective farms. Shelly suggests that 
shabashniki accounted for half of the construction workers in some regions of the USSR (Shelly 
1990, p. 16).
Finally, the last type of illegal second economy activity was underground enterprises, or formal 
enterprises that were simultaneously involved in anything from small-scale ‘plan manipulation’ to 
large-scale illegal production. Berliner (1952) argued that plan manipulation was a result of the 
motivation structure for Soviet managers. As the main motivating factor was not the wage, but the 
‘premium’ (a bonus paid in return for fulfilling the planed output target), Soviet managers used a 
variety of techniques to fulfil output targets, which were not necessarily in the interests of the 
State. These included: inflating statements of material requirements, arranging to have the firm’s 
output plan set at a level well below capacity, producing the wrong assortment of products, 
falsifying accounts, lowering the quality of the output and, misappropriating funds (Berliner 1952, 
p. 348-356). However, these techniques were also commonly used for illegally producing extra 
output, which was then sold for private gain. Through their study of a Georgian biscuit factory, 
Mars and Altman, find that similar techniques were used for parallel production and that the extra 
produce was then sold by ‘making a deal’ with the retailer, who would sell them in shops next to 
the ‘official produce’ and share the profits with the factory managers (Mars, G and Altman 1987, 
201-205).
Another common example of illicit production in state enterprises was the hiring of so-called 
dead souls (or ‘ghost workers’). These were workers who took on a second job but never 
appeared at their place of work and then shared their secondary wages with their employer (Shelly 
1990, p. 17).
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Finally, corruption has also been included in the study of the second economy, either as an 
integral part of it or as a closely related activity. Grossman identifies three types of corruption: the 
daily ‘petty bribing’ of Soviet authorities, and particularly of law enforcement officials; the 
tradition of prinosheniye (literally ‘bringing to’), which involved the regular bringing of valuable 
gifts to one’s supervisors; and the purchase of lucrative official positions (Grossman 1982, p.251- 
252). Another, widespread form of corruption was blat, or the use of personal influence to obtain 
favours to which a person or firm was lawfully entitled. Berliner argues that blat was common in 
all aspects of firm’s activity, and that its need was so great that special people were hired, the so- 
called ‘tolkach ’ (‘pushers’), who were responsible for ‘pushing’ for the firm’s interests. The 
tolkach often lived in Moscow, or in some other large city, and had very good personal 
connections. They were carried on the books as enterprise ‘representatives’ and often worked for 
several firms at a time (Berliner 1952, p.356-358).
Thus, the second economy was heterogeneous and pervasive; it involved everyone, from the top 
government official to the poorest citizen. As Shelly points out:
‘At the top, were the large-scale underground businessmen, whose success 
depended on their ties to members of the official elite. Below them were the large 
numbers of small-scale private businessmen, moonlighting professionals and full 
time black marketers. Many of these relied on their ties with mid-level 
government functionaries, for success. At the bottom were those numerous 
citizens who supplemented their incomes through some form of illegal or semi­
illegal activities such as petty theft in factories or putting aside merchandise for 
favoured customers’ (Shelly 1990, p.23).
As we will see below, many have argued that it is the legacy of the second economy and, more 
specifically, of the incentive structures that dominate it, which has been the cause of such an 
extensive informal economy during the transition period and which is in part responsible for the 
failure of formal economic policies.
2.4 THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: 
HOUSEHOLD ENTERPRISES, UNTAXED PRODUCTION OR SECOND ECONOMY?
In the past ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the informal economy in transition 
countries has increasingly become the focus of both policy and academic research. This is the 
result of a growing concern with corruption, tax evasion and crime as well as with an 
unprecedented increase in poverty and inequality. Given this wide spectrum of concerns, studies 
have used a variety of definitions of the informal sector (or economy) depending on the question
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they are addressing. Moreover, the term ‘informal sector (or economy)’ has been used 
interchangeably with ‘unofficial’, ‘hidden’, ‘underground’ and ‘shadow’ economy.
Studies of the informal sector in transition can broadly be grouped into three groups, depending 
on the issues they address. In fact, they can be seen as reflecting the three different approaches 
discussed so far. The concept of the informal sector adopted by the first group of studies 
resembles that used in ‘developing countries!, the one adopted by the second group resembles that 
of the ‘second economy’ and the third is similar to approaches used in western industrialised 
countries.
The first group consists of those whose aim has been to understand how people survive during the 
transition period, given the collapse of real wages and persistent arrears in their payments. In 
these studies the informal economy (or sector) is essentially the set of survival strategies. For 
example, Johnson, Kaufmann and Ustenko identify six types of survival strategies used in Russia, 
which they also refer to as ‘informal activities’: (1) having another job; (2) using a dacha or other 
plot of land to grow food; (3) working as private taxi driver; (4) renting out one’s apartment; (5) 
business trips abroad (to purchase goods for resale), and; (6) renting out one’s garage (Johnson, et 
al. 1997b, p. 185-186).
Similarly, Clarke (1999b) broadly defines the informal sector in Russia as including unregistered 
primary and secondary employment (including small-plot agricultural production). He argues that 
informal work is not associated with poverty as it is more o f ‘an additional security for those who 
are already well placed to weather the storm’ (Clarke 1999b, p. 20, 33). Lokshin and Yemtsov 
(2001) use the related concept of ‘coping strategies’ and distinguish between ‘active’ coping 
strategies (e.g. secondary work, cultivation of garden plot, or renting out of one’s own apartment) 
and ‘passive ones (e.g. cutting back on food and clothing expenditures). They find that the higher 
the level of a household’s human capital, the more likely it is to use ‘active’ coping strategies and 
that these strategies are more successful in offsetting economic shocks than the ‘passive’ 
strategies used by households with lower human capital.
Others have adopted the ‘traditional’ ILO definition of the informal sector and applied it to the 
transition context. Anderson, for example, in a study of the informal sector in Mongolia, defines it 
as ‘small-scale, usually family-based, economic activities that may be undercounted by official 
statistics and may not be subject, in practice, to the same set of regulations and taxation as formal 
enterprises’ (Anderson 1998, p.2). In line with the ILO approach, he limits his definition to legal 
activities, ‘monetised’ transactions (thereby excluding household production) and the urban 
sector.
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The second group of informal sector studies consists of those who have analysed the 
transformation of the Soviet second economy into the present informal economy. These 
definitions, like those the second economy, are much broader, including a variety o f activities 
such as barter, survival strategies, left-hand work, bribery, corruption, money laundering, tax 
evasion and corruption. Kurkchiyan, for instance, includes ‘tax evasion, stealing from employers, 
illegal contracts, bribing politicians and officials, money laundering and so forth’ (Kurkchiyan 
2000, p.96). She argues that the present ‘informal economy’ has evolved from the long- 
established Soviet tradition of informal relationships, and suggests that although the new market 
economy may officially be the product of the legislative reform, the behaviour is in fact 
dominated by the informal sector, which today accounts for the largest share of the total economy 
(Kurkchiyan 2000, p.93-97).
Indeed, there is much evidence of the persistence of ‘second economy’ practices in the present 
(informal) economy. Ledneva, for instance, argues that both blat (or the use of personal networks 
in order to obtain goods and services in short supply or to influence decision-making) and pripiski 
(false reporting) are as widespread now as they were in the Soviet Union (Ledeneva 2000, p.7). 
Similarly, Birdsall’s analysis of ‘covert earning schemes’ is essentially the persistence of left- 
hand work. She identifies two types of covert earning schemes: the manipulation of official 
business transactions to realise monetary earnings; and the exploitation of the ‘grey zones’ at the 
fringes of the workplace, including the diversion of customers for a private client base, and the 
pocketing of fees for services rendered through the firm (Birdsall 2000, p.5).
Feige, who has been one of the main contributors to the debate on the measurement of the 
underground economy in developed countries, also highlights the legacy of the Soviet system in 
determining the character and scope of the informal, or underground, economy during the 
transition period. He defines ‘underground economies’ as ‘non-compliant behavior with 
institutional rules’, suggesting that there are several types of underground economies depending 
on the institutional rule being violated. He thus distinguishes between ‘unreported’ economies 
when fiscal rules are violated, ‘unrecorded’ economies when income-producing activities are 
concealed from national accounting, and ‘illegal’ economies, when the criminal laws are violated 
(Feige, Edgar L. 1997, p.25). In his view, formal policies have failed in the former Soviet Union, 
because they are based on the incentive structure of formal institutions, whereas the dominant 
incentive structure is that of informal institutions, which are a result of the Soviet system of non- 
compliance. Gaddy and Ickes present a similar argument to explain the failure of enterprise 
restructuring in Russia, and the emergence of a dual economy. They suggest that while the first
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economy is private and restructured, the second is paternalistic and un-restructured, and based on 
‘informal activities’ such as barter, tax offsets and survival activities (Gaddy and Ickes 1998, p.2).
For most authors in this group, the ‘second economy’ definition is still valid, as most of the 
private sector can be considered informal. Braithwaite (1994) and Sik (1992), for instance, both 
adopt ‘second economy’ definitions to describe the informal sector in transition. Braithwaite 
includes ‘all activities outside the state sector undertaken for private gain and/or unregistered for 
taxes, etc. with the authorities’, while Sik uses the lack of regulation as the main defining criterion 
(see Braithwaite 1994; Sik 1992). Similarly, Commander and Tolstopiatenko argue that the 
economy can be divided into two sectors: the informal sector, which is comprised of private 
activities that are largely untaxed, and the formal sector, comprised of state activities (including 
privatised state enterprises) that face a set of payroll taxes (Commander, Simon and 
Tolstopiatenko 1997, p.4). Moreover, they suggest that all part-time work can be considered 
informal, or ‘undeclared’, and all full-time work is formal and subject to payroll tax.
The third group of studies on the informal economy in transition countries has focused on the 
measurement of unrecorded GDP and/or tax evasion. These definitions have generally been 
narrower than those of the second group, but have nevertheless been very broad, including all 
income or production that escapes taxation or measurement and thereby encompassing both 
survival activities and large-scale tax evasion. Some have focused on measurement, while others 
have tried to explain what causes enterprises or individuals to operate informally.
Studies that have tried to measure the informal economy have arisen from a suspicion that GDP in 
the Former Soviet Union is highly undervalued and that measures of the aggregate collapse in 
output greatly overestimate the real slump in GDP (Dobozi and Pohl 1995, p. 17). Kaufinann and 
Kaliberda define the ‘unofficial’, or ‘informal’, economy as ‘the unrecorded value added by any 
deliberate misreporting or evasion by a firm or individual’ and use the ‘macro-electrical 
approach’, first applied by Dobozi and Pohl (1995), to estimate the size of the ‘unofficial’ 
economy in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. They argue that electricity consumption 
provides a good measure of overall economic activity and compare the level of income, which 
should have been produced given the level of electricity consumption, to official measures of 
national income. Their estimates suggest that in 1994, the unofficial economy accounted for 
approximately one quarter of GDP in Central and Eastern Europe and one third in the countries of 
the former Soviet Union, reaching up to 65-70% of GDP in Georgia (Kaufinann, Daniel and 
Aleksander Kaliberda 1996, p.2, A4).
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An alternative to the Kaufinann and Kaliberda (1996) model is presented by Lackd, who argues 
that household electricity consumption (rather than total electricity consumption) provides a better 
measure of the informal economy, as it permits the isolation of the structural changes during 
transition, that may be responsible for part of the increase in overall electricity consumption 
(Lackd 2000, p. 122). She adopts a definition of the ‘underground’ economy proposed by Carter 
(1984), which includes ‘activities that are assumed to be measured but escape official registration 
or measurement’ (Lackd 2000, p.l 19). Her estimates are slightly more conservative than those of 
Kaufinann and Kaliberda, with CEE countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia having 
22-23% of their national income ‘unreported’ while CIS countries such as Ukraine and Georgia 
had unofficial economies accounting for 53% and 57% of GDP respectively.
Others have tried to explain what causes enterprises to operate ‘informally’. Johnson, Kaufinann 
and Shleifer (1997a), for instance, find that high tax burden, onerous regulation and low tax 
collection are associated with large shares of unofficial activity, as well as with poor public goods 
(such as police protection and enforcement of contracts), and poorer economic growth 
performance during transition. Later, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufinann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) 
argue that in fact, entrepreneurs go underground, not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the 
burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Finally, Kolev (1998) points out that there are two 
different causes of informal employment and therefore two main categories of the informally 
employed. On the one hand, there are those who could be at ease in the regular job market, but 
who are driven into the informal sector because of the disincentive effects of the tax system, and 
on the other, those who are forced into it in order to survive in the new circumstances and cope 
with their low regular earnings (Kolev 1998, p.6).
2.5 SUMMARY
There is no consensus over what constitutes the informal sector (or economy) worldwide. In 
developing countries, the term has largely been associated with urban household enterprises 
whose main purpose is to generate income and employment for the households concerned. The 
main policy and research questions have been: (1) to what extent is the informal sector 
independent or integrated with the formal, capitalist economy? and (2) to what extent are informal 
enterprises ‘survival activities’, caused by poverty and lack of formal employment opportunities, 
or ‘potential capitalist enterprises’ that are being held in check by excessive bureaucracy and 
regulation?
59
In western industrialised countries, the term has been used interchangeably with other terms such 
as ‘black’, ‘underground’, ‘hidden’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘shadow’, etc. economy to describe all income 
or production that escapes taxation and/or GDP estimates. The focus of the debate has been on 
how to measure it. In the Soviet Union, the corresponding ‘second economy’ referred to the 
private, and often illegal, activities, which were inconsistent with the dominant ideology, and 
included activities such as small plot agricultural production, stealing from the state, speculation, 
illicit production and underground enterprises.
In transition countries, not only have other distinct definitions been used, but also there has been 
little debate per se on what constitutes the informal sector. Thus, each piece of research has 
simply used the term to define its area of interest. Although this is mainly due to the relative 
novelty of the ‘transition context’ (only thirteen years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union), it is time for a discussion on what is meant by the ‘informal’, ‘underground’, ‘unofficial’, 
or ‘shadow’ economy in the transition context. As illustrated in this review of existing literature 
the term ‘informal sector/economy’ has been used to describe an extremely wide spectrum of 
activities, which do not necessarily have much in common, including tax evasion, corruption, 
money laundering and organised crime to bribery, subsistence farming, barter, petty trade, and the 
stealing of state property. In chapter 3 I argue that such a broad term is not particularly useful for 
policy purposes and that a conceptual framework is needed to distinguish between these different 
activities.
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3MEASURING INFORMAL LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY
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The lack of consensus on the definition of the informal sector is, in part, a result of the fact that it 
has been approached by a multitude of different disciplines. The informal sector is of interest to 
labour statisticians, national accountants, legal specialists, social policy experts, anthropologists, 
macro economists, and others. Each piece of research uses the term to define its own particular 
area of interest. As we have seen, over the past thirty years, the ‘informal sector’ has been used in 
developing, western industrialised and transition countries to describe a wide spectrum of 
activities that do not necessarily have very much in common. It has referred to street vending, 
hawking, undeclared domestic work, barter, the stealing of state property, corruption, tax evasion, 
the Mafia and organised crime.
Although there is no need for a unique definition of the informal economy per se, for policy 
purposes it is important to distinguish crime and deliberate tax evasion from small-scale activities 
that individuals undertake to meet basic needs. This chapter develops a new conceptual 
framework that distinguishes between informal, underground, household and illegal activities.48
Section 3.1 makes the case for a new definition of the informal sector for transition countries that 
distinguishes between small scale activities undertaken to meet basic needs from those 
deliberately concealed from the authorities to avoid taxation or complying with certain 
regulations. Section 3.2 develops a new conceptual framework that comprises four types of 
‘hidden’ (unmeasured, untaxed and/or unregulated) activities: household, informal, underground 
and illegal activities. Section 3.3 examines how this new definition of the informal sector relates 
to other definitions in the literature. Section 3.4 presents an operational definition of the informal 
sector for the purpose of studying informal employment. It develops a typology of informal 
employment, which will be applied to the Georgian Labour Force Survey (LFS) data and form the 
basis for the empirical analysis in chapters 5 and 6. Finally, section 3.5 summarises the main 
arguments of the chapter.
3.1 WHY SO MANY DEFINITIONS AND WHY IS A NEW CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK NEEDED?
The diversity in definitions of the informal sector is a result of the fact that different units of 
observation and different criteria of informality have been used. It is possible to identify four 
main units of observation: enterprises, activities, income and individuals. Similarly, three main 
criteria used to determine informality can be identified: registration (mainly for tax and social
48 A version of this chapter has been puiblished as Bemabd (2002a).
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security purposes), measurement (in GDP statistics) and regulation (mainly labour regulation). 
The informal sector has been defined by any combination of the above units and criteria. Thus, for 
instance, it has been defined as the set of all income that escapes measurement, all enterprises that 
escape registration, all activities that escape regulation, all income that escapes registration, all 
individuals whose work escapes registration, all enterprises that escape regulation, and so forth.
Although these concepts are related, they do not necessarily define the same thing. For instance, 
the ‘registration’ (for taxation purposes) and ‘measurement’ criteria are often assumed to 
delineate the same group of observations (see for example Kaufinann, Daniel and Aleksander 
Kaliberda 1996). However, as already noted, activities that escape taxation are not necessarily 
activities that escape measurement of GDP. Moreover, only productive activities are included in 
GDP, whereas certain activities such as illegally exporting capital or concealing income on capital 
gains, are considered tax evasion but are not productive activities and therefore are not considered 
to be ‘unmeasured GDP’. Similarly, household activities such as agricultural production for own- 
consumption should be included in GDP, and would therefore be included in measures of the 
underground economy based on the measurement criterion, but are not considered part of tax 
evasion. In the same way, using income or productive activities as units does not necessarily 
measure the same thing, as certain taxable income is generated by non-productive activities such 
as capital gains.
None of these criteria or units of observation are preferable to the others per se. Different units 
and criteria may be used depending on the aim of the research. However, it is important to make a 
conceptual distinction between those unmeasured, (and/or unregistered and/or unregulated) 
activities (income, enterprises, or individuals) whose primary purpose is to meet basic needs, from 
those which are deliberately concealed to avoid taxes or regulations. This is particularly important 
in transition countries where, despite the focus of both policy and academic research on tax 
evasion, money laundering and corruption, there is increasing evidence of the existence and 
growth of an informal sector in the ‘developing country’ sense, as people turn to small-scale 
income and employment generating activities to generate livelihoods in the absence of sufficiently 
remunerated formal employment and social security (see Anderson 1998; Bemabe 2002b; Clarke 
1999a; b; Lokshin and Yemtsov 2001). By distinguishing between these two concepts, it is 
possible to analyse the extent to which these ‘informal’ income-generating activities provide a
49social-safety net, and the extent to which they undermine government revenue. This information 
will be critical for public policy, as it will allow the benefits of an increase in government revenue 
to be weighed against the risk of an increase in poverty, which would result from an attempt to
49 This question will be examined in chapter 6.
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‘tax’ or ‘eradicate’ some of these income-generating activities without providing any other form 
of social security.
The call to distinguish between the informal and the underground/hidden/unofficial sector (or 
economy) is not new. Thomas (1992; 1995), for instance, suggests that informal enterprises can 
be distinguished from irregular ones in that the latter involve the production of legal goods and 
services, but are illegal in the production or distribution process (because they evade taxes, social 
security contributions, or infringe other regulations), while the former involve legal goods and 
services and are ‘quasi-legal’ in their production or distribution process. They are ‘quasi-legaP in 
that they are undertaken ‘not to evade taxes, since their earnings are unlikely to be large enough to 
attract the tax collector, but because the authorities do not formally encourage such (activities)’ 
(Thomas 1995, p. 14).
Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) and the International Labour Office (ILO) suggest that ‘activities 
performed by production units of the informal sector are not necessarily performed with the 
deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes or social security contributions, or infringing 
labour or other legislations or administrative provisions. Accordingly the concept of informal 
sector activities should be distinguished from the concept of activities of the hidden or 
underground economy’ (Eurostat, IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank 1993, Par.5(3); ILO 1993b, 
Par.5(3); OECD 1997, p. 16). However, as we will see below, the argument presented here is for a 
distinction between informal economic activities, and underground economic activities, 
irrespective of the type of enterprise in which they take place, whereas the ILO and OECD 
distinguish between activities that take place in informal enterprises and underground activities.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also differentiates between 
‘informal work undertaken to maintain subsistence levels’ and ‘informal labour motivated by 
market incentives such as tax evasion or the business environment’ (EBRD 2000, p. 102). It 
suggests that informal work has played a crucial role in the provision of employment and earnings 
for many people during the transition period but that the driving forces have differed across 
regions, with the poorer countries motivated by the lack of formal opportunities and a need to 
survive while in the more advanced countries the motivation has been more market-related 
including tax evasion and avoidance of bureaucratic delays and impediments (EBRD 2000, p.97).
Finally, it is important to note that the use of motive (or intent) to differentiate between activities 
is common practice in both law and economics. As Cowell (1990, p. 11-12) points out, from a 
legal perspective the distinction between (illegal) evasion and (legal but questionable) avoidance
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relies on the judge’s perception of the intentions underlying the taxpayer’s actions. Motive also 
plays an important part in the construction of models of economic behaviour and Cowell suggests 
that evasion and avoidance can be distinguished on the basis of motive and therefore also differ in 
economic behaviour.
3.2 THE HIDDEN ECONOMY: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INFORMAL, 
HOUSEHOLD, UNDERGROUND AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
Although the distinction between informal and underground activities is the subtlest, it is also 
important to distinguish between other forms of non-measured, non-taxed, and/or non-regulated 
activities. Several authors have argued that a distinction can be made between household, 
informal, underground, and illegal activities50 (Commission of the European Communities - 
Eurostat, et al. 1993; ILO 1993b; Thomas 1992). However, most of these conceptual frameworks 
have based their definition of the informal sector on that adopted by the 15th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILO 1993b). As argued below, this enterprise-based 
definition is not necessarily appropriate for transition countries where there has been a growing 
informalisation of the labour market, which is not entirely captured by the ILO (1993b) concept of 
‘informal enterprises’.
Since the informal sector is associated with unmeasured activities, it is useful to use the 
conceptual framework of the system of national accounts. I propose to build on concepts defined 
in the 1993 Eurostat, IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank ‘System of National Accounts’ (hereon 
referred to as SNA 1993). As explained above the units and criteria used to define informality are 
related, but not identical. 51 The choice of units and criteria ultimately depends on the reason for 
which the informal sector or economy is being studied. Here I do not attempt to argue that one 
unit or criterion is preferred to the others, but rather to present a broad conceptual framework, 
which can be used to distinguish between household, informal, underground or illegal sectors 
regardless of the units or criteria used to define them. It is important to highlight from the outset 
that the framework must therefore remain quite broad and that it is impossible (and unrealistic) to 
define strict boundaries between these sectors. The sectors overlap and for certain activities, 
persons, enterprises, or income, it may be difficult to determine whether they belong to one sector
50 Not all have used the same terminology (e.g. Thomas distinguishes between household, informal, irregular, and 
criminal production), but the broad concepts are the same.
51 Recall that four main units o f observation (enterprises, activities, income and individuals) and three main criteria 
(non-registration, non-measurement, and non-regulation) were identified.
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or another. However, this does not deprive us of an understanding of what constitutes the bulk of 
the sectors.
Moreover, here the use of the term ‘sector’ refers only to the grouping of similar activities, 
enterprises, individuals, or income along certain lines for the purpose of measurement and 
research and in no way implies that these groupings are independent of one another. In fact, as 
much of the research in developing countries has shown, there is a continuum, not only between 
informal and formal activities, but also between household, informal, underground and illegal 
activities. However, for policy, measurement and analytical purposes it is important to distinguish 
between them. Finally, it is possible, if so desired, to make the sectors mutually exclusive by 
simply starting with one sector and defining each subsequent one as including that, which is not 
included in the previous ones. So, for example, starting with the household sector, the informal 
sector could be defined as the set of activities, enterprises, income or persons, which satisfy 
certain characteristics, and which are, by definition, not part of the household sector, and so on.
I adopt the term ‘hidden economy ’ to refer to the output from all productive activities, 
enterprises, income or individuals which are (a) unmeasured in GDP and/or (b) untaxed 
and/or(c) unregulated. In order to simplify the discussion I refer only to ‘productive economic 
activities’, but any of the other units of observations could be used. The important thing is how 
the sectors can be distinguished from one another. Also note that any of the criteria 
(measurement, registration, regulation) could be used alone or together, depending on the 
purpose.
Thus the hidden economy comprises a wide range of productive activities from housework to 
organised crime. These can be grouped into four main categories: the household sector, the 
informal sector, the underground sector and the illegal sector.
The household sector is defined as the set o f household productive economic activities that 
produce goods and services for own-consumption within the same household and, which are (a) 
unmeasured and/or (b) untaxed and/or(c) unregulated because they are outside the SNA 
production boundary (e.g. household cleaning, maintenance and repair o f  dwelling occupied by
the household, preparation and serving o f  meals, care for the sick or elderly, transportation o f
52household members and their goods, etc).
52 Productive economic activities are activities, which fall within the general production boundary, as defined by the 
1993 SNA. They must satisfy two important criteria: (1) they are ‘carried out under the control and responsibility o f an 
institutional unit that uses inputs o f labour, capital, and goods and services to produce outputs of goods and services’. 
Thus, ‘a purely natural process without any human involvement or direction’ such as unmanaged growth of fish stocks
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According to the SNA (1993) household activities producing goods for own-consumption are 
only included in the SNA production boundary ‘if the amount produced is believed to be 
quantitatively significant in relation to the total supply of that good in the country’ (SNA 1993: 
6.25). Thus, in developing and transition countries, activities such as agricultural production for 
own-consumption (which often represents a significant share of total national agricultural 
production) are included in the SNA. These activities are therefore excluded from the definition 
of the household sector and, as will be argued below, they are considered part of the informal 
sector. Thus here the household sector includes those activities that fall within the general 
production boundary but not within the SNA production boundary.
This definition of the household sector is different from that adopted by the SNA (1993) and 
Thomas (1992), which include all household production for own-consumption in the household 
sector (regardless of how quantitatively significant it may be). The main reason they do this is that 
both adopt the ILO (1993) concept of the informal sector, which by definition excludes household 
production for own-consumption (ILO 1993b, par. 14). However, as will be argued in detail 
below, household production for own consumption should be included in the informal sector, 
because it is included in the SNA, and because it is a very important source of employment, 
income and production in many transition and developing countries. Moreover, for public policy 
purposes, it should be distinguished from other household activities such as cleaning and cooking, 
which are not included in the SNA.
Finally, some authors have argued for the inclusion of non-quantitatively significant household 
activities in the SNA, particularly in developing countries where they may contribute 
considerably to livelihoods (see for example Harrison 2000, p. 46-47). Since there are market 
alternatives to activities such as taking care of the old or the sick and education, then only 
including services that are paid for in national income means that equivalent activities, which take
in international waters is not included, whereas the activity of fish fanning is (SNA 1993 : 6.15). (2) The output must be 
capable o f being exchanged. Thus activities such as eating drinking, sleeping, taking exercise, etc. are not included as 
‘it is impossible for one person to obtain another person to perform them instead’, whereas activities such as washing, 
preparing meals, caring for children, the sick or aged are all activities that can be provided by other units and therefore 
fall within the general production boundary’ (SNA 1993: 6.16).
The SNA Production Boundary, as defined by the 1993 SNA, defines those productive economic activities that should 
be included in GDP estimates. Regarding the production o f goods and services within the household, it specifies that 
production of goods within the household should be included in GDP if  the amount produced is believed to be 
quantitatively significant in relation to the total supply o f that good in the country (1993 SNA:6.25). Production of 
services is generally excluded from GDP ‘with the exception o f own-account production o f housing services by own- 
occupier, and o f domestic and personal services produced by employing paid domestic staff (1993SNA:6.18). 
Productive activities which fall within the SNA production boundary are classified in the latest revision o f the UN 
‘International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Third Revision’ (1989). An 
equivalent classification is provided by Eurostat for the European Union in the ‘Statistical Classification o f Economic 
Activities in the European Community (NACE Rev. 1) (1996b).
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place within the household, are counted as costless. In developing and transition countries where 
social services are extremely limited and incomes are very low, household activities are an 
important source of income and employment for a significant share of the population. In the UK, 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) is developing a so-called ‘household satellite account’ 
which will, for the first time, measure and value the outputs produced by households, including 
housing, transport, nutrition, clothing, childcare, adult care and so forth (Office for National 
Statistics UK 2002).
The informal sector is defined as the set o f productive economic activities, which fall within the 
SNA (1993) production boundary, and are (a) unmeasured, and/or (b) untaxed and/or (c) 
unregulated, not because o f  deliberate attempts to evade the payment o f  taxes or infringe labour 
or other legislation, but because they are undertaken to meet basic needs (e.g. petty trade, 
household agricultural production, ambulant street vending, unregistered taxi services — with 
own car, rickshaw or other means o f  transportation, undeclared paid domestic employment, etc).
As previously mentioned, the ILO (1993) (and thereby the SNA 1993) also argue for the need to 
distinguish informal sector activities from underground activities on the basis that the former are 
not necessarily performed with the deliberate intention of avoiding the payment of taxes, social 
security contributions, or complying with certain legal standards, while the latter are. However, 
there is a fundamental difference in the conception of the informal sector presented here and the 
ILO (1993) definition: The ILO (1993) definition is based on units (or enterprises), while the one 
presented here is based on productive activities, irrespective of the units (or enterprises) in which 
they are carried out.
The ILO (1993) ‘Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector’ defines 
the informal sector as the set of ‘units engaged in the production of goods or services with the 
primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned’ (ILO 1993b, 
5(1)). Production units of the informal sector are defined as a subset of household unincorporated 
enterprises. Household enterprises are
‘units engaged in the production of goods or services which are not constituted as 
separate legal entities independently of the households or household members 
that own them, and for which no complete set of accounts (including balance 
sheets of assets and liabilities) are available which would permit a clear 
distinction of the production activities of the enterprises from the other activities 
of their owners and the identification of any flows of income and capital between 
the enterprise and the owners’ (ILO 1993b, 7).
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The informal sector definition presented here differs from the ILO (1993b) definition in three 
main ways. First of all, in the ILO definition, activities undertaken in informal sector enterprises 
can theoretically be ‘underground’ (i.e. undertaken with the deliberate intent of evading taxes etc.) 
but they generally are not, because the ‘primary objective (of informal sector enterprises) is to 
generate income and employment to the persons concerned (ILO 1993b, 5(1)). In contrast, in the 
concept of the informal sector presented here, informal activities are by definition not 
underground, although it may at times be difficult to know which of the two categories a given 
activity may belong to (see figure 3.1 below). Thus, defining the informal sector in terms of 
productive activities instead of enterprises is conceptually more consistent with the SNA (1993) 
concepts of underground, household and illegal productive activities, and therefore enables the 
conceptualisation of the hidden economy as being comprised of these four largely distinct 
concepts.
Secondly the definition presented here includes all productive activities that are unregistered, 
unprotected by labour and other legislation, unmeasured, and generally outside the formal legal 
system, and not just those that take place in units with certain characteristics. Informal productive 
activities, can take place in informal, formal, non-informal household, or other enterprises. The 
type o f unit in which they take place does not determine whether or not they are informal. This is 
important because it means that all persons engaging in such activities are considered informally 
employed, including casual workers in formal enterprises, contributing family workers in other 
household or formal enterprises, and all other unregistered workers who are not protected by 
labour regulations (such as minimum wage requirements, maximum hours of work, paid holidays, 
protection against dismissal, etc.) and have no access to social protection (such as pensions, health 
and other insurances). As previously mentioned, this is particularly important in transition
53countries (but also in developing countries and to some extent developed countries ) where there 
has been a growing informalisation of the labour market with an increase in self-employment, 
subcontracting, and moonlighting (to supplement official wages and pensions, which are often 
only a fraction of the minimum subsistence level).
Indeed, since its ‘conception’ the informal sector has been of interest in developing countries 
because it is an important source of income and employment for the poor. It is a survival strategy 
in countries where there are insufficient formal employment opportunities, where wages may be 
too low to cover the cost of living, and where social safety nets such as unemployment or pension
53 The literature on the informalisation of employment in western industrialised countries looks at whether the growth 
o f ‘self-employment’ is a positive or negative phenomenon. Some have argued that it is a sign of the efficiency, 
flexibility and adaptability of the labour market, while others see it as an increase in precarious, unprotected
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benefits are either lacking or also insufficient to cover the cost of living. As such, it should 
include all productive activities, which generate income and employment for the poor, and not 
just those that take place in household enterprises with certain characteristics.
Thirdly, the ILO (1993) resolution excludes household production of goods and services for own 
final use. In contrast, the definition presented here includes these activities as long as they are part 
of the SNA production boundary. As previously mentioned, goods are included in the SNA 
production boundary if they are quantitatively significant in relation to the total supply of that 
good in the country. In practice, in transition countries this generally means the inclusion of the 
production of agricultural goods for the household’s final use, as many other goods produced by 
households, such as clothing and housing, constitute a very small fraction of the total production 
of these goods in these countries. For services, it includes the personal services produced by 
employing paid domestic staff and the own-account production of housing services by the owner- 
occupier.
No explanation was provided by the 1993 ‘Resolution concerning statistics of employment in the 
informal sector’ for the exclusion of household activities producing for own consumption. 
However in both transition and developing countries, household agricultural production for own 
consumption constitutes not only an essential source of income and employment for a large share 
of the population, but also an important share of total agricultural production. Moreover, primary 
employment in household agricultural production for own-consumption does not differ in 
economic behaviour from that in other informal activities, as all are undertaken to generate 
income to meet basic needs. Finally, small-plot agricultural production has been a significant 
source of ‘extra income’ for households in transition countries since the Soviet period, and as we 
have seen there is evidence that with the collapse in living standards, many have turned to 
subsistence agriculture to survive.
The concepts of underground and illegal production used here are those defined in the SNA 
(1993).
The underground sector consists o f  legal productive economic activities54 that are part o f  the 
SNA (1993) production boundary and are(a) unmeasured and/or (b) untaxed and or(c) 
unregulated because they are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following 
kind o f  reasons: to avoid the payment o f  income, value added or other taxes; to avoid the payment
employment, arguing that people become ‘independent contractors’ because they lose or cannot retain full-time wage 
employment with accompanying benefits (see for example Dennis 1996).
54 They are legal provided that certain standards or regulations are complied with.
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o f social security contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum 
wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc.; to avoid complying with certain 
administrative procedures such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative 
forms (SNA1993: 6.34) (e.g. most cases o f  tax evasion and benefit fraud).
The illegal sector consists o f productive activities that generate goods and services forbidden by 
law or that are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised producers. There are two types o f  
illegal activities: (a) those that produce goods and services whose sale, distribution or possession 
is forbidden by law, and (b) activities which are usually legal, but become illegal when carried 
out by unauthorised producers (SNA 1993: 6.30) (e.g. production o f  narcotics, illegal 
transportation in the form o f smuggling, prostitution and unlicensed medical practice). 
Furthermore illegal activities are included in the SNA production boundary if the transactions 
involved are based on mutual consent. Thus, for instance, prostitution is included but theft is not 
(OECD 1997, p.12).55
The table below provides a convenient summary of the conceptual framework. It is important to 
consider that the three criteria used here to distinguish between the different sectors are not the 
only ones that determine whether an activity is informal, underground or other.56 They are just 
used here to help the reader recall what has been broadly conceptualised as the household, 
informal, underground and illegal sectors.
55 The SNA (1993) recognises that it may be difficult to determine whether there is mutual consent (e.g. does bribery 
involve mutual consent?).
36 For example, it does not include lack of measurement, registration and regulation as criteria. Nor does it include 
activities that are illegal because they are carried out by unauthorised producers.
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Table 3.1 Summary o f the Conceptual Framework
Productive
activities
Within the SNA 
(1993) 
production 
boundary?
Are goods and 
services legal?
Primary reason why activity is 
unmeasured/untaxed/unregulated?
Household No Yes Irrelevant*
Informal Yes Yes Activities undertaken to meet basic needs, not 
deliberately concealed.
Underground Yes Yes Activities deliberately concealed to avoid taxes, social 
security contributions, legal standards, compliance 
with administrative procedures, etc.
Illegal Yes No Irrelevant
* The primary reason why household and illegal activities are unmeasured is irrelevant to their classification in the 
household or illegal sector, as this is determined by whether or not they are within the SNA production boundary and 
whether or not they are legal.
As can very quickly be seen, the borderline between household, informal, underground and illegal 
sectors may not be very clear, and activities may often belong to more than one sector. Figure 3.1 
illustrates how these sectors are interrelated.
Figure 3.1 The relationship between informal, household, underground and illegal activities
Underground
sector
Illegal sector
Informal
sector
Household
Sector
As can be seen, it may not be obvious whether an activity is part of the household or informal 
sector (area A in figure 3.1). Subsistence farming, for instance, may be considered part of the 
household sector if it is not quantitatively significant in respect to total agricultural production (as 
may be the case in many western industrialised countries), whereas it may be part of the informal 
sector if it is quantitatively significant (as is the case in many developing and some transition 
countries). Similarly, it may be difficult to determine whether an activity is part of the illegal,
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* household, or informal sectors (area B). The cultivation of poppy seeds on household plots for 
instance, could be considered as any of the three depending on whether household production of 
poppy seeds is quantitatively significant with respect to the total poppy seed production in the 
country, whether it is undertaken to meet basic needs, and whether it is considered illegal in that 
particular country. The boundary is similarly difficult to define between informal and 
underground and between underground and illegal activities. Construction activities undertaken 
by unregistered construction workers, for instance, may be considered informal or underground 
(area C), depending on whether or not they are deliberately concealed and whether they are 
undertaken to meet basic needs (they could of course be both). Finally, as highlighted in the SNA 
(1993, 6.35), production that does not comply with certain safety, health or other standards, for 
instance, could be described as either underground or illegal (area D).
Having said this, however, it is important to reiterate that what is critical is the conceptual 
distinction between these activities. The sectors are not required to be mutually exclusive in order 
to understand what types of activities constitute the bulk of each sector.
3.3 HOW DOES THIS NEW DEFINITION OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR RELATE TO
THOSE IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE?
Table 3.2 provides a simplified summary of the conceptual framework and its relation to 
definitions of the informal sector in the existing literature. Once again, it is important to clarify 
that this table is neither a precise recapitulation of the conceptual framework proposed in this 
thesis, and nor is it a summary of the definitions in developing, industrialised, centrally planned or 
transition countries. For the purpose of simplicity, the table is based on only one unit of 
observation (economic activities) and one criteria of informality (lack of measurement). 
Moreover, as in table 3.1, it uses only three criteria to distinguish between household, informal, 
underground and illegal activities (position with respect to the SNA production boundary; legality
57of goods and services produced; and primary reason for which the activity is unmeasured). 
Finally, it only represents the ‘main’ or ‘stereotypical’ definitions in each of these regions 
although, as we have seen, there is great heterogeneity in informal sector definitions in all regions.
According to the conceptual framework presented here, the informal sector is represented in table 
3.2 by the sum of cells 2. 3 and 4 (i.e. the area with vertical lines). The underground sector is the
57 Note that this table is not exhaustive. Another reason why activities may be unmeasured is because o f statistical error 
for instance. However it is not included here as it is not relevant to the distinction between household, informal, 
underground, and illegal activities.
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sum of cells 5. 6. 7. the illegal sector is the sum of cells 8.9.10. and the household sector is 
represented by cell 1 (e.g. cooking, cleaning, caring for the sick etc). Note that for OECD (1997) 
and Thomas (1992) the household sector would be represented by cells 1 and 3 (i.e. they include 
all activities aimed at producing goods and services for own-consumption, including those that are 
in the SNA production boundary, such as subsistence agriculture in many developing and 
transition countries).
Definitions in 'developing' countries can be illustrated by the ILO (1993) definition, which can 
broadly be represented in table 2 by the sum of cells 2. 5. 8 (i.e. the area with horizontal lines). In 
this case, the informal sector is the set of informal own-account enterprises and enterprises of 
informal employers. As we have seen, according to this definition, activities undertaken in the 
informal sector can theoretically be underground or illegal (cells 5 and 8)
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Table 3.2: Comparing the conceptual framework to other definitions o f the informal sector in the literature
Types o f Enterprises or units
Unincorporated
Other
(i.e. corporations, quasi-corporations, 
non-profit institutions)
Household
Non Household (e.g. 
government)
Unmeasured economic activities
In SNA production boundary
Out o f SNA 
production boundary Legal Illegal
Aim is to meet 
basic needs
Deliberately concealed to 
avoid tax or regulation
Informal own-account enterprises or 
Enterprises of informal employers
Other (e.g. household enterprises 
producing for own-consumption)
Notes: Cells shaded in black represent activities that, by definition, do not exist. Cells that are blank do exist, but are outside o f  the conceptual framework o f  this thesis. In this conceptual 
framework, the household sector =  (1); the informal sector =  (2)+ (3)+ (4); the underground sector = (5)+ (6)+ (7) and  the illegal sector =  (8) + (9)+ (10).
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Definitions in *developed ’ countries can broadly be represented by the sum of  cells 2 to 10. This 
includes all activities that should be measured, taxed or regulated, because they fall within the 
SNA production boundary, but are not. Note that it may also include other activities such as the 
evasion of taxes on capital gains, which we cannot represent in our matrix because they are not 
productive economic activities.
As we have seen, definitions in transition countries have been extremely varied. In the literature 
review, studies were grouped into three categories, which can very broadly be represented in the 
table above. Definitions used by studies that have focused on how people survive during 
transition, can be represented by any combination of cells 2 and 3. Those which have focused on 
measuring untaxed or unmeasured GDP have defined it as any combination of cells 2 to 10 plus 
some other non-productive activities such as capital flight. Finally, those which have focused on 
the transformation of the Soviet second economy into the informal economy are even more 
difficult to represent in the above table as they have included all private sector activity, which 
could include cells 2.3.5.6.8.9 and those parts of cells 4.7 and 10 which are in the private sector 
plus other non-productive activities such as theft, bribery and capital flight.
Finally, definitions in centrally planned countries are equally difficult to illustrate in the above 
table and could be represented by the same cells as those of the above group that adopted second 
economy definitions.
3.4 MOVING TOWARD AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF THE INFORMAL
SECTOR
In order to measure and study the informal sector, the conceptual definition must be made 
operational. The way it is operationalised will depend on the measurement objectives. Thus, for 
example, if the aim is to measure or analyze informal employment, then labour force surveys can 
be used and the definition can be operationalised based on status in employment. If the aim is to 
measure the production of the informal economy, it may be more appropriate to use household 
income and expenditure surveys and to adopt an operational framework based on productive 
units.
The aim of this thesis is to examine informal labour market activity and to this end the conceptual 
definition of the informal sector developed above can now be operationalised to identify 
individuals that are engaging in such activities through the Georgia Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data. I begin by developing a typology of informal employment, which is relevant for transition
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countries in general. Based on this typology, I devise an operational definition that can be applied 
to the Georgian LFS.
3.4.1 A typology of informal employment
If existing data is to be used to obtain a measure of informal employment in the country, 
assumptions will have to be made. In particular, assumptions must be made as to what types of 
activities can be considered to be undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’. One way to operationalise the
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definition is to use status in employment as a proxy. It is therefore assumed that individuals 
engaging in certain types of employment can be considered to be engaging in productive activities 
which are unmeasured and/or untaxed and/or unregulated not because they are deliberately 
concealed to evade the payment of taxes or to avoid complying with certain laws and regulations, 
but because of a necessity to generate income and employment to meet basic needs.
The typology of informal employment presented here includes individuals with the following 
status in either their primary or secondary jobs: (1) own-account workers and employers in
5 9
household enterprises ; (2) contributing family workers; (3) non-regular employees; (4) others 
employed casually, temporarily or seasonally; and (5) employees engaging in left-hand work (or 
the earning of informal income at the formal workplace).60
Own-account workers and employers in household enterprises are essentially those employed in 
the traditional ILO ‘informal sector’, although as argued above, it also includes production for 
own-final use (such as small-plot agricultural production). These are ‘informal own-account 
workers’ or ‘informal employers’ as defined in ILO (1993b). Contributing family workers are 
also, by definition, employed in household enterprises. Both these groups can be assumed to be 
unregistered, unmeasured and unregulated, not because of a deliberate attempt to evade taxation 
but because are simply generating income and employment for the household.61
58 The ILO (1993a, (4)) ‘International Classification o f Status in Employment’ classifies the employed into 6 groups: 
employees, employers, own-account workers, members o f producers’ co-operatives, contributing family workers, and 
workers not classifiable by status.
59 It is important not to confuse household enterprises with the household sector. Household enterprises are not 
necessarily part of the household sector as defined here (they are only part o f the household sector if they produce for 
own consumption and the product is not quantitatively significant). See section 3.2 for the definition of household 
enterprises.
60 Bemabd Krstic’ and Reilly (2003) and Yemtsov (2001) classify individuals who are inactive or unemployed but live 
in households whose members engage in their own enterprise or own land, as informally employed. In appendix A3 we 
argue that this assumption is incorrect in the case of Georgia and show how some o f the results of the empirical analysis 
o f this thesis would be affected if  such an assumption were made.
61 The EBRD (2000, p. 102) also considers contributing family work as informal employment, undertaken to maintain 
subsistence levels.
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Non-regular employees do not satisfy the conditions of ‘regular employment’ as defined by the 
ILO (1993a). Regular employees have ‘stable contracts, for whom the employing organisation is 
responsible for payment of relevant taxes and social security contributions and/or where the 
contractual relationship is subject to national labour legislation’ (ILO 1993a, par.8, 9). In contrast 
to western industrialised countries, where many of those employed ‘under the table’, may be 
doing so to deliberately avoid the payment of taxes, in many developing and transition countries, 
these are often low-skilled, low-paid workers, who work under such contracts because of a 
necessity to meet basic needs (this is arguably also the case in western industrialised countries). 
Both the Georgian Labour Force data and Clarke (1999c) show that non-regular paid employees, 
in Georgia and Russia respectively, are largely employed in low-skilled skilled jobs such as tea or 
bread manufacturing and petty trade.
It can, of course be argued, that their employers are involved in ‘underground’ activities, because 
they may be deliberately avoiding the payment of taxes and social security contributions. 
However, evidence from the Georgia Labour Force data (1999) and from Clarke (1999c) suggests 
that non-regular agreements are often used in small-scale family enterprises, and often for friends, 
partners or relatives, not because they are ‘a means of evading the restrictions of labour 
legislation, but because they are appropriate in very small, informally organised businesses, 
particularly in the sphere of trade’ (Clarke 1999c, p. 12-13). Casual, temporary and seasonal 
workers in transition countries can also be assumed to be informal in that it can quite safely be 
assumed that they do not have ‘regular contracts’ and that those who engage in such precarious 
employment do so to meet basic needs.
Finally, as previously discussed, research and anecdotal evidence suggests that left-hand work, 
which was widespread during the Soviet period, has increased since the beginning of transition. 
These activities should be considered informal, as they are unregistered and unaccounted for not 
because of a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of taxes but because of a necessity to meet 
basic needs. As Birdsall highlights, activities such as the overcharging of customers, the 
pocketing of fees for official services or the diversion of clientele from the firm are as vital to 
livelihood as formal wages and can constitute a significant part of worker’s earnings (Birdsall 
2000, p.l). Left-hand work is regarded as a way in which people ‘get by’ in the absence of 
sufficient formal income; ‘their small-scale allows the practitioner to ‘tread water’ but not get 
ahead’ (Birdsall 2000, p.3).
This typology is distinct from the ILO operational definition in five significant ways. First, as 
discussed extensively above, it includes all forms of vulnerable, invisible, precarious ‘informal’ 
employment and not only that which takes place in ‘informal sector enterprises’. Second, it
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includes left-hand work, or the earning of informal income at the formal work place. Third, as we 
have seen, it includes employment in the production of goods and services for own consumption 
(in practice this means agricultural production for own-consumption and paid domestic 
employment).
Fourth, it includes employment in agriculture. The ILO (1993:16) excluded agricultural activities 
from the informal sector ‘for practical reasons’. It had no objection to their inclusion from a 
conceptual point of view, but from an operational one it deemed that it would be inconvenient to 
include them in the informal sector, as agriculture represents such an important share of 
employment in developing countries and it would therefore be very expensive to cover 
agricultural activities in informal sector surveys. However, precisely because it is such an 
important source of (largely informal) employment in developing and in the poorer transition 
countries and because it has proved to be one of the main strategies employed by households to 
cope with the fall in living standards in many transition countries, it is argued here that agriculture 
should be included.
Fifth, whereas the large majority of informal sector studies using the ILO (1993) operational 
framework have included only the urban sector, both rural and urban employment is included 
here. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the ILO 1993 Resolution explicitly states that both 
urban and rural activities should be included. However, as with agriculture, it recommends that 
given that the informal sector is so widespread in rural areas, and that it may be very expensive to 
carry out surveys across both urban and rural areas, countries could start by measuring the urban 
informal sector (ILO 1993b, para. 14).
3.4.2 The operational definition
To apply the typology of informal employment to the Georgia Labour Force survey, proxies must
be used for ‘household enterprises’, ‘non-regular employment’, and ‘left-hand work’. First,
location is used as a proxy for ‘unincorporated household enterprises’ rather than ‘registration’ or
62‘number of employees below a certain number’, as per the ILO (1993) definition. Thus own- 
account workers and employers in household enterprises include: (1) own-account workers or 
employers whose business is located at home, outside home, in a street booth, on a construction
62 The ILO (1993) operational definition o f the informal sector consists o f household enterprises that are either (1) 
informal ‘own-account enterprises’ or ‘enterprises o f informal employers’. The first are operated by own-account 
workers and can employ contributing family workers and employees, however they do not employ employees on a 
continuous basis. The second employ one or more employees on a continuous basis. For operational purposes, all own- 
account workers are usually included as are employers operating enterprises, which are unregistered or employ less than 
a maximum number o f workers (usually 4-10).
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site, in a market place, at a customer’s home or in a non-fixed location63 (2) own-account workers 
or employers whose business takes place in a factory, office, establishment, shop, workshop, etc. 
which is independent from the home and is not registered, and (3) own-account workers or 
employers working on their own or rented plot of land, in agriculture, either in an urban area or in 
a non-registered rural enterprise.
Location is used as a proxy for household enterprises in the case of the Georgian Labour Force 
data because the question on registration is not particularly meaningful. Over 90% of own- 
account workers said they were ‘registered’. However, qualitative research and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that in some cases this may refer to the payment of some kind of local licence 
fee (to obtain a permit to sell in a market for instance), while in others it refers to the payment of 
bribes to local police, sanitary inspectors, tax inspectors, and local racketeers.64 However, in 
neither of these cases does the ILO ‘registration criterion’ apply, since it refers to registration 
under national legislation, such as under ‘factory or commercial acts, tax or social security laws, 
professional groups regulatory acts, or similar acts, laws or regulations established by national 
legislative bodies’ (ILO 1993b, :8.(3)). The OECD (1997) also argues that it is inappropriate to 
define the informal sector in transition countries according to legal status or to the relation with 
public authorities since most of these countries lack business laws and regulations and the means 
to enforce them.
Similarly, identifying informal enterprises by the number of employees (less than 4 - which is 
generally the lowest number used in such cases) is also inappropriate, as over 97% of own- 
account workers and employers work in enterprises with less than 4 people (including owners, 
employees, unpaid workers and casual workers). It would therefore amount to including all own- 
account workers and employers and it could be argued that it would also include professionals 
(doctors, lawyers, accountants) etc. who could have relatively high incomes and intentionally 
conceal their activities to avoid the payment of taxes. The most appropriate proxy for household 
enterprises in the Georgia Labour Force Survey is therefore location.65
63 The omitted (formal) categoiy is “at a factory, office, establishment, shop, workshop, etc. independent from home”.
64 As an example of these ‘unofficial’ taxes, Dudwick (1999, p.29) relates: ‘to sell Khachapuri, a cheese pastry, in the 
market, Gayane pays the tax inspector 50 Lari (US$25) and the director o f the market 120 Lari (US$60) each month.
65 However, as can be seen in the operational framework below, the registration criterion is used for employers and 
own-account workers working in ‘non-household’ locations such as offices, factories, establishments, etc. (although 
they only represent 0.03% of total employment). Registration is also used to identify informal rural agricultural own- 
account workers and employers. This is because the data suggests that agricultural workers who say their enterprise is 
located ‘at home’ rather than ‘on a plot of land’ are less likely to be registered. This suggests that these could be, 
smaller, subsistence ‘garden plots’. We also include own-account workers and employers engaging in urban agriculture 
for similar reasons. Since own-account work in agriculture accounts for more than half of total employment in Georgia 
(Bemabd 2002b), it is important to identify the more vulnerable and precariously employed. To this end, lack of 
registration and urban setting appear to be meaningful criteria. However we could also have included all own-account 
workers in agriculture.
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Second, ‘employees with an oral agreement’ is used as a proxy for ‘non-regular employees’. In 
many transition countries, including Georgia and Russia, oral employment agreements are illegal. 
Although in most western industrialised countries the law regards oral employment contracts as 
legally binding and therefore offers employees hired on the basis of oral agreements the same 
protection as those hired under written agreements, in most CIS countries (including Russia and 
Georgia), oral agreements have no legal force and those employed under such agreements have no 
protection under the labour code (Clarke 1999c, p. 8). Moreover, employment based on an oral 
agreement is unregistered and therefore employers will not pay any of the taxes and social 
security payments required by the law.
Finally, left-hand work is omitted from the operational definition as it is problematic to 
operationalise. Not only are there no questions in the Georgia Labour Force Survey that would 
permit the identification of individuals engaging in informal income-earning activities at the 
formal work place, but also even if there were such questions, responses may not be reliable, as 
individuals are likely to be reluctant to disclose such information. One possible way of analysing 
such activities would be to use the existing literature to identify occupations that typically give 
rise to opportunities for left-hand work and to analyse the income-consumption gap of individuals 
employed in these occupations. This could be the topic for future research. However, left-hand 
work is perhaps best studied by qualitative means.
The operational framework presented below provides a detailed, step-by-step flowchart of how 
the informally employed are identified in the Georgia Labour Force Survey (1999). For the 
purposes of analysis and presentation, the informally employed are grouped into five major 
categories: (1) informal self-employed: own-account workers and employers working in 
household enterprises66 (categories PI a to PId + P2a to P2d), (2) contributing family workers 
(P3), (3) informal employees: employees with oral agreements, and employees employed casually 
or temporarily (P4+P5) (4) other informals: others (including members of producers co­
operatives) working either casually, temporarily or in typically informal activities
67(P6+P7a+P7b), and (5) informal secondary jobholders: workers with formal primary jobs and 
informal secondary jobs (SI to S7b).
66 Own-account workers are merged with employers because employers accounted for only 1.5% o f total employment 
and ‘informal’ employers accounted for only 0.7% o f total employment in 1999.
67 Members o f producer’s co-operatives and those with unidentified status in employment are not asked about the 
location of their work. Casual/temporary/seasonal employment is therefore used as a criterion of informality as well as 
whether the individuals are involved in activities or occupations for which more than 50% of workers are informal. This
81
In the framework below P and S refer to Primary and Secondary employment. We consider all 
those with an informal primary job or with a formal primary job and an informal secondary job to 
be informally employed. Primary employment is checked first. If primary employment is not 
informal, then secondary employment is checked, thereby avoiding any double counting.
group represents a very small share of total employment. Overall, others informally employed’ account for only 0.8% 
o f total employment.
Figure 3.2 Informal employment: checking primary job
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Figure 3.3 Informal employment: checking second job
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3.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented a conceptual framework for the analysis of the informal sector in 
countries in transition. Chapter 2 revealed that there is no consensus worldwide over what 
constitutes the informal sector. In transition countries, not only has the term been interpreted 
differently, but also there has been no real discussion on what constitutes the informal sector; each 
individual piece of research has simply used the term to define its own area of interest. Thus the 
‘informal’ (‘underground’, ‘unofficial’, or ‘shadow’, etc.) economy has included an extremely 
wide spectrum of activities such as tax evasion, corruption, money laundering, organised crime, 
bribery, subsistence farming, barter, petty trade, and the stealing of state property.
This chapter argued that although there is no need for a unique definition of the informal economy 
per se, for policy purposes it is important to distinguish small-scale income and employment- 
generating activities, which are undertaken to meet basic needs in the absence of formal 
employment opportunities and social protection, from those which are deliberately concealed 
from the authorities for the purpose of evading taxes or not complying with certain regulations. 
Building on the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA), it developed a new conceptual 
framework for the ‘hidden economy’ that distinguished between four types of unregistered, 
unmeasured and/or unregulated activities: (1) 'informal ’ activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet 
basic needs’ and are within the SNA production boundary; (2) ‘underground’ activities, which are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid either the payment of taxes or compliance 
with certain regulations; (3) illegal activities, which generate goods and services forbidden by the 
law or which are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised producers; and (4) household 
activities, which produce goods and services for own-consumption and are outside the SNA 
production boundary.
Given the focus of this thesis on informal labour market activity, a typology of informal 
employment was presented for transition countries, which consisted of the following status in 
either the primary or secondary job: (1) own-account workers and employers in household 
enterprises (2) contributing family workers (3) non-regular employees (i.e. employees without 
stable contracts that ensure that the employing organization pays taxes and social security 
contributions), (4) others employed casually, temporarily or seasonally and (5) employees 
engaging in left-hand work (or the earning of informal income at the formal workplace).
This typology was then operationalised with an aim to identify individuals engaging in informal 
labour market activities through the Georgian LFS. The operational definition, which will form 
the basis for the empirical analysis of chapters 5 and 6 is the following: (1) informal self-
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employed: own-account workers and employers working in household enterprises’ (2) 
contributing family workers, (3) informal employees: employees with oral agreements, and 
employees employed casually or temporarily, (4) other informals: others (including members of 
producers co-operatives) working either casually, temporarily or in typically informal activities, 
and (5) informal secondary jobholders: workers with formal primary jobs and informal secondary 
jobs.
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4GEORGIA’S LABOUR MARKET
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapters 2 and 3 presented the theoretical core of the thesis. This chapter introduces the empirical 
analysis. It represents the first in-depth study of Georgia’s labour market since the beginning of 
the transition period.68 Its aim is to provide a general understanding of the characteristics and 
main issues with respect to the labour market in Georgia It also examines one of the main 
questions of this thesis, namely whether the predictions regarding the role of unemployment in 
some models of the transition process have materialized in Georgia.
When the socialist system collapsed, models of the transition process, like that of Aghion and 
Blanchard (1993), predicted that the restructuring process would largely follow three stages. In 
the first stage state employment would fall as subsidies ceased, prices were liberalized and 
markets opened to competition. This would lead to the creation of a pool of unemployed, which 
would be a source of potential labour for the growing private sector. Spells of unemployment 
would be relatively short and the ‘pool’ would be characterised by high turnover rates (see 
Blanchard, et al. 1995; Commander, S and Coricelli 1995; Layard and Richter 1995). In the 
second stage, private firms would grow and would draw on the pool of unemployed to be the 
driving force behind economic growth. In the final stage, workers would be pulled directly out of 
the state sector into private enterprises (Aghion and Blanchard 1993). Thus, the rate of 
unemployment was seen as an indicator of the extent to which the restructuring process had got 
under way (see McAuley 1991, p.95).
Although this has been the experience of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the 
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the dramatic falls in output were not 
matched by equally significant falls in employment and even less so by increases in 
unemployment (see Flemming and Micklewright 2000, p.890; Klugman, et al. 2002, p.23). One 
explanation presented for the lack of correlation between unemployment and restructuring has 
been that private firms have recruited directly from the state sector. This has been largely 
supported by evidence on Hungary and Russia (see Clarke 1999a; Commander, S and Yemtsov 
1995; Layard and Richter 1995). Another explanation, has been labour hoarding; instead of laying 
workers off to adjust for the collapse in demand, enterprises reduce real wages and benefits, 
accumulate wage arrears, place workers on unpaid leave and reduce working hours (Commander, 
Simon and Tolstopiatenko 1997; Evans-Klock and Samorodov 1998; Layard and Richter 1995; 
Namazie 2002).
68 A modified version o f this chapter was published by UNDP (see Bemabd 2002b) and represents the first study to 
analyse the Labour Force Survey data (1998, 1999) and to present an in-depth analysis o f the Georgian labour market 
since the beginning of transition.
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The underlying question of this chapter is whether the pattern predicted by transition models has 
been observed in Georgia, namely whether (a) the collapse in output has been accompanied by a 
proportional increase in open unemployment69 and (b) privatisation and restructuring have 
resulted in the growth of private firms, capable of absorbing the labour that is shed by the State 
sector. This chapter also ask whether labour hoarding could explain the lack of correlation 
between unemployment and restructuring. Although there is evidence of labour hoarding, chapter 
5 will show that the relatively small increase in unemployment can largely be explained by a shift 
of labour into informal employment.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the characteristics of Georgia’s labour 
force. Section 4.3, examines the trends and characteristics of the employed. Section 4.4 describes 
the characteristics of the self-employed, with a focus on agricultural self-employment. Section 4.5 
examines the characteristics of paid employment, and discuss the issue of low wages and 
secondary employment. The characteristics of the unemployed are detailed in section 4.6, as is the 
reliability of unemployment data. This section also examines underemployment and evidence of 
labour hoarding. Section 4.7 uses multivariate regression to analyse in more detail the 
determinants of unemployment, underemployment and long-term unemployment, while 
controlling for a series of individual characteristics. The aim is to identify those individuals that 
are most at risk of poor labour market outcomes. Finally, section 4.8 summarises the main 
findings of this chapter.
4.2 THE LABOUR FORCE
The empirical analysis begins with an examination of labour force participation. Unless otherwise 
specified, this chapter is based on the analysis of the Georgia Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for 
1998 and 1999. For a detailed description of the LFS data set, please refer to appendix A2.1.70
Georgia’s labour force participation rate is similar to that of other western industrialised countries. 
In 1999, 66% of the working-age population (aged 15 years and over) was economically active 
compared to 69% of that of the European Union (EU) for instance, where the working-age
69 As discussed in chapter 1, by 1996, Georgia’s GDP had shrunk to 29% of its 1991 value or to the equivalent o f its 
value in 1963 (Samorodov and Zsoldos 1997, p. 11).
70 Note that all data and methodology issues are addressed in appendix 2. Also note that unless otherwise specified all 
figures in this and all subsequent sections are for 1999.
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population included only individuals aged 15 to 64 years (EUROSTAT 2000, p.32).71 However 
these figures mask considerable age, gender and urban/rural disparities.
The most striking of these is the age dimension. Figure 4.1 presents labour force participation 
rates by gender and age group for Georgia and the EU-15.72 We can see that Georgia has 
exceptionally high rates of labour force participation for individuals above retirement age.73 In 
1999, 57% of Georgian men and 41% of Georgian women over 65 years of age were 
economically active. This is about 12 times the EU average for men and 20 times that for women. 
Similarly we see that 50-64 year olds in Georgia are considerably more economically active than 
their European counterparts. As will be shown, this is a result of the fact that most pensioners are 
obliged to continue working as the level of pension benefits, if paid at all, are far below the 
minimum subsistence level. Most engage in small-plot agriculture and other small-scale informal 
activities, offering support to the hypothesis that informal activities are coping strategies in the 
face of constraint (see appendix A4.3 for a description of Georgia’s social security system).
71 In this thesis I use the terms labour force and economically active population interchangeably to mean the sum of the 
employed and unemployed in the reference week. For a more accurate definition please see Appendix A2.2. Moreover, 
the working age population in Georgia includes individuals over the age of 65 years, since a very high share is 
employed.
72 EU-15 refers to the European Union of 15 member states, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
73 Note that as o f February 1996, the retirement age was increased from 55 years for females and 60 years for males to 
60 years and 65 years respectively (IMF 2000, p.88).
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Figure 4.1 Labour force participation rates by gender and age group. Georgia and EU-15 (1999)
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Source: EU-15 figures: (EUROSTAT 2000, p.32, 40).
Georgia figures: Author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey (1999),
Notes:
(a) Labour Force participation is defined as employed plus unemployed as a share o f the working age 
population (15yrs+).
(b) Using ILO relaxed unemployment criterion, which includes the discouraged unemployed. See appendix 
A2.2 for definition o f variables.
These rates are symptomatic o f the extent o f poverty in the country. The majority o f  those over 65 
live in rural areas, and most are self-employed in rural small-scale agriculture. One could argue
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that the high labour force participation rates for over 65 s could also be explained by the generous 
employment definition.74 However, as we will see, pensioners that are employed in agriculture 
work an average (median) 28 hours per week (75% work more than 20 hours per week while 25% 
work more than 40 hours per week). Moreover, employed pensioners report ‘working’ rather than 
‘being a pensioner’ as their main occupation. These findings suggest that the generous 
employment definition does not entirely explain the high employment rates amongst pensioners 
and that a more plausible explanation is that pensioners are indeed farming to meet basic needs.
Figure 4.1 also shows that Georgian youth, who live mainly in urban areas, tend to be less 
economically active than their European counterparts. Only 43% of 15-24 year old men are 
economically active, compared to an average of 52% in the EU-15. A closer look reveals that 
these youth are not students and nor do they belong to any other conventional ‘economically 
inactive’ category. These figures suggest that young men may not be entering the labour force, as 
they have no hope of finding a job. Another troubling aspect of youth participation in the Labour 
market is the decreasing level of economic participation young women. Figure 4.1 shows that 
only 30% of 15-24 year old women are economically active compared to 43% in the EU-15. This 
may be partly explained by the fact that 68% are students; however the lack of child-care facilities 
may also be to blame, particularly in urban areas where only 42% of 20-30 year old women are 
active.
During the Soviet period childcare facilities were widely available through state enterprises and 
female participation rates were extremely high (above 90%). These figures suggest that women 
are being forced to stay at home due to the breakdown of childcare facilities, as enterprises have 
cut back on all social security provision. Research has shown that the cut back in childcare 
facilities in the countries of the Former Soviet Union has been the most severe in the Caucasus 
region, where between 1989 and 1996, kindergarten enrolment rates fell by more than 25% 
(Micklewright 2000, p. 15). Similarly, Yemtsov finds that the number of children below the age 
of 7 and the number of elderly within the household are significant factors reducing the 
probability of urban females participating in the labour force (Yemtsov 2001, p. 17).
74 According to the international definition of employment, anyone involved in ‘some work’ is employed. However, 
‘some work’ may be interpreted as work for at least one hour during a reference period of one week or one day 
(Hussmanns, et al. 1990, p.71). The Government of Georgia has chosen to use a reference period o f one week, thus 
anyone working on a plot o f land for at least one hour a week is considered self-employed. As most pensioners live in 
rural areas and most rural dwellers own a small plot of land, this definition could partially explain the high labour force 
participation rates for pensioners.
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A third aspect of the age dimension of labour force participation to emerge from the data is the 
low level of participation of men at the peak of their working lives, between the ages of 25 and 
49. Although the national participation rate for this age group is 90%, which is not far below the 
EU-15 rate of 95%, there are considerable urban/rural and regional disparities. The rate of 
inactivity of urban men between the ages of 25 and 49 is 12%, or twice as high as their rural 
counterparts and twice as high as the EU-15 average. These figures could be a further indication 
of disguised unemployment as men drop out of the labour force altogether.
Table 4.1 Labour force participation rates by urban and rural area; 
Georgia and EU-15 (1999)
% o f population aged 15 years +
Total Urban Rural
Georgia 66% 56% 79%
EU-15 56% 56% 56%
Source: EU-15 figures: EUROSTAT (2000, p .40,42).
Georgia figures: Author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey (1999)
Notes:
(a) uses ILO current unemployment definition
(b) for the definitions o f all variables used in this thesis see appendix A2.2
In addition to age, another important dimension of labour force participation in Georgia is the 
urban/rural distribution. Although urban participation rates are comparable to those of EU 
countries, rural participation rates are significantly higher than the EU average. Table 4.1 reports 
labour force participation rates for urban and rural areas in Georgia and the EU-15. We see that in 
Georgia, 79% of the working-age population in rural areas is economically active, compared to 
only 56% in the EU-15. This is a result of very high employment rates in rural areas, mainly in 
small-scale agriculture. On the other hand, although Georgia’s urban participation rate is the same 
as that of the EU-15, we will see that much of the urban economically active population is 
unemployed, as there are few formal jobs and limited possibilities for engaging in agriculture.
Together the findings on the age and the urban/rural composition of the Georgian labour force, 
highlight the fact that urban-rural migration has been very age-specific in Georgia and has altered 
the demographic composition of both shedding and receiving areas. While youth have been 
migrating from rural to urban areas in search of employment, pensioners have been migrating to 
rural areas to supplement their meagre pensions through subsistence agriculture.
Finally, the Georgian labour force has high levels of educational attainment, as 31% of 25-59 year 
olds had higher education compared to 21% in the EU-15 (EUROSTAT 2000, p.46). The level of 
education is particularly high in urban areas where approximately 43% of the labour force (both 
males and females) had higher education in 1999. Moreover, there appears to be a positive
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correlation between the level of education and economic activity, particularly in urban areas, 
where only 23% of the economically inactive had higher education. However, as we will see, 
there is evidence that the Georgian labour force is losing its skills, as an increasing share of 
workers with higher education is either unemployed, or self-employed in low-skilled, small-scale, 
petty trade and small-plot agriculture.
4.3 EMPLOYMENT
This section examines trends in employment rates and the structure of employment over the past 
two decades and then analyses the characteristics of the employed in 1998, 1999.75
4.3.1 Trends in employment
First, Georgia has seen a sharp fall in the rate of total employment over the past decade. Figure 
4.2 reports employment rates for 1985 to 1999. We see that the share of the working-age 
population to be employed fell from 91% in 1990 to 57% in 1999.76 Although employment rates 
during the Soviet period were artificially high and are considered inappropriate for a market 
economy, Georgia’s current rate of employment is still low, in comparison to the EU-15 rate of 
62%. Moreover, it is exceptionally low if one considers Georgia’s generous employment 
definition (see section 4.2). As previously argued, much of this decline could be explained by an 
increase in inactivity, which could suggest that individuals drop out of the labour market 
altogether as they have no hope of finding a job.
75 Note that this chapter refers to total employment and does not distinguish between formal and informal employment. 
This distinction will be introduced in chapter 5.
76 Only a small part o f this difference can be explained by the difference in definition of working age population (16-55 
for women and 16-60 for men in pre-transition years and 15+ for 1998, 1999). Although a higher proportion o f 16-60 
year olds are employed than are 15+, the population above 60 makes up 25% o f the employed population, and must 
therefore be included in employment figures. This was not the case during the pre-transition period when the majority 
of pensioners were not employed.
94
Figure 4.2 Employment rates Georgia (1985-1999)
1985 1990 1998 1999
Sources: 1985, 1990 rates EUROSTAT (2000, p. 39). For 1998, 1999 rates: author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour 
Force Survey data
Notes: working-age population for 1985, 1990: 16-55 years for females, and 16-60 for males. For 1998, 1999: females 
and males aged 15years +.
Second, there has been a significant change in the structure o f employment over the past decade. 
Although agriculture has always been a predominant sector o f employment and income, it has 
more than doubled its share o f  total employment since the beginning o f the transition period. As 
shown in table 4.2, agriculture’s share o f total employment increased from 26% in 1990 to 52% in 
1999. Over the same time period, the employment shares o f  industry and construction collapsed 
from 20% to 8% and from 10% to 1% respectively. Industrial production is now essentially 
limited to electricity generation and bread making.
Although some o f the growth in agricultural employment can be explained by the very loose 
definition o f employment, we will see that most o f the increase is explained by the lack o f formal 
jobs and the inability o f the social security system to ensure a minimum standard o f living for 
pensioners, the unemployed, and other vulnerable groups. Individuals cannot afford to be 
unemployed or inactive and therefore turn to small-plot agriculture to meet basic needs. Indeed, 
we will see that expectations o f increased unemployment during the transition period never 
materialised in Georgia, in part, because labour shifted into small-scale agricultural production.
In Bemabe (2002b), I find that the proportion o f the Georgian labour force employed in 
agriculture is twelve times that o f the EU-15, whereas the proportion o f those employed in 
construction and manufacturing is less than l/3rd and 176th o f the EU-15 shares respectively. Even 
in Romania or Poland, two countries in the region with very large agricultural sectors, only 38% 
and 19% o f the employed respectively work in agriculture (European Commission Employment 
and Social Affairs 2000, p. 105-106). With such a large share o f agricultural employment, it could
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be argued that the current structure of Georgia’s Labour market resembles more that of a 
developing country than that of a western industrialised one.
Table 4.2 also shows that, contrary to expectations, employment in trade has increased very little, 
and that services such as education and health care have maintained relatively stable levels of 
employment throughout the transition period. As will be shown in section 4.5.2, this is, in part, 
because organisations in these sectors have reduced and delayed the payment of wages and put 
workers on leave without pay instead of reducing employment. There has however, been a 
surprising increase in the share of employment in state administration. This could be a result of 
the establishment of a new state structure as well as an indication of increased State bureaucracy.
Table 4.2 Employment by sector o f  economic activity (1980-1999) 
% o f employed population
1980 1986 1990 1998 1999
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (A, B) 31% 28% 26% 49% 52%
Industry (D) 19% 19% 20% 9% 8%
Construction (F) 8% 9% 10% 2% 1%
Trade and services (G) 7% 7% 7% 10% 10%
Transport and communications (I) 5% 5% 4% 4% 4%
State administration (L) 2% 2% 2% 7% 6%
Education, culture, sports (M) 10% 10% 11% 12% 11%
Health care (N) 6% 6% 7% 5% 5%
Others (C, E, H, J, K, 0 , P, Q) 13% 13% 14% 4% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: State Department o f Statistics o f Georgia (2001, p .240)
Notes:
(a) Letters in brackets refer to sector o f economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial
Classification of all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(b) Others includes mining and quarrying (C), electricity, gas and water supply (E), hotels and restaurants (H), financial 
intermediation (J), real estate, renting and business activities (K), other community and personal services (0), 
private households with employees (P) and extra territorial organisations and bodies (Q).
Finally, a third significant employment trend is the reallocation of workers from the State to the 
private sector. In 1990, the State accounted for 86% of total employment (EUROSTAT 1996a, 
p.40). The LFS shows that by 1999, only 35% of all employed worked for the State. However, as 
we will see, most of the employment generated in the private sector has been self-employment in 
rural agriculture whereas the majority of urban employment still remains in the State sector.
4.3.2 Characteristics of the employed
There is strong urban/rural dimension to employment in Georgia. Table 4.3 shows that 75% of 
Georgia’s rural working-age population is employed compared to only 42% of the urban 
population. In contrast, we see that in the EU-15 employment rates for both urban and rural areas
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are approximately 50%. As has been previously argued, this is more a reflection of poverty than 
of a healthy rural economy, as people increasingly turn to agriculture to survive. It is also partly 
the result of the loose employment definition, which may be disguising some unemployment in 
rural areas (this issue will be addressed in section 4.6.2). In urban areas, the low employment rates 
are a reflection of high unemployment levels and a fall in urban labour force participation in 
urban areas. They could also be a result of under-reporting of informal activities, which are 
located mainly in urban areas, although the extent to which this may be the case is difficult to 
assess (see appendix A2.1.3 for a discussion on the reliability of the data).
Table 4.3: Urban and rural employment rates; Georgia and EU-15 (1998,1999)
% o f working age population
Georgia EU-15
Urban 42% 51%
Rural 75% 50%
Source: Georgia figures: author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999. EU-15 figures: EUROSTAT 
(2000).
Table 4.4 analyses employment status by urban and rural areas. We see that rural areas are 
characterised by a majority of self-employed in agriculture; in 1999 80% of the employed were 
self-employed, of which 58% were contributing family workers, mostly on household farms, and 
the rest were own-account workers (mostly on family farms) with no employees. Indeed 
agriculture accounts for over three quarters of total rural employment. The only other significant 
sectors of rural employment are health and education, which together made up 8% of total rural 
employment in 1999, and trade, which accounted for only 4% of rural employment the same year.
On the other hand, table 4.4 suggests that urban areas are dominated by public paid-employment. 
We see that 74% of the urban employed are ‘paid employees’ and the majority (57%) of these 
work for the State. As discussed in section 4.5.2, paid employment for the state has been marred 
by extremely low wages and arrears. Interestingly, of the 26% of urban employed who are self- 
employed, more than half work on small urban agricultural plots (see section 4.4.1). This is 
further evidence that the extent of non-farm small enterprises is still very limited in Georgia.
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Table 4.4 Employed by employment status and rural/urban area (1998, 1999)
% o f employed population
1998 1999
Urban Rural . Urban Rural
paid employees 74% 22% 74% 20%
self-employed 26% 78% 26% 80%
with employees 3% 1% 2% 1%
without employees 14% 28% 13% 32%
contributing family worker 8% 48% 8% 46%
co-operative member 1% 0% 1% 0%
other self-employed 1% 1% 2% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Notes: see appendix A2.2 for the definitions of all variables used in this thesis.
A second striking characteristic of employment in Georgia is age. On the one hand, employment 
rates are exceptionally high for both men and women in old age, while on the other, they are 
comparatively low for young and middle-aged Georgians. Figure 4.3 presents employment rates 
by gender and age group for Georgia and the EU-15. We see that 47% of Georgians aged 65 and 
over are employed. This share is even higher in rural areas where 70% of those aged 65 and over 
and employed. These figures are shockingly high - only 3% of Europeans (EU-15) in the same 
age group are employed. At the same time, only 27% of Georgian 15-24 year olds are employed 
compared to 39% in the EU-15.
As will be discussed in the multivariate analysis, this skewed employment distribution is 
symptomatic of barriers to labour market entry and of a dysfunctional social security system. As 
previously suggested, high employment rates amongst pensioners can be explained by the 
extremely low level of pension benefits, which represent only 11% of the minimum subsistence 
level, and by the extensive payment arrears (two thirds of pensioners suffered from arrears in 
1999-2000) (TACIS, 2001, p.42). At the same time, low employment rates amongst young and 
middle-aged Georgians are a result of very limited formal employment opportunities, which are 
pushing people into unemployment and inactivity.
Figure 4.3 also presents employment rates disaggregated by gender. It shows that the gap between 
female and male employment rates is similar to that of the EU-15. Thus women have lower 
employment rates than men at all ages. However employment rates for old-age Georgian women 
are exceptionally high. If the proportion of Georgian men over 65 to be employed is eleven times 
that of European men, the proportion of Georgian women working over the age of 65 is twenty 
times that of their European counterparts. This could in part be due to the significant proportion of 
war widows in Georgia, following the civil war and the two territorial conflicts, but also to the
98
decline in life expectancy o f males, characteristic o f other countries o f the FSU, partly as a result 
o f drinking and an unhealthy lifestyle.77 In fact, 18% o f women over the age o f 15 are widows 
compared to only 4% o f men, and three quarters o f them are over 60 years old. The fact that such 
a significant proportion o f women over 65 are working is further indication that pensions are 
insufficient to guarantee a minimum standard o f  living, particularly in the absence o f a partner.
Figure 4.3 Employment rates by gender and age group; Georgia and EU-15 (1999)
F em a le s
100%
m Females Georgia 
■  Females EU-15
15-24 25-49 50-64 65+
77 In 2000 life expectancy was 69 years for males and 77 years for females (World Bank 2004).
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Sources: EU-15 figures: (EUROSTAT2000, p. 72).
Georgia figures: Author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Finally, the data also reveal a relatively strong gender bias in the distribution o f employment by 
occupation. Women are under-represented in managerial and senior positions, occupying only 
32% o f such positions. On the other hand they are more likely to work in specialised professional 
positions, accounting for 64% o f ‘professionals and technicians’, as well as in semi-skilled 
positions, such as sales clerks, o f  which over 80% are women. This marks a considerable 
deterioration if compared to the Soviet period when emphasis was placed on gender equality.
4.4 SELF-EM PLO Y M EN T
We now turn our attention to the self-employed. Figure 4.4 shows that overall, the self-employed 
account for 58% o f the country’s total employment. These figures are extremely high if compared 
to the EU-15, where only 14% o f the employed are self-employed (European Commission 
Employment and Social Affairs 2000, p.85). Similarly, in other countries o f both Central and 
Eastern Europe and the CIS, self-employment accounts for only a fraction o f total employment; 
9.7% in the Russian Federation and 14.4% in the Czech Republic (O'Leary, et al. 2001, p. 16). The 
large majority (83%) o f Georgia’s self-employment is in rural areas where, as can be seen from 
figure 4.4, it accounts for 79% o f total employment.
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Figure 4.4 Employed by employment status (1999)
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Source: Author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Table 4.5 presents self-employment by sector o f  economic activity for urban and rural areas in 
1998 and 1999. Self-employment in Georgia consists almost exclusively o f  subsistence 
agriculture and informal petty trade via street stalls and markets. Overall, 90% o f the self- 
employed worked in agriculture in 1999. As a comparison, only 16% o f the self-employed in 
Europe worked in agriculture, whereas the majority worked in services, and particularly in 
wholesale and retail trade (EUROSTAT 2000, p.96). Moreover, table 4.5 shows that in rural 
areas, between 1998 and 1999, the share o f agriculture in self-employment increased by 3%, 
suggesting that other sectors o f  the economy are providing very little profitable opportunities.
Overall, our results show that small-plot agricultural production accounts for 51% o f the country’s 
total employment. This does not include employers or members o f  agricultural co-operatives; it 
only includes own-account workers and contributing family members working on their own plot 
o f land. In fact only 2% o f all self-employed in Georgia have employees, whereas the remaining 
98% are own-account workers and contributing family workers. This is evidence that privatisation 
and restructuring have not succeeded in generating small and medium private enterprises capable 
o f absorbing the labour that is shed from the state sector.
Table 4.5 also shows that the remainder o f both urban and rural self-employment is concentrated 
in so-called ‘wholesale and retail trade’. A closer look reveals that 76% o f this is petty trade, 
taking place outside a formal store, either in the street or at a market place. These figures suggest 
that self-employment is more o f a coping strategy than a way o f life and productive employment.
■  1999 paid employees 
□  1999 self-employed
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Table 4.5 Self-employed by sector o f  economic activity in urban/rural areas 
(1998,1999)
% o f self-employed population
1998 1999
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Agriculture and fishing (A, B) 48.5 92.9 57.7 96.4
Mining (C) 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.1%
Manufacturing (D) 5.6 1.1 2.4 0.5
Construction (F) 1.8 0.2 1.7 0.1
Trade and repair services (G) 28.7 4.1 26.5 2.5
Hotels and restaurants (H) 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0
Transport and communications (I) 6.7 0.4 5.9 0.2
Real estate, renting and business activities (K) 2.3 0.4 1.0 0.1
Private households with employed persons (P) 2.5 0.4 1.0 0.0
other self-employment (E+J+L+0) 3.7 0.5 2.2 0.2
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author’s own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999 
Notes:
(a) Letters in brackets refer to sector o f economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial
Classification of all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(b) Others self-employed include those working in electricity, gas and water supply (E), financial intermediation (J), 
public administration and defence (L) and in other community and personal services (O).
4.4.1 Agricultural self-employment
The extraordinary increase in agricultural self-employment, and particularly contributing family 
workers, suggests that the centrally planned system has not been replaced by a growing private 
sector able to absorb some of the released labour. At the same time, the State sector is unable to 
provide even minimum-subsistence wages and thus an increasing proportion of the population is 
turning to small-plot agricultural production to meet basic needs. In addition the poor state of 
public finances means that the state is unable to provide decent pensions and unemployment 
benefits, which is further pushing individuals into agricultural self-employment (see appendix 
A4.3 for a description of Georgia’s social security system). The World Bank finds that half of 
those who moved into agriculture between the end of 1996 and 2000 were previously 
unemployed, suggesting that they could not afford to be unemployed, as benefits were extremely 
low or inexistent (World-Bank 2001, p.33).
At the same time, incomes in agriculture fell and productivity collapsed. Contrary to the Russian 
experience, where labour was hoarded in large agricultural enterprises during the first years of 
transition, Georgian agriculture very quickly underwent a profound restructuring. In 1999, 57% of 
agricultural land was privately owned and 27% was leased from the State for private use
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(Government of Georgia 2000, p9). However the large majority of agricultural plots are very 
small (0.5-lhct). The size of these plots, coupled with the reduction in the use of capital 
equipment, tractors and fertilizers, as a consequence of the breakdown in industry and of trade 
links with other countries of the FSU, has led to a dramatic fall in productivity. Thus, between 
1996 and 1997, despite a 16% growth in agricultural employment, agricultural output grew by 
only 2%. The very low level of productivity means that agriculture generates very low incomes, 
as reflected by the fact the agricultural self-employed make up 66% of the country’s poor 
households (Yemtsov 2001, p.3).
There is also some indication that self-employment in agriculture may be disguising a certain 
amount of hidden unemployment or underemployment as a result of the generous employment 
definition, whereby anyone who works on a plot of land for at least one hour over the reference 
week is considered self-employed. However, we will see that this issue is not as important as one 
would initially suspect, as an analysis of hours worked shows that individuals work an average 
(mean) o f 28 hours a week in agriculture (see section 4.6.2).
Finally, although agricultural work is predominantly rural, in 1999 it accounted for 58% of urban 
self-employment. Contrary to what one might expect, these are not individuals that are working 
their urban plot of land ‘on the side’ or after working hours. The LFS data reveals that the mean 
time worked per week on urban plots is 26 hours, suggesting that these are individuals who are 
employed at least part-time, if not full-time on their urban plot of land.78 As discussed in chapter 
2, many urban households have had access to small plots of land since the Soviet period, when 
these were allocated by the State and were considered one of the only ‘legal’ private activities. 
The use of subsistence plots by city residents became particularly widespread in the USSR during 
the late 1980s when, as a result of the deepening crisis, land was distributed to urban households. 
In Russia, for instance, by the early 1990s, enterprises began to rent fields on which their 
employees could grow potatoes, even providing transport and adapting the rhythm of industrial 
production to the demands of potato cultivation (Clarke 1999d, p .ll) . However whereas they 
were previously used as ‘garden plots’, to grow a few fruits or vegetables for household 
consumption, urban plots are now used as a principal source of employment for one seventh of 
Georgia’s urban employed.
78 Although the dispersion around the mean is quite large as o= 13.03.
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4.4.2 Characteristics of the self-employed
Given that self-employment is largely agricultural and rural, those regions that are predominantly 
rural have a higher share of self-employment than those that are predominantly urban.
Table 4.6 Self-employment by region (1998,1999)
% o f population
Self employed Total employed
1998 1999 1999
Kakheti 14% 15% 11%
Tbilisi 5% 4% 18%
Shida Kartli 13% 12% 10%
Kvemo Kartli 13% 15% 13%
Samtsxe Javakheti 5% 6% 5%
Achara 8% 7% 9%
Guria 6% 6% 5%
Samegrelo 14% 13% 10%
Imereti 23% 21% 19%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author’s own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Table 4.6 shows that the capital, Tblisi, accounts for only 4% of self-employment, despite the fact 
that it accounts for 18% of the country’s total employment. Nevertheless, Tblisi still has the 
largest share of urban self-employment, with 21% of the country’s total. However, there has been 
a 30% fall in the total number of self-employed in Tblisi over 1998-99. This is again a sign that 
self-employment in any sector but agriculture is difficult.
A second distinguishing characteristic of self-employment in Georgia is age. This reflects the 
findings from the labour force and employment analysis, which showed that Georgia has an 
abnormally high proportion of workers over retirement age, which are largely self-employed in 
small plot agriculture.
Table 4.7 presents the distribution of self-employed by age group for males and females. We see 
that almost one quarter of the self-employed in Georgia are over 65 years old, whereas overall 
over-65s represent about 19% of the working age population. One third is over 60. Almost all the 
self-employed over 60 years of age work in rural areas, and they account for 36% of rural self- 
employment. This is a strong indication that pensioners are obliged to continue working in order 
to generate income to meet basic needs and that at the same time, access to land may be a 
significant factor in generating livelihoods. Indeed it probes the question of how urban pensioners 
survive. A closer look at urban self-employment reveals that they are also employed in small-plot 
urban agriculture (81%) and petty trade via street stalls and markets (6%).
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Table 4.7 Self-employed by age group, (1999) 
% o f self-employed
Females Males Total
15-24 9.2 11.5 10.3
25-49 38.8 43.0 40.9
50-64 26.8 24.2 25.5
65+ 25.2 21.3 23.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999
4.5 PAID EMPLOYMENT
According to the 1982 international definition of employment (ILO 1983), employment may be 
classified as either paid employment or self-employment. Paid employment includes all work 
performed for wage or salary, in cash or in kind, and therefore also includes all employees whose 
wages are in arrears. This section analyses the characteristics of paid employees and then turns to 
the issue of wages and secondary employment.
4.5.1 Characteristics of paid employees
Paid employment accounts for 42% of Georgia’s total employment. Whereas the self-employed 
work mainly in rural areas, 71% of paid employees are in urban areas, where they make up almost 
three quarters of total employment. Tblisi, being the capital and largest urban centre, accounts for 
36% of all paid employment, and 66% of its work force is employed by the State.
Table 4.8 presents the distribution of paid employment by sector of economic activity. We see 
that a significant share of paid employees work in the public sector. In particular we see that 19% 
of paid employees are employed in Education, an additional 10% is in Health and that Public 
Administration employs 14% of paid employees. Surprisingly, only 22% of paid employment is 
in the private sector. Of these, more than one third is employed in petty trade in street stalls and 
markets. These findings further confirm that formal private sector employment is still very limited 
in Georgia.
Table 4.8: Paid employees by sector o f economic activity (1999)
% o f paid employees
Total
Agriculture and fishing (A, B) 4.8
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Mining (C) 0.7
Manufacturing (D) 13.1
Electricity, gas, water supply (E) 2.8
Construction (F) 2.9
Trade and repair services (G) 10.2
Hotels and restaurants (H) 1.8
Transport and communications (I) 7.6
Financial intermediation (J) 1.4
Real estate, renting and business activities (K) 4.9
Public administration and defence (L) 14.4
Education (M) 18.6
Health and social work (N) 10.5
Other community and personal service activities (O) 5.3
Private households with employees (P) 0.7
Extra-territorial organisations (Q) 0.2
TOTAL 100
Source: State Department for Statistics o f Georgia (2001, p.84).
Notes: Letters in brackets refer to the sector of economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification o f all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
Paid employees tend to have higher levels of education and tend to be more ‘specialised’ than the 
self-employed. Whereas 70% of the self-employed have primary or secondary education, 72% of 
the paid-employed have higher or specialised secondary education.
Moreover, whereas the self-employed tend to be close to or above retirement age, paid employees 
are young or middle aged. Roughly two thirds of paid employees are between the ages of 25 and 
54 and only 6% of paid employees are over 65 years of age compared to 23% of the self- 
employed. However, as with the self-employed, we observe that the majority of paid employees 
between the ages of 15 and 30 are men and the trend reverses after 35, when just over one half of 
paid employees are women. This reflects the previous findings, which suggested that women in 
childbearing age are being excluded from the labour market due to a breakdown of childcare 
facilities. We also find that the gender dimension extends to employment by sector of economic 
activity. Women make up 81% of paid employees in the traditionally female dominated sectors of 
health and education. On the other hand, they are underrepresented in traditionally male sectors, 
such as mining, construction and manufacturing (industry).
4.5.2 Low wages, arrears and secondary employment
Perhaps one of the most serious issues related to wage employment is that of low wages and wage 
arrears. Real wages for public sector employees, who represent the majority of employees, are 
extremely low. The salaries of state budgetary organisations ranged between GEL 20 (US$10)
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and GEL 66 (US$33) in 2000, which is approximately 10-30% of the official minimum 
subsistence level for a family of four (TACIS 2001, p.33).79
The minimum wage, of GEL 20 per month, was re-introduced in June 1999 with an aim to 
increase budgetary revenue.80 However it constituted only 10% of the minimum subsistence level 
of GEL 191.8 for a family of four (TACIS 1999a, p.66-67). There is also high inequality between 
wages in different sectors. Table 4.9 shows that by 2000, nominal monthly salaries of education 
and health employees, which accounted for 30% of all wage employees, were approximately GEL 
46 to GEL 47 (US$23), compared to an average of GEL 85 (US$42.5) across all sectors.
Table 4.9 Average nominal monthly wages in selected sectors o f economic activity (2000)
GEL
Education 45.60
Health 47.40
Transport and communications 105.00
Mining and processing industry 115.00
Construction 141.50
National average 85.40
Source: (TACIS 2001, p.33).
In addition to below-subsistence wages, many paid employees are faced with wage and benefit 
arrears. Although data on wage arrears is not readily available, the SDS estimates that in 1998 and 
1999, wage arrears amounted to approximately GEL 50m (US$25m) per quarter (TACIS 1999a, 
p.67). Employers have also continued to use unpaid leave as a solution for dealing with falls in 
production and lack of funds to pay wages. Official statistics report that in the third quarter of 
1999, 36,000 people were on unpaid leave, many for indefinite periods (TACIS 1999a, p65). Low 
wages, wage arrears and unpaid leave are all signs of the substantial level of hidden 
unemployment (or underemployment) in the country (see section 4.6.2). If employees were let off 
instead of being paid token wages and put on unpaid leave, the level of unemployment in the 
country would increase significantly.
Faced with the inability to earn sufficient income through their primary formal employment, 
many paid employees resort to secondary occupations to meet basic needs. Although data on 
secondary employment must be approached with caution, as many respondents may be reluctant 
to reveal additional sources of income for fear of taxation, there is significant evidence that
79 State budgetary organisations are those financed entirely from the State Budget.
80 Since the minimum taxable income is GEL 9 (US$4.5), many registered their income at the minimum to avoid paying 
payroll and income tax. By increasing the minimum monthly wage to GEL 20, the Government hoped to increase 
revenue collection.
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suggests that many wage employees engage in secondary activities. We find that of those who 
said they had a secondary job, 91% were wage employees, and the large majority (80%) were 
women. Almost all respondents explained that they took on a secondary job because the income 
from their primary job was insufficient to support their families - 92% gave this as a reason. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the vast majority of secondary jobs are informal. Informal secondary 
jobholding will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
4.6 UNEMPLOYMENT
The ILO uses two definitions of Unemployment. According to the conventional (or ‘strict 
criterion’) definition, an individual is unemployed if he or she: (1) is 15 years of age or older, (2) 
was not employed within the studied week, (3) actively searched for work within the pervious 4 
weeks and (4) was ready to start work within the next two weeks. The ILO also allows for a 
‘relaxation' o f the 3rd criterion in cases, like Georgia, where the conventional means of seeking 
work are of limited relevance and where the labour force is largely self-employed. The so-called 
ILO ‘relaxed’ unemployment definition includes the discouraged unemployed, i.e. those who 
have ‘given up’ seeking work but are prepared to start work if they were to find one (ILO 1983, 
par. 10).
According to the ILO ‘strict’ criterion, 13.8% of the labour force was unemployed in 1999, and 
according to the ‘relaxed’ criterion, 15.7% was unemployed.81 These rates are considerably 
higher than the EU-15 rate, which was 9.5% in the same year.
4.6.1 Reliability of unemployment data
There are several reasons to suspect that Georgia’s unemployment rate is artificially low and may 
not provide an accurate picture of the labour resources left unused in the economy. First, as has 
been argued throughout, in line with international standards, the Labour Force Survey classifies as 
employed all persons working for one hour or more during the reference week. In rural areas, this 
means that anyone owning a plot of land, however small, and spending at least one hour 
cultivating it during the reference week will be considered self-employed. This is regardless of the 
fact that the income may be below the minimum subsistence level and that he or she may be 
looking for another job.82 Our results show that the mean number of hours worked by the self­
81 Note that unless otherwise specified, all unemployment rates are according to the ILO ‘strict unemployment 
criterion’.
82 Georgia’s Law on Employment stipulates that all people and their family members, owning lhct or more of land, are 
automatically considered ‘self-employed’ (IMF 2000, p.8). This law has damaging implications for social security. The 
1964 ILO Convention 122, which has been ratified by Georgia and all other ‘transition’ countries, urges countries to
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employed in agriculture is 28 hours per week compared to 50 hours in the European Union. This 
indicates that agricultural self-employment is more than gardening but less than a sustainable full­
time job. In fact, these results suggest that agricultural self employment is indeed a coping 
strategy for a significant share of Georgia’s population.
Secondly, as will be discussed in more detail in section 4.6.2 below, due to labour hoarding, these 
figures disguise underemployment, in the form of workers on leave without pay, shortened 
working hours and wage arrears. A third reason to suspect the unemployment rate to be artificially 
low is that some of the economically inactive could also be considered ‘hidden unemployed’, as 
12% are of working age and do not belong to any of the ‘economically inactive’ categories, such 
as ‘student’, ‘pensioner’, ‘disabled’, ‘draftee’ or ‘person engaged in household duties’.
Another issue with respect to the reliability of unemployment data is that the official 
unemployment rate, as measured by the number of unemployed registered with the Employment 
Fund offices, is absolutely unrealistic. Table 4.10 compares the unemployment rate based on 
registration to that based on the ILO definitions. We see that although the registered unemployed 
rate has been increasing, it still remains completely unrealistic. Only 5% of the labour force was 
registered as unemployed in 1999, whereas 16% was considered unemployed according to the 
ILO relaxed criterion.83 This is mainly due to the fact that less than 30% of the unemployed 
bothered to register with the Employment Fund offices in 1999, since unemployment benefits 
remain very low and mostly unpaid (less than 2% of registered unemployed received 
unemployment benefits) and the Employment offices have no record of successful job matching 
(see appendix A4.3 for a description of Georgia’s social security system). In 1999, only 4% of the 
unemployed were searching for work through an Employment office, whereas 85% were looking 
through private contacts. We will return to table 4.10 below when we examine the rate of 
underemployment.
Table 4.10 Unemployment rates (1998, 1999): Official registrations vs. Labour Force Survey 
% o f labour force
formulate and implement an active policy promoting ‘foil, productive and freely chosen employment’ (O'Leary, et al. 
2001, p.l). If individuals owning 1 hectare of land are automatically considered self-employed, can it be said that they 
have ‘freely chosen’ employment? In being deprived of the right to be considered unemployed, they are also deprived 
access to unemployment benefits, training and job opportunities which may be offered through the Employment Offices 
to the ‘officially’ unemployed. This also means that they may be subject to social (27% o f income) and other taxes as 
well as to relevant regulations.
83 Note that this situation is not unique to Georgia. Indeed, in most countries in the CIS, official unemployment rates 
based on registered unemployment are completely unrealistic. In Russia for instance, Flemming and Micklewright show 
that whereas the unemployment rate as measured by the ILO/OECD criteria was around 9% in 1995, the rate based on 
the official register was only 3% (Hemming and Micklewright 2000, p.890).
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1998 1999
Registration at Employment Fund Offices 3.8 4.9
Labour Force Survey ILO 'strict' criterion 14.5 13.8
Labour Force Survey ILO 'relaxed' criterion 16.8 15.8
Underemployed (less than 41 hours p.w.) / 51.3
Total labour resources left unused / 67.1
Sources: Registered unemployed: State Department for Statistics o f Georgia (2001, p .237). All other results are authors
own analysis ofLFS 1998, 1999.
Notes:
(a) Total labour resources left unused refers to total unemployed (ILO relaxed criterion) plus total underemployed as a 
share o f the labour force.
(b) Underemployment is defined as consisting of all working-age individuals who are either: (1) employed full-time 
and (2) working for a total (in primary and multiple jobs) of less than 41 hours per week; or (1) employed part-time 
and (2) doing so involuntarily (see Appendix A4.1 for details).
4.6.2 Underemployment
Underemployment (working less than normal hours) is not uncommon in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. As previously discussed, this was partly a result of so-called ‘labour 
hoarding’, by which enterprises used a variety of means to adjust for the large falls in demands 
without laying workers off. It was particularly common during the early years of the transition 
period and has been found to be an important factor in explaining why increases in open 
unemployment did not match the collapse in output in many countries of the former Soviet Union 
(see Commander, Simon and Tolstopiatenko 1997; Evans-Klock and Samorodov 1998; Layard 
and Richter 1995; Namazie 2002).84
However, underemployment can also be a result of insufficiency in the volume of employment. 
This is particularly relevant in developing and transition countries where the lack of 
unemployment benefits means that few people can afford to be unemployed for any period time 
and that the bulk of the population must engage at all times in some economic activity, however 
little or inadequate it may be (see appendix A4.1 for a discussion of underemployment).
There is evidence that labour hoarding was widespread in Georgia during the early years of 
transition. Through a large-scale survey of Georgian enterprises, the ILO estimates that in 1996, 
29% of the workers covered by the survey had been placed on unpaid leave (Samorodov and 
Zsoldos 1997, p.21). The reduction of working hours was also common, as estimates suggest that 
by mid-1996, 20% of all wage employees had an average workweek of less than 15 hours 
(Yemtsov 2001, p.9). A third form of labour hoarding was the reduction of real wages. By the end
84 Klugman, Micklewright and Redmond (2002, p.32) suggest that although there was considerable labour hoarding in 
Russian enterprises at the beginning o f the transition period, this did not entirely explain the low levels o f open 
unemployment. They find that there was also high degree o f labour turnover, but that this was concentrated largely in
110
of 1995, Yemtsov estimates that the average real wage in Georgia was one tenth of its pre­
transition level (Yemtsov 2001, p. 10). The reduction in real wages was accompanied by a high 
incidence of wage arrears. The ILO enterprise survey in 1996-1997, finds that 48% of all 
enterprises interviewed weren’t able to pay wages ‘a lot’ or a ‘few times’. Overall, 29% of the 
yearly wage bill of surveyed enterprises had not been paid on time (Samorodov and Zsoldos 1997, 
p.41, 42). The multivariate analysis (section 4.7.3) also finds evidence of on-going labour 
hoarding in the form of reduced working hours, particularly in manufacturing and municipal 
infrastructure services.
Following the approach of the ILO (see Hussmanns, et al. 1990) underemployment is defined here 
as consisting of all working-age individuals who are either: (1) employed full-time and (2) 
working for a total (in primary and multiple jobs) of less than 41 hours per week; or (1) employed 
part-time and (2) doing so involuntarily. Appendix II provides a discussion on the definition of 
underemployment.
Table 4.11 presents estimates of underemployment based on the standard 41-hour criterion and a 
stricter 35-hour criterion (full-time workers working less than 35 hours per week)85. Looking at 
these figures we see that the ILO relaxed unemployment rate (16 percent in 1999) largely 
underestimate the labour resources left unused in the economy. Table 4.11 shows that 43% of the 
urban and 58% of the rural labour force was underemployed in 1999. Overall, 51% of the labour 
force was underemployed. If we cumulate the unemployed and underemployed, we find that in 
1999, 67% of the labour resources were left unused (see table 4.10). Even if one uses the 35 hours 
per week cut-off, 35% of the labour force is still found to be underemployed (26% in urban areas 
and 44% in rural areas). These figures are shockingly high. It is important to recall, that these are 
all individuals who report working as their primary occupation and who are involuntarily working 
less than the normal duration of work.
These findings are confirmed by figure 4.7, which plots the cumulative distribution of hours 
worked per week for the full-time employed. We see that the majority (around 60%) of those 
employed full-time work less than 40 hours per week. Moreover, the shape of the distribution 
shows that there is a considerable degree of dispersion to the left of the median, indicating that 
underemployment is quite severe. We see for instance, that one quarter of those employed full­
time work less than 25 hours per week.
low quality, low wage jobs as employers were unable to retain staff because o f poor wages and working conditions. The 
result is that there is in fact a mixture of low quality labour mobility and a high degree o f immobility.
83 35 hours per week is chosen as it corresponds to the EU directive on the working week.
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In addition, the high underemployment rates in urban areas suggest that this issue is not limited to 
the agricultural sector (60% o f the underemployed are in urban areas). As we will see in the 
multivariate analysis in section 4.7.3, there is evidence o f continued labour hoarding, particularly 
in the manufacturing and municipal infrastructure sectors. These findings have serious 
implications. On the one hand, they indicate that there is a ‘pool’ not o f unemployed but o f 
underemployed, on which the growing private sector could draw to power economic growth. On 
the other, there is a risk that if the private sector does not begin to grow, this pool will become 
increasingly marginalized and de-skilled.
Table 4.11 Underemployment, 1999
Percentage o f the L abour Force Underemployed
Total Urban Rural
Using 41 hours per week 51.3 43.3 57.9
Using 35 hours per week 35.3 25.5 43.6
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 andSGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Underemployment is defined as consisting of all working-age individuals who are either: (1) employed full-time
and (2) working for a total (in primary' and multiple jobs) o f less than 41 hours per week; or (1) employed part-time 
and (2) doing so involuntarily (see Annex A 4.1 for details).
(b) We present results based on two different criteria for full-time workers: working less than 41 hours per week and 
working less than 35 hours per week.
(c) The reference period is the last 7 days.
Figure 4. 7  Cumulative distribution o f hours worked per week for full-time employed
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hours worked last 7 days
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999.
Notes:
(a) Reference period is last 7 days
(b) Refers only to individuals employed full-time
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4.6.3 Characteristics of the unemployed
We now examine the characteristics of the unemployed. This section provides a brief profile of 
the unemployed using summary statistics, while section 4.7 uses multivariate regression to 
analyse the determinants of unemployment.
First, table 4.12 shows there is a strong urban/rural dimension to unemployment in Georgia, as 
there is essentially no unemployment in rural areas. As previously argued, this could largely be 
explained by the loose employment definition. We see that only 4% of the rural labour force was 
unemployed in 1998-99. In fact, 83% of the country’s total unemployment was in urban areas in 
1999. This is an indication that access to land in rural areas is generating livelihoods in the 
absence of adequate unemployment benefits. The focus here will therefore be on urban 
unemployment. On average, one quarter of the urban labour force is out of work, ready to work 
and actively seeking work. The unemployment rate is highest in Tblisi, where it reaches almost 
30%. Although there has been a slight fall in urban unemployment over 1998-99, evidence 
discussed above, suggests that much of this reduction can be explained by an increase in inactivity 
(particularly amongst women), rather than by an increase in employment. Female inactivity can 
also partly explain the gender differences in urban unemployment rates, which are 27% for men 
and only 22% for women.
Second, as with employment, there is a significant age dimension. However, whereas there are a 
disproportionate number of pensioners amongst the employed, youth are over-represented 
amongst the unemployed.
Table 4.12 Unemployment rates in urban and rural areas (1998, 1999) 
% o f labour force within a given area
1998 1999
Total 15% 14%
Urban 26% 25%
Rural 4% 4%
Source: Author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999, using strict ILO unemployment criterion.
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Figure 4.8 Unemployment rates by age group and gender; Georgia and EU-15 (1999)
Females
1 3  Georgia females 
■  EU-15 females
15-24 25-49 50-64
Males
□  Georgia males 
■  EU-15 males
15-24 25-49 50-64
Sources: EU-15 figures: (EUROSTAT 2000, p. 176).
Georgia figures: Author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999, using strict ILO  
unemployment criterion.
Notes: we exclude the category o f individuals aged 65years+ since they are either inactive or employed.
Figure 4.8 compares unemployment rates by age group and gender for Georgia and the EU-15. 
We can see that although youth unemployment is not uncommon in the EU-15, the rates in 
Georgia are exceptionally high, and particularly so for males. More than 26% o f Georgian males 
aged 15 to 24 were unemployed, compared to only 17% o f their European counterparts. 
Moreover, the rate reaches overwhelming levels for urban males in this age group, o f which 45% 
are unemployed. These are not youth in full-time education. Only 7% were full-time students, 
whereas the rest are youth that were not in school and were actively looking for work during the 
four weeks preceding the survey. O f these 84% had never worked at all, suggesting that there are 
significant barriers to entering the labour market. Such high rates o f unemployment could have 
very damaging implications for the country’s longer-term social and economic development.
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The unemployment rate for 15-24 year old urban women is even higher, reaching 50%. The 
majority o f these women are highly educated, with 44% having higher education. On the other 
hand, unemployment rates for females above 25 are lower than for males, which is contrary to the 
EU-15 situation where female unemployment rates are higher than males at all ages. This can be 
explained by high rates o f female agricultural self-employment in rural areas, and widespread 
female inactivity in urban areas.
Figure 4.8 also shows that unemployment rates decrease as age increases. Thus pensioners have 
very low unemployment rates, not because they leave the labour market after a lifetime o f work to 
live off their accumulated assets, but because they are continuing to be employed in small-plot 
agricultural production to ensure minimum subsistence o f the household. The issue o f working 
pensioners is discussed in more detail in chapter 6 and appendix A6.1. There is considerable 
anecdotal evidence which suggests that youth stay at home and continue to live with their parents 
well into their 30s, often with their spouse and children. Resources are thus shared amongst the 
household members and it is not uncommon for the household members o f retirement age to 
continue working to support the younger members who may be inactive or unemployed.
Third, the unemployed in Georgia have high levels o f  education. Whereas the total number o f 
unemployed fell over 1998-99, the number o f unemployed with higher education increased by 
10%, bringing the share o f the unemployed with higher education to 36%. This is surprising when 
compared to the share o f the employed having higher education which was only 27% and could 
be explained by the Russian financial crisis, which hit formal paid employees the hardest.
F igure 4 .9  U nem ploym ent ra tes by edu ca tion a l a tta inm en t leve l;
G eorg ia  an d  E U -15  (1999)
G eorgia
11 Georgia males 
■  Georgia fem ales
le s s  than upper higher
upper secondary education
secondary
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EU-15
H EU-15 males 
■  EU-15 females
less than upper higher
upper secondary education
secondary
Sources: Author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999, using strict ILO unemployment criterion.
EU-15 figures: (EUROSTA T 2000, p. 178).
Figure 4.9 presents unemployment rates by educational attainment for both Georgia and the EU- 
15. Two interesting patterns emerge from these figures: (1) In Georgia, higher levels o f education 
are associated with higher unemployment rates, whereas the opposite is true o f  the EU-15, and (2) 
Georgian males have higher unemployment rates than females at all levels o f education, whereas 
females have higher levels o f unemployment than males in the EU-15. As the above chart 
demonstrates, in Georgia 19% o f the male labour force and 17% o f the female labour force with 
higher education is unemployed. This is significantly higher than the EU-15 rates o f 5% and 7% 
respectively.
However, the apparent correlation between low levels o f education and low level o f 
unemployment is misleading as it masks a considerable amount o f hidden unemployment and 
underemployment amongst those with lower education. In urban areas, 69% o f the working age 
population with less than upper secondary education is inactive, and therefore not classified as 
unemployed. In rural areas, where the majority o f the population has secondary education, most 
households own a plot o f land (including garden plots), and by working on it for 1 hour or more 
during the reference week, they are automatically classified as employed.
Those with higher education are less likely to live in rural areas and more likely to be looking for 
formal, skilled work in urban areas, which as we have seen is extremely limited, hence the higher 
levels o f unemployment. Indeed one quarter o f  the urban labour force with higher education is 
unemployed.
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Fourth, long-term unemployment is becoming an issue in Georgia. The majority (62%) o f the 
unemployed had been unemployed for more than a year, compared to only 46% o f the 
unemployed in the EU-15. Moreover, 42% have been out o f work for more than 3 years. Another 
indicator o f  long-term unemployment is the gap between the ILO ‘strict’ and ‘relaxed’ definition 
o f unemployment. The latter includes all those who have not been looking for work during the 
four weeks preceding the survey because they have lost hope o f finding any. What is 
disconcerting is that this gap is growing. Despite the fall in urban unemployment rates between 
1998-1999, the fall in the ‘relaxed-criterion’ rate was considerably smaller than that o f the rate 
including only those ‘actively-seeking’ employment.
Finally, there are significant regional disparities in unemployment rates. As we can see from 
figure 4.9, Tblisi has the highest unemployment rate, with 29.3% o f the labour force unemployed. 
Other regions with particularly high urban unemployment rates included Samagrelo and Imereti. 
Together, Tblisi and Imereti account for 63% o f the unemployed. The regional dimension to 
unemployment will be explored in more detail in the multivariate analysis that follows.
F igure 4 .10  U rban an d  ru ra l unem ploym ent ra tes  by  reg ion  (1999)
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20% -1 
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Source: Author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999 using strict ILO unemployment criterion.
4.7 DETERMINANTS OF POOR LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES
In order to identify which factors play a significant role in determining the probability o f 
unemployment and other poor labour market outcomes, multivariate analysis can be used. 
Multivariate analysis in now used in order to isolate the impact o f certain variables on the
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probability of facing poor labour market outcomes, while controlling for demographic and human 
capital characteristics. For the purpose of this chapter poor labour market outcomes are defined as 
including unemployment, long-term unemployment and underemployment.
Three separate probit regression models are used to estimate the determinants of unemployment, 
long-term unemployment and underemployment. Technical details of probit analysis are 
presented in appendix A2.4.
4.7.1 Determinants of unemployment
A probit model is used to analyse the determinants of unemployment. The model is built on the 
regression model U*{= PX&^i where U* is the underlying continuous, unobserved, latent variable. 
X  is a vector of individual, human capital and regional characteristics including gender, age, 
ethnicity, level of educational attainment and region, is the parameter vector to be estimated and 
the unit of analysis (/) is the individual. The unobservable error term £/ is defined as having 
E(e)=0 and Var(e)=a2. The definition of all variables used can be found in appendix A2.2 and a 
detailed description of Probit analysis can be found in appendix A2.4.
The observed variable is Ut. t/,=l if  an individual is unemployed and Uj=0 otherwise. 17/is related 
to U*i in the following way: if U*i>0, we observe f//=l otherwise we observe f7/=0.
The probit model is therefore defined as:
Prob(i7/=l)= ProbOS*)+E/>0)
= Prob(e>-y9J0 
= l-<D(-ySA7o)
= ®(J3XZo)
Where <X>(.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed 
that s follows a normal distribution. Two separate regressions are run for urban and rural areas 
respectively as it is expected that they should exhibit very different characteristics since, as we 
have seen, urban areas account for 83% of total unemployment. The resulting coefficients have 
been converted to marginal effects for ease of interpretation, and can be interpreted as the change 
in the probability of U r  1 for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable 
and, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
The reference category is Georgian males aged 46 to 55 with higher education living in Kakheti. 
This is chosen as the base category as I am particularly interested in whether females, youth, non-
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Georgians and individuals with lower educational attainment are significantly more likely to be 
unemployed, ceteris paribus. Kakheti is chosen as a reference category as it is considered the 
‘typical’ Georgian region in terms of ethnic make-up, degree of urbanisation and standard of 
living.
Table 4.13 reports the results, which largely confirm the findings based on the analysis of 
summary statistics. First, we see that females are significantly less likely to be unemployed, 
everything else being equal, than males. As previously argued, this could be a reflection of the 
lower participation rates for women as a consequence of the breakdown of child care facilities, 
rather than an indication that females face a lower risk of unemployment. Second, we confirm 
that, ceteris paribus, youth are significantly more likely to be unemployed than older individuals. 
Indeed in urban areas, youth (aged 15 to 25) are 27% more likely to be unemployed than are 
middle-aged individuals (46 to 55 years). This has serious implications for the future of Georgia’s 
human capital base. We also note that individuals aged 56 years and over are significantly less 
likely to be unemployed, ceteris paribus. This is not surprising as they are either inactive or 
employed in small-plot agriculture and it is unlikely that they should be looking for work.
Third, we see that overall, education does not have a particularly significant impact on the 
probability of being unemployed. Although the findings based on summary statistics showed that 
a significant share of the unemployed had higher education, the multivariate analysis reveals that 
higher education is not a significant determinant of unemployment, ceteris paribus, In fact, we 
see that in urban areas secondary education and higher technical education significantly increase 
the probability of being unemployed relative to higher education, ceteris paribus. In rural areas, 
the evidence is less conclusive. Higher technical education has a small positive effect on the 
probability of being unemployed, ceteris paribus, while technical secondary education appears to 
have a small negative impact.
Fourth, as regards ethnic identity, we see that in urban areas, Armenians are more likely to be 
unemployed than ethnic Georgians. Contrary to other ethnic minorities in Georgia, Armenians are 
more likely to live in urban centres and many are self-employed. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that non-Georgians face significant barriers to entry for formal jobs and these findings could 
reflect this. However, we also see that in rural areas, Armenians are significantly less likely to be 
unemployed. This is a reflection of the fact that, like almost all other ethnic minorities, the 
Armenians that live in rural areas are largely self-employed in small-plot agriculture and are less 
likely to be searching for non-agricultural rural employment.
We also see that individuals of Azeri and Greek origin living in both urban and rural areas are less 
likely to be unemployed than those of Georgian origin. In urban areas, this can be explained by
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the fact that 65% of them are ‘employed’ in urban agriculture, while the rest work in petty trade. 
In rural areas, the large majority of Azeris and Greeks also engage in agriculture. Given the one- 
hour employment criterion we would expect this group to be working very few hours a week on 
their urban plot, however we are surprised to find that they work a median of 28hours a week, 
which is quite significant considering the fact that it is on an urban plot.
Fifth, we see that region plays a significant role in determining whether an individual will be 
unemployed. Table 4.13 shows that in urban areas, residing in Tbilisi or Samegrelo has a very 
strong positive impact on the probability of being unemployed, increasing the probability by 12% 
and 14% respectively relative to Kakheti. It is not surprising to find the capital associated with 
higher probability of unemployment, however in Samegrelo’s unemployment is not necessarily a 
consequence of a large urban centre (the main urban centre is Poti; Georgia’s main port along the 
Black Sea coast), but rather of the influx of tens of thousands of Internally Displaced People as a 
result of the Abkhazian conflict as well as the collapse of the lucrative tea industry, which in the 
pre-transition period was the backbone of its economy. Table 4.13 also shows that in rural areas 
most regions exert a significant negative impact on the probability of unemployment, although the 
magnitude of the effect is not particularly strong.
Given the significance of the regional variables, a separate probit regression for unemployment is 
carried out, controlling for the regional rate of unemployment. Results are presented in appendix 
4, table A4.1. They show that the regional rate of unemployment is by far the strongest 
determinant of unemployment. Indeed, they show that in both urban and rural areas, individuals 
living in depressed areas, with high unemployment rates, are significantly more likely to be 
unemployed. In urban areas a one unit increase in the regional unemployment rate increases the 
probability of being unemployed by 58%, while in rural areas it increases by 44%. The strong 
impact of the regional unemployment rates, which is far greater than the impact of any individual 
characteristic, suggests that unemployment has more to do with the lack of employment 
opportunities in general and less to do with individual characteristics and attests the importance of 
stimulating labour demand as an effective way of reducing unemployment.
Table 4.13 Determinants o f Unemployment (urban and rural), Probit results, 1999.
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  u n e m p l o y e d  ( d u m m y ) u r b a n r u r a l
Individual Characteristics 
Female -0.0235 -0.0046
(0.0090)*** (0.0023)**
Age 15-25 0.2651 0.076
(0.0229)*** (0.0118)***
Age 26-45 0.058 0.0235
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(0.0120)*** (0.0047)***
Age 46-55 / /
Age 56+ -0.0464 -0.0213
(0.0136)*** (0.0037)***
Ethnic Identity
Georgian / /
Azeri -0.1327 -0.0135
(0.0249)*** (0.0042)***
Abkhazian -0.1063 0.0278
(0.0517)** (0.0394)
Greek -0.1474 -0.0145
(0.0207)*** (0.0067)**
Ossetian 0.1205 -0.0065
(0.0621)* (0.0074)
Russian -0.0048 0.0108
(0.0272) (0.0164)
Armenian 0.048 -0.0201
(0.0208)** (0.0026)***
Other -0.0079 0.0608
(0.0307) (0.0548)
Region
Tblisi 0.1168
(0.0210)***
Kakheti / /
Shida Kartli -0.0068 -0.0042
(0.0235) (0.0033)
Kvemo Kartli 0.0093 -0.016
(0.0247) (0.0031)***
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.0533 -0.0175
(0.0259)** (0.0023)***
Achara -0.031 -0.0105
(0.0212) (0.0026)***
Guria -0.0527 -0.0082
(0.0240)** (0.0031)***
Samegrelo 0.1266 -0.0231
(0.0289)*** (0.0021)***
Imereti 0.0419 -0.0004
(0.0234)* (0.0037)
Education
Primary or Less 0.0428 0.0019
(0.0450) (0.0081)
Incomplete Secondary 0.0299 0.0079
(0.0284) (0.0058)
General Secondary 0.041 0.0022
(0.0115)*** (0.0032)
Technical Secondary 0.0392 -0.011
(0.0185)** (0.0034)***
High Technical 0.0214 0.011
(0.0146) (0.0048)**
High General / /
Observations 8019 12423
L.2.Chi2 (K-l.) 528.99(24)*** 518.93(23)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether an individual is unemployed.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(e) The sample for the regression is all individuals in the labour force.
(f) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value o f the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(g) The unit of observation is the individual.
(h) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit o f the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on £-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
A2.4).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
4.7.2 Determinants of long-term unemployment
We now examine the determinants of long-term unemployment. Long-term unemployment is 
defined here as being unemployed for more than 12 months. We have seen that a considerable 
share of Georgia’s unemployed have been unemployed for more than 12 months and more than 
40% have been out of work for more than 3 years. This is cause for concern as these individuals 
risk being excluded from the labour market altogether as their skills become obsolete and they 
lose hope of finding a job. This section seeks to identify which individuals face the highest risk of 
long-term unemployment.
As with the analysis of unemployment, a probit model is used to examine the determinants of 
long-term unemployment. The model is built on the regression model U *r  /LY)+e, where U* is the 
underlying continuous, unobserved, latent variable. X  is the same vector of individual, human 
capital and regional characteristics as was used in the probit analysis for unemployment. We keep 
the same vector of explanatory variables despite the fact that some may not be significant in order 
to allow comparability with results from the analysis of unemployment /? is the parameter vector 
to be estimated and the unit of analysis (/') is the individual. The unobservable error term e, is 
defined as having E(e)=0 and Var(£)=cy2. The definition of all variables used can be found in 
appendix A2.2 and a detailed description of Probit analysis can be found in appendix A2.4.
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The observed variable is ULTf=\ if an individual is long-term unemployed and ULTi=0
otherwise. l / jTi is related to U*j in the following way: if U*i>0, we observe i f ^ r  1 otherwise we 
observe C/'r,=0.
The probit model is therefore defined as:
Prob(£/r(= l)=  P ro b ^ + e ^ O )
= Prob(e>-y8A)
= 1-0(-£*7g)
=  O03A7o)
Where 0 (.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed 
that e follows a normal distribution. Two separate regressions are run for urban and rural areas 
respectively on the sample of all unemployed. The reference category is similar to the one used in 
the analysis of unemployment to enable comparison, namely males, aged 46 to 55, with higher 
education and living in Kakheti. Moreover, we control for ethnic identity with one binary variable 
(Georgian/non-Georgian, where non-Georgian is the base category). The resulting coefficients 
have been converted to marginal effects for ease of interpretation. Results are presented in table 
4.14.
First, we see that gender does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the 
probability of being unemployed for more than 12 months, ceteris paribus. Second, in urban 
areas, long-term unemployment is significantly associated with the control age group, namely 
individuals aged 46 to 55 years. All other age groups exert a significant negative impact on the 
probability of long-term unemployment, ceteris paribus. Individuals aged 15 to 25 years are 22% 
less likely to be unemployed for more than 12 months than are those aged 46 to 55, while 26 to 45 
year olds are 13% less likely, ceteris paribus.
However, as shown in table 4.13, 46 to 55 year olds faced a lower probability o f unemployment 
overall. What these findings suggest is that barriers to labour market entry, largely due to a lack of 
new employment opportunities, mean that the younger generation (those that were under 35 years 
of age when the transition began) face a higher risk of unemployment overall. However, middle- 
aged workers who, as whole are less likely to be unemployed as they may have managed to retain 
their old jobs, once unemployed face a higher risk of being excluded from the labour market 
altogether as their skills may be obsolete in the new market economy. Finally, old-age workers 
are less likely to be long-term unemployed as they are either inactive or turn to agricultural self- 
employment to make-ends meet.
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Third, table 4.14 shows that ethnic identity does not have a significant impact on the probability 
of being long-term unemployed, ceteris paribus. Region, however, does play a very important 
role, however only in rural areas. We see that simply living in certain regions, has a strong 
positive significant impact on the probability of being unemployed long-term, ceteris paribus. 
Imereti, Samegrelo, Guria, Achara and to some extent Samtskhe-Javakheti are particularly 
associated with higher probabilities of long-term unemployment. These regions are situated in the 
Western part of Georgia along the Black Sea coast and have suffered the greatest economic 
collapse since the beginning of the transition. During the Soviet period, they were amongst the 
most affluent, with strong agricultural economies particularly in the tea industry. As argued 
above, the complete collapse of the tea industry, coupled with the influx of refugees as a result of 
the Abkhazian conflict, has had a disastrous impact on the local economy. These findings confirm 
the previous conclusion that programs aimed at stimulating labour demand, with a regional 
dimension, may be the most effective means of reducing unemployment. Finally, table 4.14 
shows that educational attainment does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
probability of being long-term unemployed, ceteris paribus,
Thus, amongst the unemployed, the individuals most at risk of remaining unemployed and of 
eventually being excluded from the labour market are middle-aged workers, whose skills may no 
longer be relevant to new market economy jobs, and individuals living in regions where 
employment opportunities are severely limited. As discussed by Micklewright and Stewart (2001, 
p.2), long-term unemployment is a strong risk factor for social exclusion both because of the 
impact it has on skills of individuals, and therefore on future employment possibilities, but also 
because of the lack of social interaction that would otherwise come with employment.
Table 4.14. Determinants o f Long-Term Unemployment fo r Urban and Rural areas, Probit 
results, 1999.
u r b a n r u r a l
Individual Characteristics 
Female -0.0234 -0.0185
(0.0236) (0.0430)
Age 15-25 -0.2168 -0.1197
(0.0445)*** (0.0791)
Age 26-45 -0.1258 0.0303
(0.0336)*** (0.0709)
Age 46-55 / /
Age 56+ -0.1324 -0.0045
(0.0495)*** (0.1066)
Georgian 0.0465 0.106
(0.0362) (0.1049)
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Region
Tblisi 0.0085
Kakheti
(0.0520)
/ /
Shida Kartli -0.0423 0.0515
(0.0689) (0.0567)
Kvemo Kartli -0.0327 -0.2109
(0.0683) (0.1155)*
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.1103 0.12
(0.0948) (0.0643)*
Achara 0.0089 0.2236
(0.0639) (0.0387)***
Guria 0.0459 0.1759
(0.0787) (0.0456)***
Samegrelo -0.0293 0.1432
(0.0625) (0.0681)**
Imereti -0.0962 0.1581
(0.0642) (0.0461)***
Education 
Primary or Less -0.0501 0.0414
(0.1093) (0.1340)
Incomplete Secondary -0.0454 -0.0326
(0.0650) (0.0860)
General Secondary -0.017 0.0345
(0.0276) (0.0569)
Technical Secondary 0.0306 -0.0372
(0.0410) (0.1275)
High Technical -0.0176 0.0263
(0.0365) (0.0625)
High General / /
Observations 1637 469
L2.Chi2 (K-l.) 44.23(18)*** 55.37(17)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether an individual is long-term unemployed (more than 12 
months).
(d) The sample for the regression is all unemployed individuals.
(e) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(f) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value of the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(g) The unit of observation is the individual.
(h) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness of fit o f the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on £-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of independent variables in our model (see appendix 
A2A).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
4.7.3 Determinants of underemployment
We now turn our attention to the determinants of underemployment. In the descriptive analysis, 
we saw that a considerable share of the employed in Georgia are underemployed, or involuntarily
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working less than the normal duration of work. Given the inadequacy of the social security 
system, and of pensions and unemployment benefits in particular, individuals cannot afford to be 
pensioners or unemployed and therefore undertake a variety of activities, particularly in 
agriculture, to survive. They are considered employed if they work more than one hour a week. In 
these circumstances unemployment figures cannot fully describe the employment situation. 
Moreover, we saw that rather than laying workers off, enterprises have dealt with fluctuations in 
demand by hoarding labour. Vulnerability in the labour market can therefore not be limited to the 
unemployed, but must also consider the underemployed.
This section identifies those individuals that are at greatest risk of underemployment. Appendix 
A4.1 provides a discussion on what is meant by underemployment. Recall, that underemployment 
is defined here as consisting of all working-age individuals who are either: (1) employed full-time 
and (2) working for a total (in primary and multiple jobs) of less than 41 hours per week; or (1) 
employed part-time and (2) doing so involuntarily. I also examine whether changing condition (2) 
to working less than 35 hours per week, as per the EU directive on the length of a working week, 
makes a difference to our results.
Again, a probit model is used to examine the determinants of underemployment and it is built on 
*
the regression model Wt = fiXt+Zj where W* is the underlying continuous, unobserved, latent
variable. X  is the same vector of individual, human capital and regional characteristics as was 
used in the probit analysis for unemployment; however, it also includes controls for sector of 
economic activity. /? is the parameter vector to be estimated and the unit of analysis (/) is the 
individual. The unobservable error term e, is defined as having E(e)=0 and Var(e)=a2. The 
definition of all variables used can be found in appendix A2.2 and a detailed description of Probit 
analysis can be found in appendix A2.4.
The observed variable is W f. W f=  1 if an individual is underemployed and using 6 number of 
hours (i.e. 41 hours or 35 hours per week) and W f =0 otherwise. W f is related to W] in the 
following way: if W* >0, we observe WBt - 1 otherwise we observe W f =0.
The probit model is therefore defined as:
Prob(IT? =1)= ProbG&Y,+$>0)
= Prob(s>-/5LY)
=  1-0  {-pX/d)
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Where 0 (.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed 
that £ follows a normal distribution. Four separate regressions are run each for urban and rural 
areas for 0 = 41 hours per week and 0 = 35 hours per week. The sample is all employed 
individuals. The reference category is similar to the one used in the analysis of long-term 
unemployment, namely non-Georgian males, aged 46 to 55, with higher education, living in 
Kakheti and employed in transport and communication. Transport and communication is chosen 
as a reference category because it is expected to be the least associated with underemployment. 
The resulting coefficients have been converted to marginal effects for ease of interpretation.
Results from the probit regression for underemployment are presented in table 4.15. A separate 
set of regressions is also run for the determinants of underemployment (using both 35 hours and 
41 hours per week) only for the urban wage employed in order to examine labour hoarding. 
Results are presented in appendix 4, table A4.2 and are largely consistent with the analysis based 
on the sample of all employed. They will be discussed below.
First, table 4.15 shows there is a strong gender bias, as females are significantly more likely to be 
underemployed than males are, both in urban and rural areas, ceteris paribus. This result is 
particularly important since a control for sector of economic activity is included and that therefore 
the findings cannot be explained by the higher share of females in education or other female- 
dominated sectors where working hours are inferior to the average. This is taken as an indication 
that females are more likely to have their working hours restricted and more likely to turn to 
subsistence agriculture because of a lack of sustainable full-time work opportunities.
Second, we see that underemployment is negatively associated with age. In particular, youth 
(aged 15 to 25) are significantly more likely to be underemployed than middle-age workers (46 to 
55 years old) in both urban and rural areas. However old-age workers (over 56 years) in urban 
areas are also significantly more likely to be underemployed than middle-aged workers. Given 
that a control for sector of economic activity is included and that youth and old-age workers are 
largely employed in agriculture, the higher risk of underemployment for both these age groups 
suggests that they are likely to be engaging in agriculture as a coping strategy, rather than as 
freely chosen full-time employment.
Third, underemployment is concentrated in certain sectors of economic activity. As suggested in 
the descriptive analysis, agriculture is strongly associated with underemployment, regardless of 
the definition used. The average (mean) number of hours worked in agriculture is 28 hours. This
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is both a result of the one-hour employment criterion and the inadequate social security system 
which means that individuals cannot afford to be unemployed or inactive and must engage in 
some economic activity to survive. Table 4.15 also reveals individuals employed in 
manufacturing and municipal infrastructure (electricity, gas and water supply) are significantly 
more likely to be underemployed than those employed in our reference category (transport and 
communication). This is particularly the case in manufacturing where, everything else being 
equal, it increases the probability of underemployment by 11% in rural areas and approximately 
6% in urban areas. This suggests that labour hoarding, which characterised the early years of 
transition, has not altogether disappeared and that an important share of workers is still being 
placed on shortened working hours or unpaid leave.
The results also show that employment in construction and domestic services significantly 
increases the probability of underemployment, regardless of the definition used. The only sector 
to be associated with a significant lower probability of underemployment is trade, which is 
dominated by small-scale ‘petty’ trade. This confirms anecdotal evidence that individuals self- 
employed in petty trade work long-hours and manage to generate livelihoods in the absence of 
formal employment. Finally, we see that employment in education, health and social work has a 
very strong positive impact on the probability of being underemployed. These findings should be 
approached with caution, as it is common for employees in these sectors to work shorter hours.
Fourth, table 4.15 shows that ethnicity is also an important determinant of underemployment. 
Non-Georgians, in both urban and rural areas, face a significantly higher risk of 
underemployment than Georgians do. This suggests that non-Georgians may be more likely to 
have their working hours reduced and that barriers to sustainable full-time employment mean that 
they are more likely to turn to subsistence agriculture to survive. Fifth, we see that higher 
education is significantly associated with an increased probability of underemployment, ceteris 
paribus in both urban and rural areas, regardless of the definition used. This could be an 
indication that in the absence of formal work opportunities, individuals with higher education turn 
to agriculture as ‘coping strategy’ and therefore work shorter hours, whereas those with lower 
education do so as a ‘freely chosen’ full-time employment.
Sixth, table 4.15 reveals that underemployment is significantly associated with private sector 
employment in both urban and rural areas. One could expect this result to be driven by the large 
share of self-employed. However, when I perform the regression on the sample of urban wage 
employed (see table A4.2 in the appendix 4), the results reveal that (using a cut-off o f 35 hours 
per week) private sector wage employment is significantly and positively associated with
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underemployment. This provides evidence for the previous suggestion that private sector firms 
adjust to falls in demand by rationing working hours rather than employment.
Finally, underemployment has a strong regional dimension. In particular, we see that although the 
capital, Tblisi, has the highest level of unemployment, underemployment does not appear to be a 
serious issue. Indeed, living in Tblisi decreases the probability of underemployment by 14% to 
19% depending on whether 35 or 41 hours per week are used. Guria is also associated with a 
lower probability of underemployment (but only when 35hrs per week cut-off is used). In 
contrast, we see that living in Imereti and Shida Kartli, everything else being equal, has a 
significant positive impact on the probability of underemployment in both urban and rural areas. 
Finally employment in Samtskhe Javakheti, Achara and Samegrelo, increases the probability of 
underemployment in rural areas but decreases it in urban areas (except for Samegrelo where urban 
results are not significant).
Table A4.2 in appendix 4 takes a closer look at the probability of underemployment for the urban 
wage employed. It shows that results are veiy similar to those discussed above for the sample of 
all employed. In particular, females and old-age workers (over 56 years) are significantly more 
likely to be underemployed, everything else being equal. Those with higher education also face a 
higher risk of underemployment, all things being equal. Similarly, certain sectors of economic 
activity are associated with a high probability of underemployment for the urban wage employed, 
particularly manufacturing, municipal infrastructure, construction, finance, education, health and 
social work and domestic services. We also see that Tblisi is still associated with a lower 
probability of underemployment and that Imereti and to some extent Shida Kartli and Kvemo 
Kartli are both associated with higher probabilities of underemployment amongst the urban wage 
employed.
Table 4.15 Determinants o f Underemployment, Probit results, 1999.
Dependent variable: underemployed (dummy)
u s i n g  4 1  h r s  p w U s i n g  3 5  h r s  p w
U r b a n R u r a l U r b a n R u r a l
Individual Characteristics 
Female 0.0892 0.0127 0.0469 0.0228
(0.0140)*** (0.0096) (0.0139)*** (0.0099)**
Age 15-25 0.0391 0.0462 0.0992 0.0691
(0.0279) (0.0178)*** (0.0298)*** (0.0190)***
Age 26-45 0.0066 0.064 0.0194 0.0623
(0.0170) (0.0137)*** (0.0168) (0.0147)***
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Age 46-55 / / f f
Age 56+ 0.0406 -0.0307 0.0356 -0.024
(0.0195)** (0.0144)** (0.0197)* (0.0150)
Georgian -0.0516 -0.039 -0.0754 -0.0532
Education
(0.0190)*** (0.0172)** (0.0202)*** (0.0181)***
Primary or Less -0.1246 -0.1181 -0.0523 -0.0389
(0.0491)** (0.0219)*** (0.0425) (0.0215)*
Incomplete Secondary -0.0269 -0.1064 0.0318 -0.0332
(0.0393) (0.0196)*** (0.0375) (0.0193)*
General Secondary -0.102 0.0127 -0.0407 0.0536
(0.0172)*** (0.0142) (0.0164)** (0.0147)***
Technical Secondary -0.0996 -0.0225 -0.022 -0.0199
(0.0253)*** (0.0226) (0.0234) (0.0233)
High Technical -0.0816 -0.0525 -0.0433 -0.0223
(0.0211)*** (0.0175)*** (0.0196)** (0.0180)
High General f / / /
Sector o f Economic Activity
Agriculture, Fishing (A, B) 0.1447 0.4231 0.2579 0.334
(0.0283)*** (0.0373)*** (0.0328)*** (0.0368)***
Manufacturing (D) 0.0605 0.1144 0.0661 0.109
(0.0293)** (0.0402)*** (0.0328)** (0.0538)**
Electricity, Gas, Water Supply (E) 0.0916 0.0359 -0.0852 0.0259
(0.0457)** (0.0674) (0.0499)* (0.0843)
Construction (F) 0.1271 0.0558 0.0955 0.0553
(0.0388)*** (0.0637) (0.0475)** (0.0779)
Wholesale and retail trade (G) -0.0984 0.0517 -0.0439 -0.0034
(0.0301)*** (0.0429) (0.0293) (0.0527)
Hotels, restaurants (H) -0.0716 -0.1241 -0.0329 -0.0349
(0.0588) (0.0941) (0.0564) (0.0992)
Transport (I) / / / /
Financial intermediation, real estate (J, K) 0.0523 0.1346 0.0713 -0.0019
(0.0356) (0.0473)*** (0.0404)* (0.0693)
Public Administration and defence -0.013 0.052 -0.1404 -0.0935
(0.0329) (0.0438) (0.0304)*** (0.0546)*
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Education (M) 0.2781 0.2715 0.4764 0.3749
(0.0237)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0360)***
Health, social work (N) 0.1258 0.1939 0.107 0.0865
(0.0313)*** (0.0355)*** (0.0380)*** (0.0596)
Other community and personal services (0 ) 0.1774 0.1545 0.0827 0.0686
(0.0326)*** (0.0459)*** (0.0423)* (0.0696)
Private Households with employees (P) 0.2735 -0.0022 0.4527 0.0259
(0.0480)*** (0.1490) (0.0615)*** (0.1622)
Other (C, Q) 0.1599 0.2581 -0.1924 0.214
(0.0719)** (0.0506)*** (0.0621)*** (0.0981)**
Region
Tblisi -0.1363 -0.1896
(0.0280)*** (0.0234)***
Kakheti / / / /
Shida Kartli 0.0862 0.1871 0.0142 0.2117
(0.0303)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0302) (0.0176)***
Kvemo Kartli 0.0497 -0.0287 -0.0857 0.0148
(0.0312) (0.0198) (0.0274)*** (0.0206)
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.0395 0.2051 -0.0802 0.1135
(0.0405) (0.0148)*** (0.0342)** (0.0194)***
Achara -0.0868 0.1201 -0.0897 0.0551
(0.0317)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0199)***
Guria -0.0392 -0.0352 -0.1378 -0.1798
(0.0371) (0.0189)* (0.0274)*** (0.0179)***
Samegrelo 0.044 0.0765 -0.0434 0.1788
(0.0329) (0.0164)*** (0.0304) (0.0178)***
Imereti 0.2388 0.0673 0.1868 0.0811
(0.0242)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0305)*** (0.0187)***
Private 0.0421 0.0182 0.1367 0.0809
(0.0177)** (0.0236) (0.0174)*** (0.0250)***
Observations 6353 11708 6353 11708
L2Chi2 (K-l) 919.55(32)*** 1258.88(31)*** 1506.17(32)*** 1583.64(31)**
Source: Author’s own analysis of LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether an individual is underemployed.
(d) Underemployment is defined as all working-age individuals who are (1) employed full-time and (2) working for a 
total (in primary and multiple jobs) of less than 41 (or 35) hours per week. OR (1) employed part-time and (2) doing 
so involuntarily (see Appendix A4.1. for details).
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(e) The sample for the regression is all employed individuals.
(f) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value o f the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(g) The unit of observation is the individual.
(h) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit of the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on Jt-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
A2.4).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
(1) Letters in brackets refer to sector o f economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification o f all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(m)Categoiy G also includes repair of motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting and business activities. 
Category C refers to mining and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
4.8 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
The findings of this chapter can be summarised in the following thirteen points.
1. When central planning collapsed, many western economists predicted that privatization 
and restructuring would lead to a fall in state employment and a growth in the private 
sector, which would draw from the pool of unemployed and be the driving force behind 
economic growth. However, contrary to expectations, this chapter found that neither 
unemployment nor private firms have grown significantly in Georgia. The results indicate 
that this is in part because labour has shifted directly into small-scale agricultural self- 
employment, and also because of labour hoarding on the part of enterprises. I argued that 
the main reason for the shift into agricultural self-employment is the overwhelming 
inadequacy of the pension and unemployment benefit system, which has meant that 
individuals cannot afford to be pensioners or unemployed for any length of time.
The findings showed that agriculture’s share of total employment increased from a 
quarter of the labour force in 1990 to over one half in 1999, whereas employment levels 
in industry and construction collapsed from 20% to 8% and 10% to 1% respectively. 
Agricultural employment accounts for 90% of all the self-employment (compared to only 
16% in the EU-15), and is largely limited to small (0.5-lhct), low-productivity, household 
plots.
2. There has been virtually no creation of small off-farm enterprises capable of generating 
employment. In 1999, only 2% of the self-employed had employees. These findings 
suggest that, contrary to expectations, privatization and restructuring have not been 
successful in generating a dynamic private sector capable of absorbing the labour shed by 
the state sector and of being the driving force behind economic growth. On the contrary,
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they suggest that the private sector in Georgia is largely dominated by subsistence 
agriculture.
3. This chapter argued that unemployment rates are artificially low. The unemployment rate 
is found to be approximately 16%, varying between an average of 4% in rural areas and 
25% in urban areas. However, there is considerable evidence that the rural rate is entirely 
unreliable and that even the urban rate may be concealing some hidden unemployment. 
Three factors support this assumption.
First, there is reason to believe that an important share of the rural labour force is 
underemployed. The Government has chosen to apply the international 'one-hour- 
employment-criterion’ to a one-week reference period, which implies that anyone 
working for at least one hour during the reference week is considered employed. This has 
serious implications in rural areas, where the majority of households have received a 
small (0.5-lhect) plot of land, as part of the land privatisation programme. This is further 
supported by the Employment Law of Georgia which specifies that anyone owning 1 
hectare or more of land is considered self-employed, regardless of whether they may 
consider themselves unemployed or may actively be seeking another job. The result is 
that 78% of the rural working-age population is considered self-employed in agriculture 
and that only 4% of the rural labour force is considered unemployed. Therefore, although 
these individuals are not unemployed, nor can they be considered employed. They are 
simply temporarily surviving in the hopes of finding a job in the future.
Second, the high and increasing rates of inactivity could be an indication that, having lost 
hope of finding a job, people drop out of the labour force altogether - thereby further 
disguising the true level of unemployment. This is particularly the case for women in 
childbearing age, who no longer have access to childcare facilities, as well as young men 
who are discouraged from entering the labour force as there are no jobs available. This 
chapter also found increasing rates of inactivity amongst urban men at the peak of their 
working lives. This is a further indication that job creation in urban areas is very limited.
Third, there was also evidence of continued labour hoarding, particularly in 
manufacturing and municipal infrastructure services. Workers are put on extended unpaid 
leave, reduced working hours, or suffer reduced wages and wage arrears. Private sector 
employees are more likely to be underemployed than employees in the state sector, 
suggesting that private firms are continuing to adjust to falls in demand by rationing 
working hours rather than employment.
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If we consider all those working less than normal working hours, we find that over one 
half of the labour force is underemployed. Compounding the underemployed and 
unemployed suggests that as much as 67% of the labour resources are left unused in the 
Georgian economy. Moreover, these findings indicate that there is a ‘pool’ not of 
unemployed but of underemployed, on which the growing private sector could draw to 
power economic growth. However, there is a risk that if the private sector does not 
expand, this pool will become increasingly marginalized and de-skilled.
4. Long-term unemployment is widespread and there are signs that it may be increasing. 
This chapter found that approximately 42% of the unemployed have been out of work for 
more than 3 years. The gap between the unemployed who have been actively-seeking 
employment, and those who have not because they have lost hope of finding any, has 
widened - a further indication of the increase in long-term unemployment. Middle-aged 
workers, whose skills may no longer be relevant to new market economy jobs, and 
individuals living in regions where employment opportunities are severely limited face 
the greatest risk of being long-term unemployed and of eventually being excluded from 
the labour market.
5. Those who are employed have extremely low incomes. On the one hand, paid-employees, 
who work mainly in urban areas, are largely employed by State budgetary organisations, 
and the severe fiscal crisis has meant that they have been suffering from below 
subsistence wages and substantial payment arrears. Salaries, which ranged between 
GEL20 (US$10) and GEL66 (US$33) in 2000, were only 10% to 30% of the official 
minimum subsistence level. In the absence of alternatives (as we have seen 
unemployment is not an alternative) many paid employees have resorted to secondary 
jobs to meet basic needs. On the other hand, there is evidence that the self-employed, 
98% of which work in agricultural small-plots, may have even lower incomes. This is a 
result of very low productivity, due to the very small size of the plots (on average 0.5- 
1 hectare), the lack of fertilizers, tractors and other modem machinery. Much of 
agricultural self-employment may, in fact, be subsistence agriculture.
6. The inadequacy of pensions means that pensioners are forced to continue working.
Economic activity rates for individuals over the age of 65 years are 57% for men and 41%
for women, compared to only 5% and 2% for men and women in the EU-15. The majority
is self-employed in rural agriculture, where they account for almost one quarter of the
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self-employed, while the rest engage in petty trade via street stalls and markets. In rural 
areas, 70% of those aged 65 and over are employed. This chapter also found that the high 
employment rates cannot fully be explained by the generous employment definition, as 
rural pensioners work an average of 27 hours per week. This suggests that the main 
reason for their employment is indeed the very low pensions (GEL14 or US$ 7.5 a 
month), which, if paid at all, account for only 11% of the poverty line.
7. On the one hand, the Georgian workforce has relatively high levels of educational 
attainment, with 31% of adults aged 25-59 having higher education, compared to only 
21% in the EU. On the other, it is increasingly losing its skills. The lack of formal 
employment opportunities means that a growing number of workers with higher 
education are either unemployed or self-employed in small-plot agriculture and petty 
trade. After more than 13 years, many may already have lost their skills. At the same 
time, those who have not lost their skills may find that their skills have become obsolete 
in the new market economy. This is particularly the case for middle-aged individuals who 
already had professions at the beginning of the transition period (see 12 below). This 
could present an obstacle to economic growth, as there may be insufficient workers with 
market-economy skills to support the growing private sector.
8. Poor labour market outcomes (unemployment, long-term unemployment and 
underemployment) are strongly associated with certain groups. In particular, this chapter 
found that individuals living in depressed regions, youth, females and to some extent 
middle-aged workers were especially vulnerable.
9. Individuals living in regions with high unemployment rates face the highest risk of 
unemployment and long-term unemployment. In urban areas, a one-unit increase in the 
regional unemployment rate increases the risk of individual unemployment by 57%. 
These findings attest to the importance of programmes aimed at stimulating labour 
demand at the regional level as an effective way of reducing unemployment.
10. Youth also face a high risk of poor labour market outcomes. There is evidence that youth 
are being marginalized from the labour market as their participation rates decline and 
unemployment rates increase. Only 30% of 15-24 year old females and 43% of 15-24
year old males are currently economically active, compared to 43% and 53% respectively 
in the EU. The youth that are economically active are largely unemployed. Youth (aged 
15 to 24) are significantly more likely to be unemployed than are older individuals,
ceteris paribus. Unemployment rates reach 45% for young urban males and 50% for their
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female counterparts. These do not include students; they are youth who are without work 
and actively looking for work. Employed youth are also more likely to be 
underemployed. These findings could have very damaging implications for the future 
human capital and the longer-term social and economic development of the country.
11. There is evidence of a gender bias in the labour market. Females are more likely to be 
underemployed than males. They are significantly more likely to have their working 
hours restricted and to turn to subsistence agriculture than males are. Females are also 
over-represented in semi-skilled positions (80% of clerks are females) and under­
represented in senior positions (only 32% of managers are females). Finally, although 
they are less likely to be unemployed, everything else being equal, females are 
increasingly inactive. This is particularly the case for females in child bearing and rearing 
age (particularly in urban areas) that are staying out of the labour market due to a 
breakdown in childcare facilities, which were previously widely available.
12. Middle-aged individuals (aged 46 to 55) face the highest risk of long-term unemployment 
than any other age group, ceteris paribus. Although they are less likely to be unemployed 
as a whole, once unemployed they face a higher risk of being excluded from the labour 
market altogether. This suggests that they are most at risk of having skills that have 
become obsolete in the new market economy and highlights the urgent need for re­
training, particularly of middle-aged individuals as a means of slowing down the increase 
in poverty and vulnerability.
13. Finally, there appears to be an important age-related pattern to the labour market in 
Georgia. A rather pessimistic age-based portrait of the labour market could be the 
following: (1) Youth are being excluded from the job market because of the lack of new 
formal employment opportunities; (2) middle aged-workers are holding on to their pre­
transition jobs, mainly as (low-paid) wage employees, but once they lose their jobs, they 
face a high risk of being excluded from the labour market altogether as their skills have 
become obsolete in the new market economy; (3) older age groups, close to or above 
retirement age, are no longer working in their pre-transition jobs but cannot afford to live 
off the very low pension benefits, and are therefore self-employed in small-scale trade 
activities or subsistence agriculture to make ends meet.
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5INFORMAL LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY IN GEORGIA
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The aim of this chapter is to measure the scale of informal labour market activity in Georgia and 
to provide a profile of the informally employed. Chapter 4 showed that despite the large-scale 
collapse in output, which accompanied the first few years of transition in Georgia, open 
unemployment did not increase as expected. This chapter tests the hypothesis that one of the 
reasons for which open unemployment did not match the collapse in output is that labour shifted 
directly into informal employment.
To this end, the operational framework developed in Chapter 3 is used to identify individuals that 
are informally employed through the Labour Force Survey (1999). Recall that the operational 
framework consists of the following categories of informal employment: (1) informal self- 
employed; (2) contributing family workers; (3) informal employees; (4) others informally 
employed; and (5) secondary job-holders (for a detailed description see chapter 3).
In sections 5.1 and 5.2, the operational framework is used to estimate the size and composition of 
informal labour market activity in Georgia and the findings are compared to those obtained using 
the classic ILO definition of informal sector employment. Section 5.3 provides a descriptive 
analysis of the characteristics of formal and informal employment. Section 5.4, uses multivariate 
analysis to examine the determinants of informal employment by category of informal 
employment and identifies which individuals face the highest risk of informal employment. 
Finally, section 5.5, summarises the main findings and highlight which individuals face the 
highest cumulative risk of informal employment. Section 5.7 draws some conclusions.
5.1 THE SCALE OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT
The operational framework developed in Chapter 3 is used to identify individuals in the Labour 
Force Survey data (1999) that are informally employed. Table 5.1 presents rates and frequencies 
of formal and informal employment both including and excluding agricultural workers. We see 
that the majority of the Georgian employed population works informally. In 1999, 52% of the 
employed (about 900,000 people) worked informally.86 Although the majority was involved in
86 Recall that individuals with an informal primary job or a formal primary job and an informal secondary job are 
considered to be informally employed. The rest is considered to be formally employed. Individuals with a formal 
primary job and informal secondary job are categorised as informal because engaging in an informal secondary activity 
is a result o f the same factors that lead individuals into informal primary employment, namely lack o f adequate formal 
employment opportunities (which pay sufficient wages on a regular basis). I recognise that this may underestimate the 
scale of formal employment and provide rates excluding informal secondary job-holders where appropriate. However, 
given that the ultimate aim of the analysis is to assess whether informal labour market activity provides a social safety 
net, I feel that it is more appropriate to consider these individuals informally employed.
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agriculture, even if we exclude all agricultural workers from our sample, table 5.1 shows that 34% 
and of the Georgian non-agricultural employed population was working informally.87
Table 5.1 also presents the rate of informal employment using the standard ILO informal sector 
definition as outlined in the 1993 ‘Resolution Concerning Statistics in the Informal Sector’ (ILO 
1993b) As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, the ILO defines the informal sector in terms of 
characteristics of ‘units’ (or enterprises). Informal enterprises are a subset of household 
unincorporated enterprises with certain characteristics including, amongst other things, small- 
scale production, family ownership, and the use of labour intensive technologies. In this sense, 
informal sector employment comprises all persons employed in ‘informal sector enterprises’. In 
contrast, the conceptual framework devised in this thesis is based on ‘activities’ instead of 
‘units’.88 As discussed in chapter 3, this means that all individuals who engage in informal 
activities are considered informally employed, regardless of the units in which these activities 
take place, thereby also including those who are employed in ‘formal sector’ enterprises.
Table 5.1 shows that informal sector employment, as defined by the ILO, accounted for a little 
under one quarter of Georgia’s employed (including agricultural workers) in 1999. Appendix A5 
provides an extensive discussion of the ILO definition of informal sector and present frequencies 
and rates for ‘total informal employment’ and ‘ILO informal sector employment’ as well as for 
the different categories of informal employment for 1999. The frequencies and rates are broken 
down by gender and quarter and calculated both including and excluding agriculture.
Table 5.1 Formal and informal employment (1999)
Rates andfrequencies
Formal Informal ILO Informal Sector Employment
% 1000s % 1000s % 1000s
All employed 47.9 830 52.1 902 23.7 410
Non-agricultural employed 65.9 551 34.1 285 30.1 252
Source: author’s own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Notes:
(a) %  refers to percentage o f employed in given category.
(b) Annual rates and frequencies are averages of quarterly rates and frequencies.
(c) ‘all employed’ and ‘non-agricultural employed’ refers to the sample used for calculating rates and frequencies.
(d) ‘ILO informal sector’ refers to the ILO definition o f informal sector employment, which includes only individuals 
employed in ‘informal sector enterprises’ (i.e. non-agricultural enterprises located at home, outside home, in a street 
booth, construction site, market place, at a customer’s home or in a non-fixed location). See Appendix A5 for the 
ILO definition of the informal sector and its operationalisation.
87 Note that unless otherwise specified all figures, in this chapter are for 1999.
88 As discussed in chapter 3, the term ‘activities’ is used here in the sense o f economic activities as in the SNA (1993) 
and the ‘International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) (ILO 1989).
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5.2 COMPOSITION OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT
Table 5.2 presents the composition of informal employment by type of informal employment. It 
shows that the majority of informal employment consists of contributing family workers. In 1999, 
such workers represented approximately 59% of all informal workers. As we will see, 
contributing family workers, who by definition are not paid wages, are often females, youth and 
old-age workers working on household agricultural plots. As shown in table 5.2, the informal self- 
employed (‘own-account workers’ and ‘employers’ whose activities are based at home, in the 
street, in a market, at a customer’s home, on an urban or unregistered plot of land) accounted for 
17% of total informal employment. Small-plot agricultural production and petty trade accounted 
for almost 98% of all self-employment (both formal and informal).
Table 5.2 also shows that informal employees make up roughly 14% of total informal 
employment. These are ‘paid employees’, working casually, temporarily, or with an oral 
agreement, and often in trade and manufacturing. The fourth category of informal employment, 
the formally employed with informal secondary jobs, accounted for approximately 8% total 
informal employment in 1999. These were mainly state employees with (formal) primary jobs in 
public administration, education and health, and informal secondary jobs mainly in agriculture.89
Finally, the fifth category of informal employment, ‘others informally employed’, identifies 
temporary and casual co-operative members or workers for whom status in employment is 
unknown, but who are either casually employed, or work in ‘typical informal activities’. As the 
number of observations for this group is very small (they represented only 0.8% of total 
employment in 1999) it will not be possible to draw any significant conclusions on their 
characteristics, and they will therefore be excluded from most of the analysis in this chapter.
Table 5.2: Informally Employed by type o f  informal employment (1999), % of total informal employment
Category of Informal Employment 1999
Informal self-employed 17
Contributing family workers 59
Informal employees 14
Other informals 2
Informal secondary job holders 8
Total 100
Source: author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Notes: For definition o f categories of informal employment see chapter 3 and appendix A2.2.
89 Note that the scale o f both informal self-employment and informal secondary jobs may be underestimated, as it is 
likely that individuals engaging in these activities, particularly in informal trade, may be reluctant to accurately report 
them. See appendix A2.1.3 for a discussion o f data quality.
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5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT
The analysis of the Labour Force data reveals that there are significant disparities between formal 
and informal employment and between categories of informal employment, depending on state or 
private sector, sector of economic activity, rural or urban setting, region, ethnic background, level 
of educational attainment, profession, gender and age of individuals. Each of these dimensions 
will be analysed in turn.
5.3.1 State and private sector
The most obvious and significant distinguishing feature of informal employment in Georgia is the 
public/private dimension. Figure 5.1 shows the composition of state and private sector 
employment by formal/informal sector. We see that in 1999, approximately 80% of state sector 
employment was formal whereas almost 70% of private sector employment was informal. Wage- 
employment was concentrated in the state sector, with only 27% of wage-employees working in 
the private sector. Moreover, more than 60% of formal private sector employment was own- 
account agricultural work, which means that the private sector was essentially limited to 
registered, small-plot agriculture and informal employment.
It is also surprising that as much as 20% of formal State employees also worked informally.90 
Two thirds of these are secondary jobholders: mainly professionals who have formal primary jobs 
in public administration, health or education, and informal secondary jobs in agriculture. As 
previously argued, the exceptionally low wages and arrears in budgetary organisations means that 
workers are obliged to supplement their income through informal employment. Another third of 
informal state employment consists of informal employees: mostly low skilled workers in state- 
owned manufacturing (mainly tea and bread) enterprises, as well as in agriculture.
Nevertheless, apart from the informal secondary jobholders, there was a clear dual dimension to 
Georgian employment: on the one had, there were the formal, mostly urban, state employees, 
while on the other there were the informal, mostly rural, private self-employed.
90 Recall that anyone with a formal primaiy job and an informal secondary job is categorised here as informal.
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Figure 5.1 State and private employment by formal/informal status (1999)
■  informal 
□  formal
State Private
Source: author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999
5.3.2 Branch of economic activity
Given this dual dimension to Georgia’s employment, we can expect to find that formal and 
informal workers are employed in different sectors o f  economic activity. Figure 5.2 presents 
sector o f economic activity by formal/informal composition. We see that individuals employed as 
domestic employees, in agriculture, trade, and to some extent construction and hotel and 
restaurant services are largely informal whereas those employed in public administration, 
education, health and other community services are largely formal. These eight sectors together 
account for 85% o f total employment. The results are not surprising as education, health, and 
public administration are almost exclusively in the state sector while employment in private 
households, agriculture, construction and trade is largely private self-employment and 
contributing family work.
Figure 5.2 shows that approximately 70% o f agricultural employment was informal. In fact, 
agriculture accounted for 69% o f total informal employment compared to only 34% o f formal 
employment. Most agricultural workers were contributing family workers and self-employed 
working on small household plots. Many ware also employed on urban plots. As discussed in 
chapter 4, although these have existed since the Soviet period, when they were allocated by the 
State as ‘garden plots’, they now represent the primary source o f employment for one seventh o f 
the urban employed population (Bemabe 2002b).91
91 The descriptive analysis in this chapter draws on Bemabd (2002).
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Figure 5.2 Formally/Informally employed by sector o f economic activity (1999)
100%
©40% ■ Informal 
^Formal
Source: author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Notes: Letters in brackets refer to sector o f economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification o f all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
5.3.3 Urban and rural
If  agriculture is included, then three quarters o f  informal employment was located in rural areas. 
However, if  agriculture is excluded, then almost 60% o f informal work was in urban areas. 
Nevertheless, rural non-agricultural employment was still found to be largely informal with one 
half o f rural non-agricultural workers informally employed.
The data reveal an interesting symmetry; whereas in urban areas 62% o f the employed worked 
formally, in rural areas 62% were informally employed. As shown in Chapter 4, there were 
significant rural -  urban disparities in the labour market as a whole. Where the urban labour 
market was characterised by low employment rates, high unemployment rates (especially for 
youth), and wage employment in the State sector, the rural labour market featured exceptionally 
high employment rates (particularly for old-age workers) and self-employment in agriculture.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the composition o f urban and rural informal employment, 
respectively, by type o f informal employment and sector o f economic activity. We see that most
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urban informal employment consisted of informal self-employed and informal employees. 
Approximately 40% of urban informal self-employed worked in wholesale and retail trade, which 
was almost entirely limited to retail sale through street stalls and markets, and more than one third 
worked on urban plots. The rest were employed as informal taxi drivers and in home-based 
manufacturing (mainly of bread).
The second substantial category of informal employment in urban areas is that of informal 
employees, which accounted for 33% of total urban informal employment. Table 5.3 shows that 
36% were employed in wholesale and retail trade in street stalls and markets, 19% were in 
manufacturing and a further 10% were casual employees on urban agricultural plots. Finally, two 
other noteworthy groups of informal employees are those working as construction workers, who 
made up 7% of informal wage employment in urban areas, and domestic employees, 90% of 
whom worked on the basis of oral agreements, and who accounted for 4% of informal wage 
employment in urban areas.
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Table 5.3 Urban informal employment and sector o f  economic activity (1999) 
% within groups
Informal
secondary
job
Informal Contributing Others holders: Total urban
self- family Informal informally primary Informal
employed workers employees employed job Employment
Urban Informal nn ■  ^ jb .y 20.8 32.6 3.9 5.4 100Employment
Agriculture, fishing (A, B) 35.5 92 10.2 6.3 7.6 36.3
Manufacturing (D) 5.7 1.2 18.5 2.5 5.3 8.8
Electricity, gas, water supply n 
(E) 0 0.4 0 3.8 0.3
Construction (F) 2.7 0.3 6.6 1.8 2.2 3.4
Wholesale and retail trade (G) 40.5 4.4 36.0 69.4 2.5 30.4
Hotels, restaurants (H) 1.3 0.4 4.7 0 2.4 2.2
Transport, communication (I) 8.9 0.6 5.8 4.1 9.5 6
Financial intermediation, real . , 0.2 2.6 8.5 5.2 2.1estate (J, K)
Public administration and n , 
defence (L) 0.1 2.9 0.7 9.5 1.6
Education (M) 1 0.1 2.9 1.6 23.5 2.7
Health, social work (N) 0.2 0.1 1.9 0 20.1 1.8
Other community and j j 
personal services (0 ) 0.4 3.1 0.7 6.1 1.9
Private Households with j  ^
employees (P) 0.4 4.2 4.1 0 2.1
Other (C,Q) 0.1 0 0.3 0.4 2.2 0 J
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Notes:
(a) Letters in brackets refer to sector of economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(b) Category G also includes repair of motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting and business activities. 
Category C refers to mining and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
Table 5.4 presents informal employment rates by sector of economic activity and type of informal 
employment for rural areas. We see that contributing family workers made up almost three 
quarters of rural informal employment and that 99% of them worked in agriculture. As we will 
see, a relatively high proportion were females over the age of 65, and young males aged 15-24. In 
addition to contributing family workers, 9% of rural informal workers were informal self- 
employed. Although more than half worked in agriculture, almost one third were petty traders in 
street stalls and markets.
An additional 9% of informal rural employment consisted of formal employees with informal 
secondary jobs. Table 5.4 reveals that most secondary job holders had a primary job in education, 
public administration, health, and agriculture. The fact that informal secondary job holding was 
more prevalent in rural areas (only 5% of urban informal employment consisted of secondary 
jobholders) and that 86% of it was in agriculture, suggests that rural areas offer access to informal
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income earning opportunities in agriculture for low-income workers, which are less prevalent in 
urban areas. Finally, the remaining 7% of informal rural employment was made up of informal 
employees working in manufacturing, agriculture, and petty trade.
Table 5.4 Rural informal employment by sector o f economic activity (1999) 
% o f rural informal employment
Informal
secondary
job
Informal
self-
employed
Contributing
family
workers
Informal
employees
Others
informally
employed
holders:
primary
job
Total Rural 
Informal 
Employment
9.2 73.8 7.1 0.8 8.7 100
57.4 99.4 21.6 20.4 16.2 82.1
4.1 0.2 26.2 8.1 7.3 3.0
0.1 0.0 2.4 0.0 2.4 0.4
0.9 0.0 5.8 2.2 1.3 0.6
32.1 0.3 21.6 57.6 3.1 5.4
0.5 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.7 0.3
2.6 0.0 5.8 7.6 6.0 1.3
1.1 0.0 2.4 2.6 4.0 0.7
0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 12.8 1.3
0.2 0.0 3.5 0.0 32.2 3.2
0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 8.6 0.9
0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 4.5 0.5
0.0 0.0 2.6 1.4 0.1 0.2
0.5 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.6 0.3
100 100 100 100 100 100
Rural Informal Employment
Agriculture, fishing (A, B) 
Manufacturing (D)
Electricity, gas, water supply 
(E)
Construction (F)
Wholesale and retail trade (G) 
Hotels, restaurants (H) 
Transport, communication (I) 
Financial intermediation, real 
estate (J, K)
Public administration (L) 
Education (M)
Health, social work (N)
Other community services (O) 
Private Households with 
employees (P)
Other (C, Q)
Total
Source: author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Notes:
(a) Letters in brackets refer to sector of economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(b) Category G also includes repair o f motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting and business activities. 
Category C refers to mining and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
5.3.4 Age and gender
Chapter 4 found that there was no significant gender difference in labour market participation as a 
whole, although there was a gender bias in the distribution of employment by occupation, with 
women being under-represented in managerial and senior positions and over-represented in low- 
skilled positions. Similarly, although females were only slightly over-represented amongst 
informal workers, a gender imbalance emerges when type of informal employment is analysed. 
As illustrated by figure 5.3, 64% of contributing family workers were females (roughly 364,000 
individuals; see Appendix A5, table A5.1 for frequencies), whereas only 33% of self-employed 
and 35% of informal employees were females. Much of this difference can be explained by the 
fact that both male and female household members may work for an equivalent number of hours 
in the same household enterprise, but the male, head of household, may be considered ‘self­
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employed’ (i.e. own-account worker or employer), while the female will be classified as a 
‘contributing family member’.
Figure 5.3 Type o f informal employment by share o f males and females (1999)
100%
■  male 
□  fem ale
Source: author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Table 5.5 illustrates formal and informal employment rates by age group and type o f informal 
employment. We see that three quarters o f the employed 15-25 year olds worked informally, 
mostly as contributing family workers on family farms. As seen in Chapter 4, compared to their 
European counterparts, Georgian youth had higher unemployment rates and lower labour force 
participation rates. These results suggest that the youth that were employed worked almost 
entirely informally.
At the same time, chapter 4 found exceptionally high employment rates (formal and informal) for 
both males and females over 50 years o f age, and particularly over 65. The vast majority o f old- 
age workers also worked in agriculture, both formally and informally. Table 5.5 shows that 49% 
of employed over-65 year olds worked informally in 1999. Whether formal or informal, such high 
employment rates amongst over 65s suggests that pensioners cannot afford to live off their 
extremely low pensions and therefore turn to subsistence agriculture to survive.
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Finally, as shown in table 5.5, whereas youth and old-age workers are particularly active as 
contributing family workers, middle-age workers, appear to work more in formal jobs as well as 
informal self-employment, informal wage-employment and informal secondary jobs.
Table 5.5 Employed by category o f formal/informal employment and age group (1999) 
% within age group
Formal Informal
Informal
self-
employed
Contributing
family
workers
Informal
employees
Other
informals
Informal 
secondary 
job holders
15-25 24 76 4 61 9 1 1
26-35 46 54 7 33 9 1 4
36-45 50 50 11 23 10 1 5
46-55 53 47 9 21 9 1 7
56-65 51 49 10 29 5 1 4
66-100 52 49 10 35 2 0 2
All
Employed 48 52 9 31 7 1 4
Source: author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Notes: rates refer to percentage within age group. Rates for ‘all employed’ refer to the total employed population.
5.3.5 Education
Overall, higher education is associated with formal employment while lower education is 
associated with informal employment. Figure 5.4 illustrates the formal/informal composition of 
employment according to educational attainment. We see that 71% of those with higher education 
worked formally, whereas only 34% of those with general secondary and 44% of those with 
technical secondary education did so. Even if agriculture is excluded, results show that only 26% 
of the informally employed had higher education compared to 55% of formal workers. Moreover, 
although half of those with primary education worked formally, they were almost exclusively 
self-employed in agriculture.
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Figure 5.4 Employed by educational attainment andformal/informal status (1999)
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Source: author’s own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Educational attainment also varies with type o f informal employment. Figure 5.5 presents the 
distribution o f formal and informal employment by category o f informal employment and 
educational attainment. We see that an exceptionally high proportion o f informal secondary 
jobholders had higher education. This is not surprising as they have formal primary jobs and, as 
we have seen, individuals with formal primary jobs have higher levels o f education. Nevertheless, 
a higher share o f secondary job-holders had higher education than do formal workers (42% vs. 
39%). In contrast, 91% o f contributing family workers had either secondary or primary education. 
However, given that they represent such a large share o f  the employed, contributing family 
workers actually accounted for 10% o f the country’s higher-educated workers.
For the informal self-employed and paid-employees, the relationship with education is less clear. 
Whereas two-thirds o f the self-employed had secondary education, almost 20% had higher 
education. If  only the non-agricultural self-employed are included, then more than one quarter had 
higher education and 60% o f these worked as street and market vendors. Similarly, almost one 
fifth o f informal wage employees had higher education, while the rest had secondary education. 
Those with higher education also worked as petty traders or as informal employees, on the basis 
o f oral agreements in bread, tea and other manufacturing industries.
1 —  ■  -------------------
■  Informal
I —  □  Formal
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Figure 5.5 Type o f formal/informal employment by educational attainment (1999)
100%
□  higher
■  secondary and 
vocational training
□  primary and 
incomplete 
secondary
Source: author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Notes: ‘Higher’, ‘general vocational and special secondary’ and ‘primaiy, incomplete primary and incomplete 
secondary’ refer to highest level o f educational attainment.
As previously noted, the Georgian labour force as a whole has particularly high levels o f 
educational attainment. However, these results show that one third o f those with higher education 
were employed in low-skilled, precarious, employment. These findings are a further indication 
that, as suggested in chapter 4, the lack o f formal employment opportunities mean that a growing 
number o f workers with higher education are either unemployed or self-employed in low-skilled 
informal activities and small-plot agriculture and therefore risk being deskilled, thereby 
undermining the country’s future human capital base.
5.3.6 Regularity of employment and number of hours worked
Informal workers worked longer hours than their formal counterparts, with the exception o f those 
employed in agriculture, who worked particularly short hours. Table 5.6 presents the mean hours 
o f work by type o f informal employment, both including and excluding agriculture. We see that 
on average non-agricultural informal workers worked 42 hours per week, compared to 40 hours 
per week in the formal sector. However, informal workers in agriculture worked an average 
(mean) o f 29 hours per week, compared to 32 hours per week for formal workers. These results 
confirm the suggestion from chapter 4 that informal agricultural employment is more than 
‘gardening’ and also that there is considerable underemployment in agriculture.
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There are considerable disparities in the regularity and time worked between categories of 
informal employment. The informal self-employed worked amongst the longest hours and the 
most regularly. As illustrated in table 5.6 if agriculture is excluded, then the self-employed 
worked an average of 44 hours per week. More than three quarters worked full-time and on a 
regular basis. In contrast, contributing family workers, who work primarily in agriculture, worked 
the shortest hours and had the largest proportion of part-time workers. They worked an average of 
31 hours per week and almost 40% worked part-time, although almost all worked on a regular 
basis. Informal employees, who by definition work temporarily, casually, seasonally or on the 
basis of an oral agreement, worked particularly long hours, with an average of 44 hours per week, 
and 22% worked more than 51 hours per week. Finally, those formally employed with informal 
secondary jobs worked almost entirely full-time and regularly. They worked shorter hours in their 
primary jobs (an average of 35 hours per week), but worked, on average, an additional 20 hours 
per week in their secondary job.
Table 5.6 Mean hours worked per week. Formal and Informal workers (1999) 
(hours)
All employed Non-agricultural employed
Formal 38 40
Informal 34 42
Informal self-employed 37 44
Contributing family workers 31 40
Informal employees 44 44
Informal secondary job holders -primary job 35 35
Informal secondary job holders -second job 20 20
Source: author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Notes:
(a) ‘all employed’ and ‘non-agricultural employed’ refers to the sample used to calculate hours worked.
(b) Mean hours refer to seven days preceding the survey.
An important result of the analysis of the number of hours worked per week is that it enables us to 
reject the hypotheses, suggested chapter 4, that the definition of employment (as including anyone 
working for at least one hour during the reference week) could partly explain the large numbers 
self-employed in agriculture. In fact, less than 2.5% of the Georgians worked less than 10 hours a 
week and that only 13% worked less than 20 hours per week. Therefore the increase in 
agricultural self-employment noted chapter 4 could indeed be explained by the absence of social
security, and formal employment opportunities, which led people to agricultural self-employment
/
and petty trade to meet basic needs.
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5.3.7 Regions and ethnic background
There were significant regional differences in the rates of informal employment. Tblisi had the 
highest share of formal workers. As illustrated in table 5.7, whereas in Tblisi more than three 
quarters of the employed were formal, in every other region the majority was informal. This is to 
be expected, as most public administration, health and education work (the three largest sectors of 
non-agricultural formal employment) is located in the capital. Informal employment in Tblisi 
consisted mainly of informal self-employment in petty trade and informal wage-employment also 
in petty trade and domestic services.
Moreover, certain regions had a particularly high proportion of informal employment, namely 
Samegrelo, Guria Imereti and Samtsxe-Javakheti, ranging from 70% of total employment in 
Samegrelo to 59% in Imereti. Although these are all agricultural regions, and hence could be 
expected to have a significant share of informal employment in agriculture, even if all agricultural 
workers are excluded, more than half the employed were still informal. The regional aspect will 
be explored in detail in the multivariate analysis that follows.
Table 5.7 Share o f  formal and informal employment by region (1999) 
% o f total regional employment
Shida Kvemo Samtsxe-
Kakheti Tblisi Kartli Kartli Javakheti Achara Guria Samegrelo Imereti Total
Formal 44 78 48 45 39 48 34 30 41 48
Informal 57 22 52 55 61 52 66 70 59 52
Informal 
self-employed 
Contributing 
family workers
9
33
10
1
11
32
8
34
8
37
7
27
5
42
13
44
7
43
9
31
Informal
Employees 7 10 6 5 3 16 6 9 5 8
Other informals 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1
Informal secondary 
job holders 7 1 2 7 14 1 11 3 3 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: author’s own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
We also find a sharp ethnic dimension to informal employment. Table 5.8 presents formal and 
informal employment by ethnic identity and type of informal employment. We see that whereas 
only 51% of ethnic Georgians worked informally, 70% of Azeris, 72% of Greeks and 59% of 
Armenians did so. Azeris and Greeks, who represent 6% and 2% of Georgia’s population 
respectively, are highly concentrated in agricultural communities in the region of Kvemo Kartli 
and over 50% of their employed populations worked as contributing family workers. Armenians, 
who represent 8% of the country’s population, are concentrated in rural regions of Samtskhe- 
Javakheti and in Tblisi. They had high rates of informal agricultural employment in Samtskhe- 
Javakheti, and of informal self-employment in Tblisi, particularly in petty trade. Finally Russians,
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Ukrainians and other Slavic ethnic groups represent roughly 7% of the population and live mainly 
in the cities. As shown in table 5.8, they were more likely to be informal self-employed or 
informal employees. The regional and ethnic dimension will be explored in more detail in the 
multivariate analysis that follows.
Table 5.8 Formal and informal employment by ethnic group (1999) 
% o f total employment
Georgian Azeri Greek Russian Armenian Other Total
Formal 49 30 28 60 41 46 48
Informal 51 70 72 40 59 54 52
Informal self-employed 8 9 9 11 16 22 9
Contributing family workers 30 53 52 14 27 1 30
Informal employees 8 3 2 11 9 30 8
Other informals 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Informal secondary job holders 4 4 7 3 6 0 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: author's own analysis o f  Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
5.4 DETERMINANTS OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT
Having described the characteristics of the informally employed, multivariate analysis is now 
used to isolate the impact of specific variables on the probability of informal employment, while 
controlling for other individual characteristics. Given the importance of agriculture in the 
Georgian labour market, the informal self-employed are separated into two groups; those 
employed in agriculture, which will be called ‘informal farmers’ and those working outside 
agriculture, which will be called ‘informal non-agricultural self-employed’. Moreover, given the 
very small number of ‘others informally employed’ (less than 1% of the sample), they will be 
excluded from the multivariate analysis. In summary, the categories of informal employment for 
this section are the following: (1) informal non-agricultural self-employed; (2) informal farmers; 
(3) contributing family workers; (4) informal employees; (5) informal secondary job-holders.
Moreover, whereas the previous section was based exclusively on the analysis of the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), in this section, the LFS is merged with the Survey of Georgian Households 
(SGH) data in order to obtain information on hourly wages which will be needed in examining the 
determinants of informal secondary job holding. Details on the merged sample are provided in 
Appendix A2.1. Although the sample size is reduced by one half (as half the LFS sample is 
common to both the LFS and the SGH) this has no effect on the use of weights as the SGH is 
designed to be nationally representative. The only possible effect is on the reliability of results at
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the regional level, as the original SGH sample was doubled for the LFS in order to obtain more 
representative data at the regional level. However, as will be shown, the reduction in the sample 
size does not affect the results as the multivariate analysis largely confirms the descriptive 
analysis based on the larger sample.
Seven separate probit models are used to estimate the effect of a number of variables on the 
probability of informal employment in each of the categories of informal employment. The seven 
probit regressions are the following: (1) probability of urban informal employment, estimated on 
the sample of all urban employed; (2) probability of rural informal employment estimated on the 
sample of all rural employed; (3) probability of informal wage employment estimated on the 
sample of all wage employed; (4) probability of informal non-agricultural self-employment 
estimated on the sample of all non-agricultural self-employed; (5) probability of informal farming 
estimated on the sample of all farmers; (6) probability of employment as a contributing family 
worker estimated on the sample of all employed; (7) probability of having an informal secondary 
job estimated on the sample of all wage employed.
Technical details on probit analysis are presented in appendix A2.4. The seven models are built
around the regression model /f* = fiX0 +Uj where I 0* is the underlying continuous, unobserved,
latent variable. X0 is a vector of individual, human capital and labour market characteristics for 
each of the seven probit regressions (6= 1,2,..7). These are characteristics that were found to be 
relevant in the descriptive analysis, namely gender, age, ethnic identity, level of educational 
attainment, sector of economic activity, region, type of settlement, private or public sector of 
employment, and wage in the primary job (the last characteristic is only for secondary job 
holders). /? is the parameter vector to be estimated and the unit of analysis (/) is the individual. 
The unobservable error term w, is defined as having E(w)=0 and Var(M)=o2. The definition of all 
variables used can be found in appendix A2.2.
The observed variable is / f . / f  =1 if an individual belongs to informal employment category 
(0= 1,2,..7) and 11 =0 otherwise. / ,  is related to I i in the following way: if 7(. >0, we observe 
j f  =1 otherwise we observe i f  =0.
The probit model is therefore defined as:
Prob(/f =1 )= Prob(£Y]+u>0)
= Prob (u>-0X)
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Where 0 (.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed 
that u follows a normal distribution. The resulting coefficients have been converted to marginal 
effects for ease of interpretation, thus they can be interpreted as the change in the probability of 
7=1 for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous, variable and, the discrete change 
in the probability for dummy variables. The reference category is the same as that used in the 
multivariate analysis of unemployment of chapter 4, namely Georgian male, aged 46 to 55 years, 
with higher education, working in transport and communication and residing in Kakheti.
Results are reported in Table 5.9. The results of the seven separate regressions are analysed in 
sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.6 and the major determinants of informal employment are then summarized 
in section 5.6.
5.4.1 All informally employed (urban and rural)
Results of the model for the probability of informal employment in urban and rural areas are 
presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 5.9. We see that many variables in the model achieve 
statistical significance at the 1% level. In particular, we see that, everything else being equal, 
gender, age, level of education, ethnic identity, region, and sector of economic activity were all 
highly significant in explaining informal employment, supporting the findings of the descriptive 
analysis.
Table 5.9 shows that, everything else being equal, gender had a significant impact on the 
probability of being informally employed in rural areas, but not in urban areas. Holding all other 
variables constant, females in rural areas were 35% more likely to be informally employed than 
males were. This is a considerable difference. As we will see below, this is an indication that there 
may be cultural or social barriers to entering the formal labour market along gender roles and 
would confirm anecdotal evidence that following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Georgia has 
reverted to a more traditional division of gender roles in the labour market.
Age was another important determinant o f informal employment. All else being equal, in urban 
areas youth (aged 15 to 25) were 11% more likely to be informally employed than were 
individuals aged 46 to 55 and in rural areas they were 44% more likely to be informally 
employed. Individuals aged 26-45 were also significantly more likely to be informally employed 
than the reference category in both urban and rural areas. It is important to note that only 9% of 
employed youth were also studying. This means that the majority of youth that worked
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informally, did so as their main occupation, suggesting that there may be barriers to formal labour 
market entry. As we will see, the lack of formal employment opportunities means young people 
are either unemployed, or they attempt to find other means of generating an income in the 
informal sector.
There was also a significant ethnic dimension. Greeks were 28% more likely to be informally 
employed in urban areas and 11% more likely in rural areas than Georgians were, ceteris paribus. 
Azeris, Abkhazians and Armenians were also more likely to be informally employed in rural 
areas and Russians, who live mainly in cities, were more likely than Georgians to be informally 
employed in urban areas. In contrast, Ossetians were significantly less likely to be informally 
employed, everything else being equal. This could be explained by the fact that Ossetians have 
traditionally had high levels of education and have occupied professional and often senior 
(formal) positions both in Georgia and major cities of the USSR. However overall these findings 
suggest that ethnic minorities in Georgia are not participating to the same extent in the formal 
economy as ethnic Georgians are, and could suggest that there are also barriers to formal labour 
market entry for non-Georgians.
The results also show that there were significant returns to education, particularly in urban areas 
where individuals with higher education were significantly less likely to be informally employed 
than any other group, confirming the findings of the descriptive analysis. Indeed having general 
secondary education increased the probability of being informally employed in urban areas by 
20% relative to those with higher education, everything else being equal. Thus in urban areas, 
higher education still increased access to formal, protected jobs, although wages were not 
necessarily higher or more reliable. In rural areas, we see that having primary education or less 
significantly reduced the probability of informal employment relative to higher education. 
Although this may seem counter intuitive, we will see that it can be explained by the fact that 
individuals with primary education were more likely to engage in formal agriculture.
The multivariate analysis reveals some interesting results in terms of sector of economic activity. 
We see that certain sectors have a strong positive impact on the probability of informal 
employment. In particular, all else being equal, individuals employed in construction, both in 
urban and rural areas, were roughly 25% more likely to be working informally than those 
employed in the reference category (transport and communication). These were largely men hired 
as casual labour without a formal agreement. Trade was also associated with a high probability of 
informality, confirming the previous findings that most of the trade sector is comprised of small- 
scale, unregistered activities in street stalls and markets rather than in formal, registered shops. 
Finally we see that working as a domestic employee was of course associated with a high degree
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of informality as the very large majority were employed without a written agreement. In contrast, 
typical public sector jobs were associated with a lower probability of informality. Thus, being 
employed in municipal infrastructure services (electricity, gas and water supply), public 
administration and defence, education, health and social work, other services and financial and 
real estate services, all significantly decreased the probability of informal employment in both 
urban and rural areas, ceteris paribus.
Region also played a fundamental role in determining informality. This dimension will be 
explored in detail in subsequent sections, however we note here that there are two main groups of 
regions: The first group consists of those regions located on the west coast of Georgia (Achara, 
Samegrelo and Guria), which were significantly associated with a strong positive impact on the 
probability of informality, particularly in urban areas. The second group, located mainly in south 
and south-eastern Georgia (Shida Khartli, Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe Javakheti), had a 
significant negative impact in urban areas but a positive one in rural areas.92
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we see that relative to the state sector, working in the 
private sector, all else being equal, increased the probability of working informally by 46% in 
urban areas and 54% in rural areas.
5.4.2 Informal Employees
We now turn to the results of the probit regression for the probability of informal wage 
employment reported in column 3 of table 5.9. The probit model was estimated on the sample of 
all wage employed. The estimated coefficients therefore indicate the impact of the different 
variables on the probability of being an informal wage employee vs. a formal wage employee.
The results show that there is a strong age dimension to informal wage employment. Youth (aged 
15 to 25) were 9% more likely to be employed informally (without a written agreement) than 
were middle aged workers, ceteris paribus. Individuals aged 26 to 45 were also significantly more 
likely to engage in informal wage employment, whereas old age workers (over 56 years) were 
significantly less likely. As we have seen, old age workers are retired individuals who supplement 
their meagre pensions with income from self-employment, largely in agriculture, so it is not 
surprising that they should be less likely to work as informal wage employed. However, the fact 
that youth are more likely to work precariously, without a written agreement, confirms previous 
suspicions that there may be barriers to labour market entry. Indeed, chapter 4 found that youth 
were also more likely to be unemployed, long-term unemployed and underemployed. All these
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findings support anecdotal evidence that youth are increasingly excluded from formal 
employment and chose either to stay in higher education, work informally, be unemployed or 
drop out of the labour market altogether.
We see that wage employees who are Russian, all else being equal, were significantly more likely 
to be informally employed than those who are Georgian. This is surprising seeing that during the 
Soviet period Russians typically held senior (formal) positions. Russians were more likely to be 
informal wage employed in all sectors of economic activity, but primarily in trade, hotel and 
restaurant services, and in transport and communication. They also worked as domestic 
employees and as informal agricultural wage employed. These findings suggest some degree of 
discrimination against Russians in formal wage employment, which is in contrast to the widely 
held view that Russians are not discriminated against in Georgia. Contrary to expectations, 
belonging to an ethnic minority other than Russian, did not increase the probability o f working as 
an informal wage employee. As we will see, this is not because ethnic minorities are more likely 
to be engaging in formal wage employment, but rather because they are more likely to be 
informal non-agricultural self-employed or farmers.
The results show that higher education reduces the risk of informal wage employment. We see 
that the wage employed with incomplete secondary and general secondary education were 22% 
and 15% more likely to be working informally than were those with higher education, ceteris 
paribus. Therefore higher education still gave access to formal, protected and stable employment. 
However, as we will explore in chapter 6, this is not a guarantee of higher income. Indeed, formal 
(largely public) wage employment is characterised by extremely low wages and persistent wage 
arrears, which means that, for instance, formal wage employment is associated with greater 
poverty than informal self-employment. Nevertheless, formal wage employment is stable and 
offers access to a variety of benefits that are not available to the informal wage employed. 
Moreover, there is a large body of evidence that suggests that individuals continue to work, even 
if they are not paid, also for reasons of social status as well as in hope that the situation will 
improve (see Zinovieva 1998).
Informal wage employment was also significantly determined by the sector of economic activity. 
In particular, everything else being equal, wage employees in agriculture, manufacturing, trade, 
hotel and restaurant services and domestic employees were significantly more likely to be 
working without a written agreement than were those in the reference category (transport and 
communication). The strongest impact was that of domestic employees, which were 67% more
92 Residing in Kvemo Kartli did not have a significant impact on the probability o f being informally employed in rural
158
likely to be informally employed. Being wage employed in agriculture, trade and construction 
increased the probability of informal employment by roughly 20%-25%. All of these sectors are 
dominated by small, private enterprises, which are most likely to use informal employment 
agreements. On the other hand, wage employees working in largely public sectors such as 
municipal infrastructure services, public administration, education and health and social work 
were, everything else being equal, significantly less likely to be informally employed.
Certain regions were also associated with a lower probability of informal wage employment. 
Residing in Tblisi, Shida Khartli, Kvemo Kartli, Samtskhe Javakheti and Imereti all reduced the 
probability of informal wage employment relative to Kakheti, everything else being equal. As 
previously discussed, Samtskhe Javakheti is one of the poorest and least developed regions in 
Georgia with few private enterprises that would provide opportunities for informal wage 
employment; less than 2% of the country’s manufacturing employment is located in this region. 
Moreover, as we will see, agriculture in Samtskhe-Javakheti is more of the small-plot self- 
employment variety.
Shida Kartli, Imereti, Kvemo Kartli and, of course, Tblisi, have some large urban centres where 
much of the country’s non-agricultural private sector enterprises are located. It is therefore 
surprising to find that the wage employed in these regions had a lower probability of being 
informally employed. This suggests that our reference category (Kakheti) had a particularly high 
incidence of informal wage employment. Examining Kakheti’s informal employment in detail, we 
find that one fifth is in the agricultural sector. Kakheti, located in Eastern Georgia, is a rich 
agricultural region, which since the Soviet period concentrated on the production of wine. These 
findings suggest that there may be considerable informal wage employment in the viticulture 
industry. One quarter of Kakheti’s informal wage employment was in wholesale and retail trade, 
mostly in Kakheti’s numerous markets and street stalls, particularly in Telavi, the region’s capital. 
Another quarter of informal wage employment was in manufacturing, particularly in bread 
manufacturing, and more than 10% was in construction. These results suggest that no particular 
sector of economic activity can explain the prevalence of informal wage employment in Kakheti 
and that it must be a result of other factors specific to this region.
Finally, it is not surprising that, everything else being equal, being wage-employed in the private 
sector increases the probability of informal employment by 29% relative to the wage-employed in 
the public sector.
areas.
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5.4.3 Informal non-agricultural self-em ployed
The fourth column of table 5.9 reports estimated coefficients for the probit model of informal 
non-agricultural self-employed. The coefficients give the impact of the different variables on the 
relative probability of being informal non-agricultural self-employed vs. formal non-agricultural 
self-employed. Recall that informal non-agricultural self-employed includes own-account workers 
working from home, in a street stall, market place, construction site, non-fixed location or in a 
customer’s home, and employers working in an unregistered enterprise. They do not include 
individuals engaging in agriculture. Formal non-agricultural self-employment consists of all self- 
employed working in registered enterprises.
We see that gender is a significant determinant of informal non-agricultural self-employment. 
Self-employed females are 6% more likely to be working informally than their male counterparts. 
This means women are more likely to be working in small-scale income generating activities, 
whereas men are more likely to own registered shops and professional activities. This is a further 
indication that Georgian society is returning to a more traditional division of gender roles in the 
labour market, since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Entrepreneurship is regarded as a ‘male’ 
sector and women who engage in self-employment are more likely to engage in what is seen as 
‘temporary’ income-generating activities to ‘make ends meet’ rather than as ‘entrepreneurship’. 
Indeed Georgia’s markets and streets are filled with women selling fruits and vegetables as well 
as home baked bread and other goods. Qualitative research by Dourglishvili (1995) suggests that 
Soviet ideology only affected gender equality in the public sphere, whereas the traditional 
division of roles between men and women within the household remained untouched.93 Therefore 
what we could be observing in our results is the extension of this traditional gender balance to the 
public sphere (see Dourglishvili 1997, p. 10).
Everything else being equal, ethnic identity was also very significant in determining whether or 
not the non-agricultural self-employed worked informally. In fact, table 5.9 shows that Azeri, 
Abkhazian and Greek individuals were dropped from the sample because they predicted success 
perfectly. That is to say that all non-agricultural self-employed Azeris, Abkhazians and Greeks in 
the sample worked informally. Given that the large majority of Azeris and Greeks worked in 
agriculture, this finding is indicates that almost all those who did not work in agriculture engaged 
in small scale informal activities.94
93 Traditionally, Georgian families are patriarchal. In feudal families, inheritance was distributed amongst sons and 
marriage, raising children, and running the house were the women’s key responsibilities. All major decision-making 
within the household was the responsibility of men. Dourgliashvili (1997, p.2) argues that this traditional, feudal and 
patriarchal family structure has been practically left in tact.
As regards the Abkhazians, given that the LFS and SGH do not cover the region o f Abkhazia, where the majority of  
Abkhazians live, I assume that the Abkhazians covered in the survey are mainly IDPs and that this sample is therefore
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We also see that, all else being equal, self-employed Russians were significantly more likely to be 
informally employed than Georgians were. This reflects anecdotal evidence, that Russians, and 
especially pensioners, have suffered a particularly harsh fall in living standards as a result of the 
contraction of formal employment and social security provision, and consequently engage in 
small-scale informal income generating activities to survive. The results also suggest that non- 
Georgians may not have access to the same social network and contacts that are required to 
successfully tackle the bureaucratic obstacles to formal enterprise establishment.
Table 5.9 shows that education also had a significant impact on the probability of informal non- 
agricultural self-employment, ceteris paribus. More specifically, general secondary education and 
higher technical education increased the probability of informality amongst the self-employed by 
7% and 10% respectively relative to general higher education. As we have seen, this is partly 
because individuals with higher education were still more likely to be in professional wage 
employment, particularly in public organisations. However, it may also be a reflection of the fact 
that individuals with higher education are more likely to have the social network required to 
establish and operate formal enterprises.
It is surprising that, everything else being equal, sector of economic activity is not a significant 
determinant of informal non-agricultural self-employment. Only domestic employment is a strong 
determinant of informal non-agricultural self-employment (indeed it has been dropped from the 
sample as it predicts success perfectly). The only other variables that have a significant (negative) 
impact on the probability of informal non-agricultural self-employment are those sectors that are 
typically associated with wage employment (i.e. manufacturing, public administration, health and 
social work and other services). I would have expected to find that employment in trade, which is 
almost exclusively informal, should have a significant positive impact on the probability of 
informality amongst the self-employed. This suggests that, everything else being equal, the sector 
of economic activity in itself does not significantly affect informality, and that other factors such 
as ethnic identity, age and gender are more important determinants.
Finally, region also plays an important role in determining informality amongst the self- 
employed. Everything else being equal, living in Tblisi increases the probability of being an 
informal non-agricultural self-employed by 14% relative Kakheti (the reference category). This is 
probably a consequence of migration from poorer rural areas where employment opportunities are 
scarce to the capital where informal self.-employment opportunities in the streets and markets are
not representative. One must therefore exert extreme caution in drawing conclusions. Nevertheless, it is not surprising
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more abundant. Shida Khartli and Samegrelo also have a higher probability of informal non- 
agricultural self-employment. In both these cases, it could be a result of the large numbers of 
IDPs, as these regions border South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively.
5.4.4 Informal farmers
The results of the probit model for informal farmers are presented in column 5 of table 5.9. Recall 
that informal farmers are defined as individuals self-employed on an unregistered rural plot of 
land or in urban agriculture. The coefficients estimated by the model provide information as to the 
impact of the different characteristics on the relative probability of an individual working on an 
unregistered or urban plot of land rather than on a registered rural plot.
The results indicate that gender and age are again particularly significant in determining informal 
employment amongst farmers. Everything else being equal, female farmers were 32% more likely 
to be informally employed compared to their male counterparts. Females were not only more 
likely to be farming an urban plot of land but they were also more likely to be working on 
unregistered rural plots. The fact that they were more than a third more likely to be farming 
informally could be an indication that, as with the self-employed, females are more likely to be 
engaging in farming to as a coping strategy rather than as a form of freely chosen employment.
Young farmers were also more likely to be informally employed. These were individuals aged 15 
to 25, who classify themselves as ‘employers or own-account workers’ on agricultural plots, so 
they were not ‘helping out’ on family plots. The results show that they were 28% more likely to 
be farming unregistered plots than the reference category (individuals aged 46 to 55 years). 
Farmers aged 26-45 were also significantly more likely to be working informally than the 
reference category. This could be an indication that many youth, particularly the highly educated, 
engage in agriculture as a last resort, when unemployment is the only alternative, and not as a 
chosen profession. On the other hand, old-age farmers (above 56 years) are significantly less 
likely to be working informally. This is counter intuitive as one would expect that given the 
extremely low pensions, individuals above retirement age should be working on ‘household plots’ 
to make ends meet. These results suggest that pensioners continue to work past retirement age, as 
a result of low and unpaid pensions. However, they do not engage in informal farming, but rather 
have access to formal, registered land.95 They also explain why the descriptive analysis found that
that Abkhazian IDPs are more likely to be generating income in small scale informal activities than Georgians are.
95 Note that the same result is obtained if the regression is run on the sample o f rural farmers. Therefore it is not the case 
that pensioners are less likely to be working as informal farmers because they live in rural areas and are therefore less 
involved in urban farming, which accounts for 53% of informal farming.
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although an exceptionally high share of individuals above retirement age was employed, a 
relatively small share was working informally.
Another interesting finding is that ethnic minorities were again significantly more likely to be 
farming informally than are ethnic Georgians. In particular, we see that Abkhazians and Greeks 
were 14% more likely to be farming informally and Azeris and Armenians were 5% more likely. 
Given that the large majority of these groups, and of Azeris and Greeks in particular, engage in 
agriculture, this raises some questions regarding the land registration procedure. It suggests that 
there could be some degree of ethnic discrimination in the registration of agricultural land. 
Agricultural reform started in 1992 and by 1997 67% of arable and perennial plot land had been 
handed out to residents. However, some have pointed out that the privatisation process, which 
began during the civil war, was not carried out with sufficient planning and was characterised by 
gross violations and land grabbing (see Didebulidze 1997, p. 39-40).
Informal farming was also strongly associated with certain regions. Samegrelo and Imereti were 
associated with a high probability of informal farming. As we have seen, these two regions in 
Western Georgia have particularly suffered from the complete disintegration of the lucrative tea 
and fruit plantations and the influx of internally displaced people from the war in Abkhazia. 
Farming in Imereti and Samegrelo increased the probability of being informal by 21% and 18% 
respectively relative to the reference category (Kakheti). Other regions associated with a high 
probability of informal farming were Shida Khartli, Kvemo Kartli, Samtskhe Javakheti, Achara 
and Guria. All these regions, with the exception of Achara, are traditionally poor and largely 
agricultural regions. Moreover, the majority of the populations of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe 
Javakheti are ethnic minorities (Azeris and Greeks in Kvemo Kartli and Armenians in Samtskhe 
Javakheti).
Finally we note that relative to higher education, primary education or less decreased the 
probability of informal farming. This is an indication that individuals with primary education 
were more likely to engage in farming as a profession and therefore to work on formal, registered 
land, whereas those with higher education engaged in agriculture to ‘make end meet’ and were 
therefore more likely to be farming an urban or small scale unregistered plot. We also note that 
living in a rural area significantly reduces the probability of informal farming, since by definition, 
as all urban farming is informal.
5.4.5 Contributing family workers
A separate probit model is estimated for contributing family workers on the sample of all 
employed. Results are reported in column 6 of table 5.9. Once again, gender and age were
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significant determinants for contributing family workers. In particular, females were 26% more 
likely to be working as contributing family workers than males were. As previously argued, this is 
a reflection of a traditional division of gender roles within the household.
Youth and old-age workers, all else being equal, were also more likely to be working as 
contributing family workers. This was particularly the case for youth, who were 51% more likely 
to be working as contributing family workers than were middle-aged individuals, ceteris paribus. 
Once again it must be highlighted that these are not students working on the family farm ‘on the 
side’. These individuals reported working as their main occupation. Individuals aged 26 to 45 
were also 14% more likely to be contributing family workers than were middle-aged individuals. 
In contrast, individuals over 56 years of age were only 3% more likely. These findings are partly a 
reflection of the structure of the Georgian household, where the (usually male) head of household 
is considered to be the ‘main bread winner’ or self-employed farmer, and other individuals 
(females and youth) are ‘unpaid help’.
As with informal farmers, there was a strong ethnic dimension to contributing family workers. 
Greeks, Abkhazians, Armenians and Azeris were all significantly more likely to be contributing 
family workers than Georgians were. Everything else being equal, being ethnically Greek 
increased the probability of working as a contributing family worker by almost 40% relative to 
Georgians. Azeris were 23% more likely to be contributing family workers, while being 
Abkhazian and Armenian increased the probability by 15% and 9% respectively. As we have 
seen, these ethnic minorities are concentrated in rural areas of certain regions. Greeks and Azeris 
live mainly in Kvemo Kartli and are mostly involved in agriculture, while the Abkhazians in our 
survey are largely IDPs living in Samegrelo and Guria and the Armenians are mainly located in 
Samtskhe Javakheti, although there is considerable Armenian community in Tblisi.
Education also plays a significant role in determining whether individuals will work as 
contributing family workers. Individuals with higher education, everything else being equal, were 
significantly less likely to be working as contributing family workers than any other group was. 
Indeed those with incomplete secondary or general secondary education were more than 20% 
more likely to be working as contributing family workers than were individuals with higher 
education. This is a further confirmation that there are returns to education, even if these are not 
necessarily monetary. Higher education was still regarded as very valuable in Georgian society, as 
was formal, skilled employment. Thus, although formal employment (largely wage employment 
in the public sector) was associated with even lower incomes than self-employment, these results 
demonstrate that individuals with higher education were still more likely to engage in formal 
employment rather than turn to farming or any type of informal employment.
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Finally, there was a strong regional dimension to contributing family work. Living in western 
Georgia increased the probability of working as a contributing family worker the most. In 
particular those living in the poorer agricultural regions of Imereti, Samegrelo and Guria were 
significantly more likely to be working as contributing family workers than the reference category 
(Kakheti). On the other hand, Tblisi, Kvemo Karli and Achara were, associated with a lower 
probability of contributing family workers. The fact that Tblisi and Achara have large urban 
centres can explain why they don’t have a high probability of contributing family work as it is 
mainly associated with agriculture, however Kvemo kartli is surprising as it is a largely 
agricultural region, with a high concentration of Azeris and Greeks who typically live in larger 
than average households and work mainly in agriculture. These results suggest that, everything 
else being equal, it is not living in Kvemo Kartli that determines whether an individual works as a 
contributing family worker, but whether he or she belongs to an ethnic minority.
Finally, we see that living in a rural area, everything else being equal, increases the probability of 
being a contributing family worker by 27%, which confirms that contributing family workers 
work largely in agriculture rather than on non-agricultural household enterprises.
5.4.6 Informal secondary job holders
Finally the results of the probit model for informal secondary jobholders are reported in the last 
column of table 5.9. Recall that anyone with a formal primary job and informal secondary job is 
considered to be informal. A probit regression for the probability of having an informal second 
job and formal primary job is carried out on the sample of all wage employed, as almost all those 
with secondary jobs are wage employed in their primary job. A control for the wage in the 
primary job is included, although results must be interpreted with caution as there is evidence that 
data on wages is not entirely reliable (see appendix A2.1.3). The aim is to identify individual 
characteristics that increase the probability of having an informal second job.96
The results indicate that the strongest impact is given by ethnic and regional identity as well as 
settlement type. However, when interpreting these results, one must always bear in mind that 
individuals may be reluctant to reveal secondary sources of income, mainly for fear of taxation, 
and that certain groups may be more likely to admit to having a secondary source of income than 
others. In particular, it may be the case that certain regions are more open about secondary 
sources of income than others and that this may not necessarily reflect a higher probability of 
secondary employment.
96 Note that the large majority of second jobs are informal.
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As shown in table 5.9, Guria and Samtskhe-Javakheti were associated with a high probability of 
secondary employment, whereas Tblisi, Shida Kartli, Achara, Samegrelo and Imereti were 
associated with a lower probability. Living in Guria and Samtskhe Javakheti increased the 
probability of having a second job by 30% and 13% respectively. As we have seen, these are 
particularly poor regions with a high proportion of rural population. Low earnings in the primary 
sector and agricultural opportunities could be incentives for individuals to take on second jobs. 
The second group, with the exception of Samegrelo, are amongst Georgia’s richer and to some 
extent more urban regions, which would indicate that individuals have perhaps less access to land 
to engage in as a secondary activity.
The ethnic dimension can be explained by similar reasoning. We see that Greeks and Ossetians 
were significantly more likely to have a secondary job than Georgians were, ceteris paribus. 
Being Greek increased the probability by 27% compared to being Georgian, and Ossetians were 
20% more likely to have a second job. The vast majority of Georgia’s Greek population lives in 
the region of Kvemo Kartli and has traditionally lived of agriculture, and are therefore more likely 
to have access to farming as a secondary activity. As regards Ossetians, previous findings 
showed that they were more likely to be formally employed in urban centres, a reflection of their 
traditionally high level of education, so these results could suggest that they were more likely to 
engage in urban farming to supplement low formal incomes.
An unexpected finding is that the wage in the primary sector was significantly and positively 
correlated with the probability of having a second job. However the magnitude of the impact was 
very small; a one-unit increase in the log of the primary job wage increased the probability of 
secondary employment by almost 2%. One could have expected secondary job holding to be 
associated with lower wages in the primary sector, however caution must be exercised when in 
drawing conclusions as this does not include information on wage arrears, and as noted in 
appendix A2.1, the quality of income data is not entirely reliable. It could be the case, for 
instance, that secondary employment was significantly correlated with wage arrears in the 
primary sector, so that the positive impact of the wage in the primary job does not necessarily 
imply that individuals with higher real wages are more likely to have second jobs. Interestingly, 
secondary employment was not associated with any particular primary sector of employment. The 
results indicate that only health and social work achieve any kind of statistical significance and 
still only at the 10% level. Moreover, the impact is not very strong.
On the other hand, the type of settlement had a stronger impact. Living in a rural area increased 
the probability of having a secondary job by almost 20%. This finding is very meaningful, as it
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would indicate that access to land is perhaps the most important determinant o f secondary 
employment.
Contrary to other types of informal employment, secondary job holding was associated with 
middle-age. Youth were significantly less likely to have an informal second job, which is not 
surprising as youth were less likely to have a formal primary job. Finally, education did not 
appear to be particularly significant in determining informal secondary employment. Individuals 
with primary education or less were significantly less likely to have a secondary job than were 
those with higher education. This finding probably reflects the fact that individual’s with primary 
education were less likely to be in formal wage employment in the first place.
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Table 5.9 Determinants o f  Informal Employment, probit results 1999
All
informals
Urban
All
informals
Rural
Informal
employees
Informal
non-
agricultural
self-
employed
Informal
farmers
Contributing
family
worker
Informal 
secondary 
job holders
D e m o g r a p h i c
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Female 0.0079 0.3474 -0.0124 0.0568 0.3236 0.2655 -0.0094
-0.0204 (0.0102)*** -0.0091 (0.0229)** (0.0096)*** (0.0071)*** -0.0101
Age 15-25 0.1126 0.4416 0.0869 0.0145 0.2812 0.5108 -0.086
(0.0422)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0250)*** -0.0447 (0.0079)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0087)***
Age 26-45 0.0893 0.202 0.0259 0.0085 0.1897 0.1366 -0.0444
(0.0239)*** (0.0154)*** (0.0103)** -0.0277 (0.0112)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0106)***
Age 46-55 / / / / / f /
Age 56+ 0.0038 -0.0854 -0.0219 0.0365 -0.0511 0.0245 -0.0044
-0.0287 (0.0164)*** (0.0118)* -0.032 (0.0136)*** (0.0114)** -0.0124
E t h n i c  B a c k g r o u n d
Georgian / / / f / / /
Azeri 0.0931 0.0787 -0.0046 psp 0.0449 0.2281 0.0424
Abkhazian
-0.0833
0.1895
(0.0319)**
0.2264
-0.0354
0.0129 psp
(0.0232)*
0.1421
(0.0281)***
0.1507
-0.0446
-0.0644
Greek
-0.1291
0.2766
(0.0937)**
0.2158
-0.0741
0.1557 psp
(0.0471)***
0.1424
(0.0748)**
0.3938
-0.0602
0.2749
Ossetian
(0.1150)**
-0.1906
(0.0410)***
0.068
-0.1032
0.011 -0.3755
(0.0206)***
0.0518
(0.0333)***
0.0533
(0.0849)***
0.1986
(0.0670)*** -0.0489 -0.0558 (0.1381)*** -0.0347 -0.0373 (0.0997)**
Russian 0.1347 -0.0708 0.0601 0.1325 -0.0058 -0.1027 -0.0276
(0.0563)** -0.0572 (0.0337)* (0.0274)*** -0.0481 (0.0249)*** -0.0272
Armenian 0.0554 0.0614 0.0042 0.0077 0.0576 0.0956 0.0263
-0.0408 (0.0289)** -0.0207 -0.047 (0.0199)*** (0.0213)*** -0.0268
Other 0.1787 -0.088 0.1054 0.0006 -0.1427 -0.1227 -0.0166
(0.0656)*** -0.1085 (0.0505)** -0.0989 -0.1186 (0.0449)*** -0.0409
E d u c a t i o n a l
A t t a i n m e n t
Primary or Less 0.0813 -0.0727 0.0618 0.0998 -0.0866 0.1056 -0.0657
-0.0841 (0.0242)*** -0.0455 (0.0580)* (0.0223)*** (0.0193)*** (0.0175)***
Incomplete Secondary 0.2595 0.034 0.2285 0.0326 -0.0227 0.2136 -0.0141
(0.0647)*** -0.0215 (0.0464)*** -0.0606 -0.0185 (0.0174)*** -0.025
General Secondary 0.2024 0.0702 0.1504 0.0746 0.0011 0.2019 -0.0145
(0.0234)*** (0.0166)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0248)*** -0.0144 (0.0103)*** -0.0115
Technical Secondary 0.0314 0.0602 0.0474 0.0161 0.0169 0.1237 -0.005
-0.0344 (0.0254)** (0.0189)** -0.0339 -0.0221 (0.0180)*** -0.016
High Technical 0.0808 0.017 0.0021 0.1062 -0.0072 0.0758 -0.0117
(0.0303)*** -0.0206 -0.0129 (0.0226)*** -0.0189 (0.0136)*** -0.0119
Higher General / / / / / / /
Sector o f Economic 
Activity
Agriculture, Fishing 
(A, B)
Manufacturing (D)
0.5433
(0.0324)***
0.0205
-0.037
-0.0559
-0.049
0.0192
-0.0537
0.2598
(0.0370)***
0.088
(0.0228)***
psp
-0.2242
(0.0627)***
0.0182
-0.0267
0.0097
-0.0218
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Electricity, Gas, Water 
Supply (E) -0.2348 -0.0192 -0.0465 -0.4823
-0.0244
(0.0538)*** -0.0907 (0.0195)** (0.2813)* -0.0241
Construction (F) 0.2443 0.2734 0.2173 -0.0552 -0.0011
(0.0515)*** (0.0515)*** (0.0424)*** -0.0842 -0.0297
Wholesale and retail 
trade (G) 0.1543 0.1401 0.1819
0.0506 -0.0259
(0.0363)*** (0.0476)*** (0.0304)*** -0.0393 -0.021
Hotels, restaurants (H) 0.1042 -0.1584 0.0707 -0.038 0.0009
-0.0673 -0.097 (0.0408)* -0.0807 -0.0428
Transport, 
communication (I) / / / / / /  /
Financial
intermediation, real -0.1157 -0.1236 -0.0086 -0.1932 0.0299
estate (J, K)
(0.0432)*** (0.0712)* -0.0208 (0.1038)* -0.0277
Public administration 
and defence (L) -0.2002 -0.3774 -0.0734
-0.6309 0.0015
(0.0398)*** (0.0470)*** (0.0123)*** (0.2602)** -0.0201
Education (M) -0.219 -0.4833 -0.0867 -0.0651 0.033
(0.0379)*** (0.0280)*** (0.0124)*** -0.123 -0.0229
Health, social work 
(N)
-0.1687 -0.5254 -0.0674 -0.6309 0.0461
(0.0435)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0139)*** (0.1535)*** (0.0265)*
Other community and 
personal services (0 ) -0.1135 -0.2923 -0.027
-0.4664 0.002
(0.0447)** (0.0627)*** -0.0185 (0.1082)*** -0.0256
Private Households 
with employees (P) 0.5222 0.4357 0.6662 psp
-0.0211
(0.0616)*** (0.0355)*** (0.1232)*** -0.0623
Other (C, Q) -0.1183 0.204 0.0119 psp 0.053
-0.1094 (0.0960)** -0.0464 -0.0524
Region
Tblisi -0.0306 -0.0906 0.1452 -0.2613 -0.089
-0.0441 (0.0123)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0130)***
Kakheti / / / f / /  /
Shida Kartli -0.0826 0.0672 -0.0482 0.0724 0.0639 -0.0055 -0.0825
(0.0478)* (0.0199)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0307)** (0.0146)*** -0.0138 (0.0091)***
Kvemo Kartli -0.0971 0.0114 -0.0833 0.0505 0.037 -0.0818 0.0225
(0.0474)** -0.0245 (0.0098)*** -0.0394 (0.0187)** (0.0140)*** -0.0197
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.1386 0.0755 -0.0546 -0.0179 0.0827 0.0084 0.1338
(0.0582)** (0.0217)*** (0.0145)*** -0.0558 (0.0149)*** -0.0155 (0.0297)***
Achara 0.2314 0.0355 0.007 0.0344 0.068 -0.0616 -0.1166
(0.0499)*** -0.0224 -0.0176 -0.0363 (0.0163)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0074)***
Guria 0.1902 0.0414 -0.0248 -0.0128 0.0775 0.0675 0.3056
(0.0633)*** (0.0212)* -0.0178 -0.0576 (0.0144)*** (0.0163)*** (0.0416)***
Samegrelo 0.1687 0.2611 0.0286 0.1375 0.1856 0.082 -0.0333
(0.0530)*** (0.0166)*** -0.0214 (0.0207)*** (0.0095)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0148)**
Imereti -0.0358 0.2562 -0.0528 -0.0106 0.2147 0.1492 -0.059
-0.0476 (0.0167)*** (0.0132)*** -0.0417 (0.0088)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0113)***
Self-employed 0.3663
(0.0258)***
-0.0456
-0.0325
Private 0.4616
(0.0205)***
0.5447
(0.0189)***
0.2924
(0.0175)***
-0.0319
(0.0122)***
log hourly wage 
primary job
169
(0.0053)***
Rural -0.0012 0.0253 -0.3096 0.2734 0.1945
-0.0096 -0.025 (0.0058)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0140)***
Observations 6378 11952 6707 1202 10150 18330 5343
L2 CHi2 (K-l) 5315.02 5149.47 2777.46(39) 206.11(32)* 3896.47(24) 6251.70(25) 1298.10
(39)*** (38)*** *** ** *** *** (40)***
Sample all non-
All urban 
employed
all rural 
employed
all
employees
agricultural
self- All farmers all employed
all wage 
employed
employed
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability models are whether an individual is: (1) informally employed in an urban 
area; (2) informally employed in a rural area; (3) informal wage employed; (4) informal non-agricultural self- 
employed; (5) informal farmer; (6) contributing family worker; (7) secondary job holder;
(d) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value o f the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(e) The unit o f observation is the individual
(f) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(g) psp  indicates that the given variable has been dropped from the regression equation because it predicts success 
perfectly.
(h) Blank cells refer to variables that have been omitted from the regression because they are not relevant
(i) Sample refers to the sample used for the regression.
(j) L2 Chi2 (K -l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness of fit of the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on £-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
x).
(k) Letters in brackets for the sector o f economic activity refers to the International Standard Industrial Classification of 
All Economic Activities (ISIC) (ILO 1989).
(1) Category G also includes repair o f motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting and business activities. 
Category C refers to mining and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
(m)Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(n) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2
5.5 SUMMARY OF MAI N FINDINGS
The descriptive analysis revealed that the informal sector represents a fundamental part of 
Georgia’s labour market. First, it showed that the majority of Georgia’s employment is informal; 
52% of the employed work informally, and if we exclude agricultural workers, 34% are 
informally employed. Overall, almost 70% of Georgia’s employed work either informally or are 
self-employed on small agricultural plots. The findings of this chapter suggest that the growth in 
these two sectors can largely explain why open unemployment did not increase when output 
collapsed.
Informal employment in Georgia consists largely of own-account workers and contributing family 
workers in unregistered agricultural plots, petty trade, home-based bread manufacturing, informal 
taxi services and some unregistered, ‘under-the-table’, low-skilled, wage employment in tea 
processing, construction, domestic services, and hotel and restaurant services.
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Second, the descriptive analysis revealed a dual (rural/urban) dimension to employment in 
Georgia. On the one hand there is a formal, state, and largely urban sector, which employs the 
majority of wage-employees, while on the other there is an informal, private, and largely rural 
sector, comprised mostly of the self-employed.
Third, it found that very little private sector employment is formal. Results show that 70% of 
private sector employment is informal, and consists almost exclusively of own-account and 
contributing family workers. More than three quarters of the little formal private sector 
employment that exists, consists of own-account workers in small-plot agriculture. Thus Georgian 
employment seems to be reduced to wage-employees in health, education, and public 
administration; own-account workers in registered small-plot agriculture; and informal 
employment. These findings seriously question the success of the transition process and of labour 
market models that predicted that privatisation and restructuring would result in the creation of a 
private sector capable of generating employment and growth.
Fourth, results suggested a possible deskilling of the labour force. One third of Georgia’s 
population with higher education worked either in small-plot agriculture or in low-skilled 
informal employment. This suggests that the lack of formal employment opportunities oblige 
people to turn to subsistence agriculture and informal employment to survive. After more than 10 
years, many have lost their skills and if they haven’t, their skills may have become obsolete. This 
poses a serious threat to the country’s future economic growth, as there will be insufficient 
workers with adequate skills. Moreover, as small-plot agriculture and informal employment are 
associated with low, volatile incomes, it increases vulnerability and poverty.
The multivariate analysis revealed that informal employment is not evenly distributed amongst 
the population. In fact, it found that it is concentrated amongst certain groups. Table 5.11 provides 
a summary of the most important determinants of informal employment, by type of informal 
employment. We see that gender, age, level of educational attainment, region and ethnic identity 
are the most significant determinants of informal employment.
First of all, everything else being equal, gender is not a significant determinant of informal wage 
employment or of secondary employment, the two types of informal employment that can be said 
to be associated with wage employment. However, amongst farmers and the self-employed, 
gender is highly significant in determining informality. Business is still a male-dominated 
environment, and formal enterprises are still more likely to be owned by men. However, poverty 
and the necessity to generate livelihoods, means that women engage in small-scale informal 
activities (both in agriculture and outside of it), which are regarded more as a way of ‘making
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ends meet’ than a ‘real job’. Similarly, women are more likely to be regarded as ‘helping out’ on 
family farms or enterprises rather than as entrepreneurs or farmers in their own right.
Moreover, as shown in chapter 4, women are less likely to hold positions of responsibility and 
more likely to work in semi-skilled jobs. Chapter 4 also found that they were more likely to stay 
out of the labour market altogether as a result of the breakdown of the previously widely available 
child-care facilities. These findings confirm other research, which suggests that transition has 
been accompanied by a return to more traditional gender division of roles in the Georgian labour 
market.97 I say return, because one of the characteristics of Soviet society was the considerable 
participation of women in public life and in positions of responsibility. However, qualitative 
research has shown that Soviet ideology had left the traditional, patriarchal and male-dominated 
family structure untouched (see Dourglishvili 1997).
Second, the multivariate analysis found that youth also face a high risk of informal employment. 
Table 5.11 shows that relative to middle-aged workers, they are more likely to be working as 
informal employees, informal farmers and contributing family workers, ceteris paribus. As we 
have seen, these are not young people who are studying and working on the side. They are 
employed full-time. Moreover, chapter 4 revealed that youth also face a significant risk of 
unemployment, particularly in urban areas. These results are worrying as they suggest that there 
are serious barriers to labour market entry. It would seem that in urban areas, Georgian youth stay 
at home and engage in higher education, partly because of the lack of employment opportunities. 
Unable to find formal employment after the completion of their studies, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that youth stay at home well into their thirties, often married with children, and continue 
to be unemployed, in the hope of finding some kind of professional, formal wage employment. 
Alternatively, they take on informal wage jobs in construction, trade and domestic employment 
and some turn to farming of urban household plots. In rural areas, in the absence of formal 
alternatives, they are likely to stay with their parents and work on family farms.
These results raise serious concerns regarding the country’s future human capital stock and 
economic development. By working in low-skilled informal jobs and agriculture, Georgian youth 
are losing their skills and potential to fill the professional positions required to foster economic 
growth and run, amongst other things, the country’s administration, health and education systems. 
Moreover, informal and agricultural employment produces low, unreliable incomes and is
97 Note that Georgia is not unique in this respect. The gender equality achieved by the socialist system has been wearing 
off in many countries o f the CIS and CEE, revealing gender discrimination in the home, workplace and in political 
structures (see UNICEF 1999, p.22).
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therefore associated with poverty and vulnerability. Georgia’s human capital is one of its principal 
assets and unless this trend is reversed, there is a risk it will be entirely eroded.
Third, the multivariate analysis found that there are still considerable returns to higher education 
in terms of formal employment. The results suggest that this is both because of the higher 
qualifications and the social network that higher education confers; two important prerequisites 
for obtaining formal jobs. This reflects the results of a recent opinion poll carried out in Georgia, 
which found that the general public perceives that getting a good job has everything to do with 
one’s network of friends and contacts (UNDP 2002, p. 10). Individuals with less than higher 
education were significantly more likely to work as informal employees, informal non- 
agricultural self-employed, and contributing family workers, everything else being equal. Higher 
education was significantly associated with formal wage employment. This is a reflection of the 
fact that there is little semi-skilled and low-skilled formal wage employment in Georgia, as a 
result of the complete collapse of the manufacturing sector, so that formal wage employment is 
almost entirely limited to the state sector in public administration, defence, health and education. 
In contrast, services, trade and construction are largely based on precarious informal wage 
agreements.
Higher education was also significantly associated with formal non-agricultural self-employment. 
This suggests that formal entrepreneurship is limited to a small group of highly educated, and 
usually highly connected, individuals. Finally, the only sector for which primary education 
increases the probability of formality is farming. This supports our hypothesis that informal 
farming is a ‘survival’ activity as individuals with higher education are more likely to be informal 
farmers, whereas those with primary education are more likely to chose farming as a profession 
and therefore work on registered established plots.
Fourth, the multivariate analysis has revealed a very strong ethnic dimension to informal 
employment in Georgia. All things being equal, non-Georgians are significantly more likely to be 
informally employed than Georgians are. Georgia is historically a multi-ethnic society. Azeris, 
Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Abkhazians, Ossetians, Slavic peoples (including Russians, Ukrainians 
and Byelorussians), Kurds, Avarians, Kists, and others, have been living in Georgia for centuries. 
Nevertheless ethnic Georgians still represent over 70% of the total population. The findings 
suggest a clear segmentation of the labour market along ethnic lines. In particular, formal 
employment (not only wage employment, but farming and self-employment as well) seems to be 
limited to ethnic Georgians. Indeed ethnic identity was revealed to be the most frequently 
significant variable in determining informality. In particular, Greeks, Azeris, Armenians and 
Abkhazians are, everything else being equal, significantly more likely to be informal non-
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agricultural self-employed, informal farmers and contributing family workers. These findings 
reflect those found in other studies that highlight the lack of integration between Georgians and 
other ethnic groups (see for example Dourglishvili 1997)
Azeris and Greeks, who are highly concentrated in Southern Georgia in the region of Kvemo 
Kartli, were found to be largely employed in informal agriculture and petty trade. Indeed, as 
pointed out by Gachechiladze (1995, p.92) ‘a typical sight in the Kolkhoz bazaars of Eastern 
Georgia is Azeri women selling vegetables’. Azeris live in large mono-ethnic communities in the 
districts of Mameuli (Kvemo Kartli), Sagarejo and Dedoplistskaro (Kakheti) in South-central 
Georgia along the border with Azerbaijan. They have historically engaged in agriculture, and are 
not particularly integrated with the Georgian population in that few speak Georgian or Russian 
(see Gachechiladze 1995, p.92). Greeks, who are mainly concentrated in the district of Tsalka in 
Kvemo Kartli, to where they emigrated from Anatolia in the 19th century and where the constitute, 
the absolute majority of the population, are also principally employed in agriculture.
Armenians, who have been present in Georgia for centuries and have played and continue to play 
a very important role in Georgian urban life (see chapter 1), are also highly concentrated, 
particularly in the rural areas of Samtskhe-Javakheti region along the Armenian border, where 
they represent the large majority of the population. This is a mountainous region, with very harsh 
climate and poor land, providing few opportunities for agriculture. Moreover, this region is also 
deprived of any kind of manufacturing sector. With few formal opportunities, it is not surprising 
that Armenians are significantly more likely to engage in informal farming or contributing family 
work. However, it is significant that they are more likely to be engaging in informal work, even 
when we control of region.
The fact that non-Georgians are more likely to be farming unregistered land or urban plots is an 
indication that there may be ethnic barriers to the land registration process. This is worrying as 
land registration is also a precondition for the right to sell land, lease it or use it as a security 
against a bank loan (EBRD 1999). Moreover, the findings also suggests that there could be ethnic 
barriers to formal self-employment as individuals from ethnic minorities may not have access to 
the same social network that is required in order to successfully tackle the bureaucratic obstacles 
to establishing formal enterprises. This could be the case for ethnic Russians, for instance, who 
were found to be more likely to be working as informal non-agricultural self-employed and 
informal wage employed. This finding is quite surprising as Russians live mainly in urban centres 
and generally have a high level of education (approximately one quarter of employed Russians 
have higher education and 80% have secondary education or more). Moreover, during the Soviet 
period they would definitely have occupied formal, professional positions. One question that
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springs to mind when analysing these results is to what extent the nationalism, which 
characterised the first years of independence under General Ghamzakurdia (see chapter 1), is still 
present?
Finally, the multivariate analysis has found that informality is significantly associated with region. 
Everything else being equal, simply living in a certain region increases the probability o f informal 
employment considerably. The most significant impact is on the probability of farming 
informally. Living in all regions significantly increases the probability of informal farming 
relative to living in our reference region Kakheti, all else being equal. In some regions, such as 
Imereti and Samegrelo, the probability increases by almost one fifth. This suggests that the land- 
registration process may have progressed faster in some regions than others. Certain regions also 
cumulate a higher probability of different types of informal employment. In particular, western 
Georgia, (Imereti, Samegrelo or Guria) was associated with significant increases the probability 
of informal farming, contributing family work and secondary job holding. Samegrelo was also 
associated with a higher probability of informal non-agricultural self-employment.
Imereti, Samegrelo and Guria, located in Western Georgia on the Black Sea coast, are regions 
with a similar history, economy, ethnic composition, climate and culture. Historically poor, 
marshy and malaria infested regions, they were revived during the Soviet period (late 1920s) 
when their sub-tropical climate was exploited to develop extensive tea and citrus fruit plantations 
to supply the Soviet market (see chapter 1). As part of the Soviet strategy to achieve ‘tea 
independence of the USSR’, 95% of tea and 100% of citrus fruits were produced in this region 
(Gachechiladze 1995, p. 10). This brought the region exceptional levels of welfare, no less 
because it provided ample opportunities for 'left-hand1 work. According to the 1989 population 
census these regions had amongst the highest standards of living in the country (Gachechiladze 
1995, p. 121-122). However the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent disintegration of the 
agricultural sector, compounded with the impact of the war in neighbouring Abkhazia and influx 
of more than 100 thousand IDPs have led to one of the sharpest falls in economic activity and 
living standards in all of Georgia.98 UNDP (2002) found that Guria and Imereti had the lowest 
HDI ranking of any region in Georgia. Samegrelo’s economy was particularly hard hit as it was 
the epicentre of the civil war, as reflected by its particular effect on the probability of informal 
employment. These findings suggest that land privatisation in these regions has created small, 
subsistence plots, as individuals are more likely to be farming informal plots than in any other 
region.
98 One interesting statistic in this respect is given by Gachechiladze (1995, p. 13); whereas at the end of the 1980s, a kilo 
of tangerines bought three litres o f petrol, after the liberalisation o f prices, a litre o f petrol bought three kilos o f  
tangerines.
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Samtskhe-Javakheti was also associated with an increased probability of informal farming and 
secondary job holding. As discussed above, this very poor region has limited agricultural 
opportunities (other than potato and fruit production). A socio-economic survey of Javakheti 
found that up to 70% of households interviewed said they did not eat fruit or meat even once a 
week and most considered the lack of food to be their greatest concern (Tblisi State University 
1999). These findings confirm anecdotal evidence that the largely Armenian population engages 
in subsistence agriculture both as a main and secondary job. Finally, we also saw that the 
reference category, Kakheti, was significantly associated with a higher probability of informal 
wage employment and secondary job holding, relative to most other regions.
Table 5.10 Summary o f  Most Important Determinants o f  Informal Employment, 1999
Type of Informal Employment
Individual Characteristics Self- Contributing Family Secondary JobEmployees Employed Farmers Workers Holders
Females X X X
Youth (15-25 years) X X X
Old-age workers (56 years+) X
Less than primary education X
Less than higher education X X X
Rural X X
Azeri X X X
Greek X X X X
Armenian X X
Abkhazian X X X
Russian X X
Tblisi X
Samtskhe Javakheti X X
Achara X
Guria X X X
Samegrelo X X X X
Imereti X X X
Source: Based on results displayed in table 5. 9. 
Notes: x means statistically significant at 1% level.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
Informal employment is strongly associated with certain vulnerable groups in Georgian society. 
Females, youth, ethnic minorities and people living in certain depressed regions were all found to 
be more likely to be informally employed, ceteris paribus. This is worrying as these groups face a 
multitude of other vulnerabilities as well. Chapter 4 found that females, youth and individuals 
living in depressed regions also faced a higher risk of unemployment, long-term unemployment
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and underemployment. These findings highlight the importance of targeted labour market and 
social assistance programmes.
The results concerning youth are particularly worrying, since they represent Georgia’s future. 
Like other former Soviet states, Georgia has a highly educated population, and although 
participation in higher education is decreasing and the quality of education is declining, as 
extremely low wages are forcing the best teachers and professors to leave academia, by 
international standards Georgia still has a highly educated workforce. Indeed, it could be argued 
that given the complete collapse of its economy, Georgia’s human capital base could be one of its 
greatest assets. In this context, the findings of this analysis are extremely worrying as they suggest 
that this human capital base is being seriously eroded as youth face only two alternatives in the 
labour market: unemployment or low-skilled, precarious and unprotected informal employment.
Moreover, the lack of formal skilled employment opportunities mean that overall, more than one 
third of the employed with higher education was working in agriculture and small-scale informal 
activities. After more than ten years, many people have either lost their skills or their skills have 
become obsolete in the new market economy. If this trend continues, there is a risk that the 
transition will have led to the establishment of an economy structured along the lines of a 
developing country rather than those of a developed, market economy, with all the implications in 
terms of poverty and social development.
At the same time this chapter has revealed what could be termed a ‘capture’ of the formal sector 
by individuals with higher education. Formal wage employment is almost entirely limited to jobs 
in public administration, education and health, for which higher education is required. Similarly, 
given the bureaucratic obstacles and corruption associated with the private sector, formal non- 
agricultural self-employment is limited to a small group of highly educated and highly connected 
individuals who have the network required to establish and operate businesses in Georgia. Within 
this context, it is important that support be given to the development of industry and services for 
the creation of formal, and particularly semi-skilled jobs, and that the process of private enterprise 
establishment be simplified and made more transparent.
The findings related to gender are also worrying as they suggest a reversal of the gender equality 
achieved, at least in the public sphere, by the Soviet system. As discussed by Mars and Altman 
(1983), Georgian society has traditionally been male-dominated. As a consequence of the Soviet 
emphasis on gender equality, Georgian women participated widely in public life and had positions 
of responsibility, although there is evidence their position within the household remained widely 
unchanged (Dourglishvili 1997). The findings of this chapter suggest that this trend has been
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reversing as the more traditional division of roles that exists within the household are being 
extended to the public sphere. Working-age women were found to be more likely to be out of the 
labour market and when in the labour market, they were, everything else being equal, more likely 
to be unemployed or informally employed. Again, this suggests an erosion of the country’s human 
capital base.
Finally the results of this chapter with respect to regions and ethnic minorities are significant not 
only from a social welfare point of view, but also from that of security. As discussed in chapter 1, 
Georgia has already been scarred by two regional conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and it 
is widely known that there are also some groups within Achara and Samtskhe-Javakheti that 
would like to see these regions secede. Within this context, it seems crucial that regional and 
inter-ethnic inequalities be minimized. Moreover, during the Soviet period, regional labour 
market and welfare inequalities were offset by transfers from the Tblisi. Resentment toward Tblisi 
and nationalist sentiment is likely to be heightened as people see inequalities increasing and feel 
abandoned by the capital. Indeed, it would seem that given the widespread increase in poverty and 
the major infrastructure problems, not least the rationing of water, heat and electricity, that are 
building frustration and dissatisfaction amongst the population in general, an important strategy 
for maintaining social cohesion in Georgia, should be to minimize ethnic and regional 
inequalities.
It would be impossible to understand the Georgian labour market without understanding the 
informal sector. More than half of all employment is unregistered, in small-scale and largely 
‘subsistence’ activities. There are indications that the informal sector is providing a social safety 
net as this chapter has found that in the absence of an adequate social security system, it is 
absorbing unemployment and replacing pensions. However, the concentration of informal 
employment amongst certain groups suggests that the informal sector is not a transitional 
phenomenon, which temporarily absorbs the unemployed and provides a source of income while 
new formal jobs are being created. On the contrary, these findings indicate that the informal 
sector may become more entrenched as certain vulnerable groups are excluded from the formal 
labour market altogether. Thus young people, women, individuals belonging to ethnic minorities 
and those living in regions with few formal employment opportunities, will only have one 
alternative to unemployment; informal employment.
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6DOES INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT PROVIDE A SOCIAL SAFETY NET?
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The main purpose of this chapter is to gain some insight into why informal employment is so 
widespread in Georgia and into the underlying question of this thesis, namely whether informal 
labour market activity is providing a social safety net in the absence of formal employment 
opportunities and adequate social protection. In other words, this chapter produces evidence that 
is consistent with the view that individuals work informally principally because (a) there are no 
formal employment opportunities and (b) social benefits are inadequate and individuals cannot 
afford to be unemployed or inactive.
To this end, I assume that if individuals were not working informally they would either be 
working formally or they would be unemployed or inactive. I then build on utility theory and on 
the theory of rational choice, and assume that (a) individuals aim to maximize utility and (b) they 
make rational choices. The relationship between labour market status and welfare can then be 
examined and it can be argued that if every categoiy of informal employment is associated with 
lower welfare than the corresponding category of formal employment, ceteris paribus, then one 
can conclude that individuals work informally because there is no formal alternative. Moreover, if 
informal employment is found to be associated with greater welfare than unemployment and 
inactivity, ceteris paribus, and the social benefit system is found to be poorly targeted and unable 
to meet basic needs, then it can be concluded that individuals also chose to work informally 
because they cannot afford to be unemployed or inactive and because they are better off being 
informally employed. If both of these hypotheses are confirmed, then it can be concluded that 
informal employment is undertaken because of constraint rather than choice.
This chapter also seeks to examine more generally the relationship between household welfare, 
labour market status and social protection, with a focus on informal employment, by addressing 
the following questions: Does the welfare of the household depend on the labour market status of 
the household head? Who are the poor in the labour market? Is informal employment associated 
with higher poverty risks than formal employment, ceteris paribus? Is formal social protection 
effective at targeting the poor and the most vulnerable groups in the labour market and, if not, are 
informal networks compensating for the inefficiencies of the formal social protection system?
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 briefly outlines the methodology used, including 
the choice of welfare indicator, equivalence scale index and poverty line. It also discusses poverty 
statistics and multivariate analysis techniques used." Section 6.2, examines poverty risks and 
consumption quintiles by the labour market status of the household head (comprising type of 
formal and informal employment, unemployment and inactivity). It also examines both poverty
99 See appendix A2.3 for details o f methodology.
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risks and consumption quintiles by the labour market status of individuals. In section 6.3, 
multivariate analysis is used to analyse the impact of the labour market status of the household 
head on household welfare, ceteris paribus, by means of both OLS (mean) and quantile regression 
techniques. Probit regression analysis is applied in section 6.4 to examine the impact of the labour 
market status of the household head on poverty status, ceteris paribus. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 
analyse the relationships of formal and informal social protection respectively with poverty 
incidence and labour market status in order assess how well targeted these are and to inform on 
the extent to which they impact on poverty risks. Section 6.7 summarises findings and draws 
some conclusions.
Some additional analysis is performed in order to test the robustness of findings, the results of 
which are reported in appendix A6.2. This includes: (a) an analysis of consumption quintiles and 
the determinants of poverty using the number of household members in each employment 
category (rather than the status of the household head); (b) an analysis of poverty risks, 
consumption quintiles and all multivariate analyses using the World Bank (WB) and Georgian 
State Department of Statistics (SDS) poverty lines, equivalence scales and economies of scale 
indexes, in order to test the sensitivity of results to the choice of equivalence scales and 
economies of scale indexes; and (c) a sensitivity analysis for the choice of economies of scale 
index (0), reported in appendix A2.3.4.
6.1 DEFINING, MEASURING AND ANALYSING HOUSEHOLD WELFARE AND
POVERTY
This section presents a brief overview of the methodology, however a detailed discussion of the 
choice of welfare indicator, poverty line, economies of scale index, equivalence scale index as 
well as the definitions of all variables used can be found in appendix A2.3.
The measure of household welfare used here is consumption per adult equivalent. Consumption 
per adult equivalent is equal to total household consumption divided by the number of individuals 
in the household, adjusted for economies of scale and for the composition of the household. In 
other words:
c p A = — - — j
(A + a K f
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where CPA is consumption per adult equivalent, C is total household consumption, A is the 
number of adults, K is the number of children, a  is a parameter representing the cost of a child 
relative to an adult and 0 is a parameter representing the extent of economies of scale. Details of 
how consumption is masured are presented in appendix A2.3.1.
The economies of scale index used here is 0= 0.75, which reflects moderate economies of scale. 
No adjustment is made for differences in needs between adults and children (i.e. a=l). In 
appendix A2.3.2 the choice of economies of scale index (0) and equivalence scale index (a) is 
discussed in detail. It shows that adjusting for differences in consumption needs between adults 
and children, as well as between males and females, makes no difference to the results. Section 
A2.3.4 also shows that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of 0 and that considerable 
assumptions regarding the degree of economies of scale must be made before the ranking of the 
labour market categories is affected, suggesting that setting 0 equal to 0.75 is appropriate.
A relative poverty line equal to 2/3 of median consumption per equivalent adult and an ‘extreme’ 
poverty line equal to Vi of median consumption per equivalent adult are used here. There is 
considerable discussion in Georgia regarding the setting of a realistic absolute poverty line. The 
official poverty line, used by the Georgian State Department of Statistics (SDS) amounts to 
approximately GEL 100 (US$50) per equivalent adult per month, while the World Bank (WB) 
poverty line is set at just over half that amount (GEL 55 or US$25 per equivalent adult per 
month). This discussion is summarised in appendix A2.3.3. The relative poverty line used in this 
thesis is equivalent to approximately GEL48 (US$24) per equivalent adult in 1999, which is just 
slightly lower than the World Bank poverty line.
Appendix A6.2 presents results of the same analysis based on both the WB and SDS 
methodology, which adjust for differences in gender and age, make stronger assumptions 
regarding the degree of economies of scale within the household and use two different absolute 
poverty lines. The results are discussed in the main text and are largely consistent with the 
findings based on the methodology adopted in this thesis.
Summary of main assumptions:
• Indicator o f well-being: consumption per equivalent adult;
• Economies o f  scale index: 0= 0.75;
• Equivalence scale index: a= l;
• Poverty line (relative): 2/3 of median consumption per adult equivalent;
• “Extreme "poverty line (relative): Vi of median consumption per adult equivalent.
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The analysis is based on a number of poverty statistics. The first of these is the head count index, 
which gives the fraction (or percentage) of individuals with equivalent consumption below the 
poverty line. The others are the poverty gap (or poverty deficit) and the severity of poverty (see 
Foster, et al. 1984). The poverty gap takes into account how far, on average, the poor are below 
the poverty line. It captures the mean aggregate consumption shortfalls of the poor relative to the 
poverty line across the whole population.100 Poverty severity is the square of the poverty gap. It 
takes into account not only the distance separating the poor from the poverty line but also the 
inequality among the poor by giving more weight to those that are furthest from the poverty line. 
This chapter also examines consumption quintiles (the consumption distribution is divided into 
five percentiles) and uses a number of multivariate analysis techniques to analyse the 
determinants of household welfare and poverty.
As information about consumption is given at the household level, the above poverty measures 
and consumption quintiles are derived on a household basis. The labour market status of the head 
of household is then used to examine in some detail poverty profiles by labour market status. The 
labour market categories are those developed in chapters 4 and 5, however in this chapter a 
distinction is made between the non-agricultural self-employed and farmers (as per the 
multivariate analysis of chapter 5). Moreover informal secondary job holders are not included as 
the focus here is the relationship between the main labour market status of the household head and 
poverty. Thus the labour market categories used here are the following: (1) formal employees; (2) 
formal non-agricultural self-employed; (3) formal farmers (4) informal employees; (5) informal 
non-agricultural self-employed; (6) informal farmers; (7) contributing family workers; (8) 
unemployed and (9) inactive.
Focusing the analysis on the labour market status of the household head represents a departure 
from the previous chapter, which focused on all individuals and not exclusively on the head of 
household. I recognize that this change in emphasis may partially distort the picture in the sense 
that a head of household’s labour market status position may be different from the status of other 
members of the household. However, given that consumption data is collected at the household 
level and that there is no information on intra-household distribution of resources, a precise 
measure of individual welfare cannot be obtained. The best alternative is to examine the labour 
market status of the household head or the number of household members in each labour market 
category.
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I analyse poverty risks, consumption quintiles and determinants of household welfare from both 
perspectives and find little difference in results. This is because household size is relatively small 
in Georgia (mean size is 3 individuals). Results based on household head are reported in the main 
text, while those based on number of individuals in each labour market category are reported in 
appendix A6.2. Finally, despite the fact that results based on individual measures of welfare are 
less accurate, I also examine poverty risks and consumption quintiles by the labour market status 
of individuals and find that they are entirely consistent with the results based on the household 
head. Again, this is because average household size is small in Georgia.
Three different techniques are exploited in the multivariate analysis. First, a conventional mean 
regression (or OLS) procedure is used. However, this only provides average point estimates for 
the variables of interest and these may provide poor estimates for those households at the bottom 
end of the consumption distribution. Second, in order to address the potential for non-robustness 
in the OLS estimation procedure in this regard, the analysis is complemented using a quantile 
regression approach (see appendix A2.4 for details on quantile regression). A set of quantile 
regression models are estimated at the 10th, 25th 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles to allow insights in 
the effects of key variables at different points of the conditional distribution. Third, a conventional 
probit model is used to examine the effect of selected labour market variables on the probability 
of being below the relative poverty line.
The consumption (dependent) variable is expressed in logarithmic form and the poverty incidence 
variable is coded one if consumption is below the relative poverty line and zero otherwise. A 
standard set of controls is included in the regression models. These include controls for the age of 
the head of household, household size, the age-structure of household members, ethnic identity of 
household head, and a set of regional controls. Definitions of all variables used in the multivariate 
analysis can be found in appendix A2.2. The main focus is on the role that labour market status 
exerts on consumption and on the incidence of poverty, and I also briefly examine the role played 
by gender and some human capital variables. All the explanatory variables that provide the focus 
of this chapter’s interest are binary (or dummy) variables.
Finally, two binary social protection variables are constructed: one for receipt of formal social 
protection and another for receipt of informal social protection. These are coded 1 if the 
household receives formal or informal social protection respectively, and zero otherwise. The 
magnitude of social protection received is not included, as the data on size was found to be 
unreliable (see appendix A2.1.3 for a discussion of the quality of the data). Formal social
100 The poverty gap is obtained by adding up all the shortfalls o f the poor (considering the non-poor as having a
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protection refers to a series of benefits, namely pensions for the elderly, pensions for the disabled, 
allowance for non-working pensioners living in households without a legal breadwinner, stipends 
for students in full-time higher education or secondary education, allowance for temporary 
disablement, income from social insurance funds, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single 
parents, child allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single 
pensioners and disabled persons. Informal social protection is comprised of: alimony, money 
received from non-family members from abroad, inheritance or other money received from 
relatives, money borrowed from a private source for household needs, and monetary gifts 
received from family members temporarily abroad. Poverty risks and consumption quintiles are 
examined by labour market status of the household head and receipt of formal/informal social 
protection.
The data used for this analysis is the merged data set of SGH and LFS for 1999.101 As discussed 
in appendix A2.1, the LFS is based on the same sample as the SGH, but includes double the 
number of households. As the SGH is designed to be nationally representative, dropping half the 
households by merging the data does not affect the weights. As mentioned in chapter 5, the only 
possible effect would be on the reliability of results at the regional level, which is not relevant in 
this case.
6.2 INFORMAL ACTIVITY AND POVERTY RISKS
The analysis begins with an examination of poverty risks by labour market activity of the 
household head. Table 6.1 shows that the poverty risks are by far the highest for households 
headed by the unemployed and the inactive where the incidence of extreme poverty is also 
relatively high. Compared to an overall relative poverty rate of 27%, households headed by 
unemployed and inactive individuals face poverty rates of 41% and 38% respectively. Moreover 
over one fifth of these households live in extreme poverty with consumption per equivalent adult 
of less than 50% of the median.102 Their poverty is also twice as severe as any other group’s 
indicating that their consumption is twice as far from the poverty line than that of any other group.
shortfall o f zero) and dividing the total by the population.
101 This is the same data set used for the multivariate analysis of chapter 5.
102 This corresponds to a risk o f extreme poverty for unemployed headed households which is roughly 1.53 times the 
overall risk. As a point o f reference, Klugman, Micklewright and Redmond (2002, p.6) show that in the EU, 
unemployed headed households have poverty risks that are 2.38 times that of the average household, while in the CIS 
overall, the ratio is 1.32 (where poverty in the EU is defined as 50% of mean expenditure and 50% of median 
expenditure in the CIS and 0=0.75).
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Although having an employed head of household decreases the risk of poverty, employment is not 
a guarantee against poverty. Poverty risks vary considerably with type of employment. Table 6.1 
reveals two main findings concerning the poverty risks of households headed by employed 
individuals. First, all types of informal activity are associated with higher poverty risks than the 
corresponding set of formal activities, although the differences are not always statistically 
significant. Whereas 24% of households headed by formal employees are ‘poor’, 28% of those 
headed by informal employees live below the poverty line. However, the 95% confidence interval 
for formal employees is 0.22 to 0.27, while that for informal employees is 0.22 to 0.33, so the 
difference is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, as we will see, when we control for other 
household and individual characteristics, we find that informal wage employment significantly 
increases the probability of being poor relative to formal wage employment. Similarly, poverty 
rates for formal non-agricultural self-employed are 14% vs. 18% for informal non-agricultural 
self-employed and those for formal farmers are 16% v.s.18% for informal farmers, however none 
of these differences are statistically significant.
Second, regardless of whether formal or informal, employees face by far the highest risks of 
poverty amongst the employed. On the one hand, high poverty risks associated with informal 
wage employment can be explained by the fact that it is characterised by a lack written contracts 
in low-skilled, precarious employment. On the other hand, the high poverty rates amongst formal 
employees are a consequence of the persistence of low wages and wage arrears in the public 
sector.103 Another interesting finding is that households headed by informal farmers (owning an 
unregistered or urban plot of land) are not only considerably poorer than those headed by formal 
farmers (owning a registered plot of land), but also their poverty is more severe than that of any 
other employed group.
103 Note that research has shown similar findings for other transition countries, and most notably those of Central Asia. 
In her comparative study o f welfare in Central Asia, Falkingham finds that although employment reduces poverty risks 
with respect to unemployment, it is by no means a guarantee against poverty as many wage employees are poor due to 
substantial wage arrears and forced unpaid leave (see Falkingham 1999b, p.22).
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Table 6.1 Labour Market Categories and Poverty Incidence, 1999
Employment Poverty (%) Extreme Poverty (%)
Categories of Head Count Poverty Poverty Head Count Poverty Poverty
the Household Gap Severity Gap Severity
Head
Total 27.4 9.1 4.5 15.3 4.9 2.5
Formal
Employees 24.3 7.4 3.6 13.1 4.0 1.9
Non-agricultural
self-employed 14.2 5.2 2.5 9.2 3.0 1.2
Farmers 15.6 5.2 3.0 8.7 3.1 2.1
Informal
Employees 27.8 7.5 3.1 12.5 3.2 1.3
Non-agricultural
self-employed 17.7 5.1 2.4 7.9 2.5 1.4
Farmers 18.1 7.3 4.7 10.8 5.0 3.6
Contributing 
family workers 13.4 3.3 1.3 5.5 1.2 0.5
Unemployed 41.3 13.6 6.4 23.0 6.8 3.4
Inactive 38.5 13.6 6.8 22.9 7.6 3.9
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at 2/3 o f median consumption per equivalent adult (0 = 0.75).
(b) Extreme poverty line is set at lA o f median consumption per equivalent adult.
(c) Head Count is the share o f household heads whose consumption falls below the poverty line.
(d) The poverty gap provides information on the distance from the poverty line. It captures the mean aggregate 
consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line across the poor population.
(e) Poverty Severity captures the inequality among the poor by effectively giving more weight to households that are 
further away from the poverty line.
(f) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition (see appendix A2.2 for details).
Table 6.2 shows the labour market composition of consumption quintiles. The results largely 
reflect the analysis of poverty risks. We see that households headed by unemployed or inactive 
individuals are more heavily represented in the lowest consumption quintiles whereas those 
headed by employed individuals, whether formal or informal, are more heavily represented in the 
higher consumption quintiles. Together, the unemployed and inactive head roughly 60% of 
households in the poorest consumption quintile compared to only 20% of those in the richest 
quintile. In contrast, only 39% of households in the poorest consumption quintile are headed by 
employed individuals compared to 77% of households in the richest quintile. Similar results are 
obtained if consumption quintiles are examined by the number of individuals in each labour 
market category rather than by the labour market status of the household head. As shown in table 
A.6.1 in appendix A6.2, the average number of inactive individuals per household decreases as 
consumption quintiles increase, whereas the average number of employed (both formal and 
informal) increases. The evidence regarding the number of unemployed is inconclusive.
Although Table .6.1 revealed that poverty rates were highest for the unemployed, Table 6.2 shows 
that the households headed by the inactive make up the largest share in the poorest consumption 
quintile. Whereas overall they account for only 34% of households, inactive individuals head over 
50% of households in the poorest consumption quintile. Approximately 45% of these are one or 
two member pensioner households, while the rest are larger households including extended family
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members. These findings reflect the deep inadequacy of pension and unemployment benefits, 
which as we have seen amount to approximately 11% of the minimum subsistence level (see 
appendix A4.3 for a description of Georgia’s pension system).
As regards the employed, table 6.2 shows that agricultural employment is associated with higher 
consumption levels. Whilst formal farmers and contributing family workers represent only 7% 
and 4% respectively of household heads in the poorest quintile, they account for 22% and 17% of 
those in the richest quintile.104 Moreover, we table A6.1 in appendix A6.2 finds that the average 
number of household members employed in agriculture increases with consumption quintiles, 
whereas this is not the case for any other sector of economic activity. This finding further in the 
multivariate analysis below, however it could be partly explained by the way in which 
consumption is calculated, particularly since agricultural employment is limited to small plot 
subsistence agriculture (average plot size is 0.75 ha).105
Table 6.2 Labour Market Categories and Consumption, 1999
Labour Market Status o f the  Consumption Quintiles
Household Head Total Poorest 2 3 4 5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Formal 34.9 24.2 31.5 37.1 38.2 43.7
Employees 19.5 16.3 18.9 20.8 21.4 20.3
Non-agricultural self-employed 0.8 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.6 1.5
Farmers 14.6 7.4 12.3 15.4 16.2 21.8
Informal 24.5 14.5 19.3 24.3 31.1 33.4
Employees 5.4 4.8 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.4
Non-agricultural self-employed 5.2 2.9 5.2 6.2 6.0 5.5
Farmers 4.5 3.0 2.4 4.5' 7.6 5.1
Contributing family workers 9.4 3.8 5.7 8.1 12.2 17.3
Unemployed 6.5 10.3 8.1 7.4 3.4 3.3
Inactive 34.0 51.0 41.2 31.2 27.3 19.6
Sample size (N) 4949 984 987 992 997 986
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Total refers to the proportion o f households in the population whose heads are in each of the labour market 
categories.
(b) The other entries refer to the proportions o f these labour market categories in the different quintiles of the 
consumption distribution.
(c) Analysis carried out using weighted data. N= number of unweighted observations.
(d) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption.
(e) The mean consumption levels per adult equivalent in Georgian Lari for formal employment, informal employment, 
unemployment, and inactivity are 98,90,78 and 70 respectively.
(f) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
104 Contributing family workers who are heads o f household tend to be old-age pensioners living in agricultural 
households.
105 There are a couple o f reasons to expect that the way in which consumption has been aggregated could result in 
apparently higher consumption levels for agricultural households. When computing the consumption variable, the State 
Department of Statistics uses market prices (mean quarterly prices derived from the SGHH) to impute the value of 
consumption o f own-production rather than farm-gate prices, which are generally lower. Moreover, regional/national 
prices are used instead of local (urban/rural) prices.
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Poverty rates and consumption quintiles are now examined from the perspective of individuals 
rather than that of the household head. As previously noted, consumption per equivalent adult is 
calculated at the household level, so it is now assumed that each household member consumes an 
equal share of equivalised household consumption. Results are presented in tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
Given the small size of households in Georgia, these results largely confirm our findings based on 
the household head. Table 6.3 presents poverty headcount, gap and severity by labour market 
characteristics of individuals and provides a more detailed analysis of labour market status. Once 
again we see that the unemployed face the highest poverty risk and their poverty is by far the 
deepest. The inactive also have a high poverty rate and poverty severity. We see that amongst the 
unemployed, it is those who have been unemployed for over 6 months that face the highest 
poverty risks. It should be noted however, that although individuals who have been unemployed 
for 6-12 months appear to face the highest poverty risk, the sample size is not very large as the 
majority (75%) of the unemployed are long-term unemployed (over 12 months). Nevertheless, the 
differences in poverty rates between different groups of unemployed are statistically significant. 
The confidence interval for those unemployed 0-6 months is 0.25 to 0.35, while that for those 
unemployed for 6-12 months is 0.41 to 0.54 and that for those unemployed more than 12 months 
is 0.38 to 0.42.
Interestingly, the registered unemployed face the lowest poverty risk. However, given the 
extremely low level of unemployment benefits, which amount to less than 11% of the minimum 
subsistence level, the payment arrears and the bureaucratic hurdles to accessing the benefits, it is 
questionable whether this is a sign of a successful unemployment benefit program or whether it is 
a reflection of the types of individuals who register. It should also be recalled that the registered 
unemployed make up less than 5% of the labour force. The sample size may therefore too small to 
draw any reliable conclusions at the population level. Table 6.3 also provides poverty rates by 
type of inactivity and we see that amongst the inactive, it is pensioners, the disabled and draftees 
who face the highest poverty risks.
The analysis from the perspective of individuals also confirms previous findings that employment 
reduces poverty risks. Employed individuals face half the poverty risk of the unemployed as well 
as less than half the poverty severity. Table 6.3 also shows that the wage employed face higher 
poverty risks than the self-employed. There seem to be some returns to private sector wage 
employment, as employees in the private sector face poverty risks that are 4% lower than those in 
the public sector. However, contrary to the analysis based on the household head, we see that 
formal self-employment is not associated with a lower poverty risk than formal paid-employment.
189
In terms of formal vs. informal employment, table 6.3 confirms that for every type of 
employment, individuals who are informally employed face higher poverty risks than those who 
are formally employed. It also confirms that agricultural employment, whether formal or informal 
considerably reduces the poverty risk of individuals. However, there are significant discrepancies 
between wage and self-employed in agriculture, with the wage-employed facing poverty risks that 
are 50% higher than the self-employed.
Table 6.3 Labour Market Characteristics o f  Individuals and Poverty Incidence, 1999.
Poverty, in %_________________ Extreme Poverty, in %
Poverty Head Poverty Poverty
Head Count Poverty Gap Severity Count Gap Severity
Population 15+ 25.8 7.9 3.5 14.1 3.9 1.7
Labour market status
Inactive 33.1 10.5 4.8 18.8 5.3 2.4
Unemployed 39.1 12.5 5.6 21.7 6.2 2.6
Employed 19.7 5.7 2.5 10.3 2.7 1.2
Unemployment duration
0-6 months 29.8 10.1 5.1 17.9 5.6 2.9
6-12 months 47.5 15.9 7.3 26.5 8.4 3.5
12 months+ 39.8 12.9 5.8 22.9 6.5 2.7
Type o f unemployed
Searching for job 39.1 12.5 5.6 21.6 6.2 2.6
Discouraged 39.2 12.4 5.5 22.1 6.2 2.6
Registered 28.5 8.4 3.3 15 3.9 1.2
Type of inactivity
Student 24.6 7.6 3.5 13.7 3.8 1.7
Pensioner 39.2 12.6 5.8 22.2 6.5 2.9
Merit pensioner 26.3 6 1.7 8 1.3 0.3
Disabled 37.1 11.5 5.1 20.5 5.4 2.3
Caring for children 30.7 9.5 4.2 17.2 4.6 2
Draftee 45.7 18.5 10.1 31.2 11.9 5.9
Type o f employment
Wage employed 23.4 6.7 2.8 12.2 3 1.2
Self-employed 17 5 2.3 8.9 2.5 1.2
Formal 20 5.8 2.6 10.4 2.7 1.2
Informal 19.4 5.5 2.5 10 2.6 1.2
Private 18 5.3 2.4 9.4 2.6 1.2
Public 23.5 6.7 2.8 12.2 3 1.2
Type o f formal employment
Wage-employed public 22.8 6.6 2.8 11.9 3 1.2
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Wage-employed private 18.6 5.1 2.1 8 2.3 1
Non-agricultural self-employed 23.4 6.1 2.6 11.6 2.6 1.2
Farmers 15.5 4.9 2.4 8.6 2.6 1.4
Type of informal employment
Wage employed 30.2 8.3 3.4 16.1 3.7 1.4
Non-agricultural self-employed 26.1 7 2.8 12.6 2.8 1.1
Farmers 18.9 5.8 2.9 9.9 3.2 1.8
Contributing family workers 15.4 4.5 2.1 8 2.3 1.1
Sector of employment
Agriculture, fishing (A, B) 16.2 4.8 2.2 8.6 2.4 1.2
Manufacturing (D) 28.7 8.1 3.2 14 3.5 1.3
Electricity, gas, water supply (E) 23.1 7.3 3.7 14.5 3.6 2.1
Construction (F) 22.7 6.1 2.3 10.3 2.4 0.9
Wholesale and retail trade (G) 24.6 6.8 2.8 12.4 3 1.2
Hotels and restaurants (H) • 24 8.6 4.1 14.9 5 2.1
Transport and communication (I) 26.8 7 2.5 14.3 2.5 0.7
Financial intermediation, real estate, 
other business activities (J, K) 21.3 6.2 2.7 11.7 2.7 1.3
Public administration and defence (L) 22.1 6.5 2.8 12.2 3.1 1.3
Education (M) 19.9 5.7 2.5 9.3 2.7 1.3
Health, social work (N) 22.7 6.6 2.8 11.5 2.9 1.2
Other community, personal service 
activities (0 ) 18.5 5.7 2.4 10 2.8 1.1
Private households with employees (P) 47.1 13.2 4.9 27.6 5.3 1.4
Other (C, Q) 16.8 4.5 2 7.3 2.1 1.1
Employed in agriculture
Self-employed 15.7 4.7 2.3 8.4 2.4 1.3
Wage-employed 23.7 5.9 2 12.4 1.9 0.5
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at 2/3 o f median consumption per equivalent adult (0 = 0.75).
(b) Extreme poverty line is set at Vi of median consumption per equivalent adult.
(c) Head Count is the share of individuals whose consumption falls below the poverty line.
(d) The poverty gap provides information on the distance from the poverty line. It captures the mean aggregate 
consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line across the poor population.
(e) Poverty Severity captures the inequality among the poor by effectively giving more weight to households that are 
further away from the poverty line.
(f) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(g) Letters in brackets refer to sector of economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification o f all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(h) Category G also includes repair o f motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting. Category C refers to mining 
and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
Table 6.4 examines consumption quintiles by labour market characteristics of individuals. The 
results confirm the findings from the analysis based on the labour market status of the household 
head. In particular, we see that the poorest quintiles have the highest share of unemployed and 
inactive individuals. Moreover, the share of long-term unemployed decreases as consumption 
quintiles increase. We also confirm that being a pensioner is associated with lower well-being, as 
the share of pensioners in the lowest consumption quintile is close to double that in the richest 
quintile.
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As far as the employed are concerned, table 6.4 confirms that wage employment is associated 
with lower levels of welfare. Whereas the majority of the employed in the poorest quintile are 
wage employed, the majority in the richest quintile are self-employed. We also note that the 
informal non-agricultural self-employed are also more significant in the poorest segments of 
society. Interestingly, we see that the share of formal and informal employment is relatively stable 
throughout the consumption distribution. Finally, table 6.4 examines consumption quintiles by 
sector of employment and shows that the share of agriculture in total employment increases with 
consumption quintiles. It also shows that although the large majority of agricultural employment 
is self-employment, the agricultural wage employed make up a higher share of the poorest 
quintiles of the consumption distribution.
Table 6.4 Labour Market Characteristics o f  Individuals and Consumption, 1999 
(percent)
C o n s u m p t i o n  Q u i n t i l e s
Poorest 2 3 4 5
Labor market status 100 100 100 100 100
Inactive 44.1 37 36 27.5 25
Unemployed 13.1 10 8.4 5.2 4.1
Employed 42.8 53 56 67.3 71
Unemployment duration 100 100 100 100 100
0-6 months 10.1 13 16 15.3 19
6-12 months 11.2 10 9.8 5.3 6.3
12 months+ 78.7 77 74 79.4 74
Type of unemployed 100 100 100 100 100
Searching for job 95.9 95 94 91.2 96
Discouraged 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.8
Registered 3.4 3.7 5.7 7.7 3.6
Type o f inactivity 100 100 100 100 100
Student 18.8 23 28 32 37
Pensioner 43.6 39 35 31.5 24
Merit pensioner 1.4 2.4 1.3 0.8 2.5
Disabled 10.7 9.7 8.5 8.2 7.6
Caring for children 23.6 25 26 26.3 28
Draftee 2 1.4 0.9 1.3 0.8
Type of employment 100 100 100 100 100
Wage employed 50.5 46 45 37.8 37
Self-employed 49.5 54 56 62.2 63
Formal 53.6 52 51 51.3 52
Informal 46.4 48 49 48.7 48
Private 59.7 65 67 70 70
Public 40.3 35 34 30 30
Type of formal employment 100 100 100 100 100
Wage-employed public 66.8 59 59 54.7 54
Wage-employed private 6.3 11 11 7.7 5
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Non-agricultural self-employed 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.8
Farmer 23.9 29 27 34.7 38
Type of informal employment 100 100 100 100 100
Wage employed 23.9 21 17 10.7 12
Non-agricultural self-employed 18.1 14 13 9.8 10
Farmer 3 5.9 7.8 9.5 7.9
Contributing family worker 50.7 59 62 70.1 71
Sector o f employment 100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture, fishing (A, B) 41.5 48 48 57.3 59
Manufacturing (D) 9.5 7.4 7.2 5.4 4.8
Electricity, gas, water supply (E) 1.6 0.7 2.4 1 0.8
Construction (F) 1.8 2 2 0.9 1.6
Wholesale and retail trade (G) 11.7 12 10 8.2 6.9
Hotels, restaurants (H) 1.4 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.7
Transport, communication (I) 5.7 4.1 4.5 2.9 3.6
Financial intermediation, real estate, other business activities (J, K) 3.3 3.1 3 2.6 3
Public administration and defense (L) 6.8 5.6 6 4.9 6.7
Education (M) 7.7 7.8 7.3 8 7.2
Health, social work (N) 5.4 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.3
Other community, personal service activities (0 ) 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.7 1.4
Private households with employees (P) 1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2
Other (C, Q) 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4
Employed in agriculture 100 100 100 100 100
Self-employed 94.8 96 98 96 97
Wage-employed 5.3 3.6 2 4 2.9
Source: Author’s own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) The entries refer to the proportions o f labour market categories in the different quintiles o f the consumption
distribution.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption.
(c) The average consumption levels per adult equivalent in Georgian Lari for formal employment, informal 
employment, unemployment, and inactivity are 98,90, 78 and 70 respectively.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(e) Letters in brackets refer to sector o f economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(f) Category G also includes repair of motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting. Category C refers to mining 
and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
The findings of the analysis of poverty risks and consumption quintiles by labour market status 
can be summarised as follows. First, given the low level of benefits as well as the unreliability in 
their payment, inactivity and unemployment are associated with the highest poverty risks of any 
labour market category. Moreover, these groups make up a significant share of the poorest 
households and their share decreases as consumption increases. Second, employment, whether 
formal or informal, considerably decreases poverty risks and the share of households headed by 
employed individuals increases with consumption. Third, informal employment is associated with 
higher poverty risks than formal employment for every category of employment. However, formal 
employment is not a guarantee against poverty. The low level of public sector wages and arrears 
in their payment means that formal wage employment is associated with higher poverty risks and 
greater concentration at the bottom end of the consumption distribution than informal self- 
employment. Nevertheless, informal wage employees are by far the poorest of any employed
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group. Finally, agricultural self-employment, and particularly formal self-employment (i.e. on a 
registered rural plot) is associated with lower poverty risks, however, as we will see, this could be 
a result of the way in which consumption of own-production is valued.
6.3. LABOUR MARKET STATUS AND DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD 
WELFARE, OLS AND QUNATILE REGRESSION
In this section two multivariate analysis techniques (OLS and Quantile regression) are used to 
examine in more detail the relationship between household welfare and labour market status. 
Details on both techniques are presented in Appendix A2.4. The use of multivariate analysis 
enables the testing of some of the findings in the previous section by examining the effect of, inter 
alia, the labour market status of the heads of household on per capita measure of household 
welfare while controlling for a variety of other household characteristics.
To this end the following multivariate model for consumption per equivalent adult is specified:
Ln7/= fiXj+Ui
Where LnT, is the natural logarithm of consumption per adult equivalent (recall that 0=0.75). The 
vector Xt is a vector of demographic, education and labour market characteristics relating to the 
household or the household head. The demographic characteristics include gender, age and 
ethnicity of the household head as well as variables controlling for region, household size and 
composition. Education characteristics refer to the educational attainment of the household head, 
and labour market status also refers to the household head and includes variables for type of 
formal and informal employment (employee, non-agricultural self-employed, farmer, contributing 
family worker) as well as unemployment and inactivity. /? is the parameter vector to be estimated, 
Uj is the unobservable error term, and the unit of analysis (/) is the household. A definition of all 
variables used can be found in appendix A2.2. All the variables of interest (mainly labour market 
and also human capital) are binary (dummy) variables.
The reference category is Georgian male heads of household living in Kakheti, who have primary 
education and work as formal employees. The choice of reference category is explained in chapter 
5, however here the education reference category is changed from higher education to primary 
education as I am interested in examining whether higher education is associated with an increase 
in household welfare, ceteris paribus.
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First, I estimate the parameters using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (see appendix 
A2.4 for details). Two separate regressions for urban and rural households are run as it is expected 
that these exhibit very different labour market and educational characteristics. Results for urban 
households are reported in table 6.5, while those for rur^l households are reported in table 6.6.
As we can see from table 6.5, the equation fit for the urban mean model is satisfactory; the 
Adjusted R2 tells us that the model explains 23% of the variation in (log) consumption per 
equivalent adult, and the F ratio, which is used to test goodness of fit, shows that our model is 
significant at the 1% level. We also see that most of our labour market estimates achieve 
statistical significance at the 5% or 1% level, indicating that labour market activity of the head of 
household is significant in determining household welfare. The results confirm the findings in 
section 6.2. Having a head of household that is unemployed or inactive significantly decreases 
consumption per equivalent adult by 19% and 14% respectively compared to households headed 
by formal employees, ceteris paribus. At the same time, the consumption of households headed 
by formal employees is significantly lower, everything else being equal, than that of almost all 
other employed groups except informal employees. Households whose heads are informal 
employees have consumption per equivalent adult levels which are 9% lower than those headed 
by formal employees, confirming previous findings which suggest that there are lower returns to 
informal paid employment.
The results on the self-employed also confirm previous findings as self-employment (both formal 
and informal) is associated with a significant positive and quite substantial increase in household 
welfare everything else being equal. Table 6.5 shows that having a head of household that is non- 
agricultural self-employed, formally or informally, increases consumption per equivalent adult by 
21% and 11% respectively relative to households headed by formal employees, ceteris paribus.
Finally, it is interesting to note that estimates for informal farmers are statistically significant and 
that the coefficient is sizeable and positive.106 As previously mentioned, this could be explained 
by the way in which consumption of own-production is valued as it is expected that most of what 
is farmed on urban plots is used for own-consumption. I suspect this to be the case, as it seems 
unlikely that households headed by individuals whose main occupation is to farm an urban plot of 
land should have welfare levels that are close to a third higher than those headed by formal 
employees, ceteris paribus. These figures should therefore be approached with caution, as they 
could be misleading. The issue of small-plot urban farming in the former Soviet Union has 
received some attention in the past few years as observers have been puzzled by its widespread
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use (see for example Clarke 1999d). The findings in this thesis suggest that whereas during the 
soviet period urban farming was a means of supplementing income and ‘communicating with 
nature’ (Gordon and Klopov, 1972 quoted by McAuley 1979a, p.76) it is now a main source of 
income and employment for approximately 4.5% of household heads.
With regards to the impact of education on household welfare, table 6.5 indicates that, in urban 
areas, the level of educational attainment of the household head is significant in determining 
household welfare, ceteris paribus. Everything else being equal, households whose heads have 
general secondary, higher technical or higher general education have consumption levels which 
are 10%, 16% and 26% higher than those headed by individuals with primary education or less.
Quantile regression analysis is now used to provide some insights into the effects of the selected 
set of variables at different points of the consumption distribution. As discussed above, quantile 
regression enables the estimation of parameter coefficients at different points of the (log) 
consumption per equivalent adult distribution. Methodological details of this approach are 
presented in appendix A2.4. Essentially, quantile regression is similar to OLS, however, instead 
of estimating the mean of the dependent variable, quantile regression estimates the 0th quantiles, 
which in our case are the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles of the (log) consumption 
distribution.107 Moreover, it is less sensitive to outliers than OLS, as its aim is to find the 
regression plane that minimizes the sum of the absolute residuals rather the sum of the squares of 
the residuals. It is also more appropriate in cases where it is suspected that the residual 
distribution is characterised by a non-normal distribution.
The following model for consumption per equivalent adult at the 0th quantile for all households 
/=1,..., N is estimated:
Ln YrXfie+Uet, Quant* (y, |x,) = xfie
Where Ln Y is the natural logarithm of consumption per equivalent adult, Quant*(y/|x,) denotes the 
conditional quantile of yh conditional on the regressor vector^ , /?* is the vector of coefficients to 
be estimated, and 0 is 0th quantile (i.e. 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90). The error term, w* is left 
unspecified and the only assumption made is that w* satisfies the quantile restriction Quant* 
(w*|x;)=0 (see appendix A2.4 for more details on quantile regression techniques).
106 Recall that the ‘informal farmer’ variable includes, amongst others, individuals whose main occupation is farming an 
urban plot o f land (see chapter 3).
107 Thus, for example, in estimating the 50th quantile, quantile regression estimated the median of the dependent 
variable.
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The parameter estimates can be interpreted in much the same way as those estimated with OLS 
procedure, namely the marginal change in the 0th conditional quantile of y  due to a marginal 
change in the independent variable of interest, controlling for all other independent variables.
Table 6.5 reports these results for urban areas. Before turning to the results however, a test is 
performed to assess to what extent the effects of the variables are the same at the different 
quantiles and to what extent the changes in the coefficients of the model are statistically 
significant. Again, details are discussed in appendix A2.4. Using a Wald test, the hypothesis that 
the coefficients are jointly equal at the 25th and 75th percentiles for both urban and rural areas can 
be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. This indicates that the explanatory variables have a 
different impact at different parts of the (log) consumption distribution.
The results of the quantile regression for urban areas are reported in table 6.5. First, we note that 
the median regression estimates for labour market and education variables (0=0.50) are similar to 
the mean (OLS) estimates in significance, magnitude and sign, thereby confirming the robustness 
of the mean results. Second, the quantile regression results show that having an unemployed head 
of household exerts a significant and strong negative impact on household welfare that is more or 
less equal at all five points of the consumption distribution. The quantile regression results also 
confirm that having an inactive head of household exerts a significant, strong, negative effect on 
household welfare, although it further shows that the effect is stronger at the bottom quantiles of 
the distribution. Table 6.5 shows that whereas at the 10th percentile, households headed by the 
inactive had consumption per equivalent adult levels that were 20% lower than those headed by 
formal employees, ceteris paribus, at the 75th and 90th percentiles, they had consumption levels 
that were 15% and 11% lower.
Third, the quantile regression results provide some interesting insight into the effect of self- 
employment on household welfare. For both formal and informal non-agricultural self-employed, 
the positive effect on household welfare is significant only at the bottom end of the distribution, 
namely at the 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles, and the magnitude of the impact decreases as 
consumption increases. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on household consumption is much 
smaller for informal than for formal self-employment, thereby confirming our previous finding 
that there are lower returns to informal self-employment. These findings could also indicate that 
at the bottom end of the distribution, where formal wage employees with extremely low wages are 
concentrated, self-employment has a significant positive impact on household welfare, whereas at 
the top end of the distribution, where perhaps the better paid formal employees are located, 
everything else being equal, self-employment exerts no particular impact on household welfare.
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Fourth, the results show that having a head of household who is an informal employee has a 
significant negative impact on household welfare, relative to those headed by formal employees, 
at all quantiles (with the exception of the 0.10th quantile), showing the robustness of results based 
on OLS estimation. Fifth, the results would suggest that having a head of household whose main 
occupation is to farm an urban plot of land (informal farming) significantly increases household 
welfare at all five quantiles of the distribution. As noted above, it is unclear to what extent urban 
plots are indeed an important source of welfare for all households, regardless of income, and to 
what extent this result is driven by the way in which consumption of own-production is valued.
Finally, with regards to the effect of education on household welfare, the quantile regression 
results show there are significant returns to education, confirming the robustness of the mean 
regression results. Moreover, they show that in urban areas, with the exception of higher 
education, returns to general secondary and technical secondary education are significant only for 
households at the 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles. They also show that the positive effect of 
secondary or higher education is strongest at the bottom end of the consumption distribution. 
Most importantly, however, we see that higher education has a significant positive impact on 
household welfare at all five quantiles of the distribution.
Overall, our quantile regression estimates show that in urban areas, the head of household’s level 
of educational attainment and labour market status are significant determinants of household 
welfare at the bottom end of the consumption distribution, but are generally not very significant at 
the top end. This is not a surprising finding, as we can expect that at the top end of the 
distribution, household welfare may depend on other factors other than labour market status or 
education, including assets and other (at times ‘unofficial’) sources of income.
Table 6.5 Determinants o f  Household Consumption, OLS and Simultaneous Quantile Regression 
Results (Urban)
Dependent variable: natural 
logarithm o f  consumption per adult Mean (OLS) Percentiles
equivalent (6=0.75) 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Demographic Characteristics 
Region 
Tblisi 0.1924 0.1815 0.0849 0.1272 0.2326 0.2506
(0.0567)*** (0.1144) (0.0665) (0.0558)** (0.0644)*** (0.0851)***
Kakheti / / f / f /
Shida Kartli 0.005 -0.0641 -0.0676 0.0102 0.0698 0.0732
(0.0657) (0.1224) (0.0941) (0.0690) (0.0831) (0.1278)
Kvemo Kartli 0.3087 0.2505 0.2462 0.3827 0.3744 0.322
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(0.0665)*** (0.1397)* (0.0863)*** (0.0604)*** (0.0881)*** (0.1029)***
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.3992 -0.8065 -0.7837 -0.4461 -0.1403 0.077
(0.0850)*** (0.2107)*** (0.1128)*** (0.1249)*** (0.2061) (0.1966)
Achara 0.4383 0.4798 0.4047 0.4126 0.4115 0.4329
(0.0649)*** (0.1331)*** (0.1022)*** (0.0591)*** (0.0725)*** (0.1047)***
Guria -0.2133 -0.3444 -0.3049 -0.185 -0.1344 -0.1324
(0.0811)*** (0.1366)** (0.0841)*** (0.0739)** (0.0874) (0.1044)
Samegrelo -0.1492 -0.1837 -0.2617 -0.1564 -0.1088 -0.1276
(0.0657)** (0.1238) (0.0890)*** (0.0572)*** (0.0362)*** (0.0877)
Imereti -0.2598 -0.2556 -0.3152 -0.2569 -0.2114 -0.2534
(0.0624)*** (0.1056)** (0.0585)*** (0.0461)*** (0.0791)*** (0.0832)***
Gender o f Household Head 
(female=l) -0.0925 -0.0657 -0.0803 -0.0579 -0.0682 -0.0739
(0.0287)*** (0.0664) (0.0465)* (0.0334)* (0.0428) (0.0671)
Age o f Household Head -0.006 -0.006 -0.0027 -0.0116 -0.01 -0.0108
(0.0054) (0.0131) (0.0083) (0.0091) (0.0065) (0.0108)
Age squared o f Household Head 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Ethnic Background of Household 
Head
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Georgian / / / / / /
Azeri 0.0256 0.2944 0.0831 -0.0669 -0.1962 -0.0715
(0.1431) (0.1493)** (0.0923) (0.1065) (0.1764) (0.3526)
Abkhazian 0.0357 0.0311 -0.0671 -0.1409 0.156 0.2255
(0.1724) (0.1779) (0.1338) (0.1953) (0.3658) (0.3248)
Greek -0.1021 -0.0282 -0.1032 -0.2847 -0.2142 -0.1324
(0.0918) (0.1802) (0.1282) (0.0855)*** (0.1037)** (0.1418)
Ossetian -0.1261 0.2234 0.0403 -0.0274 -0.1325 -0.2801
(0.1088) (0.4791) (0.1614) (0.1172) (0.1326) (0.1980)
Russian -0.2007 -0.2267 -0.2053 -0.1731 -0.1818 -0.2156
(0.0623)*** (0.1577) (0.1099)* (0.0687)** (0.0631)*** (0.0913)**
Armenian -0.1304 -0.1191 -0.1555 -0.1021 -0.139 -0.1612
(0.0484)*** (0.0990) (0.0850)* (0.0563)* (0.0709)* (0.0786)**
Other -0.0341 -0.0348 -0.0429 -0.0328 -0.027 0.0102
(0.0927) (0.1306) (0.1034) (0.1144) (0.0979) (0.1139)
Number o f adults -0.0167 0.0061 0.0028 -0.0052 -0.0449 -0.0661
(0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0154) (0.0122) (0.0099)*** (0.0199)***
Number of children aged 6 years or 
less -0.1028 -0.1002 -0.0917 -0.107 -0.0909 -0.1156
(0.0248)*** (0.0491)** (0.0350)*** (0.0278)*** (0.0246)*** (0.0450)**
Number of other children -0.0735 -0.0385 -0.0676 -0.074 -0.0876 -0.1201
(0.0149)*** (0.0245) (0.0227)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0155)*** (0.0253)***
Education Level o f Household Head 
Primary or less / / / f / /
Incomplete secondary 0.0199 0.0379 0.1201 0.1039 0.0798 -0.0306
(0.0634) (0.1669) (0.0933) (0.0893) (0.0761) (0.1362)
General secondary 0.1044 0.1707 0.1528 0.1329 0.0495 0.0207
(0.0445)** (0.0791)** (0.0641)** (0.0493)*** (0.0681) (0.0951)
Technical secondary 0.0306 0.1514 0.118 0.1048 -0.0332 -0.1444
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(0.0612) (0.1161) (0.0692)* (0.0529)** (0.0659) (0.0933)
High technical 0.1604 0.2378 0.2045 0.1561 0.0445 0.0227
(0.0525)*** (0.1047)** (0.0763)*** (0.0681)** (0.0684) (0.0963)
High general 0.262 0.3938 0.2891 0.2624 0.1613 0.1611
(0.0470)*** (0.0855)*** (0.0687)*** (0.0528)*** (0.0591)*** (0.0912)*
Labour market Status o f  Household 
Head
Formal employee / / / / / /
Formal non-agricultural self- 
employed 0.2102 0.3337 0.2584 0.1887 0.1635 0.1717
(0.0867)** (0.1273)*** (0.1242)** (0.0848)** (0.1028) (0.1111)
Formal farmer -0.172 0.3849 0.1607 -0.2312 -0.3331 -0.6067
(0.2979) (0.1148)*** (0.1186) (0.0892)*** (0.1083)*** (0.1243)***
Informal employee -0.0926 -0.0198 -0.1202 -0.1521 -0.1576 -0.1102
(0.0442)** (0.0660) (0.0535)** (0.0444)*** (0.0594)*** (0.0642)*
Informal non-agricultural self- 
employed 0.1107 0.2289 0.1286 0.084 0.0482 0.1259
(0.0456)** (0.0524)*** (0.0483)*** (0.0314)*** (0.0534) (0.1000)
Informal farmer 0.2874 0.2329 0.398 0.3071 0.2194 0.1268
(0.0504)*** (0.1039)** (0.0877)*** (0.0336)*** (0.0493)*** (0.0595)**
Contributing family worker -0.0075 0.1104 -0.0622 -0.0938 -0.0904 0.021
(0.0700) (0.0798) (0.0706) (0.0699) (0.1094) (0.1107)
Unemployed -0.1923 -0.1717 -0.2039 -0.1968 -0.206 -0.2063
(0.0377)*** (0.0569)*** (0.0427)*** (0.0461)*** (0.0492)*** (0.0582)***
Inactive -0.1366 -0.2043 -0.18 -0.1595 -0.1456 -0.1101
(0.0309)*** (0.0649)*** (0.0622)*** (0.0292)*** (0.0331)*** (0.0672)
Constant 4.4357 3.513 4.0033 4.5533 4.9794 5.4464
(0.1602)*** (0.3778)*** (0.2216)*** (0.2718)*** (0.2351)*** (0.3531)***
Observations
Adj usted-R2/Pseudo-R2
F ratio (k-1, n-k)
2357
0.23***
21.80
(34,2322)
2357
0.1695
2357
0.1517
2357
0.1515
2357
0.1352
2357
0.1192
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable is the natural log of consumption per adult equivalent (0=0.75).
(d) Mean refers to the OLS regression.
(e) The quantile regressions were performed at the lOthe, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.
(f) The unit o f observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour market status refer to the head 
o f household.
(g) f  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(h) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(i) F ratio (k-1, n-k) denotes the F-statistic with K-l, n-k degrees o f freedom, where k is the number o f independent 
variables in our model and n is the total number of observations. This statistic is used to test the Null Hypothesis 
(Ho): p2=0 (see appendix A2.4 for details).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
The results of the mean (OLS) and quantile regressions for rural areas are reported in table 6.6. 
The equation fit for the model is satisfactory; as the model accounts for approximately 23% of the 
variation in (log) consumption per adult equivalent, and it is significant (i.e. the null hypothesis
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that the model explains none of the variation in consumption per adult equivalent in the 
population can be rejected). Despite the significance of the model, fewer of the estimates for the 
labour market and education variables achieve statistical significance.108 This can be explained by 
the less heterogeneous nature of the labour market in rural areas, which is largely focused on 
agricultural activities. Thus we see that households headed by formal farmers or contributing 
family workers have, on average, 5% and 15% higher levels of consumption per equivalent adult 
than do those headed by formal employees. None of the other employment status variables 
achieve statistical significance at the mean. However, once again we see that, as with urban areas, 
unemployment and inactivity are significant in determining household welfare, ceteris paribus. 
We see that the effect of having an unemployed or inactive head of household is very strong. 
Compared to household headed by formal employees, those headed by the unemployed or 
inactive have consumption per equivalent adult levels that are 27% and 22% lower respectively, 
ceteris paribus.
As far as education is concerned, the OLS estimates show that in rural areas only higher education 
has a significant impact on household welfare. Households headed by individuals with higher 
education, everything else being equal have consumption per equivalent adult levels that are 21% 
higher than those headed by individuals with primary education, suggesting that the returns to 
higher education are significant in both urban and rural areas.
Results of the quantile regressions for rural areas are presented in table 6.6. First of all, we see 
that although the mean estimates showed that formal farming is significant at the 10% level, the 
quantile estimates show that it is only significant at the 10th percentile. Thus the significant mean 
effect is largely driven by the effect of the 10th percentile, indicating the importance of focusing 
on other parts of the distribution other than the mean regression. This could perhaps be explained 
by the fact that formal employees are concentrated at the bottom end of the consumption 
distribution in rural areas and that given their very low level of wages, formal farming 
significantly increases the level of household consumption relative to formal wage employment 
only at the bottom end of the distribution.
108 Note that I checked for a high degree of multicollinearity, which could possibly explain why the model is significant 
but not many of the estimated parameters are, but found no evidence of this. In particular, I tried running the regression 
omitting the ethnicity variable, as in rural areas most ethnic minorities are concentrated in specific regions, and it could 
therefore be expected that the ethnicity variable could be highly correlated with the regional variables. However, this 
neither improved the fit of the model (as measured by the Adjusted R2-in fact R2 decreased), and nor did it increase the 
number o f significant parameters. I also tried to run the OLS regression without the regional variables as I suspected a 
high degree o f multicollinearity between the regional variables and the labour force variables since chapters 4 and 5 
found region to be a determinant o f both informal employment and unemployment However, this did not result in an 
increase in significance in any o f the labour market variables and actually worsened the fit o f the model as measured by 
the Adjusted R2.
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Second, although informal farming and informal non-agricultural self-employment were not 
significant determinants of household welfare when estimated using OLS procedure, they have a 
significant negative impact when applying the quantile regression approach. However, they are 
only significant at the top end of the distribution. Contributing family workers in contrast, exert a 
positive effect on household welfare at all levels of the distribution. Contributing family workers 
that are household heads are typically old-age (male) individuals who live with their extended 
family and are therefore considered the household head but not the main breadwinner. The 
association with a higher level of welfare could be an indication that these are larger households 
that are perhaps farming larger plots of land. Third, as is the case in urban areas, we see that the 
impact on household welfare of having a head of household who is either unemployed or inactive 
is important and negative at all levels of the consumption distribution but particularly so for the 
bottom quantiles.
Finally, the level of education of the head of household also appears to have a less significant 
impact on household welfare in rural areas. The quantile regression results confirm the findings 
based on OLS estimation and show that higher general education has a significant and strong 
positive impact at all levels of the consumption distribution. They also show that higher technical 
education and general secondary education are significant determinants of household welfare at 
around the median (50th and 75th percentiles).
Overall, the results from the rural regressions suggest that the employment status of the household 
head in rural areas is not as significant in determining household welfare as it is in urban areas, 
although labour market status as a whole is significant (i.e. unemployment and inactivity are 
associated with significantly lower levels of welfare). Region seems to be a more important 
determinant of household welfare in rural areas. Almost all regional variables achieve 
significance at the 1% level, with some regions having a strong positive influence on consumption 
(e.g. Shida Kartli, Kvemo Kartli, Samegrelo), while others have a strong negative influence (e.g. 
Samtskhe Javakheti, Achara). These findings attest to the importance of the regional dimension in 
Georgia in determining not only welfare but also, as we have seen, informal employment and 
unemployment.
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Table 6.6 Determinants o f  Household Consumption, OLS and Simultaneous Quantile Regression
Results (Rural)
Dependent variable: natural logarithm oj 
consumption per adult equivalent Mean(OLS) Percentiles(6=0.75) 10*,, 25th 50th 75th 90*
Demographic Characteristics 
Region 
Tblisi 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Kakheti / / / / / /
Shida Kartli 0.2606 0.2188 0.2457 0.2592 0.259 0.2601
(0.0451)*** (0.0862)** (0.0455)*** (0.0403)*** (0.0397)*** (0.0446)***
Kvemo Kartli 0.3257 0.3015 0.2668 0.2441 0.293 0.3919
(0.0543)*** (0.0734)*** (0.0834)*** (0.0726)*** (0.0719)*** (0.0628)***
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.1308 -0.3931 -0.1222 0.0165 0.1177 0.1096
(0.0519)** (0.1585)** (0.0659)* (0.0514) (0.0612)* (0.0656)*
Achara -0.1212 -0.4851 -0.2061 -0.0482 0.0166 0.1007
(0.0533)** (0.1357)*** (0.0764)*** (0.0493) (0.0461) (0.0544)*
Guria 0.1585 0.2046 0.1438 0.1567 0.1387 0.1557
(0.0516)*** (0.0747)*** (0.0447)*** (0.0443)*** (0.0444)*** (0.0487)***
Samegrelo 0.2447 0.2336 0.3162 0.2518 0.1972 0.1847
(0.0474)*** (0.0623)*** (0.0643)*** (0.0418)*** (0.0480)*** (0.0569)***
Imereti 0.0587 0.0578 0.1172 0.0761 0.0356 0.0385
(0.0486) (0.0796) (0.0481)** (0.0441)* (0.0456) (0.0483)
Gender o f Household Head (female=l) -0.1566 -0.196 -0.1947 -0.1453 -0.1071 -0.0455
(0.0301)*** (0.0603)*** (0.0495)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0201)*** (0.0231)**
Age of Household Head 0.0223 0.015 0.0211 0.0236 0.0191 0.0188
(0.0054)*** (0.0104) (0.0104)** (0.0077)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0082)**
Age squared of Household Head -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000)*** (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)**
Ethnic Background o f  Household Head
Georgian / f f / / /
Azeri -0.4211 -0.7226 -0.478 -0.2092 -0.1153 -0.2403
(0.0774)*** (0.1499)*** (0.1236)*** (0.0839)** (0.0810) (0.1143)**
Abkhazian -0.2242 0.2165 -0.0045 -0.5524 -0.6294 -0.2485
(0.3091) (0.2764) (0.2072) (0.3086)* (0.3599)* (0.3442)
Greek -0.3594 -0.2604 -0.2229 -0.2988 -0.3649 -0.1946
(0.1354)*** (0.8542) (0.1075)** (0.0909)*** (0.1078)*** (0.3945)
Ossetian -0.018 -0.3577 0.0803 0.154 0.0271 -0.1689
(0.1085) (0.3328) (0.2937) (0.0839)* (0.0546) (0.0926)*
Russian 0.148 0.3351 0.2419 0.2697 0.3045 0.1381
(0.1033) (0.3571) (0.1214)** (0.2062) (0.1211)** (0.0881)
Armenian 0.0011 0.1979 0.0348 -0.0257 -0.1137 -0.1727
(0.0650) (0.1090)* (0.1208) (0.0651) (0.0499)** (0.0882)*
Other 0.1662 0.3214 0.3264 0.1156 0.0936 -0.0109
(0.1666) (0.2955) (0.2826) (0.1549) (0.1612) (0.1902)
Number o f adults -0.0641 -0.0178 -0.0489 -0.0872 -0.0922 -0.096
(0.0110)*** (0.0215) (0.0152)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0143)***
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Number of children aged 6 years or less -0.0805 -0.1107 -0.1163 -0.0771 -0.0928 -0.0693
(0.0230)*** (0.0432)** (0.0344)*** (0.0245)*** (0.0199)*** (0.0284)**
Number of other children -0.0887 -0.0689 -0.0856 -0.1077 -0.1207 -0.1055
(0.0136)*** (0.0341)** (0.0120)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0161)***
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less / / / / / /
Incomplete secondary 0.0046 0.034 -0.0657 0.0248 0.04 0.0296
(0.0418) (0.0904) (0.0722) (0.0511) (0.0418) (0.0647)
General secondary 0.0499 0.097 0.0231 0.0828 0.1009 0.0639
(0.0374) (0.0876) (0.0681) (0.0386)** (0.0407)** (0.0523)
Technical secondary 0.0734 0.0678 0.0545 0.0976 0.04 -0.0293
(0.0636) (0.1262) (0.0989) (0.0597) (0.0754) (0.1365)
High technical 0.0867 0.0945 0.0857 0.1259 0.1697 0.1992
(0.0497)* (0.0963) (0.0975) (0.0531)** (0.0687)** (0.0656)***
High general 0.2089 0.2575 0.1714 0.2471 0.2345 0.1462
(0.0501)*** (0.1201)** (0.0698)** (0.0473)*** (0.0503)*** (0.0582)**
Labour market Status o f Household 
Head
Formal employee / / / f / /
Formal non-agricultural self-employed 0.1215 0.3296 0.0172 0.1426 0.1739 0.1322
(0.1209) (0.4060) (0.1197) (0.2324) (0.1805) (0.0925)
Formal farmer 0.0509 0.1361 0.0393 0.0154 -0.0041 -0.0405
(0.0281)* (0.0691)** (0.0431) (0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0452)
Informal employee 0.0387 -0.1254 -0.0211 0.04 0.0236 0.0861
(0.0563) (0.1212) (0.0718) (0.0625) (0.0482) (0.0743)
Informal non-agricultural self-employed -0.0611 -0.1109 -0.0808 -0.148 -0.049 -0.1553
(0.0650) (0.1226) (0.0780) (0.0628)** (0.0572) (0.0465)***
Informal farmer -0.0523 0.0149 0.0186 -0.0149 -0.1469 -0.2037
(0.0494) (0.1008) (0.0522) (0.0425) (0.0386)*** (0.0519)***
Contributing family worker 0.1543 0.136 0.1006 0.1289 0.1386 0.0723
(0.0360)*** (0.0558)** (0.0575)* (0.0338)*** (0.0387)*** (0.0436)*
Unemployed -0.2676 -0.3535 -0.3602 -0.1743 -0.2293 -0.2707
(0.0741)*** (0.1193)*** (0.1834)** (0.1118) (0.0568)*** (0.0775)***
Inactive -0.2198 -0.2861 -0.2072 -0.1809 -0.178 -0.1759
(0.0345)*** (0.0628)*** (0.0516)*** (0.0425)*** (0.0369)*** (0.0425)***
Constant 3.7278 3.0771 3.457 3.8061 4.2625 4.6353
(0.1681)*** (0.2586)*** (0.3165)*** (0.2367)*** (0.1977)*** (0.3053)***
Observations 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546
Adjusted-R2/Pseudo-R2 0.18*** 0.1317 0.1035 0.12 0.1292 0.1318
F ratio (k-1, n-k) 17.76(33,2512)
Source: Author’s own analysis o f  LFS1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable is the natural log of consumption per adult equivalent (0=0.75).
(d) Mean refers to the OLS regression.
(e) The quantile regressions were performed at the lOthe, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.
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(f) The unit o f observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour market status refer to the head 
o f household.
(g) F  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(h) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(i) F ratio (k-1, n-k) denotes the F-statistic with K-1, n-k degrees o f freedom, where k is the number o f independent 
variables in our model and n is the total number o f observations. This statistic is used to test the Null Hypothesis 
(Ho): p2=0 (see appendix A2.4 for details).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
6.4 LABOUR MARKET STATUS AND DETERMINANTS OF POVERTY, PROBIT
ANALYSIS
A probit model is now estimated to examine the effect of labour market status of the household 
head on the probability of a household being poor. Technical details on probit analysis are 
presented in appendix A2.4. The relative poverty line, equal to two thirds of median consumption 
per adult equivalent, is used (see section 6.1). The model is built around the regression model 
Y * r fiXj+Ut where Y* is the underlying continuous, unobserved, latent variable. X  is the same 
vector of demographic, human capital and labour market characteristics as in the OLS model, /? is 
the parameter vector to be estimated and the unit of analysis (/) is the household. The 
unobservable error term w, is defined as having E(«)=0 and Var(H)=a2. The unobservable error 
term w, is defined as having E(w)=0 and Var(m)=o2. All variables of interest (mainly labour market 
but also human capital) are dummy variables. The definition of all variables used can be found in 
appendix A2.2.
The observed variable is Yt. Yt= 1 if a household is poor and Yf=0 otherwise. 7, is related to Y*j in 
the following way: if Y*p>0, we observe Yf= 1 otherwise we observe 7=0.
The probit model is therefore defined as:
Prob(7=l)= Prob(/2Ar;+w,>0)
= Prob(w>-/LY)
= 1-0 (-px/a)
= ®(pXZo)
Where 0 (.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed 
that u follows a normal distribution. Two separate regressions, for urban and rural areas 
respectively, are run as it is expected that they exhibit very different characteristics. The resulting 
coefficients have been converted to marginal effects for ease o f interpretation, thus they can be
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interpreted as the change in the probability of y=l for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous, variable and, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
Table 6.7 reports the results. As with the mean regression model, the probit model is significant 
at the 1% level (the likelihood ratio on a chi-squared distribution is used to test the hypothesis 
joint hypothesis that all coefficients in the population, with the exception of the intercept, are 
equal to 0). However, L2 does not allow us to make any inference regarding the degree of fit of 
the model (see appendix A2.4).
The probit regression estimates largely confirm the previous findings. First, households headed by 
the unemployed or inactive are significantly more likely to have consumption per adult equivalent 
levels below the poverty line than those headed by formal employees, ceteris paribus. However, 
contrary to the OLS results, having an unemployed head does not appear to have a significant 
impact on household poverty in rural areas, whereas in urban areas households headed by the 
unemployed are 15% more likely to be poor than those headed by formal employees. This can be 
explained by the very small numbers of unemployed in rural areas.
Second, urban households headed by informal farmers and informal non-agricultural self- 
employed are significantly less likely to be poor than those headed by formal employees. This is 
also consistent with the mean regression results. However, results for the formal non-agricultural 
self-employed are not significant at a conventional level. This is in contrast to the mean 
regression, which found that households headed by the non-agricultural self-employed, whether 
formal or informal, had higher consumption per equivalent adult levels than those headed by 
formal employees.
Third, the previous findings that in rural areas, households headed by formal farmers or 
contributing family workers are significantly less likely to be poor are also confirmed. Fourth, the 
probit results confirm the returns to higher education. Having a head of households with general 
higher education significantly reduces the probability of being poor by 16% in urban areas and 
6% in rural areas, everything else being equal. However, contrary to the mean results, general 
secondary education is not a significant variable in determining poverty.
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Table 6. 7  Determinants o f  Household Consumption, Probit Regression Results
Dependent variable: poor (dummy) Urban Rural
Demographic Characteristics 
Region 
Tblisi -0.1151
Kakheti
(0.0444)***
/ /
Shida Kartli -0.0217 -0.0861
(0.0528) (0.0215)***
Kvemo Kartli -0.1671 -0.1021
(0.0422)*** (0.0240)***
Samtskhe Javakheti 0.2399 0.0033
(0.0769)*** (0.0302)
Achara -0.2632 0.0845
(0.0299)*** (0.0364)**
Guria 0.1206 -0.0602
(0.0721)* (0.0260)**
Samegrelo 0.1083 -0.087
(0.0579)* (0.0224)***
Imereti 0.1926 -0.0211
(0.0560)*** (0.0279)
Gender o f Household Head (female=l) 0.0407 0.0457
(0.0242)* (0.0200)**
Age o f Household Head 0.0069 -0.0071
(0.0045) (0.0030)**
Age squared o f Household Head 0 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)**
Ethnic Background o f Household Head 
Georgian / /
Azeri -0.2104 0.2402
(0.0975)** (0.0687)***
Abkhazian 0.0141 0.0947
(0.1498) (0.2496)
Greek 0.051 -0.0982
(0.0896) (0.0767)
Ossetian 0.0766 0.069
(0.0953) (0.0831)
Russian 0.1933 -0.0035
(0.0577)*** (0.0686)
Armenian 0.0722 0.1388
(0.0421)* (0.0496)***
Other 0.1093 -0.0859
(0.0800) (0.0632)
Number o f adults -0.0069 0.005
(0.0093) (0.0068)
Number o f children aged 6 years or less 0.0833 0.0542
(0.0204)*** (0.0132)***
Number o f other children 0.0388 0.0314
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(0.0125)*** (0.0080)***
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less f  f
Incomplete secondary -0.0181 0.0392
(0.0502) (0.0275)
General secondary -0.0464 -0.0015
(0.0356) (0.0231)
Technical secondary -0.0129 -0.0198
(0.0497) (0.0370)
High technical -0.0689 -0.0017
(0.0396)* (0.0305)
High general -0.1627 -0.0595
(0.0341)*** (0.0263)**
Labour market Status o f  Household Head
Formal employee f  f
Formal non-agricultural self-employed -0.0977 -0.0482
(0.0670) (0.0605)
Formal farmer 0.0453 -0.0603
(0.2744) (0.0180)***
Informal employee 0.1136 -0.0036
(0.0403)*** (0.0335)
Informal non-agricultural self-employed -0.0956 0.0318
(0.0356)*** (0.0413)
Informal farmer -0.1923 0.0124
(0.0295)*** (0.0321)
Contributing family worker 0.0624 -0.0687
(0.0618) (0.0202)***
Unemployed 0.1527 0.0852
(0.0338)*** (0.0520)
Inactive 0.1155 0.0499
______________________________________________________________ (0.0260)***_____________ (0.0229)**
Observations 2366 2568
L2 Chi2 (fc-1)_________________________________________________ 474.32 (34)***__________218.33 (33)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS1999 and SGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether a household is below the relative poverty line (2/3 
median consumption per equivalent adult).
(d) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value o f the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(e) The unit o f observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour market status refer to the head 
o f household.
(f) F  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(g) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(h) L2 Chi2 (K-1) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit o f the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on £-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of independent variables in our model (see appendix 
x).
(i) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(j) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
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Finally, the robustness of the results can be checked by testing whether analysing poverty from 
the perspective of the labour market status of all individuals in the household, and not just the 
household head, makes a difference in the findings. A test can also be performed for the 
sensitivity of the results to the choice of poverty line, equivalence scales and economies of scale 
indexes used to adjust for household size and composition in the derivation of household 
consumption per equivalent adult.
First, I test whether the number of formal, informal, unemployed or inactive individuals in the 
household is significant in determining household poverty rates. The results are reported in table 
A.6.3 in appendix A6.2. They show that an increase in the number of individuals employed 
formally or informally has a negative significant impact on poverty, confirming that the findings 
based on the household head are robust. However the number of inactive or unemployed 
individuals does not appear to have a significant impact on the poverty rate. This can be explained 
by the small size of households in Georgia. The average size of households that include inactive 
or unemployed individuals was less than 3 members in 1999, which is close to the mean. In this 
case it is therefore more instructive to look at the labour market status of the household head.
Second, the results of this chapter are compared to those obtained using the World Bank and 
Georgian State Department of Statistics methodology. As previously mentioned, the WB and SDS 
use equivalence scales to account for age and gender differences between household members, 
they make stronger assumptions regarding economies-of-scale, and they use a lower (absolute) 
poverty line.109 Tables A.6.4 to A.6.8 in appendix A6.2 report findings using the WB and SDS 
methodologies. They show that results based on the continuous variable ‘consumption per 
equivalent adult’ are entirely consistent with the findings of this chapter, thereby confirming their 
robustness.
The different approach does however make a difference in results based on the discrete variable, 
‘poor/non-poor’. This is to be expected. Applying different equivalence scales and economies of 
scale index results in a re-ranking of households. Despite the difference in raking observed in the 
analysis of poverty statistics by labour market status of the household head (see table A6.4 in 
appendix A6.2), all the coefficients estimated in the probit analysis (for poor/non-poor) are 
consistent with the analysis of this chapter, except for the estimates for informal employees,
109The World Bank and SDS apply 0=0.54 and a =0.64 for children aged <7years; o=l for children aged 7-16 years; 
a=l for male adults aged 16-60 years; a=0.84 for female adults aged 16-60 years; a=0.88 for male adults aged 60+; and 
cc=0.76 for female adults aged 60+. The official poverty line (used by the SDS) is equal to 100 GEL (US$50) per 
equivalent adult per month. The World Bank poverty line is set at 55 GEL (US$25) per month per equivalent adult. See 
appendix A2.3.4 for details. Also recall that we set a=l and 0=0.75 and use a relative poverty line equal to 2/3 of 
median consumption per adult equivalent, which in 1999 was equal to about GEL 48 (US$24) per month.
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which using the WB poverty line are not significant (table A.6.8 appendix A6.2). However, 
appendix A2.3.4 (sensitivity analysis for the choice of theta) shows that this can be explained by 
the difference in the value of 0. The analysis of this chapter is therefore robust.
Third, I perform a sensitivity analysis to test the sensitivity of poverty rates to the choice of 
economies of scale index (0) (see appendix A2.3.4). The results show that considerable 
assumptions about economies of scale must be made before re-ranking occurs (re-ranking occurs 
around 0=0.5 to 0=0.4) and therefore confirm that applying a 0=0.75 is appropriate and realistic.
In summary, sections 6.3 and 6.4 have shown that labour market status of the household head 
significantly determines household welfare. In particular, inactivity and unemployment are 
significantly associated with a very high poverty risk while employment (both formal and 
informal) significantly reduces the risk of being poor, ceteris paribus. The impact of 
unemployment and inactivity on poverty and household welfare can be explained by the poor 
quality of the social security system in Georgia. Not only is the value of unemployment benefits 
and pensions extremely low, but also these are seldom paid on time and several months of arrears 
are very common.
Support was found for the hypothesis that individuals engage in informal employment because 
there is no formal alternative. The results showed that for every category of employment, working 
informally was associated with lower levels of welfare and higher poverty rates than for the 
corresponding category of formal employment. More specifically, the findings showed that 
households headed by individuals who are informally employed have higher poverty rates and 
lower levels of consumption per equivalent adult than those headed by individuals working in 
similar jobs in the formal sector, ceteris paribus. Assuming that individuals are utility- 
maximizing and that they make rational choices, it can be concluded that individuals who work 
informally do so because they have no formal alternative. This conclusion was supported by the 
findings of the multivariate analysis, which showed that for every category of employment, 
informal employment was associated either with a greater negative impact or a smaller positive 
impact on welfare than the corresponding category of formal employment, relative to the 
reference category.
Section 6.3 and 6.4 also found that not all informal employment is associated with a lower level 
of welfare than formal employment. In fact, households headed by informal non-agricultural self- 
employed and informal farmers had higher levels of consumption per equivalent adult and faced a 
lower probability of being poor, than did those headed by formal employees, ceteris paribus. This 
is because extremely low wages in the state sector (which makes up the bulk of formal wage
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employment) and extensive arrears in their payment means that many formal employees are poor. 
Nevertheless, households headed by informal wage employees face the greatest poverty risks of 
any of the employed groups and have lower levels of welfare than those headed by formal 
employees, ceteris paribus. .
Support was also found for the hypothesis that individuals also work informally because they 
cannot afford to be unemployed or inactive and are better off being informally employed. The 
results showed that, ceteris paribus, unemployment and inactivity were associated with lower 
levels of welfare and higher poverty risks than any type of informal employment. Moreover, the 
multivariate analysis revealed that informal employment was associated with a smaller negative 
impact (or a positive impact) on welfare than unemployment or inactivity, ceteris paribus. Again, 
assuming that individuals are utility-maximizing and that they make rational choices, it can be 
concluded that individuals work informally, in part, because they are better off then being 
unemployed or inactive. Section 6.5 will further test the adequacy of formal social protection by 
assessing whether it is successfully targeting the poorest groups in the labour market and section 
6.6, will complement this analysis with an assessment of whether informal networks are 
compensating for the inefficiencies of the formal social protection system.
6.5 LABOUR MARKET STATUS, FORMAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND POVERTY
As discussed extensively in Chapter 1, the absence of economic growth and the inadequate nature 
of the fiscal system have constrained the government’s ability to provide social security. 
However, at the same time, the adverse social consequences that have accompanied the economic 
transformation and re-structuring, have increased the pressure on the social protection system. 
The current formal social protection system (excluding assistance to IDPs) has been reduced to 
(purely symbolic) unemployment and pension benefits and a family allowance for a very small 
vulnerable group, namely non-working pensioners who live alone and have no legal breadwinner 
(se appendix A4.3 for details).
This section explores the relationship between formal social protection and poverty incidence by 
labour market status of the household head. The primary motivation for this examination is to get 
some sense of how well targeted social protection currently is and to inform on the extent to 
which it impacts on poverty risk. It will be particularly interesting to see whether the receipt of 
formal social protection is associated with lower poverty risks for the unemployed and inactive. 
This information will provide further evidence in testing our hypothesis that individuals engage in
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informal labour market activities because they cannot afford to rely on the social protection 
system.
Formal social protection is defined here to include the following state benefits: pensions for the 
elderly, pensions for the disabled, allowance for non-working pensioners living in households 
without a legal breadwinner, student scholarship, allowance for temporary disablement, income 
from social insurance fund, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single parents, child 
allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single pensioners and 
disabled persons. The receipt of formal social protection is constructed as a binary variable and 
the labour market categories are divided on this basis. Thus, no information is used on the 
monetary size of the public transfer but only on whether the household received a transfer or 
not.110 Caution must be exercised when interpreting the findings in such analysis given that the 
causality could run in either direction. In other words, public transfers might be one of the 
determinants of poverty but equally, poverty could determine the receipt of such transfers, 
although social benefits in Georgia are largely untargeted and are not means-tested to any great 
extent.
The poverty statistics used in section 6.2 are used here, namely poverty head count, poverty gap 
and severity by labour market status of the household head depending on whether or not the 
household receives formal social protection. The results are presented in table 6.9. However 
before turning to these results, table 6.8 briefly examines the proportion of households that 
receive formal social protection by labour market status of the head. We see that approximately 
one-half of Georgian households receive formal social protection of one kind or another. Over 
one half of these are headed by individuals that are inactive. Indeed, whereas three quarters of 
inactive-headed households receive formal social protection, we find that only one quarter of 
those headed by the unemployed does. This is a reflection of the inefficiencies of the 
unemployment benefit system discussed above. It also indicates that, although pension benefits 
are extremely low and rarely paid on time, coverage appears to be reasonable.
Another interesting feature of table 6.8 is that 40% of households whose head is engaged in 
informal activity are also recipients of some kind of formal social protection, compared to 37% of 
those whose head is formally employed. This is an indication that households that are collecting 
pension and unemployment benefits are also engaging in informal activities. It also suggests that 
informal activity has not led to the complete alienation of households from the formal social 
protection network. However overall, we see that a high proportion of households headed by
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employed individuals receive formal social protection, particularly if we compare to those headed 
by the unemployed that, as we have seen, are most vulnerable.
Table 6.8 Percentage o f  Household Heads that Receive Formal and Informal Social Protection by
Labour Market Category, 1999
Activity o f Household Head Receive Formal Social Protection Receive Informal Social Protection
All 50.0 31.8
Formal 36.7 24.8
Informal 40.3 21.8
Unemployed 25.7 47.5
Inactive 75.2 43.2
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS1999 and SGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Formal social protection includes: pensions for the elderly, pensions for the disabled, allowance for non-working 
pensioners living in households without a legal breadwinner, student scholarships, allowance for temporary 
disablement, income from social insurance funds, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single parents, child 
allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single pensioners and disabled persons.
(b) Informal social protection includes: alimony, money received from non-family members from abroad, inheritance or 
other money received from relatives, money borrowed from a private source for household needs, and gifts 
(monetary) received from family members temporarily abroad.
Table 6.9 to sheds some light on the effectiveness of the formal social protection system in 
addressing the needs of the more vulnerable groups in society. This table explores the extent to 
which the receipt of formal social protection is associated with lower poverty risks by labour 
market categories of the household head. In other words, it compares the poverty risks for those 
with and without formal protection to see if the receipt of such protection is associated with lower 
poverty risks. This approach does not provide a complete insight into the efficacy of targeting 
since evidence of reduced poverty risks for those in receipt of social protection does not imply 
anything about the well off. For instance, the well off may be as likely to receive social 
protection as the poor but it will not impact on the poverty risk.
As we can see, the poverty risks for households whose heads are employed (both formally and 
informally) are higher amongst those who do not receive formal social protection. Of greater 
interest, however, are the poverty risks of the unemployed and inactive. We see that that the exact 
opposite is true; not only is receipt of formal social protection not associated with lower poverty 
risks, but it is actually associated with higher poverty risks. Whereas 45% of the unemployed and 
40% of the inactive that receive formal social protection are poor, poverty rates for the 
unemployed and inactive that do not receive formal social protection are 39% and 32% 
respectively. Moreover, table 6.9 shows that receipt of formal social protection is also associated 
with higher extreme poverty rates for unemployed and inactive-headed households as well as 
more severe poverty than non-receipt. Although one must be cautious when interpreting these
110 This is recognised as a limitation, however the quality o f  the data on the magnitude o f the transfer was considered to 
be too unreliable to undertake an analysis based on the size o f the transfer.
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results, they would suggest that the poor do benefit from formal social protection, however the 
targeting may not be very effective nor efficient.
Table 6.9 Poverty Measures by Formal Social Protection and Labour Market Categories, 1999
Poverty, in % Extreme Poverty, in %
Head Poverty Poverty Head Poverty Poverty
Count Gap Severity Count Gap Severity
Total 27.4 9.1 4.5 15.3 4.9 2.5
Receive formal social
protection
Formal employment 18.2 5.7 2.7 10.7 3.0 1.4
Informal employment 16.7 4.3 1.9 7.3 2.0 0.9
Unemployed 45.4 13.2 5.3 24.4 5.5 2.1
Inactive 40.2 13.6 6.4 23.7 7.2 3.3
Do not receive formal social
protection
Formal employment 21.4 6.6 3.3 11.1 3.7 2.0
Informal employment 19.4 5.9 2.9 9.3 3.0 1.7
Unemployed 39.2 12.8 5.7 21.7 6.2 2.7
Inactive 32.4 12.3 6.6 19.4 7.5 4.1
Source: Author’s own analysis ofLFS 1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at 2/3 o f median consumption per equivalent adult (0 = 0.75).
(b) Extreme poverty line is set at 'A of median consumption per equivalent adult.
(c) Head Count is die share o f household heads whose consumption falls below the poverty line.
(d) The poverty gap provides information on the distance from the poverty line. It captures the mean aggregate 
consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line across the poor population.
(e) Poverty Severity captures the inequality among the poor by effectively giving more weight to households that are 
further away from the poverty line.
(f) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(g) Formal social protection includes: pensions for the elderly, pensions for the disabled, allowance for non-working 
pensioners living in households without a legal breadwinner, student scholarships, allowance for temporary 
disablement, income from social insurance funds, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single parents, child 
allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single pensioners and disabled persons.
Table 6.10 examines the labour market and social protection composition of consumption 
quintiles. We see that overall, the poorest benefit most from formal social protection, however a 
significant share of the rich also benefit from formal social protection. The share of households 
that receive formal social protection decreases as consumption quintiles increase. Whereas 56% 
of households in the poorest consumption quintile receive formal social protection, this share 
decreases only to 48% for the richest quintile.
The high proportion of richer households receiving formal social protection is mainly accounted 
for by heads over retirement age that receive pension benefits and work at the same time. We see 
from table 6.10 that close to three quarters of the heads in the richest quintile that receive formal 
social protection are employed (either formally or informally). Appendix A6.1 examines in more 
detail the issue of working pensioners and we finds that 80% of pensioners who are employed 
also receive formal social protection.111 In addition, appendix A6.1 reveals that individuals above
111 Note that the fact that working pensioners who also receive a pension appear to make up a large share o f the richer 
households must be interpreted with caution. As discussed in appendix A6.1, the majority of working pensioners are
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retirement age that do not receive a pension are more likely to be employed than those who do, 
ceteris paribus. This further confirms the hypothesis that it is indeed the inadequacy of the 
pension benefit system that is pushing pensioners into employment. Pensioners are employed 
mainly in agriculture and appendix A6.1 shows that, everything else being equal, employment 
amongst pensioners is associated with a significant positive impact on household welfare, 
suggesting that in the absence of adequate pension benefits, agriculture is an important source of 
livelihoods for pensioner households.
Table 6.11 examines the shares of household that receive formal social protection by labour 
market category of the head and consumption quintile. We see that for households whose heads 
are employed (both formally and informally), the proportion in receipt of formal social protection 
increases with consumption quintiles. At the same time, the share of inactive and unemployed that 
receives formal social protection decreases with consumption quintiles. This suggests that an 
important share of individuals above retirement age are collecting pension benefits and 
supplementing their income through formal and informal employment, and that this is particularly 
the case amongst the richer households.
We also see that households headed by the unemployed appear to be less likely to receive formal 
social protection than are those headed by the employed or inactive. Only 28% of the unemployed 
in the poorest quintile and 15% of those in the richest quintile receive formal social protection. In 
contrast, more than one third of the poorest households headed by the (formally and informally) 
employed receive formal social protection and as many as 48% and 43% of those headed by the 
informally and formally employed in the richest quintile do so. The unemployed being by far the 
poorest group in the labour market, these findings suggest that formal social protection is indeed 
ineffective at reaching the poorest. This situation cannot be considered satisfactory, particularly if 
one considers the limited resources available for the provision of social protection.
employed in agriculture and it is unclear whether agricultural employment is associated with higher levels o f welfare or 
whether this is driven by the methodology used to compute aggregate consumption and value consumption o f own- 
production in particular.
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Table 6.10 Consumption Quintiles by Formal Social Protection and Labour Market Categories,
1999
Consumption Quintiles
Poorest 2 3 4 5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receive formal social protection 56.0 55.4 46.6 44.1 48.0
Formal employment 8.4 10.7 13.1 13.3 18.8
Informal employment 4.6 8.9 8.5 11.4 16.0
Unemployed 2.9 2.7 1.8 0.5 0.5
Inactive 40.2 33.2 23.3 18.9 12.8
Do not receive formal social 44.0 44.7 53.4 55.9 52.0
protection 
Formal employment 15.7 20.8 24.1 25.0 24.9
Informal employment 10.0 10.4 15.8 19.7 17.4
Unemployed 7.3 5.4 5.6 2.8 2.8
Inactive 10.9 8.0 7.9 8.4 6.9
Sample size (N)
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Entries refer to the proportions o f the labour market categories in the different quintiles o f the consumption 
distribution.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption.
(c) Formal social protection includes: pensions for the elderly, pensions for the disabled, allowance for non-working 
pensioners living in households without a legal breadwinner, student scholarships, allowance for temporary 
disablement, income from social insurance funds, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single parents, child 
allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single pensioners and disabled persons.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
Table 6.11 Proportion that Receives Formal Social Protection by Labour Market Categories and
Consumption Quintiles, 1999
Poorest 2 3 4 5
Receive formal social 
protection
56.0 55.3 46.6 44.1 48.0
Formal employment 34.9 34.0 35.2 34.7 43.0
Informal employment 31.5 46.1 35.0 36.7 47.9
Unemployed 28.4 33.3 24.3 15.2 15.2
Inactive 78.7 80.6 74.7 69.2 65.0
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Entries refer to the proportions within the labour market category and consumption quintile that receive formal 
social protection.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption.
(c) Formal social protection includes: pensions for the elderly, pensions for the disabled, allowance for non-working 
pensioners living in households without a legal breadwinner, student scholarships, allowance for temporary 
disablement, income from social insurance funds, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single parents, child 
allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single pensioners and disabled persons.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
These findings suggest that although formal social protection is relatively extensive in terms of 
coverage, its accuracy in targeting the poor (or indeed the very poor) appears at least sub-optimal. 
The evidence suggests that the poor targeting implies that many in need (namely the unemployed 
and to some extent the inactive) will not receive support, while many not in need actually receive 
support. The targeting failures appear to be particularly serious in the case of the unemployed.
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6.6 LABOUR MARKET STATUS, POVERTY AND INFORMAL SOCIAL PROTECTION
This section wishes to assess whether informal networks are compensating for the inefficiencies 
of the formal social protection system. As discussed in chapter 2, informal networks were already 
common during the Soviet period and assumed an even greater social role with the demise of 
central planning and the emergence of a poorly developed market system with weak institutions. 
The empirical work of Cox, Eser and Jimenez (Cox, et al. 1997) examined private transfers in 
Russia during the early part of the transition and concluded that they were extensive, responded to 
the correlates of poverty, and had a positive re-distributive effect. Their findings suggest that a 
greater degree of information on need exists within informal systems than can be captured by 
state agencies administering formal systems. This could also be taken to suggest that the informal 
systems have a greater potential for efficacy in reducing poverty.
In order to gain some insight into the extent to which this is the case in Georgia, this section 
explores the coverage of informal social protection by labour market status of the household head, 
and examines the extent to which such protection is associated with poverty risk. A conventional 
problem encountered in regard to private transfers is that, in comparison to public transfers that 
are regular payments, they can be infrequent in nature. The definition of informal social 
protection used here refers to cash transfers received from relatives or friends in the last three 
months. More specifically it includes: alimony, money received from non-family members from 
abroad, inheritance or other money received from relatives, money borrowed from a private 
source for household needs, and monetary gifts received from family members temporarily 
abroad. The motives for the private transfers are not recorded. In-kind transfers (food and non­
food gifts) are not included here as these are more likely to capture barter exchange activity 
between households than informal social protectipn. However they are included in appendix A6.2 
(table A6.9) and show that even when in-kind transfers are included, results are robust. Finally, as 
with the analysis of formal social protection, a binary variable for whether a household received 
an informal transfer or not is used, and information on the size distribution of the transfer is not 
exploited.112
Returning to table 6.8, we see that just under one third of all households in Georgia receive some 
form of informal social protection. If in-kind transfers are included, then some 54% of households 
receive informal transfers. Although a similar share of households headed by the formally and the 
informally employed receive informal transfers (the share is slightly higher for the formally
1,2 Again this is due to the questionable quality of the data on size o f transfers.
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employed), we see that households headed by the unemployed benefit the most from informal 
transfers. This is in sharp contrast to formal social protection, which benefited mostly the 
employed. Thus, whereas 48% of the unemployed receive informal social protection, only 22% of 
the informally employed and 25% of the formally employed do so. These findings suggest that 
informal transfers are indeed making up for the deficiencies of the formal unemployment benefit 
system. Table 6.8 also shows that the inactive, three-quarters of who receive formal social 
protection, also rely considerably on informal transfers, with 43% of inactive headed households 
receiving some form of informal social protection. This also suggests that pension benefits are 
insufficient to meet basic needs and that inactive-headed households rely on informal transfers to 
make ends meet. The contrast with employed-headed households provides further evidence for 
this claim.
Table 6.12 presents poverty rates for each of the four possible labour market categories of the 
head of household and compares those in receipt o f informal social protection and those that are 
not. Again, caution must be exercised when interpreting these results since, as with formal 
transfers, the causality could run either way and therefore the potential endogeneity makes 
inferences extremely difficult. We see that the receipt of informal transfers does not appear to be 
associated with lower poverty risks. Indeed, if anything, the poverty risks are slightly higher for 
those who receive informal social protection for all categories. This is resonant of the findings 
noted for formal social protection. The poverty rate for households headed by the unemployed 
who receive informal transfers is 45% compared to 37% for those who do not. This could be an 
indication that informal social protection is somewhat effective at targeting the poorest. However, 
as previously noted extreme caution must be taken when interpreting these results. If we look at 
extreme poverty rates we find that for households headed by the unemployed, there is little 
difference in poverty risks across the protection boundary.
Receiving informal social protection is also associated with higher poverty risks for households 
headed by the formally employed, and particularly for those that are below the extreme poverty 
line. Whereas 15% of households who are headed by the formally employed and receive informal 
social protection are ‘extreme’ poor, only 10% of those that do not receive informal transfers are 
‘extreme’ poor. As previously discussed, the formally employed are likely to be public wage 
employees facing extremely low wages and arrears, who rely on informal networks of friends and 
family to make ends meet.
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Table 6.12 Poverty Measures by Informal Social Protection and Labour Market Categories, 1999
Poverty, in % Extreme Poverty, in %
Head Poverty Poverty Head Poverty Poverty
Count Gap severity Count Gap severity
Total 27.4 9.1 4.5 15.3 4.9 2.5
Receive informal social
protection
Formal employment 25.0 7.9 3.7 14.5 4.2 1.9
Informal employment 20.4 6.1 2.9 9.4 3.1 1.6
Unemployed 45.4 13.9 5.9 21.8 6.1 2.7
Inactive 38.4 13.4 6.5 22.1 7.3 3.4
Do not receive informal
social protection
Formal employment 18.6 5.7 2.9 9.8 3.1 1.7
Informal employment 17.7 5.1 2.4 8.2 2.4 1.3
Unemployed 36.7 11.9 5.3 23.0 6.0 2.5
Inactive 38.1 13.2 6.5 23.0 7.2 3.5
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at 2/3 of median consumption per equivalent adult (8 = 0.75).
(b) Extreme poverty line is set at lA of median consumption per equivalent adult.
(c) Head Count is die share of household heads whose consumption falls below the poverty line.
(d) The poverty gap provides information on the distance from the poverty line. It captures the mean aggregate 
consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line across the poor population.
(e) Poverty Severity captures the inequality among the poor by effectively giving more weight to households that are 
further away from the poverty line.
(f) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(g) Informal social protection includes: alimony, money received from non-family members from abroad, inheritance or 
other money received from relatives, money borrowed from a private source for household needs, and gifts 
(monetary) received from family members temporarily abroad.
Table 6.13 looks at households who receive informal social protection by labour market status of 
the household head and consumption quintiles. We see that overall, the poor benefit the most 
from informal transfers. Thus, 39% of households in the poorest quintile receive informal 
transfers whereas only 24% of those in the richest quintile do. The information in this table is 
used to calculate the shares of households that receive informal social protection by labour market 
status of the head and consumption quintiles. These shares are presented in table 6.14. We see that 
contrary to formal social protection, informal social protection appears to effectively target the 
poorest no matter what the labour market status of the household head. The shares of households 
receiving informal social protection decrease steadily as consumption quintiles increase. This is in 
contrast to the receipt of formal social protection, which saw the share of employed households 
receiving formal social protection increasing with consumption quintiles. We also see that the 
targeting appears to be most effective for households headed by the unemployed, as the share that 
receives informal social protection almost halves between the poorest and richest quintiles.
Finally, table 6.14 shows that the share of inactive-headed households that receive informal 
transfers remains relatively constant throughout the distribution at around 41% to 44%. This could 
indicate that households headed by pensioners are more likely to receive informal transfers from 
other family members regardless of their level of welfare. It could be a wider reflection of social
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norms and the responsibility that the extended family has to ‘take care’ of the elder members of 
the family.
Table 6.13 Consumption Quintiles by Informal Social Protection and Labour Market Categories,
1999
Poorest 2
Consumption Quintiles 
3 4 5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receive informal social 39.4 35.7 29.4 30.1 24.4
protection
Formal employment 7.9 8.1 7.1 10.2 10.1
Informal employment 3.6 5.3 5.7 7.0 5.3
Unemployed 5.5 3.7 3.9 1.4 0.9
Inactive 22.5 18.8 12.9 11.5 8.0
Do not receive informal social 60.6 64.3 70.6 70.0 75.6
protection
Formal employment 16.2 23.4 30.0 28.0 33.6
Informal employment 11.1 14.0 18.7 24.2 28.1
Unemployed 4.7 4.4 3.6 2.0 2.4
Inactive 28.6 22.4 18.3 15.8 11.6
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Entries refer to the proportions o f the labour market categories in the different quintiles o f the consumption
distribution.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption.
(c) Informal social protection includes: alimony, money received from non-family members from abroad, inheritance or 
other money received from relatives, money borrowed from a private source for household needs, and gifts 
(monetary) received from family members temporarily abroad.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition
Table 6.14 Proportion Receiving Informal Social Protection by Labour Market Category and
Consumption Quintile, 1999
Poorest 2 3 4 5
Receive informal social 
protection
39.4 35.7 29.4 30.1 24.4
Formal employment 32.8 25.7 19.1 26.7 23.1
Informal employment 24.5 27.5 23.4 22.4 15.9
Unemployed 53.9 45.7 52.0 41.2 27.3
Inactive 44.0 45.6 41.3 42.1 40.8
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Entries refer to the proportions within the labour market category and consumption quintile that receive informal
social protection.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption.
(c) Informal social protection includes: alimony, money received from non-family members from abroad, inheritance or 
other money received from relatives, money borrowed from a private source for household needs, and gifts 
(monetary) received from family members temporarily abroad.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
It would appear that the informal networks that developed during the Soviet period are very much 
alive today. Approximately one third of households in Georgia rely on some form of informal 
monetary transfers from friends and family. Moreover, informal social protection appears to be 
more effective at targeting the most vulnerable groups in the labour market (more specifically the
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inactive and unemployed). In particular, for households headed by the unemployed, informal 
social protection appears to be making up for the serious deficiencies of the formal unemployment 
benefit system.
6.7 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has aimed to gain some insight into why informal employment is so widespread in 
Georgia and into whether it is providing a social safety net. More specifically, it has produced 
evidence that is consistent with the view that, in general, individuals work informally (a) because 
there are no formal alternatives and (b) because of the inadequacy of the formal social protection 
system, which means that they cannot afford to be unemployed or inactive.
To this end, this chapter examined the relationship between economic activity of the household 
head and household welfare. It was specifically interested in assessing (1) whether the labour 
market status of the household head, was a significant determinant of household welfare, ceteris 
paribus', (2) whether informal employment was associated with greater poverty risks and lower 
levels of welfare than formal employment, ceteris paribus', (3) whether unemployment and 
inactivity were associated with particularly high poverty risks and whether informal employment 
decreased poverty risks and increased household welfare relative to unemployment and inactivity, 
ceteris paribus', and (4) the extent to which formal social protection was effectively targeting the 
poor in the labour market and the extent to which informal networks were compensating for the 
possible inefficiencies of the formal social protection system.
With respect to these questions, the findings showed that first, the welfare of the households 
depends on the labour market status of the head, ceteris paribus. More specifically, it was found 
that inactivity and unemployment are associated with very high poverty risks, while employment 
(both formal and informal) significantly reduces the risk of being poor, ceteris paribus. This 
chapter therefore deduced that employment is an important means of escaping poverty.
Second, the findings show that, in general, informal employment is associated with lower levels 
of welfare and greater poverty risks than formal employment. The results showed that for every 
category of employment (employee, non-agricultural self-employed, farmer), being informally 
employed was associated with higher poverty risks than being formally employed. Moreover, the 
multivariate analysis revealed that the positive impact on household welfare of the formal 
employment categories was always stronger than was the impact of the corresponding informal 
employment category. These findings suggest that, everything else being equal, informal
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employment is associated with lower welfare and a greater level of poverty than formal 
employment.
Third, the results showed that inactivity and unemployment are associated with the highest 
poverty risks of any labour market group and that their poverty is almost twice as severe. 
Moreover, the multivariate analysis revealed that, ceteris paribus, unemployment and inactivity 
were associated with lower levels of welfare and higher poverty risks than any type of informal 
employment, thereby suggesting that individuals are better off being informally employed than 
they are relying on the social protection system.
Fourth, this conclusion was confirmed by the analysis of formal social protection, which showed 
that it is ineffective at targeting the poorest groups in the labour market (namely the unemployed 
and inactive). The poor targeting implies that many of those in need (particularly the unemployed) 
are not receiving support, while many not in need (the employed both formally and informally) 
are actually receiving support. Indeed results show that amongst households headed by the 
employed, the richest quintile receives the highest share of formal social protection. Although 
formal social protection seems to be reasonably effective at targeting the inactive, as three 
quarters of inactive-headed households receive some type of formal transfer, the extremely low 
levels of pensions, and very high poverty rates for inactive-headed households indicate that many 
are forced to work to survive. Indeed it was found that 80% of pensioners who receive pension 
benefits also worked, and that employed pensioners were less likely to be poor than those who 
were not employed, ceteris paribus. In contrast, it was found that informal transfers do protect the 
most vulnerable groups in the labour market, and particularly the unemployed.
Together these findings suggest that the low level of social benefits, the extensive arrears in their 
payment and the poor targeting of the benefit system, imply that individuals cannot afford to be 
unemployed or inactive, and that, everything else being equal, they are better off working 
informally. They also suggest that, ceteris paribus, individuals are better off being formally 
employed. If one assumes that individuals are utility maximising and that they make rational 
choices, then it can be concluded that those working informally do so because there is no formal 
alternative and because they cannot afford to be unemployed or inactive.
This chapter has also revealed some other interesting findings. Although overall informality is 
associated with lower welfare levels, not all types of informal employment are associated with a 
lower level of welfare than formal employment. In fact, households headed by informal non- 
agricultural self-employed and informal farmers had higher levels of consumption per equivalent 
adult and faced a lower probability of being poor, than did those headed by formal employees,
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ceteris paribus. This is because extremely low wages in the state sector (which makes up the bulk 
of formal wage employment) and extensive arrears in their payment means that many formal 
employees are poorer than most other groups in the labour market. Nevertheless, households 
headed by informal wage employees face the greatest poverty risks of any of the employed groups 
and have lower levels of welfare than those headed by formal employees, ceteris paribus. .
The examination of the role of human capital in determining household welfare found that there 
are considerable returns to education, particularly in urban areas where they are especially 
significant for those at the bottom end of the consumption distribution. As regards the 
relationship between type of employment and household welfare, this chapter also found that 
although agriculture is associated with considerable underemployment, it is an important source 
of livelihoods. The results show that formal farming is associated with lower poverty rates than 
other labour market activities and that the share of households headed by formal farmers increases 
with consumption quintiles. Moreover, it was found that agricultural employment is an important 
coping strategy for the inactive as it reduces the risk of poverty for inactive-headed households by 
almost one quarter. However these findings must be interpreted with caution, as they could be 
influenced by the methodology used to value consumption of own-production, particularly since 
agricultural employment is limited to very small-plots (0.75 ha. on average). Further research is 
necessary to draw robust conclusions regarding the role o f agriculture in reducing poverty risks in 
Georgia. It can however be concluded that there are considerable discrepancies between the wage 
and self-employed in agriculture, with the wage-employed facing a 50% higher poverty risk than 
the self-employed.
Overall this chapter suggests that as a result of the economic collapse and the slow economic 
recovery, which have resulted in a severe contraction of formal employment opportunities and 
provision of social protection, individuals engage in informal labour market activity to survive. 
Informal employment has been found to be significantly associated with poverty and a lower level 
of welfare than formal employment. Therefore this chapter does not find support for the claim that 
informal activities could represent an important source of government revenue and, for the most 
part, nor does it find support for the claim that informal activities are potential capitalist 
enterprises. This chapter has shown that informal labour market activity can largely be 
characterised as survival activities undertaken in the absence of formal employment opportunities 
and an adequate social protection system.
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7CONCLUSIONS
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This thesis provides the first in depth study of poverty and the labour market in Georgia, as well 
as the first analysis of the scale and nature of the country’s informal labour market. It is also the 
first piece of research to analyse the Georgian Labour Force Survey data and provides the first 
comprehensive review of ‘informal sector’ literature, which spans developing, western 
industrialised, socialist and transition countries. In doing so, this thesis has made three significant 
contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, it has developed a new conceptual 
framework for the study of informal labour market activity in transition countries, which 
distinguishes it from other types of untaxed, unregulated and/or unmeasured activities (i.e. illegal, 
underground and household activities). Second, it has demonstrated that one reason why the 
increase in open unemployment did not match the collapse in output, which accompanied the 
beginning of transition in Georgia was, in part, because of a transfer of labour into informal 
employment. Third, it showed that in the absence of formal employment and adequate social 
protection, informal labour market activity provides a social safety net in Georgia.
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 begins by briefly reviewing the 
research questions and hypotheses, and by recalling the motivations for the research. Section 7.2 
then outlines how the thesis has answered these questions, and the limits of those answers. 
Section 7.3 highlights the major findings and conclusions, while section 7.4 discusses their 
implications for policy. Finally, section 7.5 examines how the findings of this research contribute 
to the existing debate on the informal sector and section 7.6 highlights what the implications are 
for a future research agenda.
7.1. MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH: WHAT WERE THE MAIN QUESTIONS
AND HYPOTHESES?
At the beginning of the 1990s, following the collapse of the socialist systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many analysts predicted that 
unemployment would be a key adjustment mechanism in the transition to a market economy. 
They argued that a pool of unemployed would be needed in order to have enough labor to fill the 
new jobs. Models of the transition process, like that of Aghion and Blanchard (1993), predicted 
that the restructuring process would lead to a fall in employment and an increase in open 
unemployment. As private firms would grow, they would draw from the pool of unemployed and 
power economic growth. Eventually workers would be pulled directly out of the state sector into 
private enterprises (Aghion and Blanchard 1993).
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Although this has been the experience of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the 
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the dramatic falls in output were not 
matched by equally significant falls in employment and even less so by increases in 
unemployment. One explanation presented for the lack of correlation between unemployment and 
restructuring has been labour hoarding (see for example Commander, S, et al. 1996; Commander, 
Simon and Tolstopiatenko 1997; Evans-Klock and Samorodov 1998; Layard and Richter 1995). 
Another explanation, supported largely by evidence in Hungary and Russia, has been that private 
firms have recruited directly from the state sector, (see Clarke 1999a; Commander, S and 
Yemtsov 1995; Layard and Richter 1995).
This thesis asked whether, in Georgia, the increase in open unemployment matched the scale of 
the collapse in output and set forth the hypothesis that it did not, in part, because labour shifted 
into informal employment. The second hypothesis concerned the motivation for the shift into 
informal employment, namely that the unexpected scale of the collapse in output crippled the 
government’s ability to provide social security and led to a contraction of formal employment 
opportunities, leaving individuals with no alternative but to generate income through informal 
labour market activities. The thesis set out to assess the validity of these two hypotheses and to 
answer some related questions, namely: What do we mean by informal employment/informal 
sector and how can we measure it? What are the implications for social and economic 
development and what, if anything should be done about it? It also sought to contribute to some of 
the existing debates in the literature, including whether the informal sector undermines 
government revenue, whether the main cause of the informal sector is poverty or excess 
regulation, whether there exists a dualistic relationship between the formal and informal sectors 
(i.e. a poor/informal sector vs. a rich/formal sector), and whether the informal sector is a 
transitory phenomenon, which will disappear with the creation of a market economy.
7.2 HOW HAS THIS THESIS AIMED TO ADDRESS THESE QUESTIONS AND WHAT
WERE THE LIMITATIONS?
First, in order to understand what the informal sector is, chapter 2 reviewed existing literature on 
the informal (‘shadow’, ‘black’, ‘underground’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘hidden’, ‘irregular’, 
‘subterranean’, ‘parallel’) economy in developing, western industrialised, socialist and transition 
countries. This literature review revealed that in transition countries, the term ‘informal sector’ 
has been used by researchers to define their own particular area of interest without building on the 
extensive body of research on the definition of the informal sector that exists in developing, 
western industrialised and socialist countries. The result is that the term has been used to define a
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wide range of activities, which have little in common with one another, from subsistence farming 
to drug trafficking and barter trade.
Second, in order to examine the informal sector, chapter 3 developed a new conceptual 
framework that distinguishes informal activities from other ‘hidden’ economic activities, namely 
illegal, underground and household activities. This conceptual definition of the informal sector 
was operationalised and a typology of informal employment was developed for transition 
countries. Informal employment is comprised of: (1) self-employed in household enterprises; (2) 
self-employed on urban or unregistered rural plots of land; (3) unpaid contributing family 
workers; (4) wage employees working on the basis of oral agreements; (5) secondary job holders 
with formal primary jobs and informal secondary jobs.
The research was based on the quantitative analysis of the Georgian Labour Force Survey data 
(1998, 1999) and the Survey of Georgian Households (1998, 1999). I constructed a number of 
standard labour market variables as well as informal employment variables for each of the above 
types of informal employment. Chapter 4 and 5 then used descriptive statistics to analyse the 
characteristics of the labour market as well as the scale and characteristics of formal and informal 
employment. Multivariate regression analysis was used to analyse the determinants of different 
types of informal employment and of poor labour market outcomes (unemployment, 
underemployment and long-term unemployment).
In order to analyse the relationships between informal employment and poverty, chapter 6 
presented estimates of a number of poverty statistics, namely the head-count index, poverty gap 
and poverty severity and analysed the poverty profile by labour force status of the household 
head. It also computed consumption quintiles by labour force status of the household head. A 
variety of multivariate regression techniques were then used (namely OLS, probit and quantile 
regression) to examine in detail the relationship between household welfare and labour force 
status of the household head, while controlling for a variety of other household characteristics. 
Finally, I also constructed two binary social protection variables, for receipt of formal and 
informal social protection respectively, and examined both the poverty profiles and distribution 
by consumption quintiles for each type of social protection by labour force status of the household 
head.
A number of interesting and important issues could not be fully addressed because of 
methodological and data limitations. First, I was unable to examine one very interesting aspect of 
informal labour market activity, namely ‘left-hand work', due to a lack of data on such activities. 
Left-hand work refers to the earning of unofficial income at the formal workplace (see chapter 3).
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that this type of informal activity, which was very common during 
the Soviet period, is still widespread in Georgia. However, neither the LFS, nor the SGH had 
questions that would have enabled the identification of such activities in the data.
Second, the lack of information on the motivation for informal labour market activity has posed 
some similar limitations. Since the LFS and SGH do not collect direct information on why 
individuals engage in the type of activity they do, the operationalisation of the informal sector 
definition (chapter 3) had to be based on assumptions as to which activities are undertaken to 
meet basic needs (informal activities) and which are undertaken to deliberately avoid the payment 
of taxes or regulations (underground activities). Moreover, it also meant that chapter 6 had to 
assume that individuals are utility-maximizing and that they make rational choices in order to 
conclude that they engage in informal labour market activity because there is no formal 
alternative and because the social security system in inadequate. If the surveys had provided 
information on the motivation for type of employment, such as ‘can’t get a formal job’ and ‘can’t 
live off unemployment benefits’ for instance, then the argument regarding the role of the informal 
labour market activity as a social safety net would have been strengthened.
Third, due to the lack of reliable data on incomes, and particularly wages, I was not able to 
examine the relationship between wages and informal employment. The quality of data on 
incomes is questionable both because of low response rate and the underreporting of incomes 
(particularly in the case of the self-employed), but also because the arrears in the payment of 
wages means that questions regarding last months wages may not fully capture actual wages 
received. This can be because, for instance, individuals may report their official wage, despite not 
having been paid in the last month, or they may report the full amount received, after having been 
paid 6 months worth of wages all at once. This meant that I was not able to examine whether 
informal employment is a significant determinant of low wages. I did however examine whether 
the wage in the primary sector was a significant determinant of secondary jobholding but 
highlighted that results must be interpreted with extreme caution, given the unreliability of wage 
data.
A fourth (and related) limitation was posed by the fact that, as with all analysis of poverty and 
labour market activity, consumption data is provided at the household level while labour force 
data is provided at the individual level. This means that assumptions have to be made about intra­
household distribution of resources and about economies of scale in order to derive an estimate of 
individual welfare. It also implies that any analysis of the relationship between labour force status 
and welfare must control for household characteristics, and particularly for the labour force status 
of other members within the household. This has meant that the focus of the analysis had to be
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changed from the labour market status of the individual in chapters 4 and 5 to that of the head of 
household in chapter 6, in order to analyse the relationship with poverty.113 This partially distorts 
the picture, as the head of household’s labour force status may be different from that of the other 
members of the household and means that conclusions could not be drawn on the direct impact of 
labour force status on poverty, and that inferences could only be made on the impact of labour 
force status of the household head.
7.3 MAJOR FINDINGS
The empirical analysis has resulted in some significant findings, which can be summarised in five 
main points:
1. Open unemployment did not match the scale of the collapse in output because the decline 
in output led to a fiscal crisis, which squeezed social spending and meant that individuals 
could not afford to be unemployed.
2. At the same time, state employment declined but there was very little growth in private 
sector firms capable absorbing the labour shed from the state sector.
3. With limited formal job creation and no adequate social benefits, labour shifted, in part, 
into informal employment. The informal sector thus provides a social safety net.
4. Another reason why open unemployment did not increase is that, given the inadequacy of 
social benefits, all individuals must engage in some form of economic activity, no matter 
for how little, in order to survive, resulting in considerable underemployment.
5. The informal sector is also associated with some detrimental consequences for Georgia’s 
social and economic development: It is contributing to deskilling the Georgian labour 
force, it risks further marginalizing certain vulnerable groups and its concentration 
amongst ethnic minorities and underprivileged regions could contribute to undermining 
Georgia’s stability.
Each of these five points will be discussed in turn.
1. Open unemployment did not match the scale o f  the collapse in output because the decline 
in output led to a fiscal crisis, which squeezed social spending and meant that individuals 
could not afford to be unemployed.
113 Note that, I also examined the impact o f the number of formally employed, informally employed, unemployed and 
inactive individuals in the household on household welfare and found that results based on the household head were 
robust. I chose to focus on the head o f household, as households in Georgia are very small and therefore the number of 
individuals in each labour force category is less significant (mean size is 3 individuals).
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Between 1989 and 1995, Georgia’s output fell by more than 70% and gross domestic investment 
decreased to just 3% of GDP (World Bank 1997, p.174-176; 2004, p.l). Chapter 4 found that, 
contrary to expectations; open unemployment did not increase proportionally. By 1999 open 
unemployment had increased to only 15% of the labour force. The scale of the decline in output 
resulted in an enormous contraction of tax revenue and crippled the Government’s ability to 
provide social security. In 1999, tax revenue was just 14% of GDP (EBRD 1999, p. 168), one of 
the lowest levels in the world, and the majority went to servicing external debt, which absorbs 
60% of total government revenue (World Bank 2004, p. 11). As a result, unemployment and 
pension benefits, if paid at all, were absolutely inadequate, amounting to only 11% of the 
minimum consumption basket. In addition, the system was marred by considerable arrears and 
only a small fraction of the unemployed actually receive benefits (IMF 2001, p.51-52).
Consequently, the unemployed and inactive face the highest poverty risks of any group in the 
labour market. Chapter 6 revealed that having an unemployed or inactive head of household had a 
strong significant positive impact on the probability of being poor, ceteris paribus. Households 
headed by the unemployed had not only the highest poverty rates but also by far the most severe. 
Moreover, the targeting of the formal social projection system was found to be poor, as many of 
those in need (particularly the unemployed) did not receive support, while many not in need (the 
employed) did.114
2 At the same time, state employment declined but there was very little growth in private sector 
firms capable absorbing the labour shedfrom the state sector.
Although there has been a significant reallocation of labour form the state to the private sector, 
this thesis found that growth in private sector employment was largely limited to subsistence 
agriculture and small-scale informal activities. Whereas in 1990, the state accounted for 86% of 
total employment (EUROSTAT 1996a, p.40), the results show that in 1999 only 35% of all 
employed worked for the state. However, we find that more than 90% of all private sector 
employment was accounted for by small-scale informal activities and own-account workers in 
small-plot agriculture. Moreover, there was virtually no creation of small enterprises capable of 
generating employment. It was found that in 1999, only 2% of the self-employed had employees.
114 In contrast, chapter 6 found that informal transfers do protect the most vulnerable groups in the labour market, and 
particularly the unemployed. The results shows that approximately one third o f households in Georgia rely on some 
form o f informal monetary transfers from friends and family. Informal social protection was found to be more effective 
at targeting the most vulnerable groups, particularly the unemployed and the inactive.
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As far as larger private enterprises are concerned, the results showed that less than 30% of wage 
employees worked in the private sector and the large majority (70%) worked informally, on the 
basis of precarious oral agreements. These findings seriously question the success of the transition 
process and of transition models that predicted that privatisation and restructuring would result in 
the creation of a private sector capable of absorbing the labour shed by the state sector and of 
being the driving force behind economic growth.
Why has restructuring failed (so far) to create private firms capable o f generating employment? 
This question goes well beyond the scope of this thesis, however some possible explanations have 
been mentioned, not least was the disruption of inter-republican trade links, which resulted in a 
sudden loss of markets for both inputs and outputs. Under the centrally planned system, most 
enterprises produced intermediate and capital goods and had a single buyer for their output and a 
single supplier for their inputs. Moreover, given the focus on very large enterprises, there was 
little diversification of production within republics so that after independence, the economies of 
newly independent states such as Georgia, were suddenly reliant on a few gigantic enterprises. 
Following the dismantlement of trade links, enterprises found they were unable to find new 
trading partners, as many of the intermediate goods they produced were of no use to western 
markets and their quality did not meet world standards. Moreover, new marketing channels could 
not be established over-night, especially in the highly competitive international market. In 
addition, given the weakness of Georgia’s economy and the unstable security situation, 
investment (and particularly foreign direct investment) has been very limited. The weak banking 
sector, complicated legal and bureaucratic hurdles and pervasive corruption have done anything to 
facilitate the growth of the private sector.
3. With limited formal job creation and no adequate social benefits, labour shifted, in part, into 
informal employment. The informal sector thus provides a social safety net.
This thesis has shown that, in general, individuals work informally because there is no formal 
alternative and because they are better off than being unemployed or inactive. It found that 
informal employment is associated with higher poverty risks than formal employment, ceteris 
paribus. For any category of employment, individuals who are informally employed are more 
likely to be poor than are those who are formally employed, everything else being equal. At the 
same time, informal employment significantly decreases the risk of poverty with respect to 
unemployment and inactivity, ceteris paribus. Building on utility theory and the theory of rational 
choice, I assumed that individuals are utility-maximizing and that they make rational choices and 
deduced that, on average, individuals work informally because there is no formal alternative and
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because it is better than being unemployed or inactive. I therefore conclude that the informal 
sector is indeed providing a social safety net.
The majority of Georgia’s employment was found to be informal. In 1999, 52% of the employed 
(or almost 1 million people) worked informally, and if agricultural workers are excluded, then 
34% were found to be informally employed. Of all the informally employed, roughly 17% were 
self-employed, 59% were unpaid contributing family workers, and 14% were wage employees 
working on the basis of temporary and/or oral agreements. We also found that, given the 
extremely low wages in the state sector, approximately 8% of the informally employed were wage 
employees with formal primary jobs and an informal secondary job. The remaining 2% were 
others informally employed, working on a casual basis or in typical informal activities.
While it is likely that this represents a considerable increase in the scale of informal employment 
in Georgia with respect to the pre-transition period, its growth cannot be measured due to lack of 
comparable data. Nevertheless, the literature relates that although secondary employment was 
widespread during the Soviet period, the vast majority of primary employment was formal (state) 
employment, suggesting that the share of informal primary employment has grown considerably.
4. Another reason why open unemployment did not increase is that, given the inadequacy o f  
social benefits, all individuals must engage in some form o f  economic activity, no matter for  
how little, in order to survive, resulting in considerable underemployment.
Chapter 4 argued that there are a number of reasons to suspect that unemployment may be 
underestimated and that there may be considerable underemployment (working less than normal 
hours) in Georgia. First, the Government has chosen to apply the international *one-hour- 
employment-criterion ’ to a one-week reference period, which implies that anyone working for at 
least one hour during the reference week is considered employed. Given the inadequacy of 
unemployment and pension benefits, a significant share of the population engages in both formal 
and informal agriculture to meet basic needs. If they work for more than one hour, they are 
considered self-employed. Thus, only 4% of the rural labour force is unemployed. Second, the 
findings showed high and increasing rates of inactivity, particularly for youth and females in 
childbearing age, which could be an indication that, having lost hope of finding a job, individuals 
drop out of the labour force altogether - thereby further disguising the true level of 
unemployment. Third, there is evidence of continued labour hoarding in the form of reduced 
working hours, unpaid leave and reduced real wages particularly in manufacturing and municipal 
infrastructure services.
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Taking account of all those working less than normal working hours, it was found that over one 
half of the labour force is underemployed. Compounding the underemployed and unemployed 
suggests that as much as 67% of the labour resources were left unused in the Georgian economy 
in 1999. This indicates that there is a ‘pool’ not of unemployed, but of underemployed, on which 
the growing private sector could potentially draw to power economic growth.
5. The informal sector is also associated with some detrimental consequences for Georgia's 
social and economic development: It is contributing to deskilling the Georgian labour force, 
it risks further marginalizing certain vulnerable groups, and its concentration amongst 
ethnic minorities and underprivileged regions could contribute to undermining Georgia's 
stability.
First, this thesis showed that although the Georgian labour force has high levels of educational 
attainment and there are significant returns to education, it is quickly losing its skills and existing 
skills are becoming obsolete.
On the one hand, the Georgian labour force was found to be highly educated relative to the EU-15 
for instance, and higher education was found to be associated with a lower probability of 
unemployment, ceteris paribus. On the other, more than one third of the employed with higher 
education worked in agriculture and low-skilled informal activities. After more than ten years, 
there is a risk that many may have already lost their skills. At the same time, those who have not 
lost their skills may find that their skills have become obsolete in the new market economy. This 
thesis argued that, given the state of Georgia’s economy, its human capital is one of its principal 
assets and that unless this trend is reversed, there is a risk it will be entirely eroded. This could 
present an obstacle to economic growth, as there may be insufficient workers with adequate skills 
to support the growing private sector. With an unskilled workforce and a large informal and 
agricultural sector, Georgia’s economy would resemble more that of a developing country than 
that of a developed market economy, with all the implications in terms of poverty, vulnerability 
and limited economic growth.
Second, this thesis found that informal employment is strongly associated with certain vulnerable 
groups in Georgian society. Females, youth, individuals with lower educational attainment, ethnic 
minorities and individuals living in depressed regions were all more likely to be informally 
employed, ceteris paribus. This is worrying as these groups face a multitude of other 
vulnerabilities as well, including a greater risk of unemployment, underemployment and long­
term unemployment.
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The results concerning youth are particularly worrying; they suggest that youth are being 
marginalized from the formal labour market. The analysis showed that relative to middle-aged 
workers, youth (aged 15 to 24) were significantly more likely to be working informally, ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, it found evidence that, having lost hope of finding a job, some youth were 
dropping out of the labour market altogether. It was highlighted that these results do not include 
students; these are young people that are either working full time or are without work and actively 
looking for work.
These findings raise serious concerns regarding the country’s future human capital stock and 
economic development. By being unemployed or working in low-skilled informal jobs, Georgian 
youth, who still have a high level of education relative to the European counterparts, are quickly 
losing their skills. This has damaging implications for living standards and economic growth, 
since, as has been argued above, there may not be sufficient skilled workers to fill the new private 
sector jobs as well as to run the country’s administration, health and education systems. 
Furthermore, since we found that, ceteris paribus, both unemployment and informal employment 
were strongly associated with lower levels of welfare, there is a risk that poverty will increase and 
deepen as these individuals continue to be excluded from the formal labour market, placing even 
greater demands on the limited resources of the state and further dampening economic growth.
This thesis also found that certain types of informal employment were associated with a 
considerable degree of gender inequality. Amongst the self-employed and farmers, females were 
more likely to be working informally than males, ceteris paribus, although gender was not a 
significant determinant of informal employment amongst wage employees. These findings 
suggest a degree of marginalisation of females in the labour market, which is confirmed by some 
of the other results: females were more likely to be underemployed, ceteris paribus; they are over­
represented in semi-skilled positions (80% of clerks are females) and under-represented in senior 
positions (only 32% of managers are females), and; females (particularly those in childbearing 
age) were increasingly inactive as a result of the break-down of child-care facilities that had been 
previously widely available.
The results reflect those of other research that suggests that transition has been accompanied by a 
reversal of the gender equality that had been achieved (at least in the public sphere) by the 
socialist system and a return to a more traditional division of gender roles in the Georgian labour 
market. Dourglishvili (1997), for instance, has argued that the gender equality achieved in the 
public sphere by the socialist system actually left the patriarchal, male-dominated family structure 
untouched. These findings suggest this traditional division of roles that exists within the 
household is being extended to the public sphere.
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Finally, this thesis revealed that individuals with lower education also face a risk of being 
marginalized from the formal labour market. Individuals with less than higher education were 
significantly more likely to work as informal employees, informal self-employed, and 
contributing family workers than were those with higher education, ceteris paribus. Indeed, it was 
suggested that there is a sort of ‘capture’ of the formal sector by individuals with higher 
education, both because of the higher qualifications and the social network that higher education 
confers; two important prerequisites for obtaining formal jobs. The findings showed that formal 
wage employment is almost entirely limited to jobs in public administration, education and health, 
for which higher education is required. Similarly, given the bureaucratic obstacles and corruption 
associated with the private sector, formal self-employment is limited to a small group of highly 
educated and highly connected individuals who have the network required to establish and 
operate businesses in Georgia. In this context, the danger is that individuals with lower education 
will only have access to informal employment opportunities that, as we have seen, are associated 
with lower levels of welfare.
Third, the findings suggest a segmentation of the labour market along ethnic and regional lines, 
which could have negative, repercussions on Georgia’s stability.
All things being equal, non-Georgians were significantly more likely to be informally employed 
than Georgians were, ceteris paribus. Formal employment (not only wage employment, but 
farming and self-employment as well) seems to be limited to ethnic Georgians. Ethnic identity 
was revealed to be the most frequently significant variable in determining informality. These 
findings reflect those of other studies that highlight the lack of integration between Georgians and 
other ethnic groups (see for example Dourglishvili 1997). These results suggest that individuals 
from ethnic minorities may not have access to the social network and ‘connections’ that are 
required to establish formal enterprises or obtain formal public sector jobs.
Informality was also found to be significantly associated with certain regions. In particular, 
everything else being equal, residing in western Georgia, (Imereti, Samegrelo or Guria) 
significantly increased the probability of informal farming, contributing family work and 
secondary job holding. Thanks to the extensive tea and citrus fruit plantations, these regions had 
amongst the highest standards of living during the Soviet period. However, following the break up 
of collective and state farms and the war in Abkhazia, which resulted in the influx of tens of 
thousands of refugees, this region has suffered one of the sharpest falls in economic activity. The 
findings show that as a result there are few formal employment opportunities and households rely 
on subsistence farming for a living. The regional analysis also revealed that Samtskhe-Javakheti is
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associated with a significant increase in the probability of informal farming and secondary job 
holding, ceteris paribus. This southern region, largely populated by Armenians, is very poor, has 
limited economic opportunities, and is seen by Tblisi as a potential source of instability. In 
addition, it was found that certain regions were also associated with very high levels of 
unemployment, and that the regional unemployment rate had by far the strongest positive and 
significant impact on the probability of individual unemployment, ceteris paribus.
This thesis argued that the findings on ethnic minorities and regions are not only significant from 
a social welfare point of view, but also from that of the country’s stability. As discussed in 
chapter 1, Georgia has already been scarred by regional conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
where fragile peace agreements are still in place. It is widely known that there are factions within 
Achara and Samtskhe-Javakheti that have secessionist intentions. Moreover, during the Soviet 
period, regional labour market and welfare inequalities were offset by transfers from Tblisi. 
Resentment toward Tblisi and nationalist sentiment is likely to be heightened as people see 
inequalities increasing and feel abandoned by the capital. Indeed, it would seem that given the 
widespread increase in poverty and the major infrastructure problems, not least the rationing of 
water, heat and electricity, that are building frustration and dissatisfaction amongst the population 
in general, an important strategy for maintaining social cohesion in Georgia, should be to 
minimize ethnic and regional inequalities.
Therefore, although the informal sector was found to be providing a social safety net in the 
absence of formal employment opportunities and adequate social security, it was also found to be 
associated with the deskilling of the Georgian labour force, with the marginalisation of certain 
vulnerable groups and with a potential source of instability. Within this mixed context, the 
challenge for policy will be how to benefit from the informal sector’s capacity to provide a social 
safety net, while minimizing its longer-term potentially detrimental consequences.
7.4 WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY?
This section discusses the implications for policy rather than make specific policy 
recommendations. It would be inappropriate to make specific policy recommendations as this 
thesis has not analysed existing policies in Georgia in any extensive way, and nor has it examined 
policies in other countries or regions that could be appropriate for Georgia’s situation. I therefore 
limit the discussion to how the findings of this thesis are relevant for policy formulation. As 
argued by Roland, theoretical and empirical research can lead to general policy conclusions,
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however there is still considerable distance between general policy conclusions and direct policy 
recommendations (Roland 2000a, p.343-344).
The policy implications can be grouped under four main points:
1. Policies should distinguish between small-scale informal activities, which generate 
employment and livelihoods for half o f  the Georgian worbforce and represent a relatively 
small loss in government revenue, from larger scale underground and illegal activities, which 
generate comparatively little employment but are an important source o f  potential tax 
revenue.
This is particularly important in connection with policies aimed at improving tax revenue 
collection. The Georgian Government and IFIs have highlighted the extremely low level of fiscal 
revenue as the single biggest obstacle to Georgia’s economic development, and have called for an 
improvement in tax administration and in efforts to combat tax evasion. In this respect, the 
Government’s and IFI’s current approach identifies a ‘large informal sector’ as one of the main 
causes of the low level of fiscal revenues and makes no distinction between small-scale 
employment-generating activities and large-scale tax evasion (see World Bank 2004). However, 
this thesis has shown that the informal sector provides an important social safety net in the 
absence of formal jobs and adequate social security. It argued that attempting to tax or eradicate 
small-scale informal activities could have damaging implications for livelihoods while raising no 
additional income. It is therefore critical that a distinction be made between informal, 
underground and illegal activities in order to effectively combat tax evasion and increase 
government revenue without undermining social security.
2. Policies should support (or at least tolerate) the informal sector in the short run, while 
actively aiming to phase it out through the creation offormal jobs and the provision o f social 
security in the longer-run.
In the absence of adequate tax revenue, an effective social security system, and adequately paid 
formal employment opportunities, the informal sector is currently providing a social safety net 
and should therefore be encouraged, or at least tolerated, by the authorities. However, this thesis 
argues that it is undesirable to encourage the informal sector as a social safety net in the long run 
for several reasons.
First, it was found that the informal sector is strongly associated with certain vulnerable groups 
and there is a risk that in the longer-run a dual labour market is created with a poor, marginalized
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and vulnerable informal sector and a rich, protected formal sector. Second, it was found that the 
informal sector contributes to the deskilling of the Georgian labour force, thereby undermining 
longer-term growth as there will not be enough skilled workers to fill new private and public 
sector jobs. Third, the high level of education amongst informal workers reflects qualitative and 
anecdotal evidence that suggests that many informal sector workers do not perceive informal 
activities as desirable longer-term employment opportunities, but rather as temporary means of 
survival in the hopes of finding adequate, skilled, formal jobs. Fourth, policy should not 
encourage pensioners to engage in informal activities to survive, but should rather aim to allow 
pensioners to enjoy the fruits of a lifetime of work. Finally, informal activities are characterised 
by low-skills and low-productivity and represent a very limited source of employment and 
economic growth.
The focus in the longer-run should therefore be to create formal employment opportunities and 
provide adequate social security so that the informal sector is phased out. Moreover, informal 
enterprises that have a potential to grow into formal enterprises should be encouraged to do so 
through favourable policies such as access to credit, tax benefits and a reduction of bureaucratic 
obstacles.
3. Policies should actively aim to minimize inequalities in access to the formal labour market.
This thesis revealed a strong regional imbalance in the distribution of formal employment. 
Policies should therefore aim to stimulate formal job creation specifically in regions where a 
significant share of the workforce is unemployed or informally employed. The results also 
suggested that there are considerable barriers to formal labour market entry for certain 
marginalized groups, particularly in the form of social networks and ‘connections’. It was found 
that, everything else being equal, higher education, Georgian ethnicity, middle-age and being 
male, were all associated with an increased probability of formal employment (both for the self- 
employed and wage employees), and it was suggested that this was because these groups had 
access to invaluable ‘connections’ and social networks. Policies should therefore aim to increase 
transparency in both the hiring of formal wage employees as well as in the bureaucratic 
procedures for establishing formal enterprises. Finally, labour market policy should also adopt an 
‘affirmative action’ approach toward these specific groups that are currently being discriminated 
against in the formal labour market in order to actively integrate them into the formal labour 
market.
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4. Policies aimed at reducing poverty should take into account the significant role that 
employment generation can play. However, they should also recognise that not all 
employment reduces poverty to the same extent.
First, the findings showed that labour force status of the household head significantly determines 
household welfare, ceteris paribus. Most importantly, households headed by the unemployed and 
the inactive (mainly pensioners) faced the highest poverty risks of any group in the labour market, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, formal job creation and the provision of adequate social security to 
pensioners and the unemployed could be the two most significant policy initiatives in efforts to 
reduce poverty in Georgia.
Second, although it was found that, in general, informal employment is associated with higher 
poverty risks than formal employment, ceteris paribus, poverty is not limited to the informal 
sector. A poverty reduction strategy must recognise the heterogeneity of the informal sector, 
which means that certain groups within the informal sector are better off than some groups in the 
formal sector. In particular, it was found that, given the extremely low level of real wages in the 
state sector, the informal self-employed and informal farmers faced lower poverty risks than did 
formal wage employees, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, amongst the wage employed, those 
employed informally still face the highest poverty risks.
Poverty reduction efforts should therefore target the wage employed, by focusing on the payment 
of adequate and timely public sector wages and by encouraging the formalisation of all wage 
employment through the enforcement of the labour code and particularly the use of written 
employment agreements, the payment of adequate wages and social security contributions, and 
the provision of standard benefits. At the same time, the findings of this thesis imply that while 
efforts to reduce poverty should also encourage informal self-employment and farming as 
important sources of livelihoods in the short-run, a distinction should be made between informal 
activities that have the potential to grow into formal enterprises and those that are temporary 
survival activities. In the longer-run, the first should be encouraged to formalise through 
favourable tax policies and access to credit for instance, while efforts should be made to phase out 
survival activities by extending social protection and creating formal employment opportunities.
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7.5 HOW DOES THIS THESIS CONTRIBUTE TO THE ON-GOING DEBATE ABOUT 
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR?
Chapter two discussed the main aspects of the informal sector debate in developing countries, 
which is where most of the conceptual debate on the informal sector has been taking place. We 
saw that in this region, the informal sector has been largely associated with unregistered and 
unregulated micro-enterprises that generate income and employment for the urban poor. There 
have been two main parts to the informal sector debate in developing countries: The first focused 
on the informal-formal sector relationship. Those who support the ‘duality’ approach’ argue that 
there are two distinct urban economies (the poor/informally unemployed vs. the rich/formally 
employed), while their critics see these as two aspects of the same, single, capitalist economy. 
The second part of the debate was between those who find that the primary cause of the informal 
sector is poverty and those who find that it is excess regulation.
How has this research contributed to these debates? As regards the first part of the debate, it finds 
a certain degree of support for both sides. First, the findings reveal that, on the one hand, the 
informal-formal sector relationship can generally be characterised by the duality approach, in that 
for every type of employment, being informally employed is associated with higher poverty risks 
than being formally employed, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, it found that the informal/poor 
formal/rich interpretation is not entirely correct. There are groups amongst the formally employed 
that face a higher risk of poverty than groups within the informally employed, thereby reducing 
the duality theory. More specifically it was found that because of the very low real wages and 
wage arrears in the state sector, formal wage employees face higher poverty risks than the 
informal self-employed.
Second, this thesis finds some support for those who reject the dualist approach and argue that 
formal and informal activities are not separate and independent, but rather parts of one overall 
capitalist system in which informal activities are subordinate to, and dependent on, the formal 
sector. In particular, informal wage employees and secondary job-holders are highly integrated 
with the formal sector and, as argued by Allen (1998, p.9), informal wage employees provide a 
pool of cheap and flexible wage labour to the formal sector. It also found some support for the 
view that the informal self-employed, essentially petty traders, are integrated with the formal 
economy in that they provide cheap goods and services to the labour force, thereby subsidizing 
the formal economy and enabling large firms and government to pay low wages. However, it was 
found that some parts of the informal sector are marginal and independent of the formal economy, 
namely the self-employed in (subsistence) agriculture.
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As regards the second part of the informal sector debate, this thesis finds support mainly for those 
who claim that poverty is the main (but not only) cause of the informal sector. Although certain 
informal labour market activities are probably motivated by excessive regulation and bureaucratic 
obstacles, the findings of this thesis show that in Georgia the main motivation for informal 
employment is the lack of formal employment opportunities and the inadequacy of social 
protection. This does not deny that there are major bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles to the 
development of formal private firms, and that these should be removed in order to create formal 
employment opportunities and therefore, indirectly reduce informal employment.
However, this thesis does not find support for de Soto’s view that the main cause of informal 
labour market activity is excess regulation and state bureaucracy, and that removing these 
obstacles will allow ‘potential capitalist entrepreneurs’ to flourish (de Soto 1989, p.l 1). Although 
further research is needed to assess whether or not informal activities have the potential to grow 
into formal enterprises, the findings suggest that given the high level of education amongst the 
informally employed, the informal sector in Georgia would be better described as consisting of 
temporary survival activities rather than potential capitalist enterprises. This is supported by 
qualitative research, which shows that in Georgia individuals work as petty traders and in 
subsistence agriculture to ‘make ends meet’, while waiting to either to return to their previous 
jobs or find new formal skilled employment (see Dudwick 1999; Tblisi State University 1999).
Finally, this research has also shed some light on two questions that have dominated the informal 
sector literature in transition countries, namely whether the informal sector undermines 
government revenue and whether it is a transitional phenomenon or ‘here to stay’. First, given the 
definition of the informal sector adopted here, little support is found for the claim that it 
undermines government revenue. This is not to say that tax evasion is not widespread in Georgia 
(as we have seen it is probably the single biggest obstacle to Georgia’s development), however 
the suggestion here is that more than 50% of the workforce engages in small-scale activities 
which do not appear to seriously undermine government revenue, but do generate livelihoods and 
provide a critical source of social security in the absence of formal social benefits. This thesis 
suggest that the bulk of tax evasion is to be found in the underground and illegal sectors, which in 
contrast generate little employment and social security. Further research is needed, however, to 
confirm this.
Second, it was argued that after ten years, the informal sector is showing signs of becoming more 
entrenched rather than of disappearing. The results show that informal employment is not evenly 
distributed amongst the population, but rather strongly associated with certain vulnerable groups. 
As these groups continue to engage in low-skilled informal activities, the risk is that they become
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increasingly marginalized and that the informal sector becomes increasingly entrenched. Thus, 
instead of being a temporary source of income and employment while formal jobs are being 
created, Georgia’s informal sector will become part of a ‘developing-country’ style dual labour 
market, with a high-skilled, protected formal sector and a low-skilled, vulnerable informal sector.
7.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis has taken a step toward understanding the nature and causes of the informal sector in 
transition countries. Further research is now needed to fully assess the informal sector’s potential 
as a social safety net as well as a source of government revenue and economic growth. Given the 
limited extent of the literature on the informal sector in transition countries, the research agenda is 
substantial. I highlight only a few possible directions for future research, which stem directly from 
the findings of the analysis.
First, this thesis has provided a conceptual framework with which to study informal labour market 
activity in transition countries. It has argued for the need to distinguish between small-scale 
informal activities undertaken to meet basic needs and larger scale underground activities whose 
objective is the evasion of taxes or non-compliance with certain regulations. More specifically, it 
has distinguished between four types of unmeasured, untaxed and/or unregulated ‘hidden’ 
economic activities: informal, underground, illegal and household activities. Further research is 
now needed to assess the size of each of these sectors in terms of income and employment. In 
particular, research could assess how much the informal and underground sectors contribute to tax 
evasion on the one hand and employment and social security on the other. These findings will be 
significant in designing effective policies to combat tax evasion, reduce poverty and strengthen 
the rule of law.
This thesis has already made a significant contribution in this respect as it has measured the extent 
of informal employment in Georgia and evaluated its role as a social safety net. It has also 
suggested that given the types of activities involved, the informal sector is unlikely to represent an 
important loss of government revenue. However, further research is needed to assess how much 
the informal sector effectively contributes to GDP and how much the underground sector 
contributes to both GDP and employment in Georgia. Efforts have already been made to quantify 
the underground economy in terms of GDP in transition countries, namely those using the 
‘macro-electrical approach’ (see Kaufmann, D and A Kaliberda 1996), however these do not yet 
distinguish between small-scale informal activities and larger-scale underground activities. This
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research agenda should also be extended beyond Georgia to other transition countries and also to 
developing countries, where the informal/underground distinction has not really been made.
Second, this thesis has attempted to extend the concept of informal sector beyond the standard 
ILO definition, which is based on units or enterprises, to include all activities that are undertaken 
to meet basic needs and are measured in GDP, regardless of the type of unit within which they 
take place. It has argued that this is important for several reasons. First of all, limiting the 
informal sector to units excludes agricultural production for own consumption, which constitutes 
an important share of total agricultural production (and is therefore included in GDP) and 
represents a very important source of employment and income in many transition and developing 
countries. Also, extending the concept of informal sector to activities means that all persons 
engaging in such activities are considered informally employed, including casual workers in 
formal enterprises, contributing family workers, and all unregistered workers who are not 
protected by labour regulations and have no access to social protection. This seems particularly 
important in transition but also developing countries where there has been a growing 
informalisation of the labour market and an increase in self-employment, subcontracting and 
moonlighting.
Further research is now needed to adopt a single definition of informal employment, which will 
allow cross-country comparisons and will enable the sharing of ‘good practices’ as far as policies 
targeting the informal sector are concerned. Work within the ILO, in preparation for discussions 
on the informal economy at the 90th International Labour Conference held in June 2002, has 
already headed in this direction, proposing to distinguish between ‘informal sector employment’ 
and ‘total informal employment’, which would also include other types of employment that is not 
subject to standard labour legislation, taxation an social protection (see Hussmanns 2001). Other 
research undertaken as background for the above discussions, including a paper prepared by this 
author, also attempted to widen the concept of informal sector beyond ‘units’.
Third, this thesis has found that informal self-employment is largely limited to petty trade and 
subsistence agriculture. However further research is needed to assess which, if any, informal 
enterprises have the potential to grow into formal enterprises. Could some of these informal 
enterprises be ‘potential capitalist’ enterprises (to use de Soto’s terminology) capable of 
generating employment and being the driving force behind economic growth? In this respect, it 
will be important to map out informal enterprises and identify those that have a potential for 
growth and could therefore be supported by favourable taxation and other economic policies and 
those that are temporary survival activities, which should be phased out and targeted by social 
welfare programmes. Moreover, research is needed to understand what are the barriers to the
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growth and formalisation of informal enterprises (e.g. access to credit, complicated bureaucratic 
procedures, corruption)? Detailed qualitative research is also needed to understand what kind of 
taxes and licensing fees informal entrepreneurs already pay, as anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many pay informal fees for selling in a street market for instance. Qualitative analysis could 
provide additional insight into the main motivation for informal enterprises (excess regulation or 
survival?). Finally, it could also provide information on ‘left-hand work’ (the earning of unofficial 
income at the formal workplace), which this thesis was not able to explore through the data 
analysis, and could be a valuable source of information on the informal social networks, which 
support the informal sector.
Fourth, further research is needed to assess the role of agriculture in reducing poverty in Georgia. 
This research has shown that agricultural employment, which is almost exclusively small-plot, is 
associated with a decrease in poverty risks. However, it noted that part of these findings could be 
explained by the methodology used to construct the welfare metric (consumption) and in 
particular by how consumption of own production was valued. There are reasons to expect that 
the way in which consumption has been aggregated could result in apparently higher consumption 
levels for agricultural households. When computing the consumption variable, the Georgian State 
Department of Statistics uses market prices to impute the value of consumption of own- 
production rather than farm-gate prices, which are generally lower. Moreover, regional and 
national prices are used rather than local (urban/rural) prices. Future research could re-compute 
aggregate consumption and examine whether employment in agriculture is indeed associated with 
higher levels of welfare, ceteris paribus.
This thesis has examined the informal sector from a labour market and social security perspective, 
however the nature and role of the informal sector within the socio-economic system cannot be 
fully understood without a multi-sectoral approach. Future research should examine the role of the 
informal sector from other perspectives such as the macro-economy, the policy-regulatory 
environment, the household and from the perspective of power relations. Research efforts could 
examine, for instance, the impact of macroeconomic restructuring on the informal sector as well 
as the impact of the informal sector on macroeconomic programmes. Research efforts could also 
focus on the policy and regulatory environments, assessing which policies and regulations 
encourage informalisation (of both wage and self-employed) and which discriminate against small 
firms and the self-employed. Finally, to fully understand the causes of the informal sector, 
research should also address one of the most critical yet often neglected variables, that of power. 
Who benefits and who loses through specific regulations, policies and programmes and what are 
the vested interests that make reform and change difficult?
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7.7 CLOSING REMARKS
The findings of this thesis are deeply troubling. More than two thirds of Georgia’s workforce is 
employed in low-skilled informal activities or small-scale (subsistence) agriculture. The rest is 
largely employed in the state sector and receives below-subsistence wages. These figures are 
symptomatic of the extent of poverty and economic collapse in the country. Although the Soviet 
Union was characterised by many economic inefficiencies, it had also achieved some exceptional 
results in the social sector, not least a relatively low level of poverty and inequality and a high 
level of education. It is disconcerting to witness the complete economic collapse and reversal of 
these achievements. After more than ten years of ‘transition’, we should now accept that the 
reform has (so far) failed to increase the standard of living of the population in this region and 
draw some lessons for the future.
Moreover, it is worth remembering that one of the main motivations for embarking on the reform 
process was to increase the standard of living of the population with an aim to reach a level of 
social and economic development comparable to that of western market economies. We must 
therefore beware of revising the aims and lowering standards, as is often the case when results fail 
to justify the means. Within this context, the informal sector should not be considered a potential 
solution to the problem of poverty or a replacement for formal social security. There is no place 
for a large informal sector in a developed market economy. The aim should therefore be to create 
a functioning formal labour market and an adequate social security system, and not to encourage 
the creation of a ‘developing country’ style dual labour market, with all its implications in terms 
of poverty, vulnerability, social exclusion, and limited potential for economic growth.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1:
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
A1.1 Abbreviations and Acronyms
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPI Consumer Price Index
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU European Union
EU-15 European Union (15 member states)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEL Georgian Lari
FSU Former Soviet Union
HDI (UNDP) Human Development Index
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
PAYG Pay-As-You-Go
SDS (Georgian) State Department for Statistics
SOE State Owned Enterprise
TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
us$ United States Dollar
A1.2 Currency Equivalents
(Exchange Rate effective 29 June 2001) 
GEL 1 =US$ 0.49 
US$1 =GEL 2.05
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APPENDIX 2:
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A2.1 Data
A2.1.1 The Survey o f Georgian Households (SGH) (1999).
The Survey of Georgian Households (SGH) replaced the Soviet ‘Family Budget Survey’ in 1995, 
was co-designed by a team of Georgian statisticians and a team from Statistics Canada, and 
financed by the World Bank. Survey implementation began in 1996 and is on-going. The survey 
covers the entire territory of Georgia with the exclusion of two regions: Abkhazia, and South 
Ossetia.
The SGH yields quarterly data on household expenditure, income and assets, basic employment 
characteristics, as well as housing conditions. Expenditure patterns are used as inputs for the 
construction of consumer price indices and information collected on income and expenditure is 
used as basis for poverty profiles. The survey has also been designed to provide data on income 
and total household expenditures for the purpose of national accounts.
Data is collected on all household members (except the labour force module which is only 
administered to members aged 15 or over). Respondents receive monetary incentives at the time 
of each of the quarterly visits. In 1998 they were equal to GEL3 (US$1.50) per quarter per 
household.
Sample Design:
The sample used a two-stage stratified area sampling design. At the first stage, 282 census units 
(primary sampling units) were selected. At the second stage, individual households in the sample 
census units were selected. The aim was to obtain completed interviews for 2500 households. In 
order to compensate for non-response (expected at 25 percent), the effective sample size was 
3,351 households per quarter. Responses were obtained for approximately 2300 to 2700 
households per quarter (actual number of households and individuals are provided in table A2.1).
Stratification
Census units were stratified into 48 strata. Stratification was performed in order that estimates 
could be obtained at different levels: urban-rural, east-west Georgia, region and big 
Caucasus/Small Caucasus levels.
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Sample selection
The 3,351 households were allocated among the strata using the ‘square-root’ allocation based on 
the 1989 population count (rather than proportional allocation). The resulting number of 
households for a given stratum determined the number of census units to be selected and the 
number of households per census unit. The census units within a stratum were selected with 
probability proportional to the number of households within the census unit and the selection of 
households was done using the principle of systematic selection.
Rotation scheme
The full sample within each stratum for each region is equally divided into 12 rotation groups. 
Each month, the households in one rotation group are dropped from the sample and replaced by 
another set of households. Households are contacted quarterly for a total of five contacts. They 
remain in the sample for 15 months. During that period they complete the initial interview, four 
weeklong diaries, and four quarterly interviews.
Weighting
The SGH uses population weights. The calculation of weights is done in 2 stages: The first stage 
weight is the sampling probability of the census unit. It is equal to the sampling interval 
multiplied by the required dwellings per census unit divided by the number of dwellings found in 
the sampling unit in 1989. The second stage weight is the actual number of addresses found in the 
census unit divided by the number of sampled addresses per census unit. The final weight is the 
product of the 1st and 2nd stage weights.
Questionnaires
The contents of the SGH resemble those of a Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)115. 
The SGH gathers information on the following characteristics of households: composition of 
households and demographic characteristics of household members (e.g. age, sex, relationship to 
the head of household, marital status, educational attainment, nationality, etc.); living conditions 
(e.g. type of dwelling, ownership status, facilities, household possessions, etc); agricultural 
holdings and production (e.g. number and size of land plots, quantities of livestock, expenditures 
on inputs for farm or garden plot, harvest, etc.); income data (e.g. from employment, income in- 
kind, social benefits, money received from family members, etc.); and expenditure data (e.g. food 
expenditures, non-food expenditures, consumption of own production, changes in household
115 The LSMS are World Bank surveys established to explore ways o f improving the quality and nature o f household 
data collection by government statistical institutions in developing counties. One o f the main objectives o f these surveys 
is to assess household welfare.
249
assets and debts, etc.). In addition, the SGH also has a labour force module, which provides some 
limited information on labour force status of household members over 15 years of age (e.g. status 
of employment, type of enterprise, organisation, numbers of hours worked, reason for not 
working, etc.).
A2.1.2 The Labour Force Survey o f Georgia (LFS) (1998,1999).
This survey began in 1998. The questionnaire was co-designed by Georgian and ILO statisticians. 
Implementation was financed by UNDP. It was designed as a quarterly labour force survey to be 
attached to the SGH, since labour force information in the latter survey was considered 
insufficient. Its implementation was however only financed in 1998 and 1999. It has not been 
carried out since.
The LFS covers the entire territory of Georgia with the exclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The survey provides information on labour market status of all household members over 15 years 
of age.
Sample design:
The LFS was designed to be attached to the SGH. The two surveys are linked through a common 
household control card, containing demographic characteristics of household members. This 
facilitates the integration of survey operations as well as the linking of the two datasets. However, 
in order to obtain more reliable data at the regional level, the sample size for the LFS was 
increased. An additional 3,294 households per quarter were selected for the LFS. Thus, the total 
sample size for the LFS is 6,645 households per quarter, and each quarter, the sample of 
households for the SGH is a subset of the LFS sample. Seventy-five percent of the additional 
households are selected from urban primary sampling units and 25 percent from rural ones.
Rotation scheme
The rotation scheme for the LFS sample follows that of the SGH. Households are interviewed 
once a quarter, thus households in the SGH sample respond to two survey questionnaires, whereas 
households that are only in the LFS sample respond to only one questionnaire. Each household 
stays in the sample for four quarters.
Questionnaire
The survey was designed to gather information on the labour market status of individuals, their 
labour force experience, their occupation, the industrial activity and ownership of their place of 
work, nature of employment, hours worked (usual and actual), location and periodicity of work. It 
also covers the unemployed, their unemployment spell, their methods of finding a job, reasons for
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quitting their job, reasons for not accepting an offered job, status of registration with the 
Employment Agency and whether they receive an unemployment benefit. The survey also 
provides information on secondary employment, including reasons for secondary job holding, 
status in employment, ownership and location of place of work, periodicity and hours worked. 
Finally the survey elicits some information on individuals seeking an extra job including reason 
for seeking an extra job and periodicity and type of work sought. The Labour Force Survey does 
not collect any information on wages or earnings. However, by merging the LFS with the SGH, 
this information can be obtained (only for the sample common to both surveys) from the income 
module of the SGH.
A2.1.3 Quality o f  the data
Overall, the quality of the data from both the SGH and the LFS is reasonably good, although there 
are some important issues to keep in mind. The biggest obstacle to its analysis is the lack of 
background documentation. Although a brief report prepared by Statistics Canada in 1996 
outlines the sample design, no proper background documentation exists. This is poses a serious 
problem for the analysis of the data particularly as some questions were added to the survey 
during implementation but were not reflected in the questionnaires (for example an additional 
question was added to the LFS in 1999 resulting in variables names being inconsistent between 
the two years). Thus, the data set does not necessarily correspond to the questionnaires. As a 
result, I had to travel to Tblisi to work with the statisticians at the State Department for Statistics 
over several weeks to fully understand the data sets.
In general I found that the SGH data was not particularly clean and that there were a considerable 
number of outliers and missing observations. However, this did not pose a problem for my 
analysis as it was not the case for the variables of interest, namely the expenditure, labour force 
and human capital variables. Outliers existed for instance in information on the number of rooms 
in the house, and height and weight of individuals. Moreover, some of the questions (e.g. height 
and weight) were not systematically asked during interviews until 2000, so data for 1999 is 
unreliable. In general, I was told that there is no systematic control of the quality of data entry and 
that no edits are performed in a systematic way besides the manual edits and imputation for 
missing variables, which is performed by a team of economists who review the completed 
questionnaires. If, at the analysis stage, the data do not look coherent, ad hoc consistency checks 
are performed and selective edits and imputation are done.
I also felt that the data on incomes was not entirely reliable as there were a considerable number 
of missing observations and outliers. Data on wages was considered not to be reliable enough to 
examine the determinants of low-wages, however wage data from primary employment was
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included in the analysis of the determinants of secondary job holding, but results were interpreted 
with caution. Data on the size of private transfers was also considered not to be reliable enough to 
examine the determinants of the scale of private transfers and receipt of private transfers was 
therefore constructed as a binary variable. Similarly, data on receipt of formal protection was also 
questionable as individuals, when asked about their benefits last month, may report their official 
benefit level, despite not having received a benefit for several months, or may report the full 
amount received, after being paid for several months at a time (see section A2.3.1 for more details 
on reliability of wage and benefit data in transition countries).
There could also be an issue of under-reporting as regards data on informal wage and self- 
employment, particularly in urban areas. It is conceivable that informal employees, working 
without a written agreement, and unregistered non-agricultural enterprises may be reluctant to 
report their activities, as they may not be certain as to the legality of their status. In contrast, 
unpaid family workers and individuals engaging in subsistence agriculture are unlikely to 
consider their activities as illegal and are more likely to report them. The low rates of informal 
employment, and indeed total employment, in urban areas may be a reflection of this fact. For 
similar reasons, it is likely that secondary employment is under reported, particularly in non- 
agricultural activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that secondary employment in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities is quite common in Georgia, particularly for formal 
employees facing very low wages and wage arrears. However only 4% of the employed reported 
having secondary jobs and the vast majority of these were in agriculture. Finally, although the 
SGH and LFS are designed to be representative of the population at the regional and urban/rural 
level, no other sources of data exist to test to what extent they are representative in terms of 
various household or individual characteristics.
Merging and cleaning o f  data
In order to examine the relationship between household welfare and labour force status of the 
household head (chapter 6), I merged the LFS and SGH using household and individual 
identifiers.116 I therefore dropped half of the LFS sample and used only the sample based of the 
SGH, since it is common to both surveys. This did not pose a problem with regards to weights as 
the SGH sample is designed to be nationally representative. The only possible problem would 
have been in the reliability of data at the regional level, since the LFS sample was doubled, with 
respect to the SGH, precisely to get more representative data at the regional level. However this 
did not pose a problem as results for the multivariate analysis in chapter 5 were consistent with
116 The analysis for chapters 4 and 5 was based only on the LFS, except for the multivariate analysis on the 
determinants o f informal employment, where the merged sample was used in order to control for the log o f hourly 
earnings in the primary sector in the analysis o f secondary job holding.
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those of the descriptive analysis (based on the full LFS sample) and chapter 6 did not consider the 
regional dimension.
For the reasons mentioned above, both data sets required considerable cleaning. The cleaning 
involved amongst other things, the labelling of variables, zeros were changed to missing when it 
was clear that this should be the case (e.g. when 90% respondents had 0 for kitchen), some coding 
took place, when it was clear what codes should be (e.g. V* of products in the diary of expenses 
had no entry for unit of measurement (kg, g, L, units), I coded variables as appropriate. For 
instance, I coded expenditures on public transport as ‘units’, etc.). Outliers were kept, and the 
range was limited during the analysis (e.g. I limited age to 0-110 years, etc.). The data was 
reshaped, collapsed and merged in order to have single observations by household and quarter.
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Table A2.1 Basic sample characteristics for SGH and LFS
Survey of Georgian Households Labour Force Survey
Sample
sampling frame (households) 1240000 1240000
sample size (households per quarter) 3351 6645
Number o f Households Number o f Individuals
Number o f  Responses (unweighted)
1st quarter 1998 2331 14303
2nd quarter 1998 2333 14322
3rd quarter 1998 2404 14165
4th quarter 1998 2563 14615
1st quarter 1999 2702 14952
2nd quarter 1999 2741 15310
3rd quarter 1999 2697 14856
4th quarter 1999 2690 14172
Source: Author's own analysis o f  SGH (1998, 1999), LFS (1998,1999)
k l .2  Definition of variables used in the thesis
Age-group: a categorical variable is used for the descriptive analyses taking on the value of 1 if a 
respondent’s age is 15-24, 2 if it is 25-49, 3 if it is 50-64, and 4 if  it is 65+. For the regression 
analyses a set of dummy variables is used, taking on a value of 1 depending on the respondent’s 
age in years: 15-25,26-45,46-55, 56+ The base category for regression analysis is 46-55.
Age o f  the household head\ a continuous variable equal to the age of the household head.
Age squared o f  the household head: a continuous variable equal to the age of the household head 
squared, which gives greater weight to older ages.
Contributing family workers: ILO (1983) definition. All persons ‘employed’ without pay in an 
economic enterprise operated by a related person living in the same household. A dummy taking 
value of 1 if the respondent is a contributing family worker and 0 otherwise.
Disabled: a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if an individual is disabled and 0 otherwise.
Do not receive formal social protection: a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a household does 
not receive formal social protection (see receive formal social protection) and 0 otherwise. This 
variable is also presented as a categorical variable taking values 1 to 4 depending on the status of 
the household head: 1 for a household that does not receive formal social protection, whose head 
is formally employed, 2. if the head is informally employed, 3 if the head is unemployed and 4 if 
the head is inactive.
254
Do not receive informal social protection: a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a household does 
not receive informal social protection (see receive informal social protection) and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is also presented as a categorical variable taking values 1 to 4 depending on the 
status of the household head: 1 for a household that does not receive informal social protection, 
whose head is formally employed, 2. if the head is informally employed, 3 if the head is 
unemployed and 4 if the head is inactive.
Economically active population: ILO (1983) definition. Comprises all persons who furnish the 
supply of labour for the production of goods and services. There are two measures of 
economically active population: the ‘usually active population’, measured in relation to a long 
reference period, such as a year; and the ‘currently active population’ (the labour force) measured 
in relation to a short reference period such as one week. We use economically active population to 
mean the ‘currently active population’ and use it interchangeably with ‘labour force’. A dummy 
taking value of 1 if the respondent is economically active and 0 otherwise.
Education level o f  head o f  household: a set of dummy variables taking on the value of 1 
depending on the level of educational attainment of the head of household: primary or less, 
incomplete secondary, general secondary, technical secondary, higher technical, higher general. 
The base category for regression models is primary or less.
Educational attainment level: a set of dummy variables taking on the value of 1 depending on the 
respondent’s level of educational attainment: primary or less, incomplete secondary, general 
secondary, technical secondary, higher technical, higher general. The base category for regression 
models is higher general. This is also presented as a categorical variable taking values of 1 to 6, 
corresponding to the 6 different levels of educational attainment. Different levels of aggregation 
of these categories are used.
Employed: ILO (1983) definition. All persons aged 15 and over who during the reference week 
proceeding the survey were either in paid-employment or self-employment, for at least one hour, 
or who were temporarily absent from their work but had a formal attachment to it. A dummy 
taking value of 1 if the respondent is employed and 0 otherwise.
Employers: ILO (1983) definition. All persons who are self-employed with employees. A dummy 
taking value of 1 if the respondent is an employer and 0 otherwise.
Employment rate: Eurostat (2000) definition. Total employed divided by the total population aged 
15+.
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Ethnic identity o f  the household head: a set of dummy variables taking on the value of 1 
depending on the ethnic identity of the head of household: Georgian, Azeri, Abkhazian, Greek, 
Ossetian, Russian, Armenian, other. The base category for the regression analyses is Georgian.
Ethnic identity: a set of dummy variables taking on the value of 1 depending on the respondent’s 
ethnic identity: Georgian, Azeri, Abkhazian, Greek, Ossetian, Russian, Armenian, other. The base 
category for the regression analyses is Georgian. This variable is also presented as a categorical 
variable taking values 1 to 8, corresponding to the 8 ethnic groups. Different levels of aggregation 
of these categories are used.
Female: a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if he respondent is female and 0 if male.
Formal employee: a dummy variable taking value of 1 if respondent is employed as (1) paid 
employee and (2) is not informally employed, and 0 otherwise.
Formal employment: a dummy variable taking the value if the respondent is (l)employed and (2) 
not informally employed, and 0 otherwise.
Formal farmer: a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a respondent is employed as (1) self- 
employed and (2) is not informally employed and (3) is employed in the agricultural sector. It 
takes on 0 otherwise.
Formal non-agricultural self-employed: a dummy variable taking value of 1 if respondent is 
employed as (1) self-employed and (2) is not informally employed and (3) is not employed in the 
agricultural sector. It takes on value of 0 otherwise.
Gender o f  the household head: a dummy variable taking value 1 if the head of household is a 
female and 0 otherwise.
Georgian: a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if  the respondent if of Georgian ethnic 
identity and 0 otherwise.
ILO informal sector employment: a dummy variable taking value 1 if a respondent has an ILO 
informal sector job and 0 otherwise. It refers to the ILO definition of informal sector employment, 
which includes only individuals employed in ‘informal sector enterprises’ (see below). See 
Appendix A5 for details of the ILO definition and our operationalisation.
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Inactive: a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a respondent is (1) of working age- i.e. above 15
years and (2) not in the labour force, and 0 otherwise.
Informal employee: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a respondent is a paid employee who 
is either (1) employed on the basis of an oral agreement, (2) employed casually, or (3) employed 
temporarily, and 0 otherwise (see chapter 3 for details of operationalisation of informal 
employment variables).
Informal employment: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a respondent is either (1) informal 
self-employed, (2) contributing family worker, (3) informal employee, (4) other informal or (5) 
informal secondary jobholder, and 0 otherwise (see chapter 3 for details of operationalisation of 
informal employment variables).
Informal farmer: a dummy variable taking value 1 if a respondent is (1) informal self-employed 
and (2) employed in agriculture, and 0 otherwise.
Informal non-agricultural self-employed: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a respondent is 
(1) informal self-employed and (2) employed outside the agricultural sector, and 0 otherwise.
Informal secondary jobholder: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a respondent has a formal 
primary job and an informal secondary job as defined by the variable ‘informal employment’, and 
0 otherwise (see chapter 3 for details of operationalisation of informal employment variables).
Informal sector enterprise: ILO definition based on the ‘Resolution Concerning Statistics of 
Employment in the Informal Sector (1993b). They include enterprises owned and operated by 
own-account workers or employers whose business is: (1) located at home, outside home, in a 
street booth, on a construction site, in a market place, at a customer’s home or in a non-fixed 
location; (2) in a factory, office, establishment, shop, workshop, etc. which is independent from 
the home and is not registered, or (3) on a plot of land either in an urban area or in a non­
registered rural agricultural enterprise (see Appendix A5 for details of ILO informal sector 
definition and its operationalisation).
Informal self-employed: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a respondent is an ‘own-account 
worker’ or ‘employer’ working in a household enterprise. It comprises: (1) own-account workers 
or employers whose business is located at home, outside home, in a street booth, on a construction 
site, in a market place, at a customer’s home or in a non-fixed location (2) own-account workers
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or employers whose business takes place in a factory, office, establishment, shop, workshop, etc. 
which is independent from the home and is not registered, and (3) own-account workers or 
employers working on their own or rented plot of land, in agriculture, either in an urban area or in 
a non-registered rural enterprise (see chapter 3 for details of operationalisation of informal 
employment variables).
Labour force participation rate: Eurostat (2000) definition. Total labour force divided by the total 
population aged 15+, or (Employed + (relaxed) Unemployed) / population aged 15+.
Labour force status o f  the household head: a set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending 
on the labour force status of the head of household: formal employee, formal self-employed, 
formal farmer, informal employee, informal non-agricultural self-employed, informal farmer, 
contributing family worker, unemployed, inactive. The base category for the regression analyses 
is formal employee.
Labour force: ILO (1983) definition . Comprises the ‘currently active population’. The labour 
force is the sum of the Employed and (relaxed) Unemployed within the reference week. A dummy 
taking value of 1 if the respondent is in the labour force and 0 otherwise.
Log hourly wage primary job: continuous variable equal to the natural logarithm of the wage 
from primary employment for wage employees.
Non-agricultural employed', the sum of all employed that are working outside the agricultural 
sector.
Number o f  adults in the household: a continuous variable equal to the number of adults within the 
household.
Number o f  children aged 6 years or less: a continuous variable equal to the number of children 
aged 6 years or less within the household.
Number o f  household members employed by sector o f economic activity: a continuous variable 
equal to the number of household members employed in each of the 17 sectors of economic 
activity (see sector of economic activity).
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Number o f  household members formally employed: a continuous variable equal to the number of 
members within the household who are formally employed.
Number o f  household members informally employed: a continuous variable equal to the number of 
members within the household who are informally employed.
Number o f  household members unemployed: a continuous variable equal to the number of 
members within the household who are unemployed.
Number o f  other children: a continuous variable equal to the number of children aged over 6 
years, and under 18 years within the household.
Other informal: a dummy variable taking the value if a respondent is either (1) unidentified in 
employment status and works temporarily or casually OR in a typical informal enterprise OR (2) 
a co-operative member working temporarily or casually, and 0 otherwise (see chapter 3 for details 
of operationalisation of informal employment variables).
Own-account workers: ILO (1983) definition. All persons who are self-employed without 
employees. A dummy taking value of 1 if the respondent is an own-account worker and 0 
otherwise.
Ownership type: a categorical variable taking on the value of 1 if employment takes place in a 
state or public enterprise or organisation, 2 if self-employment in agriculture without employees, 
3 if other self-employment without employees, 4 if self-employment with employees, 5 if private 
sector wage employment, and 6 if cooperative and other private sector employment.
Paid-employees: ILO (1983) definition. All persons who within the reference week were 
‘employed’ and performed at least 1 hour of work for wage or salary, in cash or in kind. A 
dummy taking value of 1 if the respondent is a wage employee and 0 otherwise.
Poor: a dummy variable taking on value of 1 if a respondent lives in a household whose 
consumption per equivalent adult falls below the poverty line and 0 otherwise. See section A2.3.1 
on details of how we defined poverty.
Private: a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent is employed in a private 
organisation and 0 otherwise.
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Public: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a respondent is employed in a state or public
organisation and 0 otherwise.
Receive formal social protection: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household receives 
formal social protection and 0 otherwise. The variable takes the value 1 if a household received 
any of the following benefits: pensions for the elderly, pensions for the disabled, pensions for 
families without a breadwinner, student scholarships, allowance for temporary disablement, 
income from social insurance funds, allowance for childbirth, allowance for single parents, child 
allowance, unemployment benefits, pensions for war veterans, social aid for single pensioners and 
disabled persons. This variable is also presented as a categorical variable taking values 1 to 4 
depending on the status of the household head: 1 for a household that receives formal social 
protection, whose head is formally employed, 2. if the head is informally employed, 3 if the head 
is unemployed and 4 if the head is inactive.
Receive informal social protection: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household receives 
informal social protection and 0 otherwise. The variable takes the value 1 if a household received 
any of the following: alimony, money received from non-family members from abroad, 
inheritance or other money received from relatives, money borrowed from a private source for 
household needs, and gifts (monetary) received from family members temporarily abroad. This 
variable is also presented as a categorical variable taking values 1 to 4 depending on the status of 
the household head: 1 for a household that receives informal social protection, whose head is 
formally employed, 2 if the head is informally employed, 3 if the head is unemployed and 4 if the 
head is inactive.
Region: a set of dummy variables taking on the value of 1 depending on the region of residence of 
the respondent: Tblisi, Kakheti, Shida Khartli, Kvemo Kartli, Samtskhe-Javakheti, Achara, Guria, 
Samegrelo and Imereti. The base category for the regression analyses is Kakheti.
Regional informal employment rate: a continuous variable taking on 9 different values equal to 
each of the rates of informal employment for Tblisi and the eight regions. Regional informal 
employment rates are equal to total informal employment in a given region divided by total 
employment in that region.
Regional unemployment rate: a continuous variable taking on 9 different values equal to each of 
the rates of unemployment for Tblisi and the eight regions. Regional unemployment rates are 
equal to total (relaxed) unemployed in a given region divided by total labour force in that region.
260
Rural: a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent lives in a rural area and 0
otherwise.
Sector o f  economic activity: A set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on the 
sector of economic activity according to the ILO ‘International Standard Industrial Classification 
of All Economic Activity’ (ISIC 3rd revision 1989): agriculture (A), fishing (B), mining and 
quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), electricity, gas and water supply (E), construction (F), 
wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles (G), hotels and restaurants (H), transport, 
storage and communications (I), financial intermediation (J), real estate, renting and business 
activities (K), public administration and defence (L), education (M), health and social work (N) 
other community, social and personal service activities (O) private households with employed 
persons (P) extra-territorial organisations and bodies (Q). Letters in brackets refer to classification 
in the ISIC (1989). The base category for the regressions is transport and communications (I). 
This variable is also presented as a categorical variable taking values 1-17, reflecting each of the 
above sectors of economic activity. Different levels of aggregation of these sectors are also used.
Self-employed: ILO (1983) definition. All persons who during the reference week were 
‘employed’ and performed at least 1 hour of work for profit or family gain, in cash or in kind. It 
includes only market-production and certain types of non-market production such as the 
production of primary products for own consumption (it excludes the household sector). A 
dummy taking value of 1 if the respondent is self-employed and 0 otherwise.
Status in employment: a categorical variable taking value of 1 if individual is a paid employee, 2 
if an individual is self-employed with employees, 3 if self-employed without employees, 4 if 
contributing family worker, 5 if cooperative member and 6 if other self-employed. Categories 2 to 
6 are also aggregated under ‘self-employed’, such that status in employment is equal tol if paid 
employee and 2 if self-employed.
Type o f  inactivity: a set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the type of inactivity 
of the respondent: student, pensioner, merit pensioner, disabled, caring for children, draftee.
Type o f  informal employment: a categorical variable taking the value 1 if a respondent is informal 
self-employed, 2 if contributing family worker, 3 if informal employee, 4 if other informal and 5 
if informal secondary job holder (see chapter 3 for details of operationalisation of informal 
employment variables).
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Type o f  unemployed: a set of dummy variables taking value 1 depending on the respondent’s type 
of unemployment: searching for a job, discouraged, registered.
Underemployed: ILO (1983) definition. All persons aged 15 years and over who are (1) employed 
full-time and (2) working for a total (in primary and multiple jobs) of less than 41 hours per week 
OR (1) employed part-time and (2) doing so involuntarily (see appendix A4.1 for detail of 
definition). A dummy taking value of 1 if the respondent is underemployed and 0 otherwise.
Unemployed according to the ‘relaxed criterion’: ILO (1983) definition. All persons aged 15 
years and over, who during the reference week were: (1) without work, (2) available for work 
within the next two weeks AND (3) had been seeking work for the preceding four weeks OR had 
not been searching for work during the previous four weeks because they had lost all hope of 
finding a job. A dummy taking value of 1 if the respondent is ‘relaxed’ unemployed and 0 
otherwise.
Unemployed: ILO (1983) definition. All persons aged 15 years and over, who during the 
reference week were: (1) without work, (2) available for work within the next two weeks and (3) 
had been seeking work for the preceding four weeks. A dummy taking value of 1 if the 
respondent is unemployed and 0 otherwise.
Unemployment duration: a set of dummy variables taking value 1 depending on the respondent’s 
duration of unemployment: 0-6 months, 6-12 months, 12 months +.
Unemployment rate: Eurostat (2000) definition. Total unemployed divided by total labour force. 
Unless otherwise specified, total unemployed refers to the ‘relaxed’ criterion.
Wage-employed private: a dummy variable taking value 1 if an employed person is (1) paid 
employed and (2) employed in a private organisation.
Wage-employed public: a dummy variable taking value 1 if an employed person is (1) paid 
employed and (2) employed in a public or state organisation.
Working-age population (workforce): The population aged 15 and over.
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A2.3 Poverty measurement and analysis
This section outlines the methodology used in measuring poverty in chapter 6. First, it defines 
what is meant by poverty and well-being and discusses the choice of consumption as an indicator 
of well-being. Second, it details the procedure used for adjusting for differences in size and 
composition between households (choosing so-called ‘economies of scale’ and ‘equivalence 
scales’ indexes). Third, it explains the selection of the poverty lines used in this thesis. Finally, it 
performs a sensitivity analysis for the choice of economies of scale index (0) to examine how 
sensitive the main results of this thesis are to the choice of 0.
A2.3.1 Defining Poverty and Well-Being
It is now generally accepted that the concept of well-being is a multi-dimensional one, which goes 
well beyond the material sphere and includes both physiological and sociological aspects. Thus, 
well-being is not simply associated with having sufficient income or consumption levels, but also 
with adequate health and nutrition, literacy, asset ownership, social relations, security, self- 
confidence and empowerment.
This multi-dimensional concept has been heavily influenced by Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach. Sen’s concept of ‘functionings’ relates to the things a person may value doing or being. 
‘Functionings’ are features of a person’s state of existence ranging from relatively elementary 
states (e.g. being adequately nourished) to complex personal states and activities (e.g. 
participation and appearing without shame). The concept of ‘capability’ relates to the ability of a 
person to achieve different combinations of functionings- the various combinations of valuable 
‘beings’ and ‘doings’ that are within a person’s reach, reflecting the opportunity or freedom to 
choose a life a person values. Sen argues that poverty may be best characterised in terms of the 
absence or ‘deprivation’ of certain basic ‘capabilities’ to ‘do this’ or to ‘be that’ (see Sen 1992; 
1999). As argued in the UNDP’s Human Development Report, which is based on Sen’s 
capabilities approach, poverty is ‘not merely in the impoverished state in which the person 
actually lives, but also in the lack of real opportunity - due to social constraints as well as personal 
circumstances- to lead valuable and valued lives’ (UNDP 1997, p. 16).117
Poverty can be defined as not having enough today of some dimension of well-being. It can be 
measured by comparing the individual’s income, consumption, education or other attributes with
117 The UNDP’s Human Development Reports are based on Sen’s approach and characterise human development in 
terms of the expansion o f valuable human capabilities. The Human Development Index captures the importance of three 
critical human capabilities -  achieving knowledge, longevity and a decent standard of living. The Gender-Related 
Development Index captures gender-based inequalities in the achievement o f these capabilities, while the Human 
Poverty Index captures deprivations (where ‘living standard’ is characterised in terms o f access to safe water, health 
services and birth-weight) (see UNDP 1997).
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some defined threshold below which they are considered to be poor in that attribute. Although the 
concern here is with poverty, it should be noted that poverty is just one of many tools one can use 
to analyse well-being; others include inequality, vulnerability and social exclusion.
Choosing a dimension and indicator of weli-being
For the purpose of this thesis the analysis is limited to the material dimension of well-being and 
consumption is used as an indicator. The main interest here is in measuring the ‘standard of 
living’ and its relationship with labour market status, and a person’s standard of living is usually 
taken to depend on individual consumption of privately supplied goods (for details see Ravallion 
1992, p.6-7). It could be interesting to explore other, non-monetary, dimensions of well-being 
(such as education and health outcomes, asset ownership, empowerment), however such an 
analysis goes beyond the scope of this thesis but could provide an interesting topic for future 
research.118
To use Sen’s (1984) terminology, this approach essentially takes a ‘welfarist’ perspective to the 
measurement o f well-being in that it builds on welfare-economics, and more specifically on utility 
theory, and is based on the analysis of aggregate expenditure of all goods and services 
consumed.119 ‘Non-welfarist’ measures place a premium on people’s preferences and can for 
instance be based on questions to households about their perceived situation, their judgement on 
minimum standards and their perception of needs and poverty rankings in the community.
Consumption is chosen over income as an indicator of material well-being. Most analysts agree 
that, provided the information on consumption obtained from a household survey is detailed 
enough, consumption will be a better indicator for poverty measurement than income.
First of all consumption is a better outcome indicator than income. Actual consumption better 
captures a person’s well-being as defined as having enough to meet current basic needs, whereas 
income is only one of the elements which allow consumption of goods, others including access to 
goods, availability, etc. Consumption can therefore provide a better picture of actual standards of 
living than current income, especially when income fluctuates a lot (see Atkinson and 
Micklewright 1992b, p. 184).
118 Falkingham (2000a, p.21-22) provides an interesting example of how one can analyse non-monetary dimensions of 
well-being in the CIS context. She provides an operational definition o f Sen’s concept of capability poverty to study 
child welfare in Central Asia.
119 ‘Welfare economics’ approaches to measuring well-being take the utility function as the starting point for the 
measurement o f economic welfare, and are therefore based on the idea that consumption o f goods and services raises 
welfare. Given a household utility function, household welfare levels can be compared using cost functions, which 
specify the amount of money required by a utility-maximizing household to obtain a given level of welfare. This allows
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Second, consumption may be better measured than income. There are several reasons why 
consumption data in household surveys may often be more reliable than income data, particularly 
in poor agrarian economies such as Georgia. Deaton (1997) argues that in agrarian economies, 
incomes for rural households usually fluctuate during the year, in line with the harvest cycle, and 
that depending on when the survey is carried out, agricultural income may be over or under­
estimated as households may have difficulties in correctly recalling their income (also see 
Glewwe and Gaag 1988, p.6).
Moreover, in economies such as Georgia, where a significant proportion of the labour force is 
self-employed, and particularly in the informal sector, income flows may not only be erratic, but 
respondents may be unwilling to reveal income from informal activities as these are generally not 
registered. It may also be difficult for both farmers and micro-entrepreneurs to exclude inputs 
purchased for agricultural production from revenues. Another reason why consumption may be a 
more reliable indicator of welfare than income is that in developing and transition countries many 
households, both agricultural and non-agricultural, consume their own production or exchange it 
for some other goods. This can represent a large share of total consumption, which is not captured 
by data on incomes (see Glewwe and Gaag 1988, p.6,7).
A third issue, which is specific to the former socialist economies, is that of the de-monetization of 
the economies and resulting in-kind payments (see Falkingham 2000b, p.6). Since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, chronic cash shortages have often led enterprises to settle transactions through 
barter. This has been the case both between enterprises but also between enterprises and their 
employees. Thus, wages, social benefits and pensions have been paid in-kind, in the produce of 
the enterprise. Workers then sell or barter the goods. In-kind payments reflect some sort of 
purchasing ability which is not captured by income data but which can impact on a household’s 
standard of living. As it can be very difficult to value wages in-kind, consumption may be a better 
indicator of household welfare.
Finally, another related issue is that of the non-payment and arrears in the payment of wages and 
pensions, which is widespread in Georgia and in many other countries of the CIS. Falkingham 
(2000b, p.7) argues that this can result in the introduction of distortions into the measurement of 
household income as individuals may report their official wage, when asked about their salary in 
the last month (despite not being paid), or they may report the full amount received in the last
one to compare household’s welfare by comparing aggregate consumption levels (for more details see Glewwe and 
Gaag 1988, p.3-5; Ravallion 1992, p.4-8).
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month (after being paid for the past 6 months for instance). Once again, using consumption as a 
measure of household welfare by-passes these issues.
Constructing the Consumption aggregate
I use the consumption variable derived by the Georgian State Department of Statistics and the 
World Bank. To construct the consumption aggregate, the SDS uses data from two sources: (1) 
the daily diary of expenditures (shinda_03), which is filled out daily for 7 days once per quarter 
and (2) the quarterly questionnaire on employment, income and expenses (shinda_04) which uses 
a three-month recall period (respondents are asked for their expenditures last month, two months 
ago and three months ago, which are then averaged to get an estimate for one month during that 
quarter). The consumption aggregate is made up of two components: food and non-food 
consumption.
All food and beverage expenditures are taken from the daily diary of expenditures with the 
exception of “party food expenses” that are taken from the quarterly questionnaire. The food 
consumption aggregate is computed as the sum of food expenses in cash on every food item as 
well as estimated value for food-in-kind brought into the house. The estimate uses quarterly prices 
averaged at the regional level to assign valued for (i) own food production (ii) food gifts and 
transfers in-kind and (iii) humanitarian food aid. All values are multiplied by 4.345 to get an 
amount for the whole month.
The non-food consumption aggregate includes only current non-food cash expenditures and does 
not include the consumption of non-food goods in kind. The following items are included: (1) 
tobacco (from daily diary); (2) clothing and shoes (from daily diary and quarterly questionnaire 
depending on the item); (3) household goods including furniture, most durables, tools, fabrics, 
major household maintenance, and other household goods are taken from the quarterly 
questionnaire, as are rent, water, electricity, gas, telephone and other communal expenses. Other 
household expenses such as fabrics, household maintenance products and some household 
supplies are taken from the daily diary; (4) medical services including visits to doctors, dentists, 
hospitals, and medicines are taken from the quarterly questionnaire while medical supplies are 
taken from the daily diary; (5) energy expenditures are taken from the quarterly questionnaire 
except liquid fuel, oil and diesel expenditures, which are taken from the daily diary; (6) transport 
including inter-city transport, taxi services, etc. and repair of private cars are taken from quarterly 
questionnaire while fuel, petrol and urban transport are taken from the daily diary; (7) education, 
entertainment and recreation taken mainly from the quarterly questionnaire with the exception of 
toys, films etc., newspapers and magazines, extra-curricular activities and school supplies that are 
taken from the daily diary; (8) other consumption expenses including legal services, weddings,
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baptisms funerals and other expenses on ritual services are taken from the quarterly questionnaire 
while restaurant, personal care and other miscellaneous products are taken from the daily diary.
There are some limitations in the way in which the consumption variable has been aggregated. 
First, the aggregation of the consumption variable may overestimate consumption of own- 
production as market prices are used to impute the value of consumption of own-production rather 
than farm-gate prices, which are generally lower and more appropriate (see Deaton 1997). 
Moreover, regional/national prices are used instead of local (urban/rural). Second, some 
infrequent expenditures (e.g. clothing) are taken from the daily diary of expenditures, whereas the 
recall period may be more appropriate in the quarterly survey of expenditures.
Third, expenditures on funerals, marriages etc. are included, however, as argued by Deaton (1999, 
p.24), since only a fraction of households will make such expenses during the reference period, 
households that do undertake such expenditures will look relatively better off than they really are. 
Fourth, health expenditures are also included, however, expenditures on health are not a reflection 
of greater welfare, if anything they reflect quite the opposite (see Deaton and Zaidi 1999, p.24). 
Fifth, expenditure on household durables is included; however it is not the purchase of the 
durable, but its use that creates welfare. Moreover, it unrealistically excludes households that 
purchased durables immediately before or after the survey. Calculating a ‘user cost’ may be more 
appropriate (see Deaton and Zaidi 1999). Despite these limitations, I felt that the consumption 
aggregate was reliable enough and I decided to use it in order to allow for comparability with 
other SDS, World Bank and other studies of poverty and the labour market.
A2.3.2 Deriving equivalence scales and economies o f scale indexes
Households of different size and composition have different needs and it is important to reflect 
these differences in needs in poverty measures. Adjustments can be made to reflect the age and 
gender of household members by using equivalence scales, as well as for household size by using 
economies o f scale indexes120.
The need to adjust for household size and composition arises from the fact that what we are 
ultimately interested in is individual welfare, but that consumption data is collected at the 
household level. Since we do not have individual level consumption data, the best we can do is to 
adjust total household expenditure by some measure of the number of people in the household.
120 Note that it would also be desirable to adjust for intra-household inequalities, however measuring intra-household 
allocation and inequality is difficult when the analysis is confined to income and consumption. It can, however be 
captured through qualitative and participatory surveys as well as by analysing non-income measures o f well-being, such 
as nutrition, education or health for which measures o f individual well-being are possible.
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Equivalence scales and economies of scale indexes are the deflators we use to convert household 
real expenditure into money metric utility measures of individual welfare (for a discussion on 
different approaches to setting equivalence scales see Ravallion 1992, p. 17-25).
Using a per capita measure of consumption is the most common approach used. However, Deaton 
and Zaidi (1999, p.37) argue that using per capita measures does not take into account the fact 
that children consume less than adults and so ultimately it understates the welfare of individuals 
in households with large numbers of children. Also, per capita measures ignore any economies of 
scale in consumption within the households. Larger households may be able to purchase goods in 
bulk at cheaper rates. Also, some goods (such as with consumer durables for instance) have a 
‘public goods’ aspect whereby consumption by one member does not reduce the amount available 
for consumption by another member. Thus, per capita measures understate the welfare of big 
households relative to small households.
In order to account for both differences in size and composition of households, one must calculate 
the number of adult equivalents within a household. The US National Research Council (1995) 
defines the number of adult equivalents by the following formula:
AE= (A+aK)9.
Where AE= adult equivalent.
A= number of adults.
K= number of children.
a= parameter representing cost of a child relative to an adult ranging from 0 to 1 (equivalence 
scale).
0=parameter representing the extent of economies of scale ranging from 0 to 1.
Thus when 0=1 and a= l, adult equivalent is equal to the household size, and deflating total 
expenditure by the number of adult equivalents is the same as deflating to a per capita basis.
There are no generally accepted methods for setting values for equivalence scales or economies of 
scale indexes. Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) have argued that economies of scale depend on the 
extent of public vs. private goods in a household. They show that in households with only adults, 
the elasticity o f the cost of living with respect to household size is the share of private goods in 
total households’ consumption. So if all goods are private then costs rise in proportion to the 
number of people in the households, if all goods are public, then costs are unaffected by the 
number of people in the household. Thus, in very poor countries where the share of household
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budget devoted to food (a private good) is very high, there is very little scope for economies of 
scale, whereas in richer countries, where the share devoted to public goods such as housing, 
heating, etc. is higher, then economies of scale are larger. They also argue that while it may 
remain difficult to fully establish the extent of economies of scale in consumption, it seems far 
less realistic to assume zero economies of scale than to allow for some.
Engel’s method defines the equilibrating compensation to be the level of income that sets food 
budget shares equal across households of various compositions. It is based on the idea that, as 
with any non-luxury good, the budget share devoted to food tends to decrease with total real 
consumption expenditure (see Ravallion 1992, p.21; Yemtsov 2001, p.55). Other approaches 
include relying on behavioural analysis, using direct questions to obtain subjective estimates and 
setting economies of scale in some reasonable but essentially arbitrary way. Deaton and Zaidi 
(1999, p.38) argue that the best of these approaches is probably the arbitrary approach. They 
suggest that 0 should be set to 1 in the poorest countries where a large share of the household 
budget is devoted to food and around 0.75 for the richer economies where a larger share is 
devoted to housing, heating and other public goods (Deaton and Zaidi 1999, p.40). As concerns 
the cost of children and the setting of equivalence scales, most of the literature suggests that 
children are relatively more expensive in industrialised countries relative to poorer agricultural 
economies, and thus a should be set to 1 for countries such as the US or Western Europe and as 
low as 0.3 for the poorest economies.
For the purposes of this analysis I set a=1.0 and 0=0.75.1 do not distinguish between adults and 
children in the equivalent measure. Accounting for different consumption needs of adults and 
children as well as of males and females does not make a difference in the results. As shown in 
Appendix A6.2, using the World Bank (WB) and Georgian State Department of Statistics (SDS) 
methodology, which accounts for differences in gender and age and makes stronger assumptions 
about the degree of economies of scale within the household, makes very little difference to the 
results (see section A2.3.4 for details of WB and SDS economies of scale and equivalence scale 
indexes). Moreover, although the value of 0 is large relative to that adopted by the OECD (see 
Figini (1998)), it is not unreasonable given that utility prices and housing costs are subsidized in 
Georgia and therefore the share of public goods in household consumption is relatively small. 
Moreover, I find that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of 0 and that considerable 
assumptions regarding the degree of economies of scale must be made before the poverty ranking 
of the labour market categories is affected, suggesting that setting 0 equal to 0.75 is appropriate 
(see A2.3.4 for details). Finally, 0=0.75 is consistent with the values estimated using Engel’s 
method, which for Georgia yield O.85<0<O.65 (Yemtsov 1999).
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A2.3.3 Defining a poverty line
Poverty lines, or the cut-off points separating the poor from the non-poor, can be set in two ways: 
either absolutely or relatively. Relative poverty lines are defined in relation to the overall 
distribution of income or consumption, whereas absolute poverty lines are based on some absolute 
standard, which for monetary measures, are usually based on the cost of basic food needs with a 
provision for non-food needs (for a detailed discussion of the merits and limitations of absolute 
vs. relative poverty lines see Ravallion 1992, p.25-33).121
There is considerable discussion in Georgia regarding the setting of a realistic poverty line. The 
official poverty line (used by the SDS) is based on a food-basket of 2,610 calories for a working 
adult and excludes access to health care and education. It uses CPI price data to cost the basket 
and is around 100 GEL (US$50) per equivalent adult per month. The World Bank has 
recommended the use of a new poverty line (which it uses for its poverty assessments) that is 
based on the same caloric requirement but a different basket of goods. It argues that actual 
consumption patterns (observed through household survey data) should be used, rather than those 
established during Soviet times, and costs it using household survey prices. This amounts to 
decreasing the share of ‘luxury goods’ such as meat, in the basket, and increasing non-’luxury 
goods’ such as bread. The World Bank recommended poverty line is about 55 GEL (US$25) per 
month per equivalent adult. See Annex 1 of the World Bank Poverty Profile Update (2001) for a 
detailed discussion on the establishment of a realistic poverty line for Georgia.
Given the contentiousness of the issue of drawing an absolute poverty line, I chose to apply a 
relative poverty line based on two-thirds of median consumption per adult equivalent. As it 
happens, this is slightly lower than the World Bank absolute poverty line and equal to 
approximately GEL48 (US$24) per equivalent adult per month in 1999. The choice of two-thirds 
of median consumption per equivalent adult is consistent with Bemab£, Krstic’ and Reilley 
(2003), which examines poverty and informal labour markets in the CIS-7, and therefore allows 
for comparisons with other countries in the region.122 I also construct an ‘extreme’ poverty 
measure, which we set at half the median consumption level.
A2.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis fo r Choice o f Economies o f Scale Index (0)
In this thesis I use an economies of scale index (0) equal to 0.75 and we set the equivalence scale 
index (a) equal to 1 (see A2.3.2 for details). In contrast the World Bank (WB) and the Georgian
121 Alternative poverty lines include those based on subjective or self-reported measures o f poverty (see Ravallion 1992, 
p.33-34). One can also combine absolute and relative poverty lines.
The 7 poorest countries o f the CIS, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan.
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State Department of Statistics (SDS) make stronger assumptions about both economies of scale 
and differences in intra-household needs between members of different age and/or gender groups 
(see Annex 1 Yemtsov 2001 for details). They make the following assumptions:
0=0.54 and
a =0.64 for children aged <7years; 
a=l for children aged 7-16 years; 
a=l for male adults aged 16-60 years; 
a=0.84 for female adults aged 16-60 years; 
a=0.88 for male adults aged 60+, and; 
a=0.76 for female adults aged 60+.
In appendix A6.2 (tables A6.4 to A6.8) I show that despite these differences the regression results 
(OLS, Quantile and Probit) are consistent. The estimates for the main variables of interest, the 
labour force variables, are consistent in terms of significance, sign and magnitude.
However, the results relating to the number of adults and children in the household are not the 
same. I find that the number of children in the household is negatively correlated with 
consumption, whereas using the WB/SDS methodology finds that it is positively correlated with 
consumption.123 Although this is not directly relevant to the objectives of this study, the 
sensitivity of results, concerning the relationship between household size and poverty, to choices 
of equivalence scales is an important one in the poverty measurement literature. I therefore wish 
to test to what extent poverty rates are sensitive to assumptions made about economies of scale 
and differences in intra-household needs.
Lanjouw, Milanovic and Patemostro (1998), Falkingham (1999a), Deaton (1999) and Yemtsov 
(1999) all find that using a per capita welfare indicator can lead to the conclusion that larger 
households are poorer whereas using a slightly lower value of theta (assuming some degree of 
economies of scale) can lead to the opposite conclusion. In the CIS/CEE region, the use of a per 
capita welfare indicator has had important implications. Considerable attention has been paid to 
the relative vulnerability of two household groups: old-age pensioner households and households 
with young children. Much of the empirical evidence suggests that households with young 
children have been the losers during transition whereas pensioner households have not fared so 
badly. The empirical evidence however is in sharp contrast to the anecdotal evidence that suggests
123 This is a result o f the fact that by assuming greater economies of scale (as per the WB/SDS methodology), one 
divides total household consumption by a smaller number o f equivalent adults and therefore obtains a higher level o f  
consumption per equivalent adult.
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that pensions have declined rapidly in real terms and that in some countries payments of pensions 
have fallen far behind schedule.
Lanjouw, Milanovic and Patemostro (1998) suggest that the divergence between statistical 
evidence and the more popular intuitive judgements can be accounted for by details of poverty 
measurement. Notably the utilisation of a per capita measure of individual welfare is based on the 
assumption that there exist no economies of scale in household consumption and that there are no 
differences in needs arising from differences in family composition. They show that relaxing 
these assumptions affects the comparisons of poverty between large and small households and in 
turn affects the rankings of different household groups.
They argue that, given the inability to precisely observe the degree of economies of scale in 
consumption for a household, the question is then to determine how sensitive conclusions 
regarding the relative poverty of the elderly to that of the young are to the presence of economies 
of scale. If one has to make highly unrealistic allowances for economies of scale before there are 
any re-rankings between these two population sub-groups, then statistical results based on the per 
capita assumption can probably be accepted. If however, only mild deviations from the zero 
economies of scale assumption result in sharp re-rankings, then there is clearly reason for caution 
in interpreting results (Lanjouw, et al. 1998, p.6).
I follow the approach used by Lanjouw, Milanovic and Patemostro (1998) and Falkingham 
(2000b), to test the extent to which poverty rates for our labour market categories are sensitive to 
the assumptions made about economies of scale and differences in intra-household needs.124 One 
minor limitation of this approach is that it does not distinguish between the effects of equivalence 
scales and those of economies of scale indexes. It assumes that both are captured by the value of
0. 125 Thus the equation for consumption per equivalent adult equation becomes:
CPA= 4  
ne
Where CPA is consumption per equivalent adult, E is total household expenditure, n is the 
number of individuals in the household and 0 is the elasticity of household needs with respect to 
household size.
124 Other approaches exist (see for instance Deaton and Zaidi (1999).
125 Note that Deaton and Zaidi (1999), who do distinguish between the effect of a and 0 find that the effect o f 0 is 
stronger than that o f a. They show that children become relatively poorer if  theta is decreased, holding alpha constant 
(more economies of scale assumed) than if alpha is decreased, holding theta constant (lower equivalence scale used).
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Poverty is defined as belonging to the lowest quintile of the consumption distribution and I 
compute poverty rates by labour market status of the head of household using different values of 
theta from 0 to 1. Results are reported in table A2.2 below.
Table A2.2 Poverty rates by labour market categories for different values o f  theta
Theta (0)
Head
Employment
Status 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
Population
shares
Average % poor 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Formal
Employees 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.163 0.165 0.160 0.165 0.164 0.156 0.150 0.147 0.195
Self-employed 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.100 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.116 0.008
Fanners 0.121 0.115 0.106 0.099 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.094 0.089 0.098 0.098 0.146
Informal
Employees 0.213 0.202 0.199 0.173 0.171 0.159 0.162 0.141 0.137 0.136 0.133 0.054
Self-employed 0.138 0.129 0.119 0.113 0.105 0.107 0.113 0.127 0.132 0.130 0.139 0.052
Farmers 0.148 0.140 0.134 0.127 0.116 0.110 0.095 0.091 0.094 0.098 0.116 0.045
Contributing
family workers 0.090 0.085 0.080 0.078 0.073 0.083 0.081 0.092 0.091 0.089 0.090 0.094
Unemployed 0.326 0.324 0.317 0.315 0.314 0.316 0.293 0.296 0.270 0.275 0.270 0.065
Inactive 0.272 0.281 0.291 0.303 0.307 0.310 0.314 0.317 0.329 0.329 0.326 0.340
Source: Author’s own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at bottom 20% of the consumption distribution.
(b) Labour market status refers to the household head
(c) Poverty rates refer to households
(d) Unemployed refers to ELO relaxed criterion definition.
Table A2.2 shows that on the one hand, the lower the value of theta (the greater the assumption of 
economies of scale), the higher the poverty rates for households headed by inactive individuals. 
On the other hand, the lower the value of theta the lower the poverty rates for all other 
households, particularly those headed by formal and informal employees and farmers, as well as 
the unemployed. As suggested by Lanjouw et al. (1998), this could be explained by the fact that 
the inactive are largely pensioners who typically live in small households. This is confirmed by 
Table A2.3 below, which highlights that the inactive tend to live in households that are smaller 
than the national average, although the difference is not very significant. Whereas 22% of 
households headed by inactive individuals are one-member households, nationally only 16% of 
households are one-member households. We also note that households in Georgia are relatively 
small (the median is 3 household members), particularly if compared to Central Asian 
households.
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Table A2.3 Distribution o f Households by size
Household size Cumulative percentage (%)
Inactive Head All Households
1 22 16
2 41 34
3 56 50
4 70 72
5 82 85
6 91 94
7 97 98
8 98 99
9 99 99
10 99 100
11 100 100
12 100 100
Source: Author's own analysis o f SGHH1999.
I now examine to what extent the poverty ranking of households is affected by the choice of theta. 
Table A2A  below ranks households by poverty incidence (1 highest poverty rate) for different 
values of theta. We see that re-ranking occurs around the 0.5/0.4 mark. This can explain the 
difference between the results based on my methodology and those of the WB/ SDS, since I use 
0=0.75 whereas the WB/SDS use 0=0.54. We also note that considerable assumptions must be 
made about economies of scale before re-ranking occurs (i.e. between theta=l and theta=0.6 there 
is very little re-ranking). This implies that the per capita assumption is actually a good one and 
confirms that 0=0.75 is in fact appropriate.
Table A2.4 Poverty ranking by labour market categories for different values o f  theta
Theta
Head Employment Status 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
Population
shares
Formal
4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Employees
Self-employed 8 8 7 6 6 5 6 9 8 9 6 9
Fanners 7 7 8 8 8 8 7 6 8 7 8 3
Informal
3 3 3 3 .3 4 4 4 4 4 5 6
Employees
Self-employed 6 6 6 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 4 5
Farmers 5 5 5 5 5 6 8 8 6 6 7 8
Contributing family workers 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 8 9 4
Unemployed 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 5
Inactive 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at bottom 20% of the consumption distribution.
(b) Labour market status refers to the household head
(c) Poverty rates refer to households
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
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Finally table A2.5 examines poverty rates by household size for different values of theta. We see 
that results are consistent with findings of Lanjouw et al. (1998). As greater assumptions about 
economies of scale are made, smaller households become relatively poorer while larger 
households become relatively less poor. The order begins to reverse with theta=0.6 and is 
definitely reversed by theta=0.4. As previously noted, this suggests that significant assumptions 
must be made about economies of scale to affect poverty rankings. However we note that the 
poverty ranking between one-member and two to three member households already reverses with 
theta=0.8. This suggests that there are considerable economies of scale in two to three member 
households compared to one-member households. As discussed above, this could explain our 
finding that lower values of theta are associated with higher poverty rates for inactive individuals, 
who are more likely to live in one-member households.
Table A2.5 Poverty rates by household size for different values o f  theta.
Theta
Household
Size 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
Population
Shares
1 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.54 0.16
2 to 3 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.34
4 to 6 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.44
7 to 13 0.45 0.39 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
Average % 
of poor 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Source: Author's own analysis o f  LFS1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Poverty line is set at bottom 20% of the consumption distribution.
(b) Entries refer to the percentage o f households o f a given size that are below the poverty line.
Thus, we have seen that despite considerable differences in assumptions about economies of scale 
and equivalence scales, the relationship between labour market status of the household head and 
poverty remains the same. The results are therefore robust. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis has 
shown that considerable assumptions about economies of scale must be made before the poverty 
ranking between our different labour market categories is affected and this occurs around the 0.5 
mark. This means that the use of theta equal to 0.75 is indeed appropriate. Finally it was found 
that in general, the greatest scope for economies of scale arises between one-member and two to 
three-member households, where an assumption of theta=0.8 already reverses the poverty 
ranking.
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A2.4 Multivariate regression analysis techniques
Three multivariate regression techniques are used in this thesis: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
Probit and Quantile Regression. Each of these is briefly described below, with a focus on 
interpretation of results.
Ordinary Least Squares
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression aims to estimate the mean of the dependent variable, 
given the independent variables and to assess the conditional effect of a change in the value of a 
given independent variable on the dependent variable, while controlling for the effects of all other 
variables. The regression plane is defined as the plane where the sum of the squared deviations of 
the points from the plane is a minimum (see Lewis-Beck 1980).
OLS regression is used to examine the impact of labour force and human capital variables on the 
value of (log) consumption per equivalent adult, while controlling for a series of other household 
characteristics.
I specify the following OLS model for households /=1,...,N:
Y,=fiX, +«/
Where Y is the natural logarithm of consumption per equivalent adult and the vector X  is the 
vector of explanatory variables, /? is the parameter vector to be estimated and u is a random error 
term with E(u)= 0 and Var(u)=a2.
We can interpret the regression coefficients, bi, b2,...bk, where k is the number of independent 
variables in our model, as the marginal impact on (log) y  for every 1 unit increase in the value of 
xi, x2,...Xk, for continuous variables. The coefficients for dummy variables, say bi, is interpreted 
as the relative impact ony of Xi=l relative to xref (the omitted reference category) =1.
A measure of the goodness of fit of the model is provided by the Adjusted R2, which gives an 
indication of how much of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the variance 
in the independent variables in the model. It adjusts for the number of independent variables 
relative to the number of observations. Adjusted R2 is defined as:
Adjusted R1=R 2 - ^ (1 R  ’ 
(n — k  — 1)
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where k  is the number of independent variables and n is the total number of observations. The 
Null Hypothesis (HO) that in the population pM) can then be tested. That is to say, what is the 
likelihood that one would observe the reported Adjusted R2 in the sample, if the model explained 
none of the variation in Y in the population? An F-statistic is used on (k-1) (n-k) degrees of 
freedom, to test the joint hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are 0. If it is found 
that the probability is less than 10%, 5%, or 1%, HO can be rejected and one can say that the 
model is representative of the population and is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% 
level.
Similarly, the standard errors reported enable the testing of the null hypothesis (HO) that in the 
population, each independent variable has no impact on Y, controlling for all other independent 
variables (e.g. /?i=0). A t-test to test HO can then be used. The Student’s t-statistic is defined as:
,= b> ~ A
where bt is the estimated regression coefficient, P\ is the population coefficient and is the
standard error of bi. A Student’s t-distribution can then be used on n-k degrees of freedom to 
obtain measures of the probability for HO. If it is found that the probability is less than 10%, 5%, 
or 1%, HO can be rejected and one can say that bi is significant at the 1%, 5% 10% level. These 
significance levels are reported directly in the tables.
Probit regression
I use probit regression when the dependent variable is dichotomous (usually coded 1 if the event 
takes place and 0 otherwise) and we are interested in the probability of the event taking place. A 
linear model is inappropriate in this case because the probability model is not linear in the 
independent variable (the probability is constrained between 0 and 1). The probability function 
must therefore be transformed. Several alternatives exist, and the two most commonly used are to 
transform the probability function into the functions for logistic or normal curves (logit and probit 
regression respectively) (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, p.31-35). These two curves are so similar that 
they yield essentially identical results. I chose probit analysis as I have found it to be the most 
commonly used technique when analysing the relationship between poverty and the labour market 
in the literature.
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‘Probit’ stands for the abbreviation of ‘probability unit’ (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, p.37). The 
probit model is defined as:
= 1-P(7i=0)
= 1- P (u=-X/p)
where &(.) is the cumulative distribution function, 7  is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if 
the event takes place and 0 otherwise, X  is the vector of explanatory variables, fi is the parameter 
vector to be estimated, i is the unit of observation z-l,...N , and u is a random error term with 
E(u)=0 and Var(u)=o3.
Probit parameters are estimated using a method called Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), 
in contrast to OLS regression models, which are estimated by the Least Squares Estimation. MLE 
chooses estimates of the regression coefficients (bj,...bk) that make the likelihood of observing 
this particular 7  as large as possible. The conceptual difference between OLS and MLE 
estimation is that OLS is concerned with picking parameter estimates that yield the smallest sum 
of squared errors in the fit between the model and the data, while MLE is concerned with picking 
parameter estimates that imply the highest probability of having obtained the observed sample y 
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984, p.51).
The regression coefficients (b) are converted into marginal effects (using STATA’s ‘dprobit’) for 
ease of interpretation. Thus, whereas probit reports the coefficients, dprobit reports the change in 
the probability of y= 1 for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, 
the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables, while controlling for all other 
independent variables in the model (see STATA 1999, p.65).
As with OLS regression, the standard errors are used to calculate t-statistics and test HO: f$=0 and 
determine whether the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level (see 
OLS regression above).
The likelihood ratio (L7) is used to test the goodness of fit of the model using a Chi2 distribution. 
However, unlike the Adjusted R2, it cannot provide any information on the percentage of variation 
in 7  that is explained by the model. It allows the testing of the Null Hypothesis (HO) that all 
coefficients in the population, with the exception of the intercept, are 0.
The likelihood ratio is defined as:
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V=- 2 L o g ( ^ )  
i
Where LI is the value of the likelihood function for the full model as fitted and LO is the 
maximum value of the likelihood function if all coefficients except the intercept are 0 (HO) 
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984, p.55-56).
L2 follows approximately a Ch2 distribution when the null hypothesis is true. The computed Chi2 
value tests the hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are 0. The degrees of freedom 
for L2 is k-\, where k  is the number of independent variables in our model. We can then compare 
the computed statistic to a critical value (Chi2(£-1 ,a) taken from the table of the chi-squared 
distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom and significance level a). If the probability is less than a 
10%, then the Null Hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that the model is 
significant.
Quantile regression
I use quantile regression in order to analyse the impact of the variables of interest (namely labour 
force and human capital variables) at different points of the (log) consumption distribution. 
Quantile regression models, introduced by Koeneker and Basset (1978) are similar to ordinary 
regression, but instead of minimising the sum of the squares of the residuals as in OLS, quantile 
regression models minimise the sum of the absolute residuals. Just as the aim of OLS regression 
is to estimate the mean of the dependent variable, the object of quantile regression is to estimate 
the 0th quantile of the dependent variable, conditional on the values of the independent variables 
(see STATA 1999, p.99-115).
The advantages of quantile regression include that, unlike the OLS procedure, it is less sensitive 
to outlier observations on the dependent variable and provides a more robust estimator in the case 
of deviation from normality. Furthermore, quantile regression models are also more efficient than 
the OLS estimators in the case of heteroschedasticity, when the error term is non-normal (see 
Buchinski 1998, p.89).
Quantile (including median, i.e. the 0.5 quantile) regression models are also known as least or 
minimum absolute value models. In these models, the 0th regression quantile, 0< 0 <1, is defined 
as the solution to the minimization problem:
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min fiJ { E j  0 ]yr  M  + E j ( l -  0)\yrfijx,j\ }
This set up as a linear programming problem and solved via linear programming techniques.
I estimate separate consumption functions, conditional on the values of the independent variables, 
at the 0.10,0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90 quantiles for all households i= l,..., N:
Ln YrXfie+uoi, Quant* (yt |x,) = xfig
Where Ln Y is the natural logarithm of the consumption per equivalent adult, Quant*^,!*,) denotes 
the conditional quantile of yh conditional on the regressor vector X h Bg is the vector of 
coefficients, and 0 is 0th quantile. The error term, ug is left unspecified and the only assumption 
made is that ue satisfies the quantile restriction Quant* (w*|jc,)=0.
The output of the above equation may be interpreted in exactly the same way as linear regression 
output, except that instead of the mean of the dependent variable, we predict the 0th quantile. The 
coefficients can be interpreted in much the same way as OLS regression: b2i for instance, gives 
the marginal change in the 0th conditional quantile ofy due to a marginal change in x2.
I estimate the five regressions at the 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90 quantiles simultaneously 
using simultaneous quantile regression. Thus the following equations are solved simultaneously:
Ln Yo ,90—100.90 + 0^.90*1+ bogoX2 + ... &0.90*k
Ln To.75~flo.75 +  ^ 0.75*1+ &0.75*2 +  ••• &0.75*k 
Ln To.5o=flo.50 £\).5oXi+ ^0.50^2 + ... ^0.50**
Ln To.25=fl0.25 + 0^.25*1+ &0.25*2 + &0.25*k
Ln T0 .10“ flo.io + bo.ioXi+ ^0.10^2 + ... O^.lO^ k
In quantile regression, estimates of standard errors are obtained by using bootstrap resampling. 
The advantage of simultaneously solving the regressions rather than solving them individually is 
that STATA provides a bootstrapped estimate o f the entire variance-covariance matrix of 
estimators, which enables the performance of hypotheses test to see whether the effects of certain 
variables are the same at different quantiles. To this end, we use a Wald test (i.e. a test based on 
the estimated variance-covariance matrix of estimators) to test the Null Hypothesis that the 
coefficients are jointly equal at the 25th and 75th percentiles (see STATA 1999, p. 109-110).
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The Pseudo R2 reported by STATA is calculated as:
1- sum of weighted deviations about estimated quantile 
sum of weighted deviations about raw quantile
This is based on the likelihood for a double exponential distribution ehl^  (see STATA 1999, 
p. 114).
Use o f  weights
All multivariate regression analysis in the thesis is carried out using unweighted data. This is 
because the weights used in the data sets are ‘population weights’ (i.e. of the ‘grossing-up’ type), 
which could result in an apparently high level of statistical significance for estimated coefficients, 
as a large n (sample size) would lead to small standard errors, confidence intervals and therefore 
an apparently higher significance level.
A2.5 Statistical Package
I have used STATA 6.0 and 7.0 for all the analysis. All data sets were provided to me in ACESS 
and I transferred them into STATA 6.0 format using Stat Transfer.
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APPENDIX 3:
ANNEXES RELATING TO CHAPTER 3
A3 Should the inactive and unemployed owning land be considered informally 
employed?
Bemabd, Krstic’ and Reilly considered that all individuals who are unemployed or inactive but 
live in households whose members engage in their own enterprise or own land, are informally 
employed. This was based on the approach of Yemtsov (2001), which assumes that such 
individuals are very likely to be ‘helping out’ on household farms or enterprises and are therefore 
more accurately classified as being actively employed.
This thesis argues that making this assumption is incorrect as respondents of the Labour Force 
Survey are asked whether they worked for at least one hour, including for free and on family 
farms or enterprises, within the last week. All individuals classified as unemployed or inactive 
have given a negative response to this question. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how some of 
the results of the empirical analysis of this thesis would be affected if such an assumption were 
made. In particular, we are interested in the impact on the relationship between labour market 
status, poverty and the receipt of formal social protection.
Table 1 examines the share of individuals that receive formal social protection by labour market 
category. Results are presented for both scenarios. Column 1 corresponds to the analysis of this 
thesis, namely that unemployed and inactive who own land are considered to be unemployed and 
inactive respectively. Column 2 assigns the unemployed and inactive owning land to the 
informally employed category. We see that the share of household heads that receive formal 
social protection and work informally increases from 12.5% to 21.5%, whereas the share that 
receives formal social protection and is inactive decreases from approximately 20% to 11.5%. 
This can be explained by the fact that the majority of the ‘helpers on family farms or businesses’ 
are pensioners who own small plots of land and receive formal social protection in the form of 
pensions.
Table 2 examines the composition of the bottom and top consumption quintiles by labour market 
status of the household head and by whether or not the household receives formal social 
protection. We see that the reallocation of inactive and unemployed owning land to the informal 
employment category has a considerable impact, particularly when broken down by consumption 
quintiles. In our initial analysis we find that in the poorest consumption quintile, twice as many 
heads of households who received formal social protection were formally employed as were 
informally employed, thereby suggesting that those in formal employment may be more
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successful at mobilising formal social protection. However, once we reassign the ‘inactive and 
unemployed owning land or business’ to the informally employed category, we find that exactly 
the contrary is true, suggesting that the informally employed would be more successful at 
mobilising formal social protection. At the same time, the share of households headed by the 
inactive that receiving formal social protection in the bottom quintile decreases from 40.2% to 
19.2%, which would seem to suggest that formal social protection is not effectively targeting the 
inactive.
Thus, these tables highlight that to consider the inactive and unemployed that own land as 
informally employed, would result in making the informally employed appear to be greater 
recipients of formal social protection than they actually are, while households headed by the 
inactive would appear to receive a smaller share of social protection than they actually do.
Table A3.1 Formal Social Protection and Labour Market Categories, 1999
(% o f  household heads)
H e l p e r s  o n  f a m i l y  f a r m  o r  
b u s i n e s s 9  i n a c t i v e / u n e m p l o y e d
H e l p e r s  o n  f a m i l y  f a r m  o r  
b u s i n e s s 9  
i n f o r m a l  e m p l o y m e n t
Receive formal social protection 46.1 46.3
Formal employment 11.5 11.7
Informal employment 12.5 21.5
Unemployed 2.2 1.6
Inactive 19.9 11.5
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS and SGH, 1999
Table A3.2 Bottom and Top Consumption Quintiles by Formal Social Protection and Labour 
market Status o f  Household Head, 1999 
(percent)
H e l p e r s  o n  f a m i l y  f a r m  o r  b u s i n e s s  H e l p e r s  o n  f a m i l y  f a r m  o r
=  b u s i n e s s  =
 i n f o r m a l  e m p l o y m e n t ______________________ I n a c t i v e / u n e m p l o y e d
B o t t o m  Q u i n t i l e T o p  Q u i n t i l e B o t t o m  Q u i n t i l e T o p  Q u i n t i l e
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receive formal social protection 49.0 44.5 56.0 48.0
Formal employment 9.1 16.2 8.4 18.8
Informal employment 18.3 22.3 4.6 16.0
Unemployed 2.4 0.8 2.9 0.5
Inactive 19.2 5.2 40.2 12.8
Do not receive formal social
protection 51.0 55.5 44.0 52.0
Formal employment 14.8 22.2 15.7 24.9
Informal employment 18.0 25.1 10.0 17.4
Unemployed 9.0 3.8 7.3 2.8
Inactive 9.2 4.5 10.9 6.9
Source: Author‘s own analysis o f  LFS and SGH, 1999
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APPENDIX 4:
ANNEXES RELATING TO CHAPTER 4
A4.1 Defining underemployment
According to the 1966 International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) resolution, 
underemployment ‘exists when a person’s employment is inadequate, in relation to specified 
norms or alternative employment, account being taken of his occupational skill (training and 
working experience)’ (Hussmanns, Mehran et al. 1990).
Two principal forms of underemployment are distinguished: visible underemployment, reflecting 
an insufficiency in the volume of employment; and invisible underemployment, characterised by 
low income, underutilisation of skill, low productivity and other factors. The 1982 ICLS 
resolution recognised, however, that ‘for operational reasons the statistical measurement of 
underemployment may be limited to visible underemployment’ (Hussmanns, Mehran et al. 1990).
Underemployment has particular relevance in developing and transition countries, notably in 
connection with agriculture. It has been observed that in many developing countries measured 
unemployment is consistently low. This is explained by various reasons, one of which is that a 
limited number of workers are covered by unemployment insurance or other social benefits. 
Under such conditions, very few people can afford to be unemployed for any period of time. The 
bulk of the population must engage at all times in some economic activity, however little or 
inadequate that may be. Although at the same time they may be seeking other or additional work, 
they will not be considered as unemployed. In such circumstances, the employment situation 
cannot be fully described by unemployment data alone and should be supplemented with data on 
underemployment.
According to the international definition, ‘persons visibly underemployed comprise all persons in 
paid or self-employment, whether at work or not at work, involuntarily working less than the 
normal duration of work determined for the activity, who were seeking or available for additional 
work during the reference period’ (Hussmanns, Mehran et al. 1990). This means that there are 
three criteria for identifying the visibly underemployed; (1) working less than normal duration; 
(2) doing so on an involuntary basis; and (3) seeking or being available for additional work 
during the reference period.
We wish to operationalise the above definition of visible underemployment for Georgia. As 
regards the first criterion, according to the resolution on statistics of hours of work adopted by the 
Tenth ICLS in 1962, normal hours of work for an activity should refer to the hours of work as
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fixed by national legislation. For persons not covered by such legislation, normal duration of work 
should be determined on the basis of usual practices for the activity. The use of a uniform 
conventional norm should be regarded as a last resort, only to be applied in the case of activities 
for which there is neither legislation nor usual practices regarding hours of work (Hussmanns, 
Mehran et al. 1990). The individual working hours should account for all activities that the person 
performed during the reference period, including any secondary activities. The Georgian Labour 
Code stipulates that the normal working period is fixed at 41 hours per week, 5 working days a 
week. Certain unhealthy or dangerous activities may have a working week of 36 hours. 126
The second criterion for identifying underemployment is the involuntary nature. Although we 
have no direct information as to whether those employed full-time are voluntarily working less 
than normal duration, we can exclude those who would typically be classified as voluntarily 
working less than normal hours. These include women with young children (under the age of 3), 
students and elderly workers (over the retirement age). We then assume that all others who are 
working less than normal hours do so involuntarily.
Finally, the third criterion ‘seeking or being available for additional work’ actually reinforces the 
involuntary nature of working short time. In fact, the two criteria can be considered as 
complementary or even somewhat overlapping (Hussmanns, Mehran et al. 1990). Moreover, we 
argue that this criterion is not necessarily very relevant in transition countries where the lack of 
formal work opportunities mean that people may have lost hope of finding an other or an 
additional job. This concept if analogous to that of the ‘discouraged unemployed’, who are 
considered unemployed despite the fact that they have not actively been searching for work as 
they have lost hope of finding a job.
We therefore operationalise ‘underemployment’ as consisting of all working-age individuals who 
are (1) employed full-time and (2) working for a total (in primary and multiple jobs) of less than 
41 hours per week. OR (1) employed part-time and (2) doing so involuntarily.
126 Georgia still has the Soviet Labour Code. A new labour code is currently being drafted but has yet to be submitted to 
Parliament for discussion.
A4.2 Tables relating to chapter 4
Table A4.1 Determinants o f  Unemployment, controlling fo r  the regional rate o f unemployment,
Probit results, 1999
Dependent variable: unemployed (dummy) Urban Rural
Individual Characteristics
Female -0.0207 -0.0047
(0.0091)** (0.0026)*
Age 15-25 0.2471 0.077
(0.0226)*** (0.0119)***
Age 26-45 0.0537 0.0241
(0.0121)*** (0.0051)***
Age 46-55 / /
Age 56+ -0.0523 -0.0259
(0.0135)*** (0.0041)***
Georgian 0.0145 0.0132
(0.0125) (0.0035)***
Education
Primary or Less 0.0019 0.0043
(0.0386) (0.0095)
Incomplete Secondary 0.0346 0.0134
(0.0282) (0.0071)*
General Secondary 0.0471 0.001
(0.0117)*** (0.0035)
Technical Secondary 0.0448 -0.0104
(0.0187)** (0.0045)**
High Technical 0.0338 0.0137
(0.0150)** (0.0055)**
High General / /
Regional Unemployment Rate (relaxed) 0.5768 0.4443
(0.0490)*** (0.0793)***
Observations 7990 12177
L.2.Chi2(K-l) 420.94(11)*** 418.62(11)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether an individual is unemployed.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(e) The sample for the regression is all individuals in the labour force.
(f) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value of the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(g) The unit of observation is the individual.
(h) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit o f the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on k-l degrees o f freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
x).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
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Table A4.2 Determinants o f Underemployment fo r urban wage employees, Probit results 1999.
Dependent variable: underemployed (dummy) using 41hrs pw using 35hrs pw
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.1298 0.0768
(0.0177)*** (0.0157)***
Age 15-25 -0.0141 0.0484
(0.0371) (0.0352)
Age 26-45 0.0018 0.0278
(0.0203) (0.0178)
Age 46-55 / /
Age 56+ 0.0591 0.0598
(0.0240)** (0.0226)***
Georgian 0.0179 -0.0007
(0.0247) (0.0223)
Education
Primary or Less -0.1308 -0.1873
(0.0820) (0.0380)***
Incomplete Secondary 0.0159 0.0915
(0.0671) (0.0676)
General Secondary -0.1154 -0.0326
(0.0218)*** (0.0186)*
Technical Secondary -0.1056 -0.0064
(0.0306)*** (0.0255)
High Technical -0.0807 -0.0222
(0.0249)*** (0.0206)
High General / /
Sector o f  Economic Activity
Agriculture, Fishing (A, B) -0.1646 -0.0286
(0.0503)*** (0.0442)
Manufacturing (D) 0.1179 0.1279
(0.0331)*** (0.0375)***
Electricity, Gas, Water Supply (E) 0.1167 -0.0115
(0.0484)** (0.0515)
Construction (F) 0.1713 0.129
(0.0428)*** (0.0538)**
Wholesale and retail trade (G) -0.0545 -0.0192
(0.0397) (0.0356)
Hotels, restaurants (H) 0.047 0.0743
(0.0665) (0.0684)
Transport, communication (I) f /
Financial intermediation, real estate (J, K) 0.1007 0.1345
(0.0393)** (0.0453)***
Public Administration and defence (L) 0.011 -0.0899
(0.0361) (0.0304)***
Education (M) 0.2967 0.4952
(0.0285)*** (0.0365)***
Health, social work (N) 0.1212 0.1146
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(0.0357)*** (0.0401)***
Other community and personal services (0 ) 0.2105 0.1096
(0.0355)*** (0.0453)**
Private Households with employees (P) 0.2733 0.4912
(0.0643)*** (0.0856)***
Other (C, Q) 0.1529 -0.192
Region
(0.0790)* (0.0389)***
Tblisi -0.1145 -0.186
(0.0400)*** (0.0301)***
Kakheti / /
Shida Kartli 0.1881 0.0223
(0.0412)*** (0.0405)
Kvemo Kartli 0.0985 -0.1364
(0.0439)** (0.0269)***
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.1282 -0.1039
(0.0565)** (0.0370)***
Achara -0.0327 -0.0586
(0.0448) (0.0331)*
Guria -0.0785 -0.1305
(0.0567) (0.0315)***
Samegrelo 0.0415 -0.0742
(0.0465) (0.0332)**
Imereti 0.2389 0.1344
(0.0371)*** (0.0435)***
Private -0.0209 0.0605
(0.0237) (0.0218)***
Observations 4305 4305
L.2Chi2(K-l.) 763.92(32)*** 995.55(32)***
Source: Author’s own analysis of LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether an individual is underemployed.
(d) Underemployment is defined as all working-age individuals who are (1) employed fiill-time and (2) working for a 
total (in primaiy and multiple jobs) of less than 41 (or 35) hours per week. OR (1) employed part-time and (2) doing 
so involuntarily (see Annex X. for details).
(e) The sample for the regression is the urban wage-employed.
(f) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value of the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(g) The unit of observation is the individual.
(h) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit of the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on k-l degrees o f freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
x).
(j) Letters in brackets refer to sector o f economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification o f all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(k) Category G also includes repair of motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting and business activities. 
Category C refers to mining and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
(1) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(m)Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
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A4.3 The system of social security in Georgia
The current social security system has three main components: the state social allowance, the 
unemployment benefit and the pay-as-you-go pension system.
The State Social Allowance was introduced in the beginning of 1998 to replace the family 
allowance. Whereas the family allowance had a wider coverage of vulnerable groups, the State 
Social Allowance only targets households comprised of non-working pensioners without a legal 
breadwinner. The allowance was fixed, by a Presidential decree of 10 February 2001, at GEL 22 
(US$11) for a one-member recipient household and GEL 35 (US$12.50) for a household of two 
or more (TACIS 2000, p.37). Not only are these amounts only a fraction of the official minimum 
subsistence level, but also the allowance is paid sporadically and the system is suffering from 
enormous payment arrears (TACIS 1999a, p.71). As a consequence, many pensioners continue to 
work, so as to meet basic needs, however for some these benefits are the only source of 
livelihood.
In 1998, the government also introduced a fixed Unemployment benefit. As mentioned in the 
discussion on the Employment Fund, in order to be eligible, the unemployed must be registered 
with an Employment Fund office. Not only is the registration procedure complex and time 
consuming, but also eligibility is limited to those who are unemployed involuntarily, performing 
no work whatsoever and having participated in the unemployment insurance programme for some 
time or otherwise entering the labour market for the first time. As of September 1998, the 
unemployment benefit is only payable for the first six months, and is purely symbolic at GEL 14 
(US$7) for the first two months, GEL 12 (US$6) for the next two months and GEL 11 (US$5.50) 
for the last two months. Moreover, as with the Social State Allowance, as a result of the chronic 
under collection of payroll tax, the unemployment benefits are suffering from constant arrears in 
payments (TACIS 1999a, p.71). As a consequence, it is not surprising that very few people bother 
to register with Employment Fund offices at all.
Georgia has introduced a pay-as you-go Pension System127. Pensions are fixed at GEL14 (US$7) 
for the majority of pensioners, GEL 18 (US$9) for war veterans’ widows and GEL 35-45 
(US$17.50-22.50) for war veterans and invalids. Despite the fact that the fixed-rate pension only 
represents 14.5% of the minimum subsistence level, GEL3 (US$1.50) is deducted at the source to 
pay for utilities, bringing the current pensions down to 11% of the poverty line (TACIS 2001. 
p.42).
127 In the pay-as-you-go pension system (common in western industrialised countries), the current employed pay for the 
current pensioners.
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The pensions are financed through the United State Social Safety Fund (USSSF). which is 
financed by payroll tax, with budgetary transfers to compensate for under-funding. The payroll 
tax is 26% of gross wages for budgetary organisations, 27% of gross wages for other 
organisations (to be paid by the employer), and an additional 1% of gross wages paid by 
employees. In addition, in an attempt to increase tax collection, the Government has introduced a 
payroll tax for the self-employed but as of yet there are no incentives to pay and no clear 
mechanisms to collect it.
As a result of the severe fiscal crisis, brought on by both non-collection and non-compliance, the 
system suffers from substantial payment arrears. In 1998-999, pension arrears amounted to GEL 
76 million (TACIS 1999a, p.72). In 1999-2000, more than two-thirds of pensioners suffered from 
arrears (TACIS 2001, p.42). Moreover, given the tight budgetary situation, the compensating 
budgetary transfers are hardly ever made. This places the Government in a difficult position. On 
the one hand it must expand payroll tax collection in order to finance social security, on the other, 
reducing the tax rate would serve as an incentive for those who are not paying to legalise their 
operations. The level of payroll tax is higher in Georgia than in most industrialised countries. The 
‘tax wedge’, which measures the total cost to the employer of the net salary received by the 
employee, is 1.66 for a gross monthly salary of GEL200. This means that the payroll tax increases 
the cost of labour to the employer by 66% (Yemtsov 2001, p. 16).
In addition to the high contribution rate and narrow contribution base, the replacement rate (the 
average pension as a percentage of the average wage) is only 20%. That is to say that the average 
pension is only 20% of the average employees monthly salary, which itself is only a fraction of 
the minimum subsistence level. Finally, institutional weakness and poor management have further 
crippled the system, resulting in insufficient collection of payroll tax, corruption, and a further 
aggravation of its financial difficulties.
The Government has taken steps to introduce a multi-pillar pension system consisting of three 
pillars: a universal state pension scheme, a mandatory private pension scheme and a voluntary 
private pension scheme. However it is unlikely that a significant portion of the population will be 
able to afford participation in the private schemes in the short or even medium term and it is 
therefore expected that the pay-as-you-go pillar will continue to be mandatory and significant for 
the majority of pensioners.
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APPENDIX 5:
ANNEXES RELATING TO CHAPTER 5
A5. Informal employment and informal sector employment in Georgia by gender 
and quarter
The typology of informal employment used in this chapter consists of the following categories: 
(1) informal non-agricultural self-employed; (2) informal farmers; (3) contributing family 
workers; (4) informal employees, (5) informal secondary jobholders; (6) others informally 
employed.
Below we present frequencies and rates of informal employment by gender and quarter. We 
further break down our categories of informal employment to isolate ‘informal sector 
employment’ as defined by the ILO (1993b).
The ILO (1993b) defines the informal sector as consisting of a subset of household 
unincorporated enterprises.
‘(1) The informal sector may be broadly characterised as consisting of units 
engaged in the production of goods or services with the primaiy objective of 
generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units 
typically operate at a low level of organisation, with little or no division between 
labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations- 
where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal 
and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.
(2) Production units of the informal sector have the characteristic features of 
household enterprises. The fixed and other assets used do not belong to the 
production units as such but to their owners. The units as such cannot engage in 
transactions or enter into contracts with other units, nor incur liabilities, on their own 
behalf. The owners have to raise the necessary finance at their own risk and are 
personally liable, without limit, for any debts or obligations incurred in the 
production process. Expenditure for production is often indistinguishable from 
household expenditure. Similarly, capital goods such as buildings or vehicles may 
be used indistinguishably for business and household purposes.’ (ILO 1993b, para.5)
Within the household sector, the informal sector comprises (i) ‘informal own-account enterprises’ 
and (ii) ‘enterprises of informal employers’. (1) Informal own-account enterprises are household 
enterprises with the characteristics described above, that are owned and operated by own-account 
workers, either alone or in partnership with members of the same or other households, which may 
employ contributing family workers and employees on an occasional basis, but do not employ 
employees on a continuous basis. ‘Enterprises of informal employers’ are household enterprises 
with the characteristics described above, owned and operated by employers, either alone or in
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partnership with members of the same or other households, which employ one or more employees 
on a continuous basis. (ILO 1993b, para 8,9).
We use location as a proxy for ‘household enterprise’.128 Therefore informal sector enterprises 
include enterprises owned and operated by own-account workers or employers whose business is: 
(1) located at home, outside home, in a street booth, on a construction site, in a market place, at a 
customer’s home or in a non-fixed location; (2) in a factory, office, establishment, shop, 
workshop, etc. which is independent from the home and is not registered, or (3) on a plot of land 
either in an urban area or in a non-registered rural agricultural enterprise.129
In order to isolate ILO informal sector employment from other informal employment, we break 
down our typology of informal employment into the following categories:
1. Own-account workers, producing for sale, barter, or for own consumption in informal 
sector enterprises.
2. Employers in informal sector enterprises.
3. Contributing family workers in informal sector enterprises.
4. Contributing family workers in non-informal sector enterprises.
5. Informal employees in informal sector enterprises.
6. Informal employees in non-informal sector enterprises.
7. Others employed in informal sector enterprises.
8. Others informally employed in non-informal sector enterprises (employed casually, 
temporarily or seasonally).
9. Informal members of producers’ co-operatives.
10. Formal employees in informal sector enterprise.
128 The ILO definition allows for the use of location as a proxy for household enterprises, when registration is irrelevant 
(as per ILO 1993b). In the Georgian Labour Force data, the question on registration is not particularly meaningful, as 
over 90% o f own-account workers said they were ‘registered’. However, qualitative research and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that this may refer to the payment o f some kind of local licence fee (to obtain a permit to sell in a market for 
instance), or to the payment of bribes to local police, sanitary inspectors, tax inspectors, and local racketeers. However, 
in none o f these cases does it refer to registration under national legislation as per ILO Ibid.. The ILO also suggests 
identifying informal (household)enterprises by the number o f employees (less than 4 - which is generally the lowest 
number used in such cases). However, this is also inappropriate, as over 97% of own-account workers and employers 
work in enterprises with less than 4 people, and it could be argued that this would also include professionals (doctors, 
lawyers, accountants) etc. who could have relatively high incomes and 'intentionally conceal their activities to avoid the 
payment of taxes.
129 The registration criterion is used for employers and own-account workers working in ‘non-household’ locations 
such as offices, factories, establishments, etc. (although they only represent 0.03% of total employment). Registration is 
also used to identify informal rural agricultural own-account workers and employers. This is because the data suggests 
that agricultural workers who say their enterprise is located ‘at home’ rather than ‘on a plot o f land’ are less likely to be 
registered. This suggests that these could be smaller, subsistence ‘garden plots’. We also include own-account workers 
and employers engaging in urban agriculture for similar reasons. Finally, note that we include production for own 
consumption, which is not included in the ILO definition.
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In terms of our typology; (1) informal non-agricultural self-employed & informal farmers are 
equal to category 1 plus 2 (farmers are included in figures ‘including agriculture’); (2) 
contributing family workers are equal to categories 3 plus 4; (3) informal employees are equal to 
categories 5 plus 6; (4) others informally employed are equal to the sum of categories 7 to 9; (5) 
informal secondary jobholders are included in each of the categories 1-9, depending on their 
status in the second job. Category 10; ‘formal employees in informal sector enterprises’ is 
included in the ILO informal sector employment definition, but not in our definition of informal 
employment.
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Table A5.1 All employed (weightedfrequencies) 1999
TOTAL C ategory o f Inform al Em ploym ent
Q u arter
I
Female
Population 
aged 15+
Total
Employed
Employed 
in IS
Total
Inform ally
employed
1. Own- 
account 
w orkers
2.Employers
inform al
sector
3,C ontributing
family
w orkers
inform al
sector
4.C ontributing 
family 
w orkers non- 
inform al 
sector
5.Inform aI
employees
inform al
sector
6,Inform al
employees
non-
inform al
sector
7,O thers
inform al
sector
8 .0 th e rs
inform ally
employed
non-
inform al
sector
9 Inform al 
producers 
co­
operatives
lO.Formal
employees
inform al
sector
1,632,536 830,520 160,991 457,707 58,685 1,981 55,591 289,234 22,581 22,933 5,881 298 523 16,722
Male 1,385,553 881,695 235,163 402,595 122,371 10,883 19,845 161,281 45,854 35,395 5,949 593 424 33,208
Unknown 27,396 13,135 2,757 5,716 725 156 443 2,959 1,433 0 0 0 0 217
Total 3,045,485 1,725,351 398,911 866,017 181,781 13,020 75,879 453,474 69,869 58,327 11,830 891 946 50,147
II
Female 1,660,478 872,510 169,102 512,274 51,672 1,667 65,995 337,629 27,671 19,748 6,526 296 1,071 16,975
Male 1,403,371 919,975 241,411 457,641 112,072 8,617 23,908 208,757 55,966 35,280 11,169 398 1,473 34,533
Unknown 19,932 10,761 3,392 6,159 1,196 156 1,472 2,554 568 213 0 0 0 0
Total 3,083,781 1,803,246 413,904 976,073 164,940 10,439 91,374 548,940 84,205 55,241 17,696 694 2,544 51,508
III
Female 1,678,489 875,717 178,568 501,818 60,764 2,426 64,832 319,102 30,321 19,473 4,589 209 102 16,283
Male 1,402,572 908,035 254,834 429,467 117,609 9,085 30,170 178,409 50,991 34,687 6,342 872 1,303 44,315
Unknown 14,841 8,385 2,836 5,585 1,369 0 311 2,581 913 168 242 0 0 0
Total 3,095,902 1,792,136 436,238 936,870 179,742 11,511 95,313 500,092 82,225 54,328 11,173 1,080 1,405 60,598
IV
Female 1,615,255 783,476 151,525 429,647 51,979 1,154 50,690 272,500 24,990 19,167 7,668 590 909 15,130
Male 1,338,729 814,081 237,138 393,189 102,892 11,647 21,894 157,904 55,396 32,317 9,787 389 962 37,653
Unknown 23,732 12,015 3,350 7,013 1,474 0 820 3,900 475 344 0 0 0 581
Total 2,977,716 1,609,572 392,014 829,849 156,345 12,801 73,404 434,304 80,861 51,828 17,455 979 1,871 53,364
Average 1999
Female
Male
1,646,690 840,556 165,047 475,361 55,775 1,807 59,277 304,616 26,391 20,330 6,166 348 651 16,277
1,382,556 880,947 242,137 420,723 113,736 10,058 23,954 176,588 52,052 34,420 8,312 563 1,040 37,428
Unknown 21,475 11,074 3,084 6,118 1,191 78 761 2,998 847 181 61 0 0 199
Total 3,050,721 1,732,576 410,267 902,202 170,702 11,943 83,993 484,203 79,290 54,931 14,538 911 1,691 53,904
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Table A5.2 All Employed (percentage o f total employment) 1999
TOTAL Category of Informal Employment
Quarter Population 
aged 15+
Total
Employed
Employed 
in IS
Total
Informally
employed
1.Own- 
account 
workers
2.Employers
informal
sector
3.Contributing
family
workers
informal
sector
4.Contributing 
family 
workers non- 
informal 
sector
S.Informal
employees
informal
sector
6.Informal
employees
non-
informal
sector
7,Others
informal
sector
8.0thers
informally
employed
non-
informal
sector
9 Informal 
producers 
co­
operatives
lO.Formal
employees
informal
sector
I Female nidi 50.87% 19.38% 55.11% 7.07% 0.24% 6.69% 34.83% 2.72% 2.76% 0.71% 0.04% 0.06% 2.01%
Male n/a 63.63% 26.67% 45.66% 13.88% 1.23% 2.25% 18.29% 5.20% 4.01% 0.67% 0.07% 0.05% 3.77%
Total n/a 56.65% 23.12% 50.19% 10.54% 0.75% 4.40% 26.28% 4.05% 3.38% 0.69% 0.05% 0.05% 2.91%
11 Female n/a 52.55% 19.38% 58.71% 5.92% 0.19% 7.56% 38.70% 3.17% 2.26% 0.75% 0.03% 0.12% 1.95%
Male nld. 65.55% 26.24% 49.74% 12.18% 0.94% 2.60% 22.69% 6.08% 3.83% 1.21% 0.04% 0.16% 3.75%
Total n/a 58.48% 22.95% 54.13% 9.15% 0.58% 5.07% 30.44% 4.67% 3.06% 0.98% 0.04% 0.14% 2.86%
III Female nidi 52.17% 20.39% 57.30% 6.94% 0.28% 7.40% 36.44% 3.46% 2.22% 0.52% 0.02% 0.01% 1.86%
Male nidi 64.74% 28.06% 47.30% 12.95% 1.00% 3.32% 19.65% 5.62% 3.82% 0.70% 0.10% 0.14% 4.88%
Total n/a 57.89% 24.34% 52.28% 10.03% 0.64% 5.32% 27.90% 4.59% 3.03% 0.62% 0.06% 0.08% 3.38%
IV Female n/a 48.50% 19.34% 54.84% 6.63% 0.15% 6.47% 34.78% 3.19% 2.45% 0.98% 0.08% 0.12% 1.93%
Male n/a 60.81% 29.13% 48.30% 12.64% 1.43% 2.69% 19.40% 6.80% 3.97% 1.20% 0.05% 0.12% 4.63%
Total n/a 54.05% 24.36% 51.56% 9.71% 0.80% 4.56% 26.98% 5.02% 3.22% 1.08% 0.06% 0.12% 3.32%
Average 1999 Female n/a 51.05% 19.64% 56.55% 6.64% 0.21% 7.05% 36.24% 3.14% 2.42% 0.73% 0.04% 0.08% 1.94%
Male n/a 63.72% 27.49% 47.76% 12.91% 1.14% 2.72% 20.05% 5.91% 3.91% 0.94% 0.06% 0.12% 4.25%
Total n/a 56.79% 23.68% 52.07% 9.85% 0.69% 4.85% 27.95% 4.58% 3.17% 0.84% 0.05% 0.10% 3.11%
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Table AS. 3 Non-agricultural employed (weighted frequencies) 1999
TOTAL Category of Informal Employment
Quarter
I
Female
Population 
aged 15+
Total
Employed
Employed 
in IS
Total
Informally
employed
l.Own-
account
workers
2.Employers
informal
sector
3.Contributing 
family workers 
informal sector
4.Contributing 
family workers 
non-informal 
sector
5. Informal 
employees 
informal 
sector
6.1nformal
employees
non-
informal
sector
7,Others
informal
sector
8,Others
informally
employed
non-
informal
sector
9 Informal 
producers 
co­
operatives
lO.Formal
employees
informal
sector
1,188,935 386,920 83,444 106,266 32,109 1,704 6,800 16,577 21,513 21,159 5,881 0 523 15,887
Male 965,316 461,458 157,868 171,067 67,664 9,112 1,617 11,146 43,703 31,452 5,949 0 424 32,443
Unknown 23,510 9,249 2,415 2,880 599 156 226 465 1,433 0 0 0 0 217
Total 2,177,761 857,627 243,727 280,212 100,373 10,972 8,644 28,188 66,650 52,610 11,830 0 946 48,547
II
Female 1,174,834 386,866 91,891 119,961 37,980 1,428 10,435 25,160 20,547 17,286 6,526 142 457 15,896
Male 930,511 447,115 158,667 174,030 65,581 8,461 1,750 14,806 44,073 28,542 10,119 398 299 32,240
Unknown 13,466 4,295 1,309 1,522 867 156 287 0 0 213 0 0 0 0
Total 2,118,810 838,276 251,867 295,513 104,428 10,045 12,472 39,966 64,620 46,041 16,645 540 756 48,136
III
Female 1,196,109 393,337 94,172 119,221 36,999 2,224 8,982 23,277 26,653 16,287 4,589 209 0 15,161
Male 940,039 445,502 167,394 167,788 66,682 8,580 2,399 12,089 43,867 25,973 6,204 691 1,303 41,635
Unknown 9,927 3,471 1,086 1,415 283 0 0 161 560 168 242 0 0 0
Total 2,146,075 842,309 262,651 288,423 103,965 10,804 11,381 35,527 71,081 42,429 11,035 900 1,303 56,796
IV
Female 1,209,122 377,343 82,912 104,970 33,916 1,154 5,149 18,542 21,586 16,541 6,583 590 909 14,524
Male 947,901 423,253 163,890 168,616 58,914 11,477 1,953 10,020 50,930 27,025 7,425 183 689 35,150
Unknown 17,142 5,424 1,656 1,873 600 0 0 454 475 344 0 0 0 581
Total 2,174,165 806,021 248,457 275,460 93,430 12,630 7,102 29,017 72,991 43,909 14,009 773 1,598 50,255
Average 1999
Female
Male
1,192,250 386,116 88,105 112,604 35,251 1,627 7,842 20,889 22,575 17,818 5,895 235 472 15,367
945,942 444,332 161,955 170,375 64,711 9,407 1,930 12,015 45,643 28,248 7,424 318 679 35,367
Unknown 16,011 5,610 1,616 1,923 587 78 128 270 617 181 61 0 0 199
Total 2,154,203 836,058 251,676 284,902 100,549 11,113 9,900 33,174 68,835 46,247 13,380 553 1,151 50,933
Source: author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999
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Table A5.4 Non-agricultural employed (percentage of total employment, 1999
TOTAL Category of Informal Employment
Quarter Population 
aged 15+
Total
Employed
Employed 
in IS
Total
Informally
employed
1.Own- 
account 
workers
2.Employers
informal
sector
3.Contributing
family
workers
informal
sector
4.Contributing
family
workers non- 
informal
sector
5.1nformai
employees
informal
sector
6.Informal
employees
non-
informal
sector
7,Others
informal
sector
8.0thers
informally
employed
non-
informal
sector
9 Informal 
producers 
co­
operatives
lO.Formal
employees
informal
sector
Female n/a 32.54% 21.57% 27.46% 8.30% 0.44% 1.76% 4.28% 5.56% 5.47% 1.52% 0.00% 0.14% 4.11%
Male n/a 47.80% 34.21% 37.07% 14.66% 1.97% 0.35% 2.42% 9.47% 6.82% 1.29% 0.00% 0.09% 7.03%
I Total n/a 39.38% 28.42% 32.67% 11.70% 1.28% 1.01% 3.29% 7.77% 6.13% 1.38% 0.00% 0.11% 5.66%
Female n/a 32.93% 23.75% 31.01% 9.82% 0.37% 2.70% 6.50% 5.31% 4.47% 1.69% 0.04% 0.12% 4.11%
Male n/a 48.05% 35.49% 38.92% 14.67% 1.89% 0.39% 3.31% 9.86% 6.38% 2.26% 0.09% 0.07% 7.21%
II Total n/a 39.56% 30.05% 35.25% 12.46% 1.20% 1.49% 4.77% 7.71% 5.49% 1.99% 0.06% 0.09% 5.74%
Female n/a 32.88% 23.94% 30.31% 9.41% 0.57% 2.28% 5.92% 6.78% 4.14% 1.17% 0.05% 0.00% 3.85%
Male n/a 47.39% 37.57% 37.66% 14.97% 1.93% 0.54% 2.71% 9.85% 5.83% 1.39% 0.16% 0.29% 9.35%
III Total n/a 39.25% 31.18% 34.24% 12.34% 1.28% 1.35% 4.22% 8.44% 5.04% 1.31% 0.11% 0.15% 6.74%
Female n/a 31.21% 21.97% 27.82% 8.99% 0.31% 1.36% 4.91% 5.72% 4.38% 1.74% 0.16% 0.24% 3.85%
Male n/a 44.65% 38.72% 39.84% 13.92% 2.71% 0.46% 2.37% 12.03% 6.38% 1.75% 0.04% 0.16% 8.30%
IV Total n/a 37.07% 30.83% 34.18% 11.59% 1.57% 0.88% 3.60% 9.06% 5.45% 1.74% 0.10% 0.20% 6.23%
Female n/a 32.39% 22.82% 29.16% 9.13% 0.42% 2.03% 5.41% 5.85% 4.61% 1.53% 0.06% 0.12% 3.98%
Male n/a 46.97% 36.45% 38.34% 14.56% 2.12% 0.43% 2.70% 10.27% 6.36% 1.67% 0.07% 0.15% 7.96%
Average 1999 Total n/a 38.81% 30.10% 34.08% 12.03% 1.33% 1.18% 3.97% 8.23% 5.53% 1.60% 0.07% 0.14% 6.09%
Source tables I to 8: author's own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1998, 1999.
Notes :tables 1 to 8:
(a) ‘Employed in IS’ refers to the total number employed in the Informal Sector as defined by the ILO (1993b). It is the sum o f categories 1,2,3,5,7,10.
(b) ‘Total Informally Employed’ refers to the total number o f individuals employed informally, both inside and outside the informal sector. It is the sum of categories 1-9.
(c) The yearly figures correspond to quarterly averages.
(d) The figures include individuals with a primary or secondaiy job in each category.
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Table A5.5 Informal sector and informal employment as share o f  total employment and total jobs
% of total Employment % of total Jobs
All Employed
In the IS 23.67% 23.28%
Total Informal employment/jobs 52.17% 50.30%
Non-agricultural 1 employed
In the IS 30.10% 28.41%
Total Informal employment/jobs 34.09% 32.44%
Source: author’s own analysis o f Georgia Labour Force Survey, 1999.
Notes:
(a) Total informal employment: total number of persons with either an informal primary job or an informal secondary
job.
(b) Total informal jobs: total number o f informal primary jobs plus total number o f informal secondary jobs.
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APPENDIX 6:
ANNEXES RELATING TO CHAPTER 6
Table A6.1 Average number o f  formal, informal, unemployed and inactive individuals per 
household by consumption quintile,
Georgia 1999 (percent)
Consumption Quintiles
Poorest 2 3 4 5
Formal 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Informal 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Unemployed 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8
Inactive 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
Source: Author’s own analysis o f  LFS1999 andSGHH1999.
Notes:
(a) The entries refer to the proportions of labour market categories in the different quintiles of the consumption 
distribution.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption (0=0.75).
(c) The average consumption levels per adult equivalent in Georgian Lari for formal employment, informal 
employment, unemployment, and inactivity are 98, 90,78 and 70 respectively.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
Table A6.2 Average number o f  household members employed by sector and consumption quintile 
Georgia 1999 (percent)
Consumption Quintiles
Poorest 2 3 4 5
Agriculture, fishing (A, B) 0.57 0.93 0.98 1.13 1.1
Manufacturing (D) 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10
Electricity, gas, water supply (E) 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Construction (F) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
Wholesale and retail trade (G) 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.10
Hotels, restaurants (H) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Transport, communication (I) 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
Financial intermediation, real estate, other 
business activities (J, K) 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Public administration and defense (L) 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10
Education (M) 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.11
Health, social work (N) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
Other community and personal service activities 
(O)
Private households with employees (P)
0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other (C, Q) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Source: Author’s own analysis of LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) The entries refer to the proportions of labour market categories in the different quintiles of the consumption
distribution.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption (0=0.75).
(c) The average consumption levels per adult equivalent in Georgian Lari for formal employment, informal 
employment, unemployment, and inactivity are 98, 90, 78 and 70 respectively.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(e) Letters in brackets refer to sector of economic activity according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (ILO 1989).
(f) Category G also includes repair of motor vehicles. Category K also includes renting and business activities. 
Category C refers to mining and quarrying and category Q refers to extra territorial organisations and bodies.
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Table A. 6.3 Determinants o f  poverty using number o f  informal, formal, unemployed and inactive
individuals, probit results.
Dependent variable: poor (dummy) Urban Rural
Demographic Characteristics
Region
Tblisi -0.0915 0
(0.0441)** 0
Kakheti / /
Shida Kartli -0.0009 -0.0856
(0.0534) (0.0216)***
Kvemo Kartli -0.1622 -0.0929
(0.0428)*** (0.0253)***
Samtskhe Javakheti 0.2473 0.0283
(0.0753)*** (0.0326)
Achara -0.2339 0.119
(0.0335)*** (0.0389)***
Guria 0.1814 -0.0637
(0.0730)** (0.0256)**
Samegrelo 0.128 -0.0836
(0.0573)** (0.0226)***
Imereti 0.2251 -0.029
(0.0542)*** (0.0261)
Gender of the Household Head (female=l) 0.0545 0.0416
(0.0238)** (0.0196)**
Age o f Household Head 0.004 -0.0078
(0.0045) (0.0030)***
Age squared of Household Head 0 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)**
Ethnic Background of Household Head 
Georgian / /
Azeri -0.2132 0.2522
(0.0985)** (0.0697)***
Abkhazian 0.0307 0.1091
(0.1501) (0.2529)
Greek 0.0125 -0.1005
(0.0850) (0.0755)
Ossetian 0.0531 0.0465
(0.0928) (0.0790)
Russian 0.1718 -0.0125
(0.0575)*** (0.0661)
Armenian 0.0412 0.14
(0.0409) (0.0499)***
Other 0.1188 -0.0696
(0.0799) (0.0718)
Number of adults 0.0233 0.0493
300
(0.0189) (0.0136)***
Number o f children aged less than 6 years 0.0808 0.0512
(0.0204)*** (0.0133)***
Number o f other children 0.0395 0.04
(0.0129)*** (0.0084)***
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less / f
Incomplete secondary -0.0302 0.0367
(0.0493) (0.0276)
General secondary -0.0333 -0.0005
(0.0358) (0.0233)
Technical secondary -0.0154 -0.0085
(0.0494) (0.0387)
High technical -0.0691 0.0069
(0.0397)* (0.0313)
High general -0.1512 -0.0537
(0.0350)*** (0.0271)**
Labour market Status
Number o f household members informally employed -0.1135 -0.0709
(0.0237)*** (0.0152)***
Number o f household members formally employed -0.0993 -0.0666
(0.0228)*** (0.0184)***
Number o f household members inactive 0.0047 -0.0133
(0.0198) (0.0154)
Number o f household members unemployed 0.0329 -0.0142
(0.0249) (0.0272)
Observations 2367 2568
L2 Chi2 (k-\.) 460.61(30)*** 215.11(29)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether a household’s consumption per equivalent adult is 
below the relative poverty line.
(d) The relative poverty line is set at 2/3 o f median consumption per adult equivalent.
(e) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value of the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(f) The unit of observation is the household and gender, education, and ethnicity, refer to the head o f household. 
Labour market status refers the number of household members in each labour market category.
(g) F  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(h) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit o f the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on k-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
x).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data
(k) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
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Table A6.4 Labour market categories and poverty incidence using World Bank and SDS
methodology
(1999)
Employment Poverty, in %  (WB poverty line)_________ Poverty, in % (SDS poverty line)
Categories of the Head Poverty Poverty Head Poverty Poverty
Household Head Count Gap Severity Count Gap Severity
Total 14.7 4.9 2.6 41.8 15.4 8.0
Formal
Employees 11.2 3.8 1.9 39.9 13.2 6.5
Self-employed 10.0 2.3 0.8 28.5 8.5 4.0
Farmers 6.9 2.8 2.0 26.0 8.6 4.5
Informal
Employees 9.9 2.8 1.2 42.5 12.7 5.7
Self-employed 8.2 2.8 1.6 31.8 10.2 4.9
Farmers 8.2 4.3 3.3 26.1 9.5 5.7
Contributing family 
workers 4.9 1.0 0.5 22.7 6.6 2.7
Unemployed 20.6 6.7 3.6 57.8 21.7 11.3
Inactive 24.4 8.0 4.1 55.8 22.9 12.4
Source: Author’s own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) WB Poverty line is set at GEL 55 (US$25) per equivalent adult per month.
(b) SDS Poverty line is set at GEL 100 (US$55) per equivalent adult per month.
(c) Consumption per equivalent adult is calculated using WB/SDS methodology: 0=0.54 and a =0.64 for children aged 
<7years; o=l for children aged 7-16 years; o=l for male adults aged 16-60 years; a=0.84 for female adults aged 16- 
60 years; ct=0.88 for male adults aged 60+; and o=0.76 for female adults aged 60+.
(d) Head Count is the share of household heads whose consumption falls below the poverty line.
(e) The poverty gap provides information on the distance from the poverty line. It captures the mean aggregate 
consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line across the poor population.
(f) Poverty Severity captures the inequality among the poor by effectively giving more weight to households that are 
further away from the poverty line,
(g) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
Table A6.5 Labour market categories and consumption using WB/SDS methodology, 1999
(percent)
Labour Market Status of the Consumption Quintiles
Household Head Poorest 2 3 4 5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Formal 23.9 31.2 35.5 40.1 44.3
Employees 15.8 20.2 20.1 20.1 21.6
Self-employed 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.4
Farmers 7.8 10.4 15.1 18.8 21.3
Informal 13.6 20.4 25.4 31.3 32.2
Employees 4.3 6.5 4.5 5.6 6.1
Self-employed 3.1 4.5 5.8 5.7 6.8
Farmers 2.3 3.3 4.8 7.8 4.5
Contributing family workers 3.9 6.2 10.2 12.2 14.7
Unemployed 9.7 8.4 6.1 4.1 4.0
Inactive 52.7 39.9 33.0 24.6 19.6
Source: Author's own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) The entries refer to the proportions of these labour market categories in the different quintiles o f the consumption 
distribution.
(b) The consumption measure is per capita adult equivalent household consumption calculated using WB/SDS 
methodology (see Notes to Table A. 1.6 above).
(c) The average consumption levels per adult equivalent in Georgian Lari for formal employment, informal 
employment, unemployment, and inactivity are 98,90, 78 and 70 respectively.
(d) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
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Table A6.6 Determinants o f  Household Consumption, OLS and Simultaneous Quantile Regression
Results using WB/SDS Methodology (Urban)
Dependent variable: natural logarithm Mean (OLS) Percentileso f consumption per adult equivalent 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Demographic Characteristics 
Region 
Tblisi 0.1596 0.1718 0.0497 0.0749 0.242 0.3206
(0.0575)*** (0.1260) (0.0656) (0.0550) (0.0766)*** (0.0852)***
Kakheti / / f / / /
Shida Kartli -0.0163 -0.0369 -0.1011 -0.006 0.0744 0.0914
(0.0667) (0.1462) (0.0999) (0.0692) (0.0717) (0.1004)
Kvemo Kartli 0.2883 0.1791 0.2024 0.272 0.4026 0.3777
(0.0675)*** (0.1497) (0.0893)** (0.0594)*** (0.0862)*** (0.0946)***
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.4304 -0.8114 -0.7012 -0.5623 -0.1136 0.0541
(0.0863)*** (0.1895)*** (0.1065)*** (0.0959)*** (0.1002) (0.1072)
Achara 0.444 0.5377 0.3836 0.425 0.4479 0.4404
(0.0658)*** (0.1368)*** (0.0579)*** (0.0628)*** (0.0666)*** (0.0856)***
Guria -0.2274 -0.2886 -0.3002 -0.21 -0.1647 -0.1936
(0.0823)*** (0.1099)*** (0.1177)** (0.0613)*** (0.0814)** (0.1123)*
Samegrelo -0.1518 -0.1957 -0.3342 -0.172 -0.0978 0.0146
(0.0666)** (0.1190) (0.0799)*** (0.0566)*** (0.0627) (0.1108)
Imereti -0.2526 -0.3113 -0.2756 -0.2719 -0.1656 -0.1855
(0.0633)*** (0.1364)** (0.0724)*** (0.0488)*** (0.0778)** (0.1018)*
Gender of Household Head (female=l) -0.0578 -0.037 -0.03 -0.0276 -0.0374 -0.1089
(0.0291)** (0.0587) (0.0461) (0.0351) (0.0378) (0.0594)*
Age o f Household Head -0.0112 -0.0113 -0.0074 -0.0186 -0.0171 -0.0176
(0.0054)** (0.0112) (0.0049) (0.0075)** (0.0065)*** (0.0086)**
Age squared o f Household Head 0 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)* (0.0000)* (0.0001)
Ethnic Background of Household Head 
Georgian / / / / / /
Azeri -0.0554 0.2017 0.0243 -0.1889 -0.2879 -0.2212
(0.1452) (0.1181)* (0.1160) (0.0973)* (0.2287) (0.2595)
Abkhazian 0.0716 0.1727 -0.1021 -0.2692 0.4054 0.3469
(0.1749) (0.2385) (0.1742) (0.3895) (0.5023) (0.4011)
Greek -0.0662 -0.046 -0.0365 -0.1592 -0.2032 -0.1693
(0.0932) (0.1545) (0.0718) (0.0454)*** (0.0999)** (0.1215)
Ossetian -0.1305 0.0755 -0.0352 -0.0889 -0.1635 -0.232
(0.1104) (0.2869) (0.1073) (0.0898) (0.1311) (0.1709)
Russian -0.2043 -0.2489 -0.2363 -0.2088 -0.2179 -0.142
(0.0632)*** (0.0941)*** (0.1351)* (0.0712)*** (0.0668)*** (0.0902)
Armenian -0.1183 -0.1281 -0.1933 -0.0624 -0.1162 -0.1484
(0.0491)** (0.0773)* (0.0801)** (0.0732) (0.0564)** (0.0962)
Other -0.0706 -0.094 -0.0753 -0.0664 -0.1082 -0.0161
(0.0940) (0.1503) (0.1256) (0.1274) (0.1438) (0.1628)
Number o f adults 0.0418 0.0584 0.0505 0.0445 0.0205 -0.0159
(0.0113)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0171)*** (0.0154) (0.0180)
Number of children aged 6 years or 0.0757 0.1129 0.0641 0.0722 0.0942 0.064
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less
(0.0251)*** (0.0333)*** (0.0321)** (0.0296)** (0.0367)** (0.0379)*
Number o f other children 0.0982 0.1218 0.1105 0.1045 0.076 0.0521
(0.0151)*** (0.0317)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0238)**
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less / / / / / /
Incomplete secondary 0.0573 0.0212 0.1306 0.1195 0.1547 0.0505
(0.0644) (0.1748) (0.0956) (0.0657)* (0.0767)** (0.1067)
General secondary 0.1116 0.1771 0.1472 0.1307 0.0763 0.0839
(0.0452)** (0.0981)* (0.0599)** (0.0522)** (0.0525) (0.1026)
Technical secondary 0.0396 0.1857 0.1271 0.0546 -0.0129 -0.0679
(0.0621) (0.1119)* (0.0680)* (0.0550) (0.0742) (0.1271)
High technical 0.1496 0.2537 0.1976 0.1655 0.0754 0.0846
(0.0532)*** (0.1371)* (0.0642)*** (0.0586)*** (0.0739) (0.1282)
High general 0.2667 0.3818 0.2991 0.2833 0.2027 0.1459
(0.0477)*** (0.0925)*** (0.0545)*** (0.0519)*** (0.0523)*** (0.1095)
Labour market Status o f Household 
Head
Formal employee / / / / / /
Formal self-employed 0.176 0.296 0.2444 0.1235 0.162 0.107
(0.0880)** (0.1762)* (0.0902)*** (0.0657)* (0.0835)* (0.1206)
Formal farmer -0.1673 0.3859 0.1289 -0.213 -0.3544 -0.659
(0.3023) (0.2066)* (0.0790) (0.1108)* (0.2035)* (0.2532)***
Informal employee -0.0942 -0.1 -0.0694 -0.1368 -0.1269 -0.1187
(0.0448)** (0.0543)* (0.0617) (0.0333)*** (0.0490)*** (0.0734)
Informal self-employed 0.1128 0.2599 0.1337 0.103 0.0427 0.0577
(0.0463)** (0.0478)*** (0.0496)*** (0.0427)** (0.0445) (0.0596)
Informal farmer 0.2845 0.3039 0.3508 0.2767 0.2385 0.1926
(0.0511)*** (0.0766)*** (0.0774)*** (0.0362)*** (0.0543)*** (0.0789)**
Contributing family worker 0.0018 0.1876 -0.0151 -0.1038 -0.0244 -0.0166
(0.0710) (0.1041)* (0.0529) (0.0482)** (0.0816) (0.1156)
Unemployed -0.1791 -0.1626 -0.2315 -0.2033 -0.1655 -0.1151
(0.0383)*** (0.0594)*** (0.0459)*** (0.0480)*** (0.0725)** (0.0775)
Inactive -0.1391 -0.2466 -0.2055 -0.1544 -0.1166 -0.0815
(0.0314)*** (0.0518)*** (0.0338)*** (0.0410)*** (0.0459)** (0.0578)
Constant 4.7409 3.8354 4.3042 4.9418 5.2981 5.7337
(0.1626)*** (0.3365)*** (0.1521)*** (0.2074)*** (0.1823)*** (0.2480)***
Observations 2357 2357 2357 2357 2357 2357
Adjusted-R2/Pseudo-R2 0.25*** 0.2013 0.1782 0.1639 0.1353 0.1156
F ratio (k-1, n-k) 24.49(34,2322)
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable is the natural log of consumption per adult equivalent.
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(d) Consumption per equivalent adult is calculated using WB/SDS methodology: 0=0.54 and a =0.64 for children aged 
<7years; a=l for children aged 7-16 years; a=l for male adults aged 16-60 years; a=0.84 for female adults aged 16- 
60 years; a=0.88 for male adults aged 60+; and o=0.76 for female adults aged 60+.
(e) Mean refers to the OLS regression.
(f) The quantile regressions were performed at the lOthe, 25th, 50th, 75lh and 90th percentiles.
(g) The unit o f observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour market status refer to the head 
o f household.
(h) F  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(j) F ratio (k-1, n-k) denotes the F-statistic with K -l, n-k degrees o f freedom, where k is the number o f independent 
variables in our model and n is the total number o f observations. This statistic is used to test the Null Hypothesis 
(Ho): p2=0 (see appendix A2.4 for details).
(k) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(1) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
Table A6.7 Determinants o f  household consumption, OLS and simultaneous quantile regression
results using WB/SDS methodology (rural)
Dependent variable: natural 
logarithm of consumption per adult Mean (OLS)
Percentiles
equivalent 10* 25th 50th 75*" 90th
Demographic Characteristics 
Region 
Tblisi 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Kakheti f f / / / /
Shida Kartli 0.2476 0.1894 0.2353 0.2866 0.2888 0.2679
(0.0456)*** (0.0840)** (0.0694)*** (0.0584)*** (0.0371)*** (0.0647)***
Kvemo Kartli 0.3258 0.2222 0.2588 0.2465 0.3349 0.4012
(0.0549)*** (0.0923)** (0.0730)*** (0.0644)*** (0.0615)*** (0.0465)***
Samtskhe Javakheti -0.1482 -0.5119 -0.1152 0.0181 0.153 0.1242
(0.0524)*** (0.2198)** (0.0926) (0.0458) (0.0598)** (0.0523)**
Achara -0.1401 -0.5588 -0.1897 0.0069 -0.0297 0.1121
(0.0538)*** (0.1404)*** (0.1139)* (0.0542) (0.0558) (0.0764)
Guria 0.1693 0.1586 0.1784 0.2214 0.1557 0.2278
(0.0521)*** (0.0697)** (0.0663)*** (0.0623)*** (0.0557)*** (0.0548)***
Samegrelo 0.2566 0.2522 0.2989 0.3126 0.2186 0.1895
(0.0479)*** (0.0900)*** (0.0758)*** (0.0493)*** (0.0416)*** (0.0574)***
Imereti 0.0619 0.0552 0.1115 0.1295 0.0534 0.1118
(0.0491) (0.0782) (0.0751) (0.0540)** (0.0399) (0.0667)*
Gender o f Household Head (female=l) -0.1364 -0.2048 -0.1756 -0.1153 -0.0888 -0.0453
(0.0304)*** (0.0478)*** (0.0366)*** (0.0231)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0416)
Age o f Household Head 0.0 i 97 0.0183 0.022 0.0187 0.0158 0.0028
(0.0054)*** (0.0108)* (0.0096)** (0.0058)*** (0.0071)** (0.0105)
Age squared of Household Head -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0
(0.0000)*** (0.0001) (0.0001)* (0.0000)** (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ethnic Background of Household Head 
Georgian / / / / / /
-0.4418 -0.6471 -0.4007 -0.2177 -0.2045 -0.2097
Azeri (0.0781)*** (0.2492)*** (0.1660)** (0.1174)* (0.1007)** (0.1529)
-0.2593 0.2561 -0.0619 -0.3473 -0.5824 -0.3915
Abkhazian (0.3123) (0.1624) (0.1907) (0.1563)** (0.2917)** (0.2630)
-0.3374 0.0332 -0.114 -0.2032 -0.4945 -0.3411
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Greek (0.1368)** (0.6863) (0.1414) (0.1056)* (0.1009)*** (0.2062)*
-0.0127 -0.4169 -0.0226 0.0945 0.0283 -0.076
Ossetian (0.1096) (0.2872) (0.2478) (0.1118) (0.0726) (0.0867)
0.171 0.432 0.229 0.248 0.3287 0.3188
Russian (0.1044) (0.2858) (0.1409) (0.1811) (0.1403)** (0.1444)**
0.0053 0.2471 0.051 0.0044 -0.1118 -0.2225
Armenian (0.0657) (0.1033)** (0.0933) (0.0592) (0.0660)* (0.0810)***
0.1467 0.5431 0.1778 0.0943 -0.0382 -0.1915
Other (0.1683) (0.1681)*** (0.2354) (0.1492) (0.1435) (0.1765)
0.0054 0.0437 0.0115 -0.0084 -0.0284 -0.0192
Number o f adults (0.0111) (0.0194)** (0.0154) (0.0104) (0.0152)* (0.0138)
0.0819 0.0448 0.0581 0.0747 0.0816 0.0879
Number of children aged 6 years or less (0.0232)*** (0.0347) (0.0371) (0.0224)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0345)**
0.0703 0.0964 0.0556 0.0498 0.0492 0.0369
Number of other children (0.0138)*** (0.0267)*** (0.0179)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0178)*** (0.0151)**
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less / f / / / /
Incomplete secondary -0.008 0.0353 -0.0196 0.0107 0.0131 0.0254
(0.0423) (0.0764) (0.0751) (0.0401) (0.0560) (0.0681)
General secondary 0.0297 0.0427 0.0473 0.0902 0.1015 0.0238
(0.0378) (0.0795) (0.0631) (0.0433)** (0.0381)*** (0.0531)
Technical secondary 0.073 0.0184 0.1565 0.1558 0.0669 -0.0141
(0.0642) (0.1415) (0.1234) (0.0567)*** (0.0473) (0.1027)
High technical 0.0681 0.0621 0.0955 0.0951 0.1279 0.133
(0.0502) (0.1157) (0.0822) (0.0478)** (0.0495)*** (0.0684)*
High general 0.2106 0.2353 0.1904 0.2505 0.24 0.1567
Labour market Status o f  Household 
Head
(0.0506)*** (0.1030)** (0.0826)** (0.0525)*** (0.0527)*** (0.0633)**
Formal employee / f / / / /
Formal self-employed 0.1406 0.3076 0.1145 0.0743 0.0808 0.1909
(0.1222) (0.3707) (0.1446) (0.2204) (0.1541) (0.1655)
Formal farmer 0.0591 0.0944 0.033 0.016 -0.0307 -0.0036
(0.0284)** (0.0899) (0.0472) (0.0269) (0.0317) (0.0510)
Informal employee 0.0445 -0.126 -0.0293 0.0094 -0.0119 0.0655
(0.0568) (0.0975) (0.0798) (0.0552) (0.0482) (0.1044)
Informal self-employed -0.0678 -0.1721 -0.1202 -0.1059 -0.0296 -0.0487
(0.0657) (0.1396) (0.0897) (0.0835) (0.0636) (0.0743)
Informal farmer -0.0618 0.0074 0.0022 -0.0214 -0.1298 -0.2158
(0.0499) (0.1013) (0.0660) (0.0454) (0.0512)** (0.0572)***
Contributing family worker 0.1463 0.117 0.0993 0.0833 0.0879 0.0836
(0.0364)*** (0.0475)** (0.0445)** (0.0421)** (0.0428)** (0.0525)
Unemployed -0.2422 -0.3782 -0.3837 -0.1254 -0.2155 -0.2764
(0.0749)*** (0.2233)* (0.2037)* (0.0995) (0.0449)*** (0.0631)***
Inactive -0.2387 -0.301 -0.2461 -0.2125 -0.1939 -0.1504
(0.0348)*** (0.0498)*** (0.0731)*** (0.0408)*** (0.0361)*** (0.0426)***
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Constant 3.9289 3.1436 3.5609 4.0062 4.5155 5.2442
(0.1698)*** (0.2852)*** (0.2839)*** (0.1868)*** (0.2048)*** (0.3079)***
Observations 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546
Adjusted-R2/Pseudo-R2 
F ratio (£-1, n-k)
0.13***
12.52(33,
2512)
0.1302 0.0774 0.0688 0.0688 0.74
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable is the natural log o f consumption per adult equivalent.
(d) Consumption per equivalent adult is calculated using WB/SDS methodology: 0=0.54 and a =0.64 for children aged 
<7years; a=l for children aged 7-16 years; a=l for male adults aged 16-60 years; o=0.84 for female adults aged 16- 
60 years; cc=0.88 for male adults aged 60+; and a=0.76 for female adults aged 60+.
(e) Mean refers to the OLS regression.
(f) The quantile regressions were performed at the lOthe, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.
(g) The unit of observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour market status refer to the head 
o f household.
(h) F  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(j) F ratio (k-1, n-k) denotes the F-statistic with K-l, n-k degrees o f freedom, where k is the number o f independent 
variables in our model and n is the total number o f observations. This statistic is used to test the Null Hypothesis 
(Ho): p2=0 (see appendix A2.4 for details).
(k) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(1) Definitions o f all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
Table A6.8 Determinants o f household consumption, probit regression results using WB/SDS
methodology, 1999
WB poverty line SDS poverty line
Dependent variable: poor (dummy) Urban Rural Urban Rural
Demographic Characteristics
Region
Tblisi -0.0404 -0.1101
(0.0327) (0.0508)**
Kakheti / / / f
Shida Kartli 0.0171 -0.0332 -0.0473 -0.145
(0.0428) (0.0132)** (0.0591) (0.0264)***
Kvemo Kartli -0.0442 -0.0583 -0.2235 -0.1617
(0.0344) (0.0123)*** (0.0543)*** (0.0303)***
Samtskhe Javakheti 0.2397 0.0569 0.1541 0.0393
(0.0806)*** (0.0270)** (0.0728)** (0.0393)
Achara -0.1097 0.0848 -0.3604 0.0702
(0.0220)*** (0.0306)*** (0.0435)*** (0.0408)*
Guria 0.1719 -0.0406 0.1485 -0.0644
(0.0727)** (0.0138)*** (0.0697)** (0.0341)*
Samegrelo 0.0962 -0.0428 0.1056 -0.1569
(0.0507)* (0.0126)*** (0.0581)* (0.0270)***
Imereti 0.0982 -0.0199 0.2016 -0.0426
(0.0480)** (0.0157) (0.0518)*** (0.0335)
Gender of Household Head (female=l) 0.0057 0.0322 0.0421 0.0869
(0.0170) (0.0134)** (0.0261) (0.0235)***
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Age o f Household Head 0.0069 -0.0006 0.0102 -0.0113
(0.0032)** (0.0024) (0.0050)** (0.0038)***
Age squared of Household Head 0 0 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)**
Ethnic Background of Household Head 
Georgian / / / /
Azeri 0 0.3008 0.0755 0.2266
(0.0000) (0.0826)*** (0.1266) (0.0664)***
Abkhazian 0.0157 0.0944 0.0566 0.1776
(0.1129) (0.2229) (0.1483) (0.2716)
Greek -0.0719 -0.0315 0.0513 -0.2001
(0.0440) (0.0511) (0.0810) (0.0744)***
Ossetian 0.1032 0.0566 0.0236 -0.0352
(0.0819) (0.0614) (0.0972) (0.0803)
Russian 0.1443 0.0116 0.1205 -0.0011
(0.0506)*** (0.0458) (0.0562)** (0.0801)
Armenian 0.0724 -0.0016 0.0928 -0.0944
(0.0340)** (0.0251) (0.0422)** (0.0422)**
Other 0.046 -0.0288 0.1204 -0.1622
(0.0651) (0.0376) (0.0783) (0.0755)**
Number o f adults -0.0338 -0.0152 -0.0209 -0.003
(0.0069)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0101)** (0.0082)
Number of children aged 6 years or less -0.0419 -0.0077 -0.0468 -0.0382
(0.0174)** (0.0096) (0.0224)** (0.0174)**
Number of other children -0.0485 -0.017 -0.089 -0.0338
(0.0101)*** (0.0059)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0104)***
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less / / / /
Incomplete secondary -0.0224 0.018 -0.0891 -0.0106
(0.0315) (0.0188) (0.0569) (0.0307)
General secondary -0.0361 0.0085 -0.0345 -0.0333
(0.0240) (0.0152) (0.0404) (0.0274)
Technical secondary -0.0229 -0.0158 -0.0095 -0.0493
(0.0324) (0.0223) (0.0563) (0.0436)
High technical -0.0375 -0.0052 -0.0381 -0.0508
(0.0260) (0.0188) (0.0477) (0.0342)
High general -0.1031 -0.0306 -0.1718 -0.13
(0.0220)*** (0.0150)** (0.0412)*** (0.0299)***
Labour market Status o f Household Head
Formal employee / / / /
Formal self-employed 0.0442 -0.0112 -0.1014 0.0401
(0.0671) (0.0409) (0.0832) (0.0930)
Formal farmer 0 -0.031 0.3223 -0.0522
Informal employee -0.0272
(0.0117)***
0.0043
(0.1815)*
0.1575
(0.0213)**
-0.0091
(0.0266) (0.0224) (0.0376)*** (0.0411)
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Informal self-employed -0.081 0.0201 -0.1006 0.0016
(0.0215)*** (0.0284) (0.0417)** (0.0474)
Informal farmer -0.1098 -0.0002 -0.1748 -0.0279
(0.0168)*** (0.0208) (0.0428)*** (0.0369)
Contributing family worker -0.0131 -0.03 0.0684 -0.0979
(0.0422) (0.0125)** (0.0635) (0.0247)***
Unemployed 0.0732 0.1006 0.1526 0.0734
(0.0276)*** (0.0428)** (0.0326)*** (0.0578)
Inactive 0.0821 0.0642 0.107 0.1099
(0.0197)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0276)*** (0.0272)***
Observations 2335 2546 2357 2546
L2 Chi2 (£-1) 434.94 (32)*** 202.18(33)*** 523.46 (34) 236.39 (33)
Source: Author’s own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes: •
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether a household’s consumption per equivalent adult is 
below die absolute poverty line.
(d) The World Bank poverty line is set at GEL55 (US$25). The SDS poverty line is set at GEL100 (US$50).
(e) Consumption per equivalent adult is calculated using WB/SDS methodology: 0=0.54 and a =0.64 for children aged 
<7years; a=l for children aged 7-16 years; a=l for male adults aged 16-60 years; a=0.84 for female adults aged 16- 
60 years; oc=0.88 for male adults aged 60+; and a=0.76 for female adults aged 60+.
(f) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value o f the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(g) The unit o f observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour market status refer to the head 
o f household.
(h) /  denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(j) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness of fit of the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on £-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
(x).
(k) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(1) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
Table A.6.9 Determinants o f  informal social protection (including in-kind transfers), probit
regression results, 1999
Dependent variable: receive informal social protection 
(including in-kind transfers) Urban Rural
Demographic Characteristics
Region
Tblisi -0.1467
Kakheti
(0.0498)***
/ /
Shida Kartli -0.1444 -0.337
(0.0574)** (0.0326)***
Kvemo Kartli -0.1117 -0.1557
(0.0591)* (0.0464)***
Samtskhe Javakheti 0.153 -0.1316
(0.0686)** (0.0440)***
Achara -0.2102 -0.39
(0.0555)*** (0.0314)***
309
Guria -0.0711 -0.0307
(0.0718) (0.0458)
Samegrelo -0.1527 -0.2831
(0.0573)*** (0.0362)***
Imereti 0.0284 -0.2775
(0.0547) (0.0371)***
Gender o f the Household Head (female=l) 0.0211 0.0745
(0.0327) (0.0349)**
Age o f Household Head -0.0123 -0.0088
(0.0049)** (0.0048)*
Age squared of Household Head 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000)** (0.0000)
Marital Status o f Household Head 
Single 0.0213 0.0101
(0.0477) (0.0573)
Divorced or Separated 0.0177 -0.1055
(0.0515) (0.0684)
Widow(er) 0.0395 -0.0209
(0.0371) (0.0370)
Ethnic Background o f Household Head 
Georgian / /
Azeri -0.0629 -0.4864
(0.1242) (0.0280)***
Abkhazian -0.0476
Greek
(0.1527)
-0.2181 -0.3029
(0.0772)*** (0.0875)***
Ossetian -0.0871 0.2353
(0.0936) (0.0754)***
Russian 0.053 0.2919
(0.0531) (0.0709)***
Armenian -0.048 -0.2346
(0.0428) (0.0489)***
Other -0.1212 0.0788
(0.0804) (0.1500)
Number o f adults -0.0291 -0.0396
(0.0099)*** (0.0099)***
Number o f children aged less than 6 years 0.0273 -0.0339
(0.0217) (0.0200)*
Number o f other children 0.032 -0.013
(0.0133)** (0.0121)
Household Consumption 0.0208 -0.0044
(0.0180) (0.0174)
Education Level o f  Household Head
Primary or less / /
Incomplete secondary -0.0261 -0.1312
(0.0560) (0.0363)***
General secondary -0.1232 -0.1275
(0.0394)*** (0.0328)***
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Technical secondary -0.0989 -0.0618
(0.0544)* (0.0554)
High technical -0.0942 -0.0396
(0.0469)** (0.0437)
High general -0.1038 -0.0467
(0.0421)** (0.0436)
Labour Force Status o f  Household Head
Formal employee
Formal self-employed -0.0893 0.0274
(0.0749) (0.1006)
Formal farmer 0.037 0.1088
(0.2501) (0.0243)***
Informal employee 0.1712 0.1484
(0.0337)*** (0.0456)***
Informal self-employed 0.0391 0.0076
(0.0389) (0.0569)
Informal farmer -0.012 -0.0832
(0.0441) (0.0426)*
Contributing family worker 0.0249 -0.1158
(0.0591) (0.0306)***
Unemployed 0.1714 0.0977
(0.0302)*** (0.0615)
Inactive 0.1863 0.141
(0.0261)*** (0.0291)***
Observations 2357 2542
L2 Chi2 (k-l) 222.08 (38)*** 491.50 (36)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether a household receives informal social protection, 
including in-kind transfers (gifts o f food and non-food items). Informal social protection is: alimony, money 
received from non-family members from abroad, inheritance or other money received from relatives, money 
borrowed from a private source for household needs, and gifts (monetary) received from family members 
temporarily abroad.
(d) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value of the variables for 
continuous variables and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummies.
(e) Household consumption is the log o f consumption per equivalent adult.
(f) The unit of observation is the household and gender, education, ethnicity, and labour force status refer to the head of 
household.
(g) F denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(h) Unemployed refers to ILO relaxed criterion definition.
(i) L2 Chi2 (K-l) refers to the likelihood ratio used to test the goodness o f fit of the model and is compared to a Chi2 
distribution on k-\ degrees of freedom, where k is the number o f independent variables in our model (see appendix 
x).
(j) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(k) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
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A6.1 Working Pensioners
As we have seen, a considerable share of individuals above retirement age is employed in 
Georgia. This is a consequence of the very low levels of pensions and the extensive arrears in 
their payment. Pensions are fixed at GEL 14 (US$7) with a GEL3 (US$1.50) deduction at the 
source to pay for utilities, which amounts to only 11% of the poverty line (TACIS 2001. p.42). 
Moreover, as a result of the severe fiscal crisis, the system suffers from substantial payment 
arrears, and in 1999-2000, more than two-thirds of pensioners suffered from arrears (TACIS 
2001, p.42).
As a result, we are not surprised to find that almost one half of all individuals above the 
retirement age are employed.130 As table 14 demonstrates, 49% of pensioners work and 
80% of those who work also receive a pension. As we have seen, the large majority of 
working pensioners are involved in small-plot farming. These results suggest that 
subsistence agriculture may be playing an important role in generating livelihoods in the 
absence of a functioning pension system.
Table A6.9.1 Share ofpensioners that work and that receive a pension, 1999 (percent)
Employment Status o f Pensioners All Receive Pension (% within groups)
Employed 49 80
Not employed 51 91
Total 100
Source: Author's own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
Notes:
(a) Pensioner refers to individuals above retirement age (60 yrs. for females, 65 yrs. for males).
(b) Receive a pension refers to whether the household receives a pension.
We wish to examine in more detail the determinants of pensioner employment status. More 
specifically, we are interested in the impact of (a) receiving a pension and (b) household welfare, 
on the probability of a pensioner being employed. We use a probit model for the probability of a 
pensioner being employed. Technical details on probit analysis are presented in appendix 2.2.
We specify the following regression model:
E'rPX&u,
where E* is the underlying continuous, unobserved, latent variable. A" is a vector of individual 
characteristics, including gender, ethnic identity and region, as well as human capital
130 Retirement age is 60yrs for females and 65 years for males.
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characteristics, household characteristics (including household consumption per equivalent adult 
and whether the household received a pension in the last month).131 Consumption per equivalent 
adult is calculated by adjusting household consumption for economies of scale using 0=0.75 (see 
section 1 and appendix A2.3 for details). A brief definition of the variables used can be found in 
appendix A2.2. is the parameter vector to be estimated and the unit of analysis (/') is the 
individual. The unobservable error term ui is defined as having E(w)=0 and Yai(u)=o3
The observed variable is Eh £,=1 if a household is poor and E Y r0 otherwise. £, is related to E*t 
in the following way: if £*/>0, we observe Et= 1 otherwise we observe £,=0.
The probit model is therefore defined as:
Prob(£,=l)= ?Tob(fiXi+Uj>0)
-  Prob(u>-fiX)
= 1-0 (-fiXZc)
= O ifix/d)
Where 0(.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis we assume 
that u follows a normal distribution. The resulting coefficients have been converted to marginal 
effects for ease of interpretation and are reported in table 15.
First, we can see that, everything else being equal, the receipt of a pension is associated with a 
significant negative impact on the probability of a pensioner being employed. Indeed the 
probability that a pensioner will work decreases by 17% if the household receives a pension. This 
suggests that it is not just the low level of benefits that is pushing pensioners to work, but also that 
some individuals above retirement age are not receiving pensions at all and are therefore forced to 
work. Indeed 98% of individuals above retirement age who do not receive a pension work.
Second, we find a significant positive association between household welfare and the probability 
of a pensioner being employed. However, we must be very cautious when interpreting these 
results, as the direction of the causality is not necessarily clear (i.e. does the level of household 
welfare determine whether a pensioner is employed or does the fact that a pensioner is employed 
determine household welfare?). Our results show that the higher the level of consumption per 
equivalent adult, the higher the probability of pensioners being employed, although the magnitude
131 Information regarding the receipt of pensions is collected at the household level.
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of the coefficient is very small. These results suggest that households with employed pensioners 
have a higher level of welfare, everything else being equal, than those with inactive pensioners.132
Table 15 also reveals that female pensioners are significantly less likely to be employed, ceteris 
paribus, than male pensioners. Moreover, we see that location is also a very important factor in 
determining whether or not pensioners are employed. In particular we see th^t living in rural areas 
increase the probability of being employed by 36%. This result indicates that access to land is one 
of the main factors in determining whether or not pensioners are employed. We also see that 
living in certain depressed regions, everything else being equal, significantly increases the 
probability of being employed. Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe Javakheti are two regions that are 
particularly associated with higher probability of pensioner employment. As we have seen in 
chapter 5, these two regions are also associated with high levels of poverty and informal 
employment. Finally, it is interesting to note that higher education is significantly associated with 
an increased probability of pensioners being employed. Table 15 shows that, relative to 
pensioners with higher education, all other pensioners (except those with technical secondary 
education) are significantly less likely to be employed.
In general these findings show that the inadequacy of the pension benefit system, both in terms of 
coverage and level of benefits, is pushing pensioners into employment to meet basic needs. 
Pensioners largely engage in agricultural activities, which appear to be a very important source of 
livelihoods and are associated with an increase in household welfare.
132 As previously discussed, this result could also be due to the fact that pensioners are largely employed in agriculture 
and that agricultural households tend to have higher levels of consumption per equivalent adult. However it is unclear to 
what extent these findings are determined by the methodology used to impute consumption o f own production.
Table A6.9.2 Determinants o f  working pensioners, probit results, 1999.
Dependent variable: working pensioner (dummy)
Individual Characteristics
Female -0.0833
Georgian
(0.0144)***
0.0043
Region
Tblisi
(0.0204)
-0.1577
Kakheti
(0.0278)***
/
Shida Kartli -0.1036
Kvemo Kartli
(0.0253)***
0.1331
Samtskhe Javakheti
(0.0271)***
0.1144
Achara
(0.0304)***
-0.0758
Guria
(0.0327)**
0.0474
Samegrelo
(0.0294)
-0.1266
Imereti
(0.0261)***
-0.0027
Rural
(0.0253)
0.3638
Education 
Primary or Less
(0.0155)***
-0.1281
Incomplete Secondary
(0.0230)***
-0.0717
General Secondary
(0.0235)***
-0.0624
Technical Secondary
(0.0206)***
0.0511
High Technical
(0.0375)
-0.0745
High General
(0.0288)***
/
Household Characteristics
Household Received a Pension Last Month -0.1735
Household Consumption
(0.0179)***
0.0021
Observations
(0.0001)***
6652
L.R.Chi2(d.f.) 1890.37(18)***
Source: Author's own analysis o f  LFS 1999 and SGHH 1999.
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Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in brackets.
(b) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using two-tailed tests.
(c) The dependent variable for the probability model is whether an individual of pensionable age is employed. 
Pensionable age is 60 for females and 65 for males.
(d) The coefficients refer to the marginal effects in percentages, computed at the average value o f the variables for b
(e) Household consumption is the log o f consumption per equivalent adult.
(f) Consumption per equivalent adult is calculated using 0=0.75 and cc=l. See Chapter 6 section 1.3 for details.
(g) The unit o f observation is the individual. Consumption and receipt o f pension refer to the household.
(h) / denotes variables omitted in the estimation (base categories).
(i) Analysis carried out using unweighted data.
(j) Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix A2.2.
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